Report / Asia 3 minutes

菲律宾:棉兰老岛问题的突破性进展

执行摘要

2012年10月15日,摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线(Moro Islamic Liberation Front,MILF)与菲律宾政府签署了一项协议。就很多方面而言这项协议都是一个突破,但与实现最终和平仍相去甚远。双方在多年的谈判过程中签署了数份协议,最近签署的这项协议——“框架协议”——同以前的协议一样,把许多棘手的问题搁置一边,也没有阐明如果未来要解决这些问题应该如何着手。当务之急是要在以穆斯林人口为主的棉兰老岛成立一个真正的自治区,为被称为邦萨摩洛的几个少数族群服务。该自治区应享有更多权力、更多领土和更多资源控制权。这份框架协议设想在动乱的、以穆斯林人口为主的南部成立一个新政府,新政府负责自己的财政收入,拥有自主的警察和司法系统。协议制订了一个多步骤的进程,要在2016年总统阿基诺三世任期结束时成立这个新政体。协议前进的道路困难重重。棉兰老岛或者马尼拉的政治活动可能会对其进行阻拦,另外要在不违背宪法的情况下移交足够的权力给邦萨摩罗政府,这一点也不太可能。在整个进程结束之前,MILF是不太可能放弃其武装的。

拥有一万两千名兵力的MILF是菲律宾最大、武装实力最强的叛军组织,而同该组织的和平谈判始于1997年。谈判进展极为缓慢,2000年、2003年和2008年发生的严重冲突曾三度中断谈判进程。2008年谈判的破裂具有破坏性的政治影响,因为它使得各方在实现最终和平的关键因素上的立场变得强硬。这些关键因素包括新的自治区邦萨摩洛的领土以及它与马尼拉方面的权力对比。处于政治风暴中心的是一个总括性的文本,叫做《祖传领地协议备忘录》(Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain,MOA-AD),最高法院判决该备忘录的条款违反宪法。这份备忘录也从未正式签署过。此后,要使和平进程回到正轨上非常困难,因为MILF坚持谈判在哪里中断就要从哪里重新开始。

现任总统阿基诺2010年6月开始执政,他无意再重复先前的错误。阿基诺政府向可能破坏和平进程的人进行咨询并向他们进行了保证。任何协议都必须符合法律和宪法的规定,也不能激起政治风波。 政府之前的策略是找到一种把MILF的注意力从2008年失败的协定上移开的方式。阿基诺当选的施政纲领是反腐,如果和平协议有恶化南部治理问题的风险,那么这样一个协议也并非他所希望看到的。MILF对其自身在这场谈判的持久战中所表现出来的顽强和前后的一致性颇为自豪,因此最初MILF并没有意愿把注意力转到这个新的方式上来。

直到2012年年中,谈判才开始取得实质性进展。当时各方开始起草一份文件,文件中涵盖了所有能达成共识的方面,而把不能达成共识的方面搁置一旁。 在和谈促成者马来西亚以及国际上其他一些与和平进程相关的第三方的推动下,MILF和阿基诺政府关系日趋紧密,框架协议的文本也逐渐成形。当进行到比较艰难的部分——领土问题时,MILF准备好了冒险,接受了一些可能难以获得它在棉兰老岛支持者认可的条款,但是这些条款却能给整个邦萨摩洛一个机会来决定是否接受实现最终和平的条件。

对阿基诺政府而言,在经历了数年海外秘密谈判之后让和平进程重回菲律宾,并给予棉兰老岛的其他势力一个机会,让他们享有发言权,这两点是非常重要的。尽管邦萨摩洛的政治格局四分五裂,MILF的领导人还是声称MILF代表了整个邦萨摩洛。他们同意为邦萨摩洛的其他势力腾出位置,让他们也参与谈判,并帮助他们起草新法律来建立一个新的邦萨摩洛政府。如果一切进展顺利,这将会提高和平进程的大众合法性;如果进展不顺,并且邦萨摩洛内部本身都无法达成一致意见的话,将会严重破坏地区自治的概念。接下来将会遇到的阻碍是在国会通过这项新法律。总统的广泛支持率和雄厚的政治资本将会帮助赢得马尼拉的利益相关方的支持,他在履行棉兰老岛和平承诺的决心究竟有多大,会宪法问题不可避免地浮出水面时,显得明朗。如果和平进程在任何阶段停滞下来,MILF的领导层将会很难控制手下的将领们,也很难再取得广泛的支持。

对邦萨摩洛而言,框架协议为实现和平、建立一个积极应对的政府以及给后代们带来一个更好和更繁荣的未来提供了可能性。虽然一切尚未改变,但是人们怀揣着真正的希望,那就是这一次将不同于以往。MILF、政府和国际上的伙伴们需要携手一致,以确保不让希望遭受破灭。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2012年12月5日

Executive Summary

The pact signed on 15 October 2012 between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Philippine government is a breakthrough in many ways but is far from a final peace. As with earlier texts signed over years of negotiations, this one – the “framework agreement” – defers several tough questions and it is unclear how, if ever, they will be resolved. At stake is the creation of a genuinely autonomous region in Muslim-majority Mindanao for the various ethnic groups collectively known as the Bangsa­moro, with more powers, more territory and more control over resources. The framework agreement envisions a new government for the troubled Muslim south that would raise its own revenues and have its own police and judiciary. It maps out a multi-step process to create this new entity by the time President Benigno Aquino III’s term ends in 2016. The obstacles ahead are huge. Politics in Mindanao or Manila could get in the way, and it may be impossible to devolve sufficient power to the Bangsamoro government without running afoul of the constitution. The MILF is unlikely to surrender its arms until the process is complete.

Peace talks with the 12,000-strong MILF, the country’s largest and best armed insurgent organisation, began in 1997. They have moved glacially ever since and were interrupted three times by serious fighting: in 2000, 2003 and 2008. The collapse in 2008 had damaging political implications because it hardened the positions of all stakeholders on critical elements of a final peace. These include the territory for a new Bangsamoro homeland and its powers vis-à-vis Manila. At the centre of the storm was a sweeping text known as the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), whose provisions the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional; it was never formally signed. It was difficult to get the peace process back on track afterwards because the MILF insisted that discussions resume from where they had left off.

President Aquino, who took office in June 2010, had no interest in repeating these mistakes. His government would consult and reassure potential spoilers, and any deal reached would have to be legally, constitutionally and politically water­tight. The government strategy from early on was to find a way to move the MILF away from the terms of the failed 2008 agreement. Aquino, elected on an anti-corruption platform, also did not want a peace pact to run the risk of worsening governance problems in the south. The MILF, proud of its tenacity and consistency in the protracted talks, was initially unwilling to adjust to this new approach.

The negotiations only started to make real progress in mid-2012 when the parties began to draft a text that embodied all points they could agree on, while setting aside everything they did not. With Malaysia, which facilitates the negotiations, and other international third parties to the peace process nudging the MILF and the Aquino government closer together, the text of the framework agreement fell into place. When the hard part came – territory – the MILF was ready to take a leap of faith. It agreed to provisions that are tricky to sell to its supporters in Mindanao but that give all Bangsa­moro a chance to decide whether they accept the terms of a final peace.

For the Aquino government, it was important to bring the peace process back to the Philippines after years of confidential negotiations abroad and to give other voices in Mindanao a chance to be heard. The MILF’s leaders, who claim to represent all Bangsamoro despite the undeniably fractious politics of the region, have agreed to make space for others to sit at the table and help them craft the new law that will create a Bangsamoro government. If all goes well, this will increase the popular legitimacy of the peace process; if it does not, and the Bangsamoro cannot even agree among themselves, it will do serious damage to the idea of regional autonomy. The next hurdle will be passing this new law through Congress. The president’s popularity and considerable political capital will help with stakeholders in Manila, and the depth of his commitment to securing peace in Mindanao will become clear when constitutional issues inevitably rear their head. If the process stalls at any stage, it may be hard for the MILF leadership to control its commanders and retain popular support.

For the Bangsamoro, the framework agreement holds out the possibility of peace, a responsive government and a better, more prosperous future for their children. Nothing has changed yet, but there is real hope that this time will be different. The MILF, the government and their international partners need to work together to ensure those hopes are not dashed.

Jakarta/Brussels, 5 December 2012

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