Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Report 188 / Asia

巴布亚的激进化与对话

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印度尼西亚最东部的巴布亚省在2009年经历了政治暴力高潮,这种政治暴力一直持续到了2010年。导致政治暴力的一个因素是武装分子在中央高地的活动有所增加。这些武装分子中的大多数是西巴布亚全国委员会(Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB)的成员。他们认定,根本不能寄希望于通过和平的方式实现其主要目标——举行全民公决决定巴布亚省能否独立。因此一些人宣扬暴力,并在某些情况下直接参与暴力行动。他们的策略受到许多巴布亚人的谴责,但他们发出的讯息却在巴布亚人中间产生了广泛的共鸣,其所表达的挫折也真实存在。如果精心准备巴布亚领导者和中央政府官员之间的对话,就有可能解决一些长期存在的不满,并且不会损害印尼的主权。

西巴布亚全国委员会(KNPB)产生于1998年苏哈托政权下台后在巴布亚愈演愈烈的主张独立的学生运动。在各种联盟分化和重组的过程中,由一群大多接受过高等教育的学生组成的全国委员会(KNPB)逐渐凸显。他们信奉激进的左翼意识形态,视自己为革命者,与印度尼西亚政府和靠近蒂米卡的强大的自由港铜金矿公司作战。委员会逐渐增强的战斗性导致了两个主要后果:他们更加接近在高地的进行同样活动的组织——自由巴布亚运动(Tentara Pembebasan Nasional/Organisasi Papua Merdeka, TPN/OPM)游击队组织;委员会成员逐步意识到实现其理想的唯一希望在于向世界展示巴布亚正经历危机——这意味着更明显的冲突示威。

2009年暴力冲突上升的部分原因是由于当年是选举年,投票成为暴力活动的关注焦点。另外,国外的活动——尤其是2008年10月一个后来被称为西巴布亚国际国会议员(IPWP)的小型组织的成立——也鼓舞了激进的活动家,促使他们相信更多的国际支持可以改变国内的政治态势。4月份立法选举期间,在省会查亚普拉(Jayapura)和阿贝普拉德(Abepura)大学区发生的几起暴力事件可直接归因于西巴布亚全国委员会(KNPB)。此外,委员会成员也可能通过与当地自由巴布亚运动(TPN/OPM)指挥官戈里亚特•塔布尼(Goliat Tabuni)的沟通和协调,帮助鼓动了查亚峰高地地区的暴力冲突。

而在发生暴力的其它地区,全国委员会(KNPB)在它显然没有直接作用的时候声称对事件负责,如占领蒙巴拉莫•拉亚(MamberamoRaya)县卡帕索村的简易机场。在过去八个月中,发生在巴布亚的最引人注目的暴力事件是发生在自由港连接蒂米卡(Timika)和谭巴架佩亚(Tembagapura)城镇的主要矿区道路沿线的一系列枪击事件,目标是自由港或者准军事警察的车辆,如机动旅。巴布亚内外的许多人认为安全部队本身应对此负责,因为安全部队扩大规模,从而使得他们在蒂米卡寻求租用车辆的机会也有所增多。而危机组织则相信有充足的理由认为,自由巴布亚运动(TPN/OPM)涉嫌指挥其中的一个或多个行动,因为其声称对其中一些事件而非全部袭击负责,而目击者的证言也能证实这一点。但这些暴力事件仍有可能存在多方参与,用巴布亚人的说法就是“分而食之”。

暴力与西巴布亚全国委员会(KNPB)活动的结合,已经成功地提升了巴布亚在国内和国际的受关注度,并且也增加了巴布亚领导人与雅加达之间为解决冲突所涉及的一系列问题进行对话的可能性。不过,通往双边对话的道路充满陷阱,并且双方之间存在着诸多不信任以及对话的潜在破坏者。中央政府的许多人都认为,任何关于非经济问题的讨论,如关于更高自治权或历史恩怨的讨论,只会加速推动巴布亚的独立并阻碍产生积极的改变。不仅当地政府曾经发生“巴布亚化”并且声称要致力于加速发展,而且警察逐渐代替了军队,成为应对分裂活动的前头兵。

一些巴布亚活动家认为,对话应当只在有国际调停的参与和政治残局未得以解决的情况下才能进行,而不是在巴布亚接受自治而最终不取得独立的情况下。即便是那些认同印尼主权的人,他们中间也有一部分人认为雅加达的一贯作风就是只做出口头承诺,却不付诸实施。所以如果雅加达同意进行对话,那么这只是它的一种公共关系手段,而非确实有改变现状的意图。但西巴布亚全国委员会(KNPB)的激进运动证明了政治不满长期发展下去的危险性。此外,尽管许多巴布亚精英并不赞同KNPB的战术,KNPB的讯息所产生的共鸣超过了它那原本较小的规模可以带来的影响。一个由巴布亚知识分子和印尼科学研究所(Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, LIPI)的研究学者提出的联合倡议勾勒出了可能构成双边对话基础的路线图,这可能是最卓有成效并能结束冲突的选择。如果要实现该路线图,就需要承认解决巴布亚冲突不只需要发展经济(尽管发展经济是至关重要的),它还需要从印尼总统苏西洛•班邦•尤多约诺那里得到公众支持。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2010年3月11日

Indonesia’s easternmost province of Papua saw an upsurge in political violence in 2009, continuing into 2010. One factor was the increased activity of militant activists from the central highlands, many of them members of the West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB). They decided there was no longer any hope of achieving their main objective – a referendum on independence – through peaceful means, and led some to advocate violence and in some cases directly participate in violent acts. Their tactics are decried by many Papuans, but their message resonates widely, and the frustrations they articulate are real. A dialogue between Papuan leaders and central government officials, if carefully prepared, offers the possibility of addressing some longstanding grievances, without calling Indonesian sovereignty into question.

The KNPB had its origins in the growth of pro-independence student activism in Papua following the fall of Soeharto in 1998. As various coalitions formed and fissured, KNPB emerged as a group of mostly university-educated students and ex-students who adopted a militant left-wing ideology and saw themselves as revolutionaries, fighting the Indonesian state and the giant Freeport copper and gold mine near Timika. There were two main consequences to their increased militancy. They moved closer to their highland counterparts in the guerrilla army of the Free Papua Movement (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional/
Organisasi Papua Merdeka, TPN/OPM) and they increasingly saw that the only hope of achieving their cause lay in showing the world that Papua was in crisis – and that meant more visible manifestations of conflict.

Violence rose in 2009 in part because it was an election year, and the polls provided a focus for action. It was also because activities abroad – particularly the establishment in October 2008 of a then tiny group called International Parliamentarians for West Papua (IPWP) – encouraged the militant activists to believe that more international support could change the political dynamics at home. Several violent incidents in the provincial capital Jayapura and the university suburb of Abepura in April, around the time of legislative elections, are directly attributable to the KNPB. Its members may also have helped spur violence in the highland district of Puncak Jaya, through communication and coordination with the local TPN/OPM commander, Goliat Tabuni.

In other areas where violence took place, the KNPB either claimed responsibility when it apparently had no direct role, as in the occupation of an airstrip in the village of Kapeso in Mamberamo Raya. The most dramatic violence in Papua over the last eight months has been the series of shootings along Freeport’s main mining road linking the towns of Timika and Tembagapura, aimed at either Freeport vehicles or those of the paramilitary police, Brimob. Many inside and outside Papua believe the security forces themselves are responsible as a way of increasing their numbers and therefore their rent-seeking opportunities in Timika. Crisis Group believes there is a stronger case to be made for the involvement of one or more TPN/OPM commands, because of statements claiming responsibility for some but not all of the attacks and various witness testimonies. But the possibility remains that multiple parties were involved, in what the Papuans refer to as “one plate, two spoons”.

The violence, combined with the activities of the KNPB, has succeeded in raising the profile of Papua both at home and abroad, and has increased interest in the possibility of dialogue between Papuan leaders and Jakarta on a range of issues aimed at resolving the conflict. The path toward dialogue is full of pitfalls, and there are potential spoilers and much distrust on both sides. Many in the central government believe that any discussion of non-economic issues such as greater autonomy or historical grievances will only fuel the push for independence and obscure the positive changes taking place. Not only has there been “Papuanisation” of local government and a commitment to accelerated development, they argue, but the police have gradually replaced the military as the front line of response to separatist activity.

Some Papuan activists believe that dialogue should only take place with international mediation and with the political endgame left open, rather than accepting autonomy and not independence as final. Even some of those who accept Indonesian sovereignty as a given believe that Jakarta has a history of promising but not delivering, and that if it does agree to dialogue, it will be as a public relations effort without any intention of changing the status quo. But the radicalisation of the KNPB is proof of the dangers of leaving political grievances to fester. Moreover, though many of the Papuan elite disagree with its tactics, the KNPB’s message resonates more widely than its small numbers would suggest.

A joint initiative of Papuan intellectuals and researchers at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, LIPI) to outline a road map that would form the basis of a dialogue between the two sides is potentially the most fruitful option on the table to end the conflict. If it is to succeed, it will require acknowledgment that the solution for Papua is more than just economic development, though that is critically important. It will also need public backing from Indonesia’s president, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Jakarta/Brussels, 11 March 2010

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.

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