印度尼西亚伊斯兰圣战运动:小组织,大计划
印度尼西亚伊斯兰圣战运动:小组织,大计划
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Report 204 / Asia

印度尼西亚伊斯兰圣战运动:小组织,大计划

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执行摘要

在印度尼西亚,暴力极端主义正日渐体现出小团体独立行动的趋势,虽然它们的活动时常受到大型伊斯兰圣战组织的鼓动。导致这一现象的部分原因是印尼政府执法有效,逮捕了大批伊斯兰教祈祷团、唯一真主游击队和其它被控涉及恐怖活动组织的成员,并削弱了它们的组织基础。但另一部分原因是圣战分子的观念有所改变:他们从“团体”圣战转而倾向于“个人”圣战,由于造成大规模伤亡的袭击也可能误杀穆斯林,他们转而倾向于低成本、小规模的有针对性谋杀。2011年4月15日发生在一处警察局清真寺的自杀性爆炸袭击及三月中旬邮寄到雅加达的一批信件炸弹都是这一观念转变的典型体现。印尼政府急需建立预防措施来降低此类小组织继续涌现的可能性。

“团体”圣战的提倡者和小组织的支持者观念有所不同,前者认为如果没有大规模集团和强有力领袖,圣战运动将一事无成。而且如果圣战运动的最终目的是建立伊斯兰国家,那么获取公众拥护将是必不可少的条件。伊斯兰教祈祷团和唯一真主游击队一类组织目前暂且减少了暴力活动,转而通过寻求解决能让目标受众产生共鸣的问题来建立群众基础。这意味着圣战分子日趋将注意力从外国“敌人”转到本地“敌人。”在他们的目标中,被视作压迫者的官员(尤其是警察)、基督教徒和伊斯兰教支系“阿赫默迪亚”派教徒首当其冲。这还意味着这些圣战组织更愿意与非圣战组织结盟。

大小两股伊斯兰圣战力量相辅相成:大型组织可以为宗教对外联络活动提供资金,从而帮助小组织吸纳新成员;大型组织还可以提供人员来翻译和传播从极端网站下载的支持小组织理念的英文或阿拉伯文材料;大型组织可以在韬光养晦的同时为小组织提供掩护,而且与其保持足够距离来与暴力行径脱清干系。

该报告将对2009至2010年间在苏门答腊岛的棉兰和楠榜及爪哇岛的万隆和克拉登涌现的小型暴力组织做详细的案例分析。所有这些组织都至少有一名成员为刑满释放人员;四个组织中有三个同唯一真主游击队有关联但不受其控制并独立活动。四个组织中有三个以清真寺为据点组织了学习小组,而这些小组此后演变成刺杀小分队。这些组织都一心从事秘密暗杀,而且贫穷都不是驱使它们走上激进道路的主要因素。

关于这些组织的信息只是在它们的成员遭逮捕后才为人所知。由此引发的疑问是:在印尼全国还有多少类似的小集团在警方一无所知的情况下活动,而只有在成功实施谋杀后才被发现?

在执法系统外实施预防措施至关重要。新组建的国家反恐署将在制定和测试这些措施中起重要作用,但所有的举措必须以扎实研究为基础并且从其它国家的成败中吸取经验和教训。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2011年4月19日

Executive Summary

Violent extremism in Indonesia increasingly is taking the form of small groups acting independently of large jihadi organisations but sometimes encouraged by them. This is in part a response to effective law enforcement that has resulted in widespread arrests and structural weakening of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and other organisations accused of links to terrorism. But it is also the result of ideological shifts that favour “individual” over “organisational” jihad and low-cost, small-scale targeted killings over mass casualty attacks that inadvertently kill Muslims. The suicide bombing inside a police station mosque on 15 April 2011 and a spate of letter bombs delivered in Jakarta in mid-March are emblematic of the shift. The government needs urgently to develop prevention strategies to reduce the likelihood that more such groups will emerge.

Unlike the small group proponents, advocates of “organisational” jihad believe that nothing can be accomplished without a large organisation and a strong leader, but if the ultimate goal is an Islamic state, then it is imperative to build public support. Rather than engage in violence, groups like JI and JAT are focused for the moment on building up a mass base, by finding issues that resonate with their target audience. Increasingly this means a greater focus on local rather than foreign “enemies”, with officials who are seen as oppressors, particularly the police; Christians; and members of the Ahmadiyah sect topping the list. It also means a greater willingness than in the past to join coalitions with non-jihadi groups.

The two strands of jihadism are complementary. The larger organisations can fund the religious outreach that attracts potential recruits for the small groups. They can also provide the translators and distributors for material down­loaded from extremist websites in Arabic or English that buttress the small group approach. They can maintain plausible deniability for acts of violence while trying to rebuild their ranks, while at the same time providing the cover under which small groups emerge.

The report looks at detailed case studies of small violent groups that have emerged in Indonesia in 2009 and 2010 in Medan and Lampung, on Sumatra, and in Bandung and Klaten, on Java. All involved at least one former prisoner; three of the four had links to JAT but operated independently of JAT control. Three of the four also involved mosque-based study groups that evolved into hit squads, and all were committed to the idea of ightiyalat, secret assassinations. In none of them was poverty a significant driver of radicalisation.

Information about these groups is only available because their members were caught. This raises the question of how many similar small groups operating under police radar exist across Indonesia that will only come to light when one of their murderous attempts succeeds.

Prevention strategies that go beyond law enforcement are critical, and the new National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) has an important role to play in designing and testing them. All such strategies, however, must be based on well-grounded research and informed by serious study of what has and has not worked elsewhere.

Jakarta/Brussels, 19 April 2011

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.

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