印度尼西亚伊斯兰圣战运动:小组织,大计划
印度尼西亚伊斯兰圣战运动:小组织,大计划
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Report 204 / Asia

印度尼西亚伊斯兰圣战运动:小组织,大计划

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执行摘要

在印度尼西亚,暴力极端主义正日渐体现出小团体独立行动的趋势,虽然它们的活动时常受到大型伊斯兰圣战组织的鼓动。导致这一现象的部分原因是印尼政府执法有效,逮捕了大批伊斯兰教祈祷团、唯一真主游击队和其它被控涉及恐怖活动组织的成员,并削弱了它们的组织基础。但另一部分原因是圣战分子的观念有所改变:他们从“团体”圣战转而倾向于“个人”圣战,由于造成大规模伤亡的袭击也可能误杀穆斯林,他们转而倾向于低成本、小规模的有针对性谋杀。2011年4月15日发生在一处警察局清真寺的自杀性爆炸袭击及三月中旬邮寄到雅加达的一批信件炸弹都是这一观念转变的典型体现。印尼政府急需建立预防措施来降低此类小组织继续涌现的可能性。

“团体”圣战的提倡者和小组织的支持者观念有所不同,前者认为如果没有大规模集团和强有力领袖,圣战运动将一事无成。而且如果圣战运动的最终目的是建立伊斯兰国家,那么获取公众拥护将是必不可少的条件。伊斯兰教祈祷团和唯一真主游击队一类组织目前暂且减少了暴力活动,转而通过寻求解决能让目标受众产生共鸣的问题来建立群众基础。这意味着圣战分子日趋将注意力从外国“敌人”转到本地“敌人。”在他们的目标中,被视作压迫者的官员(尤其是警察)、基督教徒和伊斯兰教支系“阿赫默迪亚”派教徒首当其冲。这还意味着这些圣战组织更愿意与非圣战组织结盟。

大小两股伊斯兰圣战力量相辅相成:大型组织可以为宗教对外联络活动提供资金,从而帮助小组织吸纳新成员;大型组织还可以提供人员来翻译和传播从极端网站下载的支持小组织理念的英文或阿拉伯文材料;大型组织可以在韬光养晦的同时为小组织提供掩护,而且与其保持足够距离来与暴力行径脱清干系。

该报告将对2009至2010年间在苏门答腊岛的棉兰和楠榜及爪哇岛的万隆和克拉登涌现的小型暴力组织做详细的案例分析。所有这些组织都至少有一名成员为刑满释放人员;四个组织中有三个同唯一真主游击队有关联但不受其控制并独立活动。四个组织中有三个以清真寺为据点组织了学习小组,而这些小组此后演变成刺杀小分队。这些组织都一心从事秘密暗杀,而且贫穷都不是驱使它们走上激进道路的主要因素。

关于这些组织的信息只是在它们的成员遭逮捕后才为人所知。由此引发的疑问是:在印尼全国还有多少类似的小集团在警方一无所知的情况下活动,而只有在成功实施谋杀后才被发现?

在执法系统外实施预防措施至关重要。新组建的国家反恐署将在制定和测试这些措施中起重要作用,但所有的举措必须以扎实研究为基础并且从其它国家的成败中吸取经验和教训。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2011年4月19日

Executive Summary

Violent extremism in Indonesia increasingly is taking the form of small groups acting independently of large jihadi organisations but sometimes encouraged by them. This is in part a response to effective law enforcement that has resulted in widespread arrests and structural weakening of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and other organisations accused of links to terrorism. But it is also the result of ideological shifts that favour “individual” over “organisational” jihad and low-cost, small-scale targeted killings over mass casualty attacks that inadvertently kill Muslims. The suicide bombing inside a police station mosque on 15 April 2011 and a spate of letter bombs delivered in Jakarta in mid-March are emblematic of the shift. The government needs urgently to develop prevention strategies to reduce the likelihood that more such groups will emerge.

Unlike the small group proponents, advocates of “organisational” jihad believe that nothing can be accomplished without a large organisation and a strong leader, but if the ultimate goal is an Islamic state, then it is imperative to build public support. Rather than engage in violence, groups like JI and JAT are focused for the moment on building up a mass base, by finding issues that resonate with their target audience. Increasingly this means a greater focus on local rather than foreign “enemies”, with officials who are seen as oppressors, particularly the police; Christians; and members of the Ahmadiyah sect topping the list. It also means a greater willingness than in the past to join coalitions with non-jihadi groups.

The two strands of jihadism are complementary. The larger organisations can fund the religious outreach that attracts potential recruits for the small groups. They can also provide the translators and distributors for material down­loaded from extremist websites in Arabic or English that buttress the small group approach. They can maintain plausible deniability for acts of violence while trying to rebuild their ranks, while at the same time providing the cover under which small groups emerge.

The report looks at detailed case studies of small violent groups that have emerged in Indonesia in 2009 and 2010 in Medan and Lampung, on Sumatra, and in Bandung and Klaten, on Java. All involved at least one former prisoner; three of the four had links to JAT but operated independently of JAT control. Three of the four also involved mosque-based study groups that evolved into hit squads, and all were committed to the idea of ightiyalat, secret assassinations. In none of them was poverty a significant driver of radicalisation.

Information about these groups is only available because their members were caught. This raises the question of how many similar small groups operating under police radar exist across Indonesia that will only come to light when one of their murderous attempts succeeds.

Prevention strategies that go beyond law enforcement are critical, and the new National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) has an important role to play in designing and testing them. All such strategies, however, must be based on well-grounded research and informed by serious study of what has and has not worked elsewhere.

Jakarta/Brussels, 19 April 2011

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