Self Determination and Peace Operations in Timor-Leste
Self Determination and Peace Operations in Timor-Leste
Report 246 / Asia

东帝汶:稳定的代价?

执行摘要

联合国维和人员于2012年12月撤离东帝汶,结束了长达13年的东帝汶维和行动。此前,东帝汶的两次成功选举显示出了国家的持续稳定。2006年危机过后,东帝汶的地方领导人决定用增加的石油产业收入换取和平,这个务实的决定已经取得成效。但这一策略依赖于三项因素:现任总理的权威、安全部门制度改革的推迟,以及帝汶海的油气收入。对石油产业的依赖是不可持续的,东帝汶急需寻找其他的政策基础。

2006年,东帝汶爆发危机,警察、军队以及心存不满的退伍军人陷入混战,紧张局势波及平民,导致10万多名帝力居民流离失所。不过,危机后的东帝汶恢复势头良好,油气收入为东帝汶提供了解决问题的良方。2004年,东帝汶开始了在帝汶海的石油开采,此后东帝汶的石油基金便迅速增加,现在基金总额已达到117亿美元。这笔资金让沙纳纳·古斯芒领导的议会多数派联盟(AMP)政府具备了走出危机的信心与资源。政府对投降的“请愿者”给予奖励,当初正是请愿者擅自离开军队,才引发了危机。政府也向流离失所的居民发放现金补助,鼓励他们重返家园,并为心存不满的退伍军人发放高额养老金。政府所签订的利润丰厚的建设合同,还为可能的暴乱分子提供了就业。

2012年的选举证明东帝汶的政局更为稳定,但这场选举也导致权力集中在少数人手中。古斯芒的政党重新执政,权力比以往更大,执政联盟也比过去有所精简。古斯芒在游击队期间的下属(也是前国防军司令)——陶尔·马坦·鲁阿克就任东帝汶总统。古斯芒和鲁阿克都动员抵抗组织帮助自己竞选,而商业利益在议会投票中也发挥了很大的作用。古斯芒虽然组建了55人的内阁,但一直不愿将政治权力下放给可能的继任者,而是将权力集中于自己以及关键的几名部长手中。所有的政党都面临着内部问题,现在仍然不清楚会由谁来接任总理这一主导职位。鲁阿克是可能的人选之一——他一直都直言不讳地批评政府,东帝汶议会权力较小,由鲁阿克继任总理有利于政治问责。但除了鲁阿克就几乎没有什么显而易见的人选了,东帝汶的政治权力交接可能会非常混乱。

东帝汶安全部门既缺乏有效监督,又缺乏充分的制度安排,过度集中的政治权力进一步加剧了这两方面带来的风险。古斯芒兼任东帝汶国防及安全部长,他利用个人权威压制不同安全力量之间及内部的矛盾,却没有制定长期政策。警察部门没有明确的领导班子,存在侦查能力不足和纪律方面的问题。东帝汶在处理诉讼案例方面表现不佳,但如为解决这一问题而建立独立的刑侦部门只会削弱整个警察力量。军队的专业化水平有所提升,但随着军队规模翻番以及军事力量部署至全国各地,东帝汶仍迟迟没有清晰划分各安全力量的职责,这会带来更大的风险。虽然东帝汶几乎不面临任何外部威胁,但军队的野心正在扩张。这种反常的现象使得东帝汶更难划分各安全力量的职责。

东帝汶政府还需要进一步努力,提高投资回报,让回报更加公平。石油基金使得东帝汶在决定优先任务时有独立权,无需过多考虑捐助国的意愿。石油基金也让东帝汶有充分的财政自由,不必举债即可增加开支。政府将支出视为刺激经济的手段,将基础设施的改善看做持续增长的前提,但回报却不尽如人意。近年来,国家预算中有一半以上用于建设项目,但有时政府似乎是事后才想到要真正执行这些项目。而政府对薄弱的教育与医疗部门的投资有限,不足以保证子孙后代的福祉。

现任政府面临的最大挑战是创造更多的经济机会,同时又不耗尽国家财富。东帝汶的出生率位居世界前列,劳动力增长迅速,政府需要优先为劳动力提供更可持续的就业。东帝汶的精英人群大多集中于首都,随着他们从政府增加的支出中受益,公众认为社会不平等在加剧,政府需要寻找解决这一问题的方法。另外,政府必须在反腐方面取得实实在在的成果。在土地所有权立法、权力下放等重大措施的制定过程中,政府需要与议会和公民社会合作,保证立法和政策具备更大程度的公众合法性。

东帝汶在2006年危机之后,实施了旨在快速恢复稳定的务实政策,其成就值得赞赏。任何一个冲突后的经济体要实现转型,都需要增强国内外的信心。东帝汶仍然存在冲突复发的风险,但东帝汶通过政治及经济投资降低这一风险的机会可能稍纵即逝。

帝力/雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2013年6月19日

Executive Summary

UN peacekeepers withdrew from Timor-Leste in December 2012, ending a thirteen-year presence after two successful elections underscored the country’s continued stability. Pragmatic decisions by local leaders after the 2006 crisis to use swelling petroleum industry revenues to buy peace have paid dividends. But that strategy rests on three anchors: the authority of the current prime minister; the deferral of institutional reforms in the security sector; and the flow of oil and gas revenues from the Timor Sea. The dependence on the petroleum industry is unsustainable, and the need to develop alternative anchors may be more urgent than it appears.

Timor-Leste has recovered well from the 2006 crisis, when tensions spilled onto the streets as police, army and disaffected veterans fought one another, and over 100,000 Dili residents were displaced. Oil and gas revenues have helped provide the cure. The Petroleum Fund began to swell after production from the Timor Sea began in 2004 and now stands at $11.7 billion. The money gave the Aliança da Maioria Parlamentar (AMP) government headed by Xanana Gusmão the confidence and the resources to spend its way out of conflict. It gave rewards to the surrendering “petitioners”, whose desertions from the army had set the crisis in motion; offered cash grants to persuade the displaced to return; funded lavish pensions for disgruntled veterans; and put potential spoilers to work pursuant to lucrative construction contracts.

The 2012 elections bore testament to greater political stability but placed power in the hands of a few. Gusmão’s party returned with a broader mandate and streamlined coalition; his former guerrilla army subordinate (and recent armed forces chief), Taur Matan Ruak, became president. Both mobilised the structures of the resistance to aid their elections, while business interests also played a large role in the parliamentary poll. Though he formed a 55-member cabinet, Gusmão has been reluctant to delegate political authority to potential successors, instead centralising power under himself and a few key ministers. All political parties face internal problems, and the question of who will succeed such a dominant figure remains. Ruak is one possibility – he has been a vocal government critic, providing some accountability not offered by a weak parliament. But there are few other obvious successors, and the transition could be messy.

Overly centralised political power sharpens risks from the dual lack of effective oversight and of adequate institutional arrangements in the security sector. Gusmão, who reappointed himself joint security and defence minister, has used his personal authority to tamp down tensions among and between the various security forces rather than make long-term policy. The police are without clear leadership and hobbled by inadequate investigative skills and discipline problems. Proposals to establish a separate criminal investigation service to address the poor track record of prosecutions may only weaken the force as a whole. The military has become more professional, but as it doubles in size and deploys across the country, the reluctance to outline a clear division of labour between the security forces poses greater risks. That task will not be made easier by the anomaly that though the country faces almost no external threats, the army’s ambitions are expanding.

The government will also have to work harder to ensure improved and more equitable returns on its investments. The Petroleum Fund provides considerable independence from donor-driven priorities and freedom to spend without going into debt. The government views spending as an economic stimulus measure and improvements to infrastructure as a prerequisite to sustainable growth, but returns have been woeful. In recent years, over half the state budget has been devoted to construction projects, but actual execution has sometimes seemed an afterthought. Limited investment in the weak education and health sectors is not doing enough to ensure the welfare of future generations.

The greatest challenge facing this government will be to make progress in providing economic opportunities without exhausting national wealth. It will have to prioritise the search for more sustainable employment for a rapidly growing workforce, driven by one of the world’s highest birth rates. It will also need to find ways to tackle the perceived growth in social inequality, as elites largely centred in the capital benefit from access to increased spending. It must produce visible results against alleged corruption. And in designing major measures, such as land-titling legislation and decentralisation, it will need to work with parliament and civil society in order to produce legislation and policies that enjoy a greater degree of public legitimacy.

Timor-Leste deserves praise for the success with which it has implemented pragmatic policies designed to bring rapid stability following the 2006 crisis. Promoting confidence at home and abroad is important for transforming any post-conflict economy. But it likely has a very limited window of opportunity during which to make investments – both political and financial – that might mitigate the still real risks of an eventual return to conflict.

Dili/Jakarta/Brussels, 8 May 2013

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