Briefing / Asia 2 minutes

菲律宾:棉兰老岛中部选举前的紧张局势

概述

随着2010年5月10日菲律宾选举的临近,棉兰老岛中部的选民最为关注的问题是:“马京达瑙大屠杀”的政治余波;家族政治;新的自动化选举系统;以及菲律宾政府和摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线(MILF)能否在总统格洛丽亚·马卡帕加尔·阿罗约6月30日离任前达成任何协议。

选民将选出新任总统和副总统、国民议会成员、以及1.7万名地方行政和立法官员。然而,棉兰老岛中部最大的问题是由于安帕图安家族高层成员因涉嫌屠杀而被捕,而其家族势力因此受到的打击目前还并不明朗。人们担心族长老安达尔·安帕图安的律师总会以某种方式使他们的客户获得释放,这种忧虑在马京达瑙省内外溢于言表。由于审判前的法律程序受到拖延,因此存在有力证据认为安帕图安家族有能力贿赂和恐吓证人。而且,尤其是考虑到司法部曾在四月中旬做出颇受争议的裁决,取消了对两位家族成员的指控,因此对老安达尔族长最终会获得释放的担心也并非没有依据。

即使家族政治已经或说暂时由于安达尔族长受到逮捕而被打破,从而为其政治对手开辟了新机会,但其在马京达瑙省政治的主导地位仍未受到影响。虽然安帕图安的对手也许会对军阀态度温和一些,但政治变革将只是一个家族代替另一个家族,而非对制度的根本改变。

冲突的根源仍然活跃。如果2009年屠杀不是源于家族间的仇杀(当地方言称“里多”),它可能也已造成了今后将在杀手和受害者家族之间延续的仇恨。并且,安帕图安家族成员的被捕也使一些人敢于对其家族私人军队成员实施报复。暴力事件发生的可能性如此之大,以至于军队已将马京达瑙省在选举期置于最高戒备状态。

而且,在摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线(MILF)和阿罗约政府之间实现临时协定的压力在整个过程中都相当紧迫。政府极想达成协议,这样阿罗约就能功德圆满地离任,而摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线并不会因为政府的迫切而屈服。一些地方的政治候选人已经抓住了产生协议的可能性,故意煽动基督教徒的担忧,扬言他们将被卷入一个并不符合他们期望的协议,并且毫无商讨余地。

如果在阿罗约离任之前不能达成任何实质性协议,她的继任者将负责继续协商,然而人们并不能确定是否有其他高层竞争者有兴趣或政治意愿去和平推动这一进程。若新总统不能参与其中,这将逐渐削弱相对温和的摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线谈判小组,并可能促使更为年轻激进的小集团分裂产生。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔, 2010年5月4日

Overview

As the Philippine election on 10 May 2010 draws nearer, voters in central Mindanao are focused on the political fallout from the “Maguindanao massacre”; clan politics; the new automated election system; and whether any agree­ment between the Philippines gov­ernment and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is possible before President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo leaves office on 30 June.

Voters will choose a new president and vice president, members of the national Congress, and some 17,000 local executive and legislative positions. The biggest question in central Mindanao, however, is how much the power of the Ampatuan clan has been weakened by the arrests of its senior members for suspected involvement in the massacre. Fear that lawyers for the patriarch, Andal Ampatuan Sr, will somehow find a way to obtain the release of their client remain palpable in and around Maguindanao province. As pre-trial legal proceedings drag on, there is strong evidence of the family’s ability to bribe and intimidate witnesses, and the worry about Andal Sr’s eventual release is not without basis, especially given the controversial decision by the Department of Justice in mid-April to drop charges against two members of the clan.

Even if the political hold of the clan has been broken, at least temporarily, by the arrests, and new opportunities have opened up for its political rivals, the dominance of clans in Maguindanao politics remains unaffected. The Ampatuans’ opponents may give warlordism a gentler face, but political change would consist of substituting one family for another, not of any fundamental alteration of the system.

Sources of conflict remain high. If the 2009 massacre did not have its roots in a blood feud (rido) between clans, it may have created one going forward between the families of the killers and their victims. The arrests of the Ampatuans have also emboldened some to pursue rido-related revenge on members of the family’s private army. The likelihood of violence is so great that the military has placed Maguindanao on highest alert through the elections.

And in the midst of it all, pressure to produce an interim agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Arroyo government remains high. The government is desperate for a pact so that Arroyo can leave office on a high note; the MILF will not be forced into an agreement for agreement’s sake. Some local political candidates have seized on the possibility of a pact to deliberately fan Christian concerns that they are about to be rushed into an agreement they do not want and say they have had no opportunity to discuss.

If no substantive agree­ment is reached before Arroyo leaves office, responsibility for con­tinuing the negotiations will fall to her successor, and it is open to question whether any of the top contenders has the interest or political will to push forward with peace. Failure of a new president to engage could undermine the relatively moderate MILF negotiating team, opening the possibility that a younger, more militant splinter group could emerge.

Jakarta/Brussels, 4 May 2010

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