icon caret Arrow Down Arrow Left Arrow Right Arrow Up Line Camera icon set icon set Ellipsis icon set Facebook Favorite Globe Hamburger List Mail Map Marker Map Microphone Minus PDF Play Print RSS Search Share Trash Crisiswatch Alerts and Trends Box - 1080/761 Copy Twitter Video Camera  copyview Youtube
缅甸转型过程中的黑暗面: 反穆斯林暴力事件
缅甸转型过程中的黑暗面: 反穆斯林暴力事件
Myanmar: Humanitarian Crisis and Armed Escalation
Myanmar: Humanitarian Crisis and Armed Escalation
Report 251 / Asia

缅甸转型过程中的黑暗面: 反穆斯林暴力事件

  • Share
  • Save
  • Print
  • Download PDF Full Report

执行摘要

继2012年若开邦族群之间爆发致命冲突之后,反穆斯林暴力事件已经蔓延到缅甸其他地区。由于缅甸国内对穆斯林积怨已深,安保力量又应对无力,意味着冲突有可能进一步扩大。除非政府做出有效反应,同时扭转社会上的态度,否则暴力可能会继续蔓延,影响缅甸的转型进程,并危及其在本地区以及国际上的地位。

暴力冲突发生的背景是,缅族佛教徒的民族主义情绪日益高涨,由僧侣发动的倡导不宽容和抵制穆斯林商业的“969”运动的影响力逐步扩大。这两个因素构成一个危险的组合:多年独裁统治下民众压抑已久的巨大挫败感和愤怒情绪,现在被一个披着宗教地位和道德权威外衣的民粹政治力量所引导,将矛头指向了穆斯林。

反印度和反穆斯林的暴力事件在缅甸屡见不鲜。这些问题的根源是该国的殖民历史和人口组成,以及在此背景下缅族民族主义的兴起。在随后的几十年里,致命的暴力事件在缅甸各地时有发生。然而,极权统治的废除和现代通信的普及,都意味着暴力蔓延的风险大大增加。

缅甸最受歧视的人口是若开邦北部地区的穆斯林罗兴亚人。他们中的大多数都被剥夺了公民权,在人身自由方面也受到严格限制,同时强加于他们的还有许多残暴严苛的政策。2012年6月和10月,若开邦的佛教徒和穆斯林之间爆发冲突,导致近200人死亡,约14万人流离失所,其中绝大多数为穆斯林。直到今天那里的族群之间实质上仍处于相互隔离状态,人道主义形势相当严峻。

2013年初,暴力活动蔓延至缅甸中部。最严重的事件发生在密铁拉市,某个店铺里发生的一起争端引发了反穆斯林暴力冲突:一名佛教僧侣被残酷杀害,导致局势迅速升级,多达1000名暴徒在持续两天的骚乱中给穆斯林社区带来了大范围的破坏,造成至少44人死亡,其中包括在某伊斯兰学校的一场屠杀中丧生的20名学生和几名老师。

警方的应对一直饱受缅甸国内以及国际舆论的诟病。若开邦的警察几乎全由若开佛教徒组成,据称他们无力制止针对穆斯林的袭击,有的还被指控参与了暴力活动。一旦部署了军队来实施行动,军队的表现会更好一些。密铁拉市的警察显然无力控制那些聚集在店铺外面的愤怒民众,当冲突迅速升级时,警察无可救药地陷入寡不敌众的境地,无法采取有效措施。

缅甸的暴力冲突对本地区也产生了影响。乘船离开若开邦,历经千辛万苦前往本地区其他国家的穆斯林人数一直在急剧增加,引发了其中一些国家公众的谴责之声。随着缅甸佛教徒在马来西亚被杀害、其他国家发生相关的暴力冲突,种族间的紧张局势也蔓延至缅甸边界之外。缅甸还一直受到圣战的威胁,一直以来也都还有针对缅甸或针对本地区佛教人物的阴谋和袭击。缅甸准备在2014年接手成为东南亚国家联盟(东盟)轮值主席国,暴力冲突可能会成为一个严重的政治问题。

缅甸政府明白这一问题利害攸关。吴登盛总统公开阐明了暴力的危害性,并宣布对暴力事件采取“零容忍”态度。警方的应对已有所改善,能够更快、更有效地采取干预措施,更迅速地控制暴力事件。尽管有所延迟,但犯下这些罪行的肇事者都被起诉和判刑,然而也存在这种担心,那就是对佛教徒的处理有时会较为宽大。

然而,还有更多的工作亟待处理。除了加强警察的防暴训练和升级其装备外,有必要对警察服务进行更广泛的改革,使包括来自少数民族和信仰少数派宗教等在内的警察的服务更高效,更取信于民,尤其是在族群层面。现在万事才刚刚开头。政府和全社会也必须作出更大的努力,打击在公共场合、媒体和网上发布的极端偏激言论。缅甸正处于历史性的改革开放关键时期,绝不能因为狭隘和偏执而功亏一篑。

仰光/雅加达/布鲁塞尔, 2013年10月1日

Commentary / Asia

Myanmar: Humanitarian Crisis and Armed Escalation

Ethnic armed conflict, the ongoing Rohingya crisis and thriving illegal business are preventing Myanmar from solving the country’s protracted conflicts. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2019 for European policymakers, Crisis Group urges the EU to sustain aid and diversify its peacebuilding initiatives.

The Rohingya crisis continues to take a heavy toll on the nearly one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, Rohingya remaining in Myanmar, and Myanmar’s international reputation, and remains a significant barrier to peace. No durable solution is on the horizon for the refugees, most of whom are in crowded camps exposed to health and natural disaster risks. Muslims remaining in Rakhine State suffer increasingly entrenched conditions of apartheid, with limited access to essential services and livelihoods. The human catastrophe on both sides of the border represents a major threat to peace and security. The ethnic Rakhine are also on a collision course with Naypyitaw, particularly over the detention and potential high treason conviction of a key Rakhine leader. This has undermined the Rakhine population’s confidence in politics and is driving broad support for the Arakan Army insurgency, which has sharply escalated attacks and threatens to tip the state into prolonged armed conflict. Elsewhere, in the north east, armed conflict has eased due to the unexpected declaration by the military on 21 December of a unilateral ceasefire in Shan and Kachin States. However, clashes between ethnic armed groups continue, the peace process remains moribund, and insecurity is exacerbated by increasingly lucrative opportunities for armed groups in drug production, human trafficking, and a range of other illicit activities.

The EU and its member states can help to address this complex set of challenges by:

  • Continuing to fund the humanitarian appeal for Rohingya camps in Bangladesh and stepping up development aid to host communities. This is the best way to give greater dignity to refugees and limit space for actors with other agendas, potentially including those promoting violence.
     
  • Providing humanitarian and development support that takes into account the differentiated needs of men, women, girls, and boys from all ethnic and religious groups in Rakhine State. Delivery of this support should avoid entrenching segregation or reinforcing apartheid policies, and should be sensitive to past human rights abuses some have suffered, including sexual and gender-based violence.
     
  • Remaining engaged with Myanmar while continuing to support international accountability measures. Disengagement and isolation will not bring positive change and will likely exacerbate the structural factors underlying Myanmar’s multiple crises.
     
  • Establishing sectoral exemptions if it decides to revoke Myanmar’s access to the Everything But Arms trade preferences scheme, which provides Least Developed Countries with tariff- and quota-free access to EU markets. Revoking the scheme in its entirety would harm hundreds of thousands of low-income garment industry workers, mostly young women who would lose their jobs, potentially further impoverishing their families and leaving these women at heightened risk of trafficking and exploitation.
     
  • Diversifying its support to peacebuilding initiatives aimed at ending Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts. This support should aim to protect civilians, assist conflict-affected communities and de-escalate rising levels of violence, including in Rakhine State.

Deadlock in the Peace Process and a New Escalation in Rakhine State

While international condemnation helped avert Bangladesh’s planned forcible repatriation of some Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar in November 2018, the risk remains that Dhaka could revive the process or force refugees to relocate to a remote island. Uncertainty about their future is feeding fear and desperation among the refugees, creating fertile ground for potential militancy. No long-term solution is in sight. Safe, dignified and voluntary repatriation is a distant prospect, third-country resettlement is extremely unlikely for all but a tiny proportion of refugees (and currently blocked even for small numbers), and the Bangladeshi government continues to resist local integration.

In Rakhine State, living conditions for the Rohingya that were already dire are worsening. Myanmar’s government is making no concerted effort to implement the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State – it has taken some steps on health, education and development, but made no progress on guaranteeing freedom of movement, citizenship and other fundamental rights. Nor has it made progress on holding accountable those responsible for crimes committed during the Myanmar army’s expulsion of the Rohingya following militant attacks in October 2016 and August 2017, which a UN report has said merits investigation for genocide. The government is moving forward tentatively with closing camps for displaced Muslims but without granting the freedom of movement necessary to access services and livelihood opportunities, thereby reinforcing a situation of apartheid and leaving the population indefinitely reliant on humanitarian assistance. Repression and poverty are fuelling a new wave of dangerous boat journeys from Rakhine State across the Bay of Bengal to Malaysia and Indonesia; desperation in the Bangladesh camps is prompting Rohingya refugees to attempt the same route.

At the same time, deadly coordinated attacks by the Arakan Army, an ethnic Rakhine insurgent group, on four police posts in northern Rakhine on 4 January – Myanmar’s Independence Day – will have a major impact in Rakhine State and the country as a whole. Beyond the immediate escalation in clashes this will bring, and the added complications for addressing the plight of the Rohingya, the attacks portend something significant and dangerous for the longer term: a shift in Rakhine popular sentiment away from politics toward armed insurgency as the means of addressing their grievances. This shift threatens to plunge the state into serious and sustained armed conflict for the first time in decades. The popular perception that politics has failed comes in part from the fact that, although a Rakhine political party won a large majority of elected seats in 2015, Naypyitaw imposed a minority National League for Democracy government; subsequently the top Rakhine political leader was arrested for high treason and remains on trial facing a possible death sentence.

Myanmar’s patchwork of local conflicts and grievances of ethnic minorities against the central state now have a dangerous accelerant through the illicit economy.

In the restive north of the country, even with the military’s unilateral ceasefire, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s government will likely struggle to reinvigorate the moribund peace process for ending Myanmar’s multiple internal ethnic armed conflicts. This is due to a loss of trust on all sides, resistance from the military and government to meaningful concessions on minority rights and greater devolution of power, and the fact that political dynamics ahead of the 2020 elections further narrow the administration’s room for manoeuvre. Armed conflict in Shan State has eased as a result of the unilateral ceasefire, although clashes between competing Shan factions continue; this will enable the military to focus more attention and firepower on the escalating conflict in Rakhine State.

Myanmar’s patchwork of local conflicts and grievances of ethnic minorities against the central state now have a dangerous accelerant through the illicit economy. Revenues from illegal businesses (including drug production, gem and wildlife smuggling, gambling, money laundering and racketeering) now contribute to funding and sustaining the civil war. A toxic political economy based on organised crime and corruption fosters local resentment and enormous disincentives against ending conflicts.

Moving Beyond the Status Quo

The EU should take steps in three areas. First, it should re-evaluate its approach to the Rohingya crisis. More than six years on from the initial segregation of Muslim communities in Rakhine State, the government has shown no sign of reintegrating them – rather, it has opted for an ever more entrenched system of segregation. The EU and others providing humanitarian assistance in such a context are an important lifeline for these communities, but must ensure that they take a principled approach and keep the parameters of assistance under close review to ensure they are not inadvertently reinforcing the government’s discriminatory practices. For example, the Rohingya camps in central Rakhine are not classic internally displaced persons camps but, rather, internment camps, and policy approaches must start from a recognition of this. This dynamic presents a dilemma to which there is no easy answer: withdrawing humanitarian support from this population would negatively impact on vulnerable people; continuing support as camps transition to semi-permanent confinement sites could amount to complicity in longer-term ghettoisation. The only way forward for the EU and other humanitarian actors is to continuously assess their approach and the evolving context to ensure they are minimising harm.

The EU should avoid a blanket revocation of Myanmar’s access to the Everything But Arms trade preferences scheme.

The EU should continue its vital support to the camps in Bangladesh while also continuing to push for accountability for those responsible for violence against the Rohingya. Domestic processes such as the government-appointed Commission of Enquiry are not credible; this leaves international mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court, and the UN-established body charged with preparing case files for future criminal proceedings, as the most likely route through which perpetrators could be held to account.

Second, the EU should avoid a blanket revocation of Myanmar’s access to the Everything But Arms trade preferences scheme. Such a move would have a catastrophic impact on many workers, particularly girls in the garment industry, without doing anything to punish the perpetrators of crimes in Rakhine State and elsewhere, who should be the focus of the EU’s actions in this regard. Hurting vulnerable workers would damage the EU’s reputation in Myanmar and beyond, and hamper its ability to engage with the government and other actors for no positive gain.

Last, the EU has a leading role on Myanmar’s peace process, having been a key donor since its inception. While the EU should continue to support the stalled negotiations, it should also make a realistic assessment of prospects for success, particularly as the country heads to elections in 2020. Redirecting EU funds to local initiatives could have a greater impact than support to the formal process at national level. Recognising that no imminent end to the armed conflicts is in sight, funds should go toward de-escalation efforts, peacebuilding and protecting civilians. The EU should also extend support to the Anti-Corruption Commission and related initiatives. Such support could strengthen government efforts toward combating organised crime, including drug production and human trafficking, which are rampant in conflict-affected areas and help fuel those conflicts.