缅甸克钦冲突的暂时和平
缅甸克钦冲突的暂时和平
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  1. Overview
Five Years On, Rohingya Refugees Face Dire Conditions and a Long Road Ahead
Five Years On, Rohingya Refugees Face Dire Conditions and a Long Road Ahead
Briefing 140 / Asia

缅甸克钦冲突的暂时和平

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概述

2013年5月30日,克钦独立组织(Kachin Independence Organisation, KIO)与缅甸政府签订了一项初步和平协议——克钦独立组织是自2011年以来与政府签订暂时和平协议的11个主要民族武装团体中的最后一个。这标志着在克钦邦甚至在整个缅甸实现长久和平的重要机会。然而,要实现这个目标将会面临重大挑战。政府和克钦独立组织仍需要对一些关键问题进行讨论并达成一致意见,包括重新安置双方部队以降低发生冲突的可能性,建立监管机制,并开展有意义的政治对话。只有采取重大举措才能建立公平的和平经济,如果克钦丰富自然资源的开采工作监管不当的话,将会加重不平等现象,重新引发冲突。以前的停火进程遭遇了失败,为避免重蹈覆辙,还有很多工作要做。

克钦冲突是在缅甸以及世界范围内持续时间最长的民族叛乱之一。克钦族是一个生活在山区里的粗犷而独立的民族,二战期间曾对北部缅甸联军的抗日胜利发挥了关键性作用,也曾是缅甸独立后军事力量的核心组成部分。缅甸军队开始叛乱之后,克钦独立组织很快发展成为最大、最有实力的民族武装团体。

1994年,克钦独立组织同当时的军政府达成了一项停火协议,并参加了有着深层缺陷的全国代表大会,该大会在结束前完成了2008年宪法的起草工作。但是,克钦独立组织并没有获准在宪法的起草中贡献太多的意见,也未能就本民族的不满展开实质性讨论。在2010年选举前的筹备期间,缅甸当局违背了其早前对克钦独立组织所作的承诺,要求克钦独立组织改编为接受缅甸军队部分控制的边境保卫部队。在克钦独立组织拒绝了当局的要求、停火宣告无效的同时,选举委员会也禁止主要的克钦独立组织政党和独立候选人报名参加竞选。

2011年年中,也就是在权力移交新政府之后不久,克钦地区再度爆发武装冲突。双方进行的无数轮和平谈判均以失败告终,没能取得任何突破。2012年底冲突进一步升级。实现和平的希望看来十分渺茫。

中国担心其边境地区的稳定和安全以及在克钦的重大投资项目受到波及,因此对克钦冲突进行了坚决干预,于是,克钦独立组织和缅甸政府于2013年2月重回谈判桌。在中国境内举行了两轮谈判之后,和谈再次陷入僵局,这次是因为北京方面反对克钦独立组织邀请的其他国际观察员——美国、英国和联合国——参与谈判。僵局持续了两个多月,直到缅方意识到中国的立场对事情毫无帮助,愤懑之情日渐强烈之时,克钦独立组织和缅甸政府才达成妥协。

双方达成的妥协是,只邀请联合国和中国以国际观察员的身份参加2013年5月28-30日在克钦邦首府密支那举行的和谈。第一次在政府控制地区举行的这轮谈判取得了突破性进展。双方签署了一份包含七项内容的和平协议,其中提及了克钦独立组织在如下方面的长期诉求:权力分离,建立监督和核查机制,以及就政治事务进行对话。

协议的达成是一个巨大的进展。要保证持久的和平并非易事,取决于在上述三个方面进行更具体的协商。5月30日的和平协议是巩固和平进程的起点而非终点。如果不能取得进一步进展,武装冲突很可能重新爆发。

让流离失所的人们能够获得人道主义援助这点至关重要。满足克钦人民的长期发展需求同样是关键所在。这需要国际社会提供捐赠,但更重要的是,克钦地区需要进行转型——从当前的冲突型经济转变为使克钦邦和克钦人民广泛受益的经济。其中关键一点是要持续而公平地管理克钦邦极具经济价值的自然资源——包括每年产值高达几十亿美元的缅甸玉产业。

仰光/雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2013年6月12日

I. Overview

On 30 May 2013, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) signed a tentative peace agreement with the Myanmar government – the last of the eleven major ethnic armed groups to do so since 2011. This represents a major opportunity to se-cure lasting peace in Kachin State, and in the country as a whole. Yet, there will be significant challenges in doing so. Key issues still need to be discussed and agreed, including the repositioning of troops from both sides to reduce the chance of clash-es, a monitoring mechanism, and a meaningful political dialogue. Major steps need to be taken to develop an equitable peace economy, and the exploitation of Ka-chin’s significant natural resources, if not appropriately regulated, could compound inequalities and trigger renewed conflict. Much remains to be done to avoid a re-peat of the failures of the previous ceasefire process. 

The Kachin conflict is one of the longest-running ethnic insurgencies in Myan-mar and in the world. A rugged and independent hill people, the Kachin had played a key role in the allied victory over Japanese forces in northern Myanmar during the Second World War, and were a central part of the post-independence military. After these troops rebelled, the KIO quickly became among the largest and most formidable of the ethnic armed groups.

In 1994, the KIO reached a ceasefire agreement with the then-military government and participated in the deeply flawed National Convention process that ended with the drafting of the 2008 constitution. The KIO was allowed no substantive input, however, and no real discussion of ethnic grievances was possible. In the lead-up to the 2010 elections, the regime reneged on earlier promises to the KIO, demanding that they transform into border guard units under the partial control of the Myanmar army. When the KIO refused to do so, the ceasefire was declared void, and the electoral commission prevented registration of the main Kachin political parties and independent candidates.

In mid-2011, shortly after power was transferred to the new government, armed conflict in Kachin reignited. Numerous rounds of peace talks failed to achieve a breakthrough, and in late 2012 the conflict escalated once more. The prospects for peace looked grim.

It was a firm intervention from China, worried about border stability and security and its major investment projects in the area that brought the two sides back to the negotiating table in February 2013. After two rounds of talks in China, there was once again deadlock, this time because Beijing objected to the presence of other international observers – the U.S., UK and UN – who had been invited by the KIO. The deadlock lasted more than two months, and a compromise was only reached after increasing resentment in Myanmar over what was perceived to be an unhelpful Chinese position.

The compromise was that the next talks, held from 28-30 May 2013 in the Ka-chin State capital Myitkyina, would have the UN and China as the international observers, but no-one else. These talks – held for the first time in government-controlled territory – resulted in a breakthrough. A seven-point peace agreement was signed, referencing longstanding demands of the KIO on the need for force separation, a monitoring and verification mechanism, and a dialogue on political issues.

This is a major step forward. Securing a sustainable peace will not be easy, and depends on more detailed negotiations in these three areas. The 30 May agreement is the beginning of a process of consolidating peace, not the end. Without further progress, a resumption of armed conflict is possible.

Access to displaced people for provision of humanitarian assistance is vital. It is also critical to address the longer-term development needs of Kachin communities. This will require donor support, but most importantly, it requires a shift in Kachin areas – from the present conflict economy to one that provides broad benefits to Kachin State and its peoples. Managing the state’s valuable natural resources in a sustainable and equitable way – including billions of dollars of jade production annually – will be key.

Yangon/Jakarta/Brussels, 12 June 2013

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