Briefing / Asia 3 minutes

菲律宾:小心翼翼地在棉兰老岛重返谈判桌

概况

菲律宾政府和摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线(MILF)之间的和平谈判回到了正轨。2011年2月双方已在吉隆坡进行了第一轮谈判,下一轮谈判已安排在四月底。虽然实现最终和平面临着巨大障碍,但总统贝尼格诺·阿基诺三世的执政至少为整个进程带来了一些新气象。新政府的和平问题小组似乎决意寻找办法摆脱谈判者的噩梦:多方卷入并行甚至有时相互矛盾的会谈;强大的潜在破坏者;由于民族分裂、部族不合、在摩洛人民(Bangsamoro)——棉兰老岛和苏禄群岛的穆斯林——中的政治利益分歧,而令摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线支持者内部的统一难以实现。

尽管存在这些障碍,谈判双方都对继续前进给予足够承诺,但双方也需要认识到一些严酷的事实。一是与摩洛民族解放阵线(MNLF)和摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线(MILF)之间相互独立的和平进程迟早要殊途同归,所以现在就需要对如何促使两个进程聚合多加考虑。另外一个事实是,不仅在马尼拉,而且在摩洛中心地区,都存在着对于在棉兰老岛的任何自治政府是否有能力执政的深切疑虑。摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线因此需要在和平协议签署前开展更多工作,以具体行动显示其最终成果将使现有棉兰老岛穆斯林自治区(ARMM)发生质变。

摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线仍然致力于与菲律宾“联合”建立一个下属自治州。过去,反对者一直将这视为对菲律宾主权的侵犯,所以对于这一概念和所提议的摩洛自治州边界都极力反对。另外,棉兰老岛穆斯林自治区本身也阻碍着建立一个下属自治州,这一自治区是由菲律宾国会在1989年建立的一个非正常运转的的政治单元,它最初是作为后马科斯政权为化解地区叛乱活动所做努力的一部分,后来在2001年略有扩大。它的命运在政府与摩洛民族解放阵线和摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线之间的对话中是个争端,因此也是成为协调两方和平谈判的主要原因。自棉兰老岛穆斯林自治区建立以来,该区贪污腐败和管理不善的历史也一直被批评者用以反对任何可能导致自治区权力或领土扩张的计划。阿基诺政府还未公开其谈判立场,但似乎原则上接受这一下属自治州的想法,只要其领土是接壤的;但细节的确定将是难点。此外,阿基诺政府也了解需要与潜在反对者进行协商并取得支持的必要性,决意避免那些曾导致2008年谈判破裂的失误。

如果这些就是谈判者需要对付的所有问题的话,和平谈判就已经将会相当困难,但实际上情况还要更为复杂。政府对马来西亚籍的调解人拿督·阿卜杜尔·奥斯曼·阿都拉的不满使得谈判的重新开始推迟到了2011年,因为马尼拉方面施压要解除他的职务;而现在他很可能被替换,但至于马尼拉是否认为他的继任者更为公正还有待观察。2010年12月,一位主要的指挥官阿梅尔·布雷加藤脱离了摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线军队并建立自己的部队,这一行动引起了人们对于摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线指挥和控制能力的担忧。2011年1月底,马尼拉中心商业区发生了公共汽车爆炸事件。虽然肇事者从未被查明,但这导致媒体猜测是否有阿布沙耶夫组织(ASG)或摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线的极端分子参与其中,令人再度联想起恐怖分子。

面对所有这些困难,政府与摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线和平进程的复杂架构一直是其优势之一,它为监控和解决争端提供了一个框架,这一框架不受行政变化的影响并保证一系列的利益相关者参与其中。目前的情况是停火变得无限期,但却尚未达成能令足够多人可以接受,并使其合法和得到执行的政治解决方案,而政党们需要找到超越这一现状的出路。

目前正在进行的和平谈判可以产生三种可能结果中的任一种。一是达成最终的全面合约,结束冲突并建立一个新的自治区。另外一种结果是旷日持久的谈判,虽然可能永远无法完整结束,但具有足够的前进势头,以使得摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线的地位和文件有效,以及确保停火机制就位。第三种可能性将会是谈判破裂,这种情况或是由于摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线一方对于谈判缺乏进展而倍感受挫而引发,或是由于外部事件,如区域内的袭击和报复事件而导致。从历史上来看,最终获得成功的解决方案并不太乐观。然而,有马尼拉真诚的政治意愿,就仍有保持谨慎乐观的余地。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔, 2011年3月24日

I. Overview

Peace talks between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) are back on track, with one round of talks in Kuala Lumpur in February 2011 and another scheduled for late April. The obstacles to achieving a final peace are huge, but the administration of President Benigno S. “Noynoy” Aquino III has at least brought some fresh air to the process. A new government peace panel seems determined to find a way out of a negotiator’s nightmare: multiple parties engaged in parallel and sometimes contradictory talks; powerful potential spoilers; and ethnic divisions, feuding clans and divergent political interests among the Bangsamoro – the Muslims of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago – that make unity within the MILF’s own constituency elusive.

Enough commitment exists on both sides to move forward despite these obstacles, but the two parties need to recognise some hard truths. One is that, sooner or later, the separate peace processes with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the MILF will have to converge, and more thought is needed now about how to make it happen. Another is that there is deep scepticism, not just in Manila but also in the Moro heartland, about the capacity to make any autonomous government in Mindanao work; the MILF thus needs to do more even before a peace agreement is signed to show with concrete actions that its end product will be a qualitative improvement over the existing Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

The MILF remains committed to the creation of an autonomous sub-state “in association” with the Philippines. In the past, opponents have seen this as an assault on Philippine sovereignty and fought against both the concept and the proposed boundaries of a Moro homeland. Also standing in the way of a sub-state is the ARMM itself, a dysfunctional unit created by the Philippine Congress in 1989 as part of the post-Marcos effort to reach out to regional insurgencies, then slightly expanded in 2001. Its fate is an issue in the government’s talks with both the MNLF and MILF and thus a major reason for finding a way to coordinate the two sets of negotiations. The history of corruption and poor governance in ARMM since its founding is also used as ammunition by critics to argue against any plan that would result in an expansion of its powers or territorial reach.

The Aquino government has not made its negotiating stance public, but it seems to accept in principle the idea of a sub-state as long as its territory is contiguous; the details will be the hard part. It also understands the need for consultations with and buy-in from potential opponents and is determined to avoid the pitfalls that led to the 2008 breakdown of negotiations.

The talks would be difficult enough if this were all the negotiators had to contend with, but there are other complications. Government unhappiness with the Malaysian facilitator, Datuk Othman Abdul Razak, delayed resumption until 2011, as Manila pressed for his removal; while he now is likely to be replaced, it remains to be seen whether Manila will find his successor more impartial. A move in December 2010 by Ameril Umbra Kato, a key commander, to break away from the MILF’s army, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, and establish his own unit has raised concerns about the extent of MILF command and control. The bombing of a bus in Manila’s main business district in late January 2011 led to media speculation about the possible involvement of extremists from the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) or the MILF, raising the old spectre of links to terrorists, though the perpetrators were never identified.

Through all of these difficulties, the complex architecture of the government-MILF peace process has been one of its strengths, providing a framework for monitoring and dispute resolution that survives changes of administration and keeps a range of stakeholders engaged. But the parties need to find a way to move beyond the status quo, a ceasefire stretching indefinitely into the horizon without ever reaching a political settlement that enough people can accept to make it both legitimate and enforceable.

The talks now underway could produce one of three possible outcomes. One would be a final comprehensive compact formally ending the conflict and creating a new autonomous region. Another would be protracted negotiations that never quite manage to reach an end but have enough forward momentum to keep the MILF rank and file on board and the ceasefire mechanisms in place. The third would be breakdown, triggered by either frustration on the MILF side at lack of progress or an external event, such as an attack and retaliation in the field. History is not on the side of successful resolution. Nevertheless, with genuine political will in Manila, there may be room for cautious optimism.

Jakarta/Brussels, 24 March 2011

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