Report 261 / Asia

缅甸:若开邦的政治

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执行摘要

 若开邦当下情势混杂了一系列恶性因素,其中包括根源深长的中央政府与边陲地区的紧张关系、针对穆斯林少数族裔的社群间及宗教间的严重冲突、以及极端贫困和发展欠缺。这引发了2012年的大规模暴力事件以及随后爆发的零星冲突。政治气氛已然处于高温状态,并可能随着缅甸2015年底全国大选的逼近而继续升高。若开邦的形势对缅甸政治转型的整体成功形成了重大威胁,并在政府亟需国际支持和投资之际,使其声誉严重受损。制定任何政策方案的前提是意识到任何简单办法或者快捷途径是不存在的。若开邦所面临的问题根源于数十年的武装暴力、威权统治以及国家——社会冲突。这场危机已经波及全邦以及其中的所有社群。化解危机需要一个持续和多角度的解决方案,并需要在过渡时期提供至关重要的人道主义和保护性干预。

 对若开邦局势的失败处理将会造成全国性影响。缅甸正在将自身重塑为一个与各少数民族和平相处、尊重多元化的更加开放的社会,狭隘且歧视性民粹主义的萌芽将会成长为巨大祸根,为政治解决数十年武装冲突,包括建立一个联邦国家,造成严重困难。

 若开邦最大的族群是信奉佛教的若开族,穆斯林在少数民族中为数不少,其中包括得不到缅甸政府和若开邦承认的罗兴亚人。国际上趋向于将若开族一概视为暴力极端主义分子,而忽略族群内存在的多种观点、忽视若开族本身也是一个长期受压迫的少数民族这一事实、并且很少试图去理解他们的想法和顾虑。这样的态度显然于事无补,因为其强化了若开族四面受敌的心态,并且将复杂现实简单模糊化,而对这一现实的准确把握是寻求可持续解决方案的必要条件。

 与缅甸其他少数民族类似,若开族人的积怨源于长期遭受政府歧视、对本民族事务缺乏政治控制、经济边缘化、人权受侵犯以及在语言和文化表达上受到的限制。然而若开族人积累了数十年的怨愤已经开始变形。自从向新政府的转型以来,在重建社区和重新树立民族身份的过程中,许多若开族人日益将人口数量对比视为最直接和明显的威胁,并由此担心将在自己本邦中成为少数民族。且不论有理与否,此类担忧在若开族社群中无疑十分强烈。

 多年来,穆斯林社群在社会和政治生活中被日益边缘化,而罗兴亚人受害尤甚。很多人长期得不到完整的公民权利,致使生存手段和生活水平严重受损。目前有人正试图通过立法剥夺他们的公民权,此举可能成为导火索。罗兴亚人视公民身份为仅存的与政治的联系纽带和影响政治的手段,失去了公民权,他们很可能得出政治大门已经关闭的结论,并可能由此走向非暴力反抗,甚至有组织暴力的路径。

 缅甸政府当下应对方案的核心包括一个核实无身份证明的穆斯林的公民身份的试点项目,以及一个在更大范围内应对政治、安全和发展问题的“行动计划”,但两者都存在严重问题。政府和若开族人社区拒绝使用“罗兴亚人”这个名称,罗兴亚人同样强烈地反对“孟加拉人”这个称呼,这成了一个死结。这一问题还未得到解决,对穆斯林人的公民身份核实项目就已经开始进行,大部分罗兴亚人可能采取抵制。

 行动计划设想将被授予公民权的人迁移到新的定居点,而非返回他们原本的家园,此举有可能会强化种族隔离。那些被确定为非公民,或拒不接受核实的人,可能会在达成解决方案前不得不暂居营地,这实际上可能会是很长时间。另外,许多穆斯林可能会被赋予入籍公民身份,因此得不到完整公民身份所具有的保障和多项权利。

 公民身份本身并不能自动提升穆斯林人口的权利。卡曼族的困境就是很明显的例子,他们从出生就拥有完整公民身份,而且其土著群体身份也获得了承认,但是由于他们的伊斯兰信仰,许多人被限制在难民营中,没有自由迁徙或返回家园的可能。由此可见,公民身份是改善权利的必要条件,而非充分条件。终结包括迁徙限制在内的歧视政策,改善安全环境与加强法治也同样必不可少。

 若开族佛教徒和穆斯林社区的需求与期望很可能无法调和,缅甸政府因此面临重大挑战。在此环境下,必须在保护穆斯林的基本权利和自由的同时,寻求缓解若开族担忧的途径。打击极端主义思想和仇恨言论的努力也同样重要,否则当下任意表达仇恨观点并据此行动而不受惩罚的大环境将无法得到改善。暴力的倡导者和实施者必须被及时抓捕归案,这在目前很少发生。及时执法不仅能维护正义,还有助于政治稳定和提升实现和平解决方案的可能性。

 政治解决方案可能不会立竿见影,即便如此也不能无所作为。危机的解决不仅对若开邦,而且对全缅甸都至关重要。防止极端主义暴力需要立即启动有公信力的程序,向若开族和穆斯林社区证明政治道路是存在的。更广泛地说,除非缅甸成功地塑造新的国家认同感,以包容这个国家极具多元化的文化、种族和宗教,否则就与全国范围的和平与稳定继续无缘。与此同时,国际社会也必须继续向弱势群体提供亟需的人道主义援助和保护,这可能会持续数年。同样关键的是解决若开邦所有社群都面临的长期贫穷和欠发展问题,公平和有针对性的村级社区发展项目尤为重要。

 仰光/布鲁塞尔,2014年10月22日

Executive Summary

The situation in Rakhine State contains a toxic mixture of historical centre-periphery tensions, serious intercommunal and inter-religious conflict with minority Muslim communities, and extreme poverty and under-development. This led to major violence in 2012 and further sporadic outbreaks since then. The political temperature is high, and likely to increase as Myanmar moves closer to national elections at the end of 2015. It represents a significant threat to the overall success of the transition, and has severely damaged the reputation of the government when it most needs international support and investment. Any policy approach must start from the recognition that there will be no easy fixes or quick solutions. The problems faced by Rakhine State are rooted in decades of armed violence, authoritarian rule and state-society conflict. This crisis has affected the whole of the state and all communities within it. It requires a sustained and multi-pronged response, as well as critical humanitarian and protection interventions in the interim.

Failure to deal with the situation can have impacts for the whole country. As Myanmar is redefining itself as a more open society at peace with its minorities and embracing its diversity, introducing the seeds of a narrow and discriminatory nationalism could create huge problems for the future. Political solutions to the decades-long armed conflict, including the building of a federal nation, will be much more difficult.

The largest group in the state are the Rakhine, who are Buddhist, and there is a significant Muslim minority, including the Rohingya – a designation rejected by the government and Rakhine. The Rakhine community as a whole has tended to be cast internationally as violent extremists – ignoring the diversity of opinions that exist, the fact that the Rakhine themselves are a long-oppressed minority, and rarely attempting to understand their perspective and concerns. This is counterproductive: it promotes a siege mentality on the part of the Rakhine, and obscures complex realities that must be understood if a sustainable way forward is to be found.

The grievances of the Rakhine are similar to those of Myanmar’s other ethnic minorities – including longstanding discrimination by the state, a lack of political control over their own affairs, economic marginalisation, human rights abuses and restrictions on language and cultural expression. Decades of Rakhine anger have begun to morph. Since the transition to the new government, many Rakhine have increasingly felt that the most immediate and obvious threat that they face in rebuilding their communities and re-asserting their ethnic identity is one of demographics. There is a fear that they could soon become a minority in their own state – and, valid or not, there is no doubt that it is very strongly felt in Rakhine communities.

Muslim communities, in particular the Rohingya, have over the years been progressively marginalised from social and political life. Many have long been denied full citizenship, with significant consequences for their livelihoods and well-being. There are now efforts underway in the legislature to disenfranchise them, which could be incendiary. The Rohingya see this as their last remaining connection to politics and means of influence. Without this, it would be hard for them to avoid the conclusion that politics had failed them – which could prompt civil disobedience or even organised violence.

Current government initiatives to address the situation are centred on a pilot process to verify the citizenship of undocumented Muslims, and an “action plan” to deal with a broader set of political, security and development issues. Both contain deeply problematic elements. The refusal of the government and Rakhine community to accept the use of the term “Rohingya”, and the equally strong rejection of the term “Bengali” by the Rohingya, have created a deadlock. The verification process is going ahead without resolving this, and it may be boycotted by a majority of Rohingya.

The action plan envisages moving those who are granted citizenship to new settlements, rather than back to their original homes, potentially entrenching segregation. Those who are found to be non-citizens, or who do not cooperate with verification, may have to remain in camps until a solution can be found – which could be a very long time. An additional problem is that many Muslims may be given naturalised citizenship, which is more insecure and does not confer many of the rights of full citizenship.

Citizenship will not by itself automatically promote the rights of the Muslim population. This is made clear by the plight of the Kaman, who are full citizens by birth and a recognised indigenous group, but whose Islamic faith has meant that many are confined to displacement camps with no possibility to move freely or return to their land. Citizenship is thus necessary but not sufficient for improving rights. An end to discriminatory policies, including movement restrictions, and improved security and rule of law are also indispensable.

The government faces a major challenge in that the demands and expectations of the Rakhine Buddhist and Muslim communities may not be possible to reconcile. In such a context, it is essential to ensure that fundamental rights and freedoms are protected while also finding ways to ease Rakhine fears. Important too are efforts to combat extremism and hate speech. Only by doing so can the current climate of impunity for expressing intolerant views, and acting on them, be addressed. Ringleaders and perpetrators of violence must be brought swiftly to justice, which has rarely been the case. Doing so will help ensure not only that justice is done; it can also contribute to political stability and enhance the prospects for peaceful solutions.

Political solutions may not bear fruit quickly, but this must not lead to complacency. Solutions are critical for the future of Rakhine State and the country as a whole. Pre-empting extremist violence requires starting a credible process now that can demonstrate to the Rakhine and Muslim communities that political avenues exist. More broadly, unless Myanmar is successful in creating a new sense of national identity that embraces the country’s huge cultural, ethnic and religious diversity, peace and stability will remain elusive nationwide. In the meantime, it is essential for the international community to support the humanitarian and protection needs of vulnerable populations, which are likely to remain for years. It is also vital to address the chronic poverty and underdevelopment of all communities in the state, particularly through equitable and well-targeted village-level community development schemes.

Yangon/Brussels, 22 October 2014

A Myanmar soldier guards an area at the Sittwe airport in Rakhine state, September 2018. Ye Aung THU / POOL / AFP
Report 325 / Asia

避免缅甸若开 邦重返战争

非正式停火让若开邦自2021年政变后相对于缅甸大部分地区平静。然而,缅军和若开军之间的摩擦正在加剧。 各方应达成正式协议,以避免重新陷入战争。

新发展:在 2020 年底非正式停火后,若开军利用这段短暂的休战时间巩固了其对若开邦中部和北部大部分地区的控制。因为 2021 年政变的影响,缅甸军方起初几乎没有反对,但愈加紧张的局势可能会重新导致战斗冲突的发生。

影响:许多若开邦居民,包括一些罗兴亚人,欢迎受若开军控制的此一变化,但情况仍然令人担忧。停火状态是脆弱的,而若开军在过去十八个月里变得更加强大。冲突若是重新爆发,将对若开邦的每个人造成毁灭性的后果。

应做工作:缅军和若开军应该避免挑起新的战争,并达成正式停火协议。若开军应避免对人道主义援助组织施加限制,这些组织也应更好地协调他们与该组织的交往。内比都和达卡应与若开军就遣返罗兴亚人议题展开对话。

执行摘要

自 2021 年 2 月政变以来,暴力事件席卷了缅甸除了若开邦外的其他地区。若开邦得以维持此种平静,一方面是因为在缅军于内比都夺取政权前几个月,军方与若开军达成非正式停火,结束了军方与亲若开族武装团体的若开军之间两年的战斗。 若开军队摒弃了民族团结政府领导的反对派和其他民族武装团体之间日益壮大的实际联盟,并转而专注于巩固其对若开邦大部分地区的控制。直到最近,军方一直过于分心,无法反对若开军的控制,但局势已经开始愈加紧张。双方很快地会发现他们有可能又再次卷入冲突。虽然双方都有理由对正式停火持怀疑态度,双方也同样有理由欢迎停火所创造的喘息空间。最重要的是,若开邦的人民将深受其益。与此同时,若开军队应减少对人道主义行动者的要求,人道主义行动者应协调他们与若开军的互动,达卡和内比都应与若开军就遣返罗兴亚人进行接触。

2018 年末至 2020 年间席卷若开邦的两年战争严重削弱了内比都政权对若开邦地区的控制。警察和许多其他公务员在冲突期间因为害怕遭袭击或绑架,往往不愿离开主要城镇,对于冒险进入农村也持谨慎态度。因为武装团体的威胁,或者因为缅甸军方怀疑当地行政人员与敌人勾结而进行的恐吓,许多地方行政人员在此期间辞职。此后,若开军在其控制的地区使用自己的行政人员取代离职的行政人员,或者收编了军事政权自政变以来派出的新任命人员。因此,若开军现在直接或间接控制了该邦中部和北部的大部分农村地区,同时在城市地区发挥了重大影响力;另外,若开军也开始向南、向北靠孟加拉国边境扩张。

在过去的一年里,若开军队通过其行政部门——“若开人民管理局”(Arakan People’s Authority)——推出了一套公共服务,进一步巩固了其控制权。此一套公共服务包括与若开邦平行运作的司法系统和警察部队,以及一些医疗保健服务(包括提供 COVID-19 疫苗)。因此,许多居民渐而转向若开军的体系,而非内比都体系,寻求基本服务与解决争端。提供公共服务的战略加深了公众对若开军及其治理的支持,但也存在风险:如果服务达不到预期,有可能会严重消耗该武装组织的资源,损害其受欢迎程度,并招致来自内比都的反对。

若开邦的事态发展所带来的影响不仅限于若开族社区。若开军的崛起为一些迄今遭排斥的罗兴亚人带来了积极的变化。虽然罗兴亚人所面临的整体情况仍然很糟糕,有一些社区改善了居民可获得公共服务的机会,也有些社区现在享有更大的行动自由,因为若开军没有执行内比都政府所施加的限制。尽管国际危机组织采访的罗兴亚消息人士在很大程度上赞扬了若开军及其政府,我们让应考量这些意见的大背景,事实上罗兴亚社区整体而言仍然很脆弱,罗兴亚人民因为害怕遭报复,一般也无法批评若开军。

自称为国家管理委员会的缅甸军事政权目前专注于平息缅甸其他地方对政变的抵抗,直到最近才做出象征性的努力来对抗若开军不断扩大的控制。部分原因可能是当地政府和军方官员蹲守在大城镇中,别无选择,只能接受当地的事实。许多名义上仍由内比都运行的公立学校已开始播放由若开军编写的若开国歌,而非缅甸国歌,以此作为衡量指标,我们可见若开军日益增长的影响力。现在,我们甚至还能见到积极合作的例子,比如内比都控制的警察与若开军合作,透过双方行政人员举行定期、非正式磋商,解决犯罪问题。

但是,与若开军合作肯定不是国家所采取的默认姿态。在某些情况下,军政府试图吓唬若开族和罗兴亚社区,使其远离与若开军机制和机构进行合作。近期,军政府采取了更激进的策略,设置路障并搜查车辆,增援部队、巡逻并拘留军政府怀疑为若开军支持者的人民。

缅军的资源目前仍然过于紧张,无法给予若开邦议题太多关注,但重新陷入冲突的风险明显存在。如果若开军试图追求其雄心勃勃的政治愿望,扩大其影响力——例如,进入边境地区或若开邦南部——有可能会激怒自称为塔玛都的缅甸军队,使其采取行动。同样地,与民族团结政府领导的反对派合作——虽然许多缅甸人将欢迎此举——可能会引发战争的回归。尽管塔玛都很难赢得这场战斗,若开邦人民已经因忽视、经济不景气、社区暴力和前两年的战争而陷入困境,冲突重新爆发所带来的附带影响令人畏惧、担忧。

尽管若开邦目前没有一条通向和平与稳定的明确道路,但是正式实现过去 18 个月以来基本上维持和平的非正式停火,可能是可以让双方和该地区长期远离战斗的一个方法。此类安排将主要侧重于维护和平,特别是通过划定领土和建立正式的沟通渠道,以在紧张局势再次开始加剧的情况下帮助缓和局势。

面对此类决策,政府和若开军皆有理由保持警惕,因为这会给对方机会集结力量,并为未来新的对抗行动做好准备。但各方也有接受停火协议安排的理由。一年多前发动的政变的结果不断恶化,缅军毫无能力分神处理其他事务;正式停火将缅军提供一保险措施,让其免于面对另一场会使局势进一步恶化的冲突。而对若开军而言,此类安排可以使其在已经受其控制的领土内进一步巩固权威,并获得包括人道主义组织和邻国孟加拉国等的外部参与者的认可。虽然延长喘息时间让各方有机会加强自行能力,以应对进一步的冲突,但也创造了未来出现持久、和平解决方案的可能性——因此,外部行为者是可以鼓励这种安排的。

若各方同意将目前的停火巩固为正式协议,则有必要改善一些影响着若开邦人民的临时安排。例如,许多人道主义组织越来越担心,在若开邦内开展业务上,可能将面临一系列的平行要求——其中一些为内比都所施加的要求,另一些则是若开军所施加的要求——这些要求有可能会造成行政负担和运营困难。若开军组织应努力确保不会因为新规则瘫痪组织运作而切断对有需要的人民的人道主义援助。如果这些规则变得过于繁重,人道主义组织应该团结起来建立统一战线。达卡和内比都也应与若开军就居住在孟加拉国的罗兴亚难民遣返问题进行接触。

尽管正式停火无法满足任何一方各自的具体诉求,但是正式停火带来的益处也足够充分,使得正式停火有可能成功。正式停火又能够进而提供若开邦居民他们所最需要的东西:持续摆脱暴力的危险,并有相应的机会建设一个更加和平的未来,让若开邦和罗兴亚人可以在相对安全的环境中并肩生活。

布鲁塞尔 1 2022 五月

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