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南海翻波(二):地区反应

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中国与越南、菲律宾、马来西亚和文莱等一些东南亚邻国之间的南海争端已陷入僵局。声索国之间愈加强硬的态度将地区紧张局势推向新高度。受到潜在油气储量的驱动和渔业资源锐减的压力,尤其是越南和菲律宾这两个国家,对中国采取了更为敌对的态度。所有声索国都在扩张军事和执法力量,而国内高涨的民族主义情绪又使得强硬派要在领土声索上力争更为强势的立场。此外,各声索国还在探索各种不同的问题解决机制;中国坚持必须通过双边谈判解决争端,而越南和菲律宾则积极邀请美国和东南亚国家联盟(简称“东盟”)参与其中。为避免解决争端的前景进一步暗淡,各国应加倍努力,促进对油气和渔业资源的共同开发,并采用对争端各方都具有约束力的行为准则。

中国对南海主权声索范围表述的模糊性及强势态度,让其他声索国极为不安。但煽动紧张局势的不止中国一个。其他东南亚声索国,特别是越南和菲律宾,现在也在更竭尽全力地积极保卫自己所声索的主权并争取外部同盟伙伴。危机组织的南海报告分为两部分,第一部分《南海翻波(一)》阐述了中国内部力量如何塑造其地区政策。本报告为第二部分,重点分析了何种因素促使区域内其他国家加剧紧张局势。

南海声索国都急于开发声索主权海域内的石油天然气资源,并由于近海渔业资源已近枯竭而倍加重视保护其声索主权的渔场。这都加剧了冲突的可能性。使事情更为复杂的是,对所有声索国来说,控制海洋资源也是一个民族主义问题,这给各国政府降级冲突事件增加了难度,并局限了它们合作执行缓和紧张局势主张的能力。在这些东南亚国家中,越南政府承受的国内压力最大,民众要求政府保卫自己的领土主权不受中国侵犯。

尽管中国和其他许多东南亚国家已经展开海军现代化进程,但在争议海域巡逻的却是日益增加的民用船只,这最有可能产生冲突。最近几次冲突都涉及民用船只。尽管它们武器装备较轻,也不像军舰那样富有威胁性,但它们容易调遣,对领导指挥级别的要求也较为宽松,更可在小规模冲突时随时介入。

虽然自1988年以来,海上事件没有引发过任何实质性武装冲突,但却固化了人们对该地区力量平衡变化的焦虑。东南亚各声索国认为它们的争端解决途径仅限于与中国进行双边谈判;争取像美国或东盟等其他方的参与;以及申请根据《联合国海洋法公约》(UNCLOS)进行仲裁。东南亚诸国意识到自己缺乏实力与中国一对一处理争端。尤其是越南和菲律宾,试图通过将南海问题国际化来增加与中国对抗的筹码。中国政府则坚持通过双边谈判解决争端,以使其经济和政治实力发挥最大作用。因此,中国极力反对东南亚各国与其他外部伙伴加深合作,并认为美国对亚洲的战略转移是为了遏制中国的崛起。

与中国对抗的声索国之间缺乏团结,同时区域多边合作框架又比较薄弱,这妨碍了各国寻求解决方案。各声索国不是运用国际法来解决争端,而是有选择地利用国际法来为自己在有争议海域的强硬行动进行辩护。东盟,作为首要的争端解决多边论坛,在缓和紧张局势上也显得缺乏成效。成员国之间的分歧,源自对南海问题的不同看法,以及各国与中国外交关系中价值取向的不同,这都妨碍了东盟对南海问题达成共识。中国充分利用了这些分歧,对不支持南海声索国的东盟成员国提供优惠待遇。结果,东盟未能就南海问题的解决达成任何行为准则,东盟内部的分歧也愈加严重。

虽然爆发重大冲突的可能性不大,但局势发展的势头正日益恶化,解决争端的前景也日益暗淡。合作开发有争议地区的资源有助于缓和各声索国之间的紧张关系,但目前中国、越南和菲律宾之间的唯一联合行动——对有争议地区的联合地震勘测——也在2008年宣告失败。此后,各声索国强烈抵触对其领土主权和海洋权益的妥协行为,而这正是开展上述联合行动所必须的。由于对政策选择方案缺乏区域性共识,同时缺乏有效机制缓和或降级冲突事件,这一海洋战略要地的动荡局势将持续下去。

北京/雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2012年7月24日

Executive Summary

The South China Sea dispute between China and some of its South East Asian neighbours – Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei – has reached an impasse. Increasingly assertive positions among claimants have pushed regional tensions to new heights. Driven by potential hydrocarbon reserves and declining fish stocks, Vietnam and the Philippines in particular are taking a more confrontational posture with China. All claimants are expanding their military and law enforcement capabilities, while growing nationalism at home is empowering hardliners pushing for a tougher stance on territorial claims. In addition, claimants are pursuing divergent resolution mechanisms; Beijing insists on resolving the disputes bilaterally, while Vietnam and the Philippines are actively engaging the U.S. and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). To counter diminishing prospects of resolution of the conflicts, the countries should strengthen efforts to promote joint development of hydrocarbon and fish resources and adopt a binding code of conduct for all parties to the dispute.

The extent and vagueness of China’s claims to the South China Sea, along with its assertive approach, have rattled other claimants. But China is not stoking tensions on its own. South East Asian claimants, with Vietnam and the Philippines in the forefront, are now more forcefully defending their claims – and enlisting outside allies – with considerable energy. Crisis Group’s first report in this two-part series, Stirring up the South China Sea (I), described how China’s internal dynamics shape its actions in the region. This second report focuses on factors in the other regional countries that are aggravating tensions.

South China Sea claimants are all anxious to pursue oil and gas exploration in the portions of the sea that they claim, and are concerned with protecting their claimed fishing grounds as coastal waters become depleted. This makes skirmishes more likely. Further complicating matters, control over resources in the sea is a nationalist issue for all claimants, making it more difficult for governments to de-escalate incidents and restricting their ability to cooperate on initiatives that could lessen tensions. Among those in South East Asia, the Vietnamese government is under the most domestic pressure to defend the country’s territorial claims against China.

Although China and many other South East Asian states have embarked on modernisation programs for their navies, it is the increasing number of civilian vessels patrolling disputed waters that presents the greatest potential for conflict. They have been involved in recent incidents. In spite of being more lightly armed and less threatening than navy ships, civilian law enforcement vessels are easier to deploy, operate under looser chains of command and engage more readily in skirmishes.

While incidents in the sea have not led to actual armed conflict since 1988, they have crystallised anxiety about the shifting balance of power in the region. South East Asian claimants feel that their options are limited to bilateral discussions with China; attempts to include other actors such as the U.S. and ASEAN; and arbitration provided by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). South East Asian states know they lack the clout to face China one-on-one. Vietnam and the Philippines in particular are seeking to increase their leverage vis-à-vis China by internationalising the issue. Beijing insists on resolving disputes bilaterally, where its economic and political clout carry the most weight. It strongly opposes efforts of South East Asian countries to deepen cooperation with outside actors, and perceives the U.S. strategic shift towards Asia as purposely containing its rise.

A lack of unity among China’s rival claimants, coupled with the weakness of the regional multilateral framework, has hampered the search for a solution. International law has been used selectively by claimants to justify assertive actions in the sea, instead of as a means to resolve disputes. ASEAN, the leading multilateral forum for discussing the issue, has also proven ineffective in reducing tensions. Divisions between member states, stemming from different perspectives on the South China Sea and differences in the value each member places on their relations with China, have prevented ASEAN from coming to a consensus on the issue. China has worked actively to exploit these divisions, offering preferential treatment to ASEAN members that do not side with its rival claimants. As a result, no code of conduct on the management of South China Sea disputes has been agreed, and ASEAN is increasingly divided.

While the likelihood of major conflict remains low, all of the trends are in the wrong direction, and prospects of resolution are diminishing. Joint management of resources in the disputed areas could help reduce tensions among claimants, but the only attempt so far by China, Vietnam and the Philippines to jointly conduct seismic survey in disputed areas failed in 2008. Since then, claimants have strongly resisted compromising their territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, which would be necessary to undertake such projects. In the absence of regional agreement on policy options or an effective mechanism to mitigate and de-escalate incidents, this strategically important maritime domain will remain unstable.

Beijing/Jakarta/Brussels, 24 July 2012

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