A house destroyed by security services in Dagestan. CRISIS GROUP/Varvara Pakhomenko Report 238 / Europe & Central Asia 16 三月 2016 6 minutes 北高加索动乱和叙利亚：输出的圣战？ 随着俄罗斯政府的强势打击，很多武装分子离开前往叙利亚和伊拉克作战，俄北高加索动乱已经渐渐平息。但民怨迟迟不能平复，战争规模可能只增不减。俄罗斯客机埃及遇袭、国内宣誓效忠伊斯兰国的新组织不断涌现等事实充分说明了这一点。 Share Facebook Twitter 电子邮件 Linkedin Whatsapp 保存 打印 Download PDF Full Report Also available in Русский 简体中文 Русский English 执行摘要 俄北高加索的暴力冲突持续了二十年，造成伤亡无数，近两年来才基本平息下来—部分原因是大多数激进分子已经去往叙利亚和伊拉克作战。到2015年6月，绝大多数北高加索反叛组织已经宣布效忠伊斯兰国，随后被伊斯兰国封为“新省份”，即Vilayat Kavkaz。但一些达吉斯坦和巴尔卡里亚的小团体仍然效忠于当地的暴力圣战组织--高加索大公国，不过该组织的实力和能给予的支持已经微乎其微。俄罗斯和伊斯兰国已经处于直接对抗的状态：俄安全官员称已于2015年制止了多个伊斯兰国煽动的恐怖袭击活动；伊斯兰国发誓要袭击俄罗斯，并宣布对10月搭载224名俄罗斯乘客由埃及飞往俄罗斯的客机遇袭事件和达吉斯坦的两起袭击事件负责。为保护国家安全，俄罗斯应加大投入，有效地去激进化，同时紧急安抚北高加索民众合理的不满情绪，更系统地铲除暴力根源。 2014年索契冬奥会前夕，对于搜捕北高加索武装圣战分子的人员来说，局势已经发生了实质性的改变。俄罗斯安全部门全面挫败了高加索大公国，导致其运作和通讯基本上瘫痪。同时，伊斯兰国宣称的“五星圣战”正在吸引着越来越多的追随者。几千名本地或在欧洲或中东定居的高加索人加入了圣战。随着北高加索不断向中东地区输出圣战，俄罗斯树敌越来越多，使问题由局限于国内演化成全球范围。 冬奥会前夕，俄罗斯政府展开了对萨里菲派展开了严厉打击，很多去往叙利亚的俄罗斯圣战分子选择土耳其作为中转地，温和保守派穆斯林也举家迁往土耳其避难。“newmuhajiru”，即来自俄罗斯的移民已经形成了一个个团结的、自给自足的社区，分布在伊斯坦布尔城区及城郊。直到2015年土耳其遭到受伊斯兰国煽动的恐怖袭击之前，当局都没有对这两种社区表现出太多担忧。会说俄语的伊斯兰国联络人有效地协助新来的移民跨越叙利亚边境。据悉，若干高调的高加索大公国特务和追从者也在土耳其活动，协助移民中转到除伊斯兰国以外的组织。同时，自2003年以来，已经有八名和车臣叛军有联系的人相继在土耳其被暗杀，最近一起暗杀发生于2015年，据说是俄罗斯联邦安全局（FSB）特工执行的。土耳其政府表示，由于缺乏确凿证据，政府无法采取坚定的但是合法的措施，不过他们最近已经加强了安保。 在叙利亚和伊拉克北的高加索人不仅为伊斯兰国作战，也为救国阵线作战，有的加入了不隶属于以上任何一个组织的叛军，主要听命于车臣指挥官。车臣人以无惧善战而出名，因此很快就能晋升成为指挥官或者伊斯兰国的二、三级位置。报道称，伊斯兰国职位最高的北高加索人--阿布•奥马尔•希沙尼已在最近美国的袭击中受伤或被击毙。希沙尼战功赫赫，尤其是他领导部队占领了伊拉克安巴省和叙利亚以东部分地区，据称因此协助阿布•巴克尔•巴格达迪一手建立了哈里发，并把俄罗斯列为伊斯兰国的主要打击对象。为了巩固其在伊斯兰国的权利，希沙尼和来自卡拉恰伊切尔克斯共和国的野心勃勃的亲信及宣传官--阿布•杰哈德，在2014拉北高加索叛军入伙。最终，绝大多数北高加索武装分子纷纷投靠伊斯兰国。 虽然俄罗斯法律规定参加海外武装团体属于危害“俄罗斯联邦利益”的犯罪行为，但有消息称，俄罗斯安全局曾为当地激进分子打开边境大门，让他们在冬奥会之前离开北高加索。然而自2014年下半年以来，俄罗斯政府已经限制了人口外流，并对武装团体的招募者、出资人、潜在的武装分子展开了系统性的搜捕。与此同时，俄罗斯对非暴力的，尤其是在达吉斯坦地区的萨里菲派继续施压。车臣针对萨里菲派的政策更严酷。车臣内政部长时不时开展反萨里菲派活动，据悉，2015年很多人被收监，有的人在年末消失。印古什共和国领导人叶夫库罗夫(Yunus-bek Yevkurov)实行的是不对抗政策；他阻止神职人员夺回纳瑟尔-科尔特（Nasyr-Kort）最重要的萨里菲清真寺，并试图联合国内的信众。同样的，巴尔卡尔共和国的原教主义者也没有反映受到系统性的安全局骚扰。 当地的萨里菲派一再强调，宗教是北高加索人加入叙利亚圣战的主要原因。当前的宗教环境受民怨的影响，而民怨又导致了激进化，包括未解决的冲突、缺乏问责制和透明度的管制、恶劣的社会经济境况、对于社会不公的强烈不满、和公民选举权遭受剥夺等。与此同时，伊斯兰国给北高加索暴力圣战分子在国内面对着自亡前景提供了一个选择，使离乡去异国捍卫宗教信仰显得更有说服力。 激进分子劝说年轻人投奔（hijjra）伊斯兰国或为其作战是每个穆斯林人应尽的义务（fardh ‘ajn），那些选择回避的人就没有履行对真主安拉的义务。伊斯兰国将自己标榜成一个可行的政治出路，一个有效率的伊斯兰政府。它宣称为人人平等的福利行动，为战士家属提供住房和补贴。伊斯兰国为表现优异的战士提供晋升机会，并公开其针对穆斯林在全球受到的耻辱采取的报复行为。如果要阻止伊斯兰国随着北高加索叛军的加入不断壮大，俄罗斯需要一个集结各方智慧的消除激进化战略，汇聚宗教专家、开明的公安官员、教育家和温和派宗教领袖。守法的原教主义领袖在影响年轻人方面可以扮演重要的角色。同样重要的是建立规范安全的返境通道和设立项目防止监狱里传播激进化思想。让那些从叙利亚和伊拉克失望而归的人讲述他们的经历，可能是对抗伊斯兰国招募活动最有效的武器。 布鲁塞尔，2016年3月16日 Download pdf to continue reading the full report Executive Summary Violence in Russia’s North Caucasus, which has experienced deadly conflict for two decades, is down substantially the last two years – partly because most of its radicals have joined the foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. By June 2015, most North Caucasus insurgent groups had sworn allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), later to be designated its new “province”, Vilayat Kavkaz. Some small groups in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria remain loyal to the Caucasus Emirate (CE), the regional violent jihadist organisation, but its support and capacity are now minimal. Russia and IS are in direct conflict: security officials announced they prevented a number of IS-inspired terrorist acts in 2015; IS pledged to harm Russia and claimed destruction of the October flight over the Sinai Desert in which 224 Russians returning from Egypt died and two attacks in Dagestan. In parallel to protecting its national security, Russia should invest in effective de-radicalisation, while urgently addressing legitimate grievances in the North Caucasus better and systematically coping with the root causes of its violence. The conditions for those pursuing militant jihad in the North Caucasus qualitatively changed in the lead-up to the 2014 Sochi Olympics. Russian security agencies defeated and paralysed the CE, whose operations and communication became largely impossible at the same time as what IS calls its “five-star jihad” became increasingly popular. A few thousand North Caucasians joined that fight from their homeland and their diasporas in Europe and the Middle East. The export of the North Caucasus jihad to the Middle East has made Russia new enemies and transformed the problem from national to global. Since the pre-Olympic clampdown on Salafism in Russia, Turkey has become a popular destination for both Russian jihadists transiting to Syria and peaceful conservative Muslims with families who made it their new home. The “newmuhajirun” (immigrants) from Russia have formed tight, rather self-sustainable communities mostly in and around Istanbul. Until IS-inspired terrorist acts hit Turkey in 2015, the authorities had not shown much concern with either group. Russian-speaking IS liaisons who helped new arrivals cross the Syrian border operated effectively. Several high-profile CE operatives and ideologues have reportedly also worked from Turkey, facilitating transit to groups other than IS. In addition, eight figures linked to the Chechen insurgency have been assassinated in Turkey since 2003, the most recent in 2015, allegedly by Russian federal security service (FSB) proxies. Turkish authorities say they often lack sufficient evidence on which to act more resolutely but legally against such activities. They have, however, considerably tightened security recently. North Caucasians fight in Iraq and Syria not only for IS, but also for Jabhat al-Nusra, as well as in rebel groups not affiliated with either and mostly under Chechen commanders. Due to their reputation as fearless fighters, Chechens are often promoted quickly to command of small groups, or to second- and third-rank positions in IS. Abu Omar (Umar) Shishani, the most senior-positioned North Caucasian in IS, was reportedly wounded or killed in a recent U.S. strike. His military achievements, particularly leading operations to capture Iraq’s Anbar province and parts of eastern Syria, reportedly helped Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to declare his caliphate and put Russia high on the agenda of IS. In an effort to strengthen their power in IS, Shishani and his ambitious confidante and propagandist from Karachay-Cherkessia, Abu Jihad, set out in 2014 to co-opt the North Caucasus insurgency. This eventually resulted in the almost overwhelming defection of North Caucasus fighters to IS. Russian security services allegedly opened borders for local radicals to leave the North Caucasus before the Olympics, even though Russia has criminalised participation in armed groups abroad which contradict the “interests of the Russian Federation”. Since the second half of 2014, however, the authorities have reduced the outflow and systematically hunted down recruiters and fundraisers, as well as potential fighters, while also intensifying pressure on non-violent Salafis, especially in Dagestan. In Chechnya, policies toward Salafis have traditionally been even harsher. The Chechen interior ministry routinely carries out campaigns against them; reportedly, many were detained in 2015 and some disappeared late in the year. The Ingush leader, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, pursues a non-confrontational policy; he prevented official clergy from seizing the most important Salafi mosque in Nasyr-Kort and tries to consolidate believers in the republic. Similarly, Kabardino-Balkaria fundamentalists do not complain of systematic security-service harassment. The region’s Salafis emphasise that religion is a key motivation for North Caucasians to join violent jihad in Syria. The immediate religious context is influenced by deeper underlying grievances that drive radicalisation, including unresolved conflict, often unaccountable and non-transparent governance, poor socio-economic conditions and a deep sense of injustice and disenfranchisement. The opportunity presented by IS gives violent Caucasus jihadists an alternative to a suicidal enterprise at home, making departure to pursue religious commitments even more compelling. Radicals convince youth that hijjra (emigration) to IS or fighting for it is the individual obligation (fardh ‘ajn) of each Muslim, and those who abstain fail in duty to Allah. IS in turn portrays itself as a feasible political project with an efficient Islamic government. Claiming to be an egalitarian welfare project, it provides flats and subsidies for fighters’ families. It likewise offers opportunity for merit-based promotion and publicised revenge for perceived global humiliation of Muslims. If powerful reinforcements for IS from the North Caucasus are to be staunched, Russia needs to develop a de-radicalisation strategy that pools intellectual resources from various fields and across disciplines, including experts on the region, open-minded security officials, educators and moderate religious leaders. Law-abiding fundamentalist leaders can play a significant role in influencing young people. Creation of controlled but safe channels for return and programs to prevent radicalisation in prisons are also important. Accounts of those who have returned disillusioned from Syria and Iraq are perhaps the most powerful weapon against recruitment. Recommendations To address the root causes of radicalisation To the government of the Russian Federation: Recognise that unresolved grievances and conflicts, as well as limited development opportunities are strongly conducive to radicalism, and address them vigorously by establishing more democratic procedures and rule of law; ensuring reasonable decentralisation, socio-economic development and youth jobs; and improving social services, especially education. Encourage genuine transformation of sectarian conflict between traditional and fundamentalist Muslims by facilitating Sufi-Salafi dialogue in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, and increasing efforts to integrate non-violent Salafi communities into the social mainstream across the North Caucasus. Improve law-enforcement agency investigations and support efforts to pursue and prosecute corruption and economic crimes; and end at the same time law-enforcement impunity and investigate systematically and effectively allegations of serious human rights violations. Strengthen the focus of youth policies in the North Caucasus on preventing idleness and encouraging other ways of self-realisation; and devise more sophisticated ways to combat radical influences from abroad. To prevent further radicalisation To the government of the Russian Federation: Strengthen investigators’ capacity to prosecute jihadists returning from the Middle East fairly; and reward voluntary contributions to anti-extremism propaganda by softening sentences. Distinguish between violent and law-abiding fundamentalists, focusing law-enforcement efforts on the former; cease repression of non-violent Salafis, especially in Chechnya, unless they violate the law; and oppose any discriminatory rhetoric and practices targeting individuals for religious beliefs. To the interior ministry of the Republic of Dagestan: Halt discriminatory practices against non-violent fundamentalist believers, including registering them as extremists, and – other than within the framework of a criminal case – detaining them, restricting their movements and submitting them to unsanctioned searches and blood and saliva tests. Cease pressuring and closing Salafi mosques other than after a credible investigation and pursuant to a judicial decision. To facilitate de-radicalisation To the National Anti-Terrorism Committee: Strengthen soft-power counter-insurgency, including creation of exit programs for radicals who have not committed grave crimes and wish to return from Syria and Iraq. Revive and strengthen the mandates of the republican commissions for the rehabilitation of fighters to deal with returning jihadists; and engage more constructively with families of jihadists and law-abiding fundamentalist leaders in joint efforts to combat violent jihadism ideologically. To the government of the Russian Federation: Create a de-radicalisation research group of independent experts, law-enforcement and security service professionals, educators and media and religious leaders, including law-abiding Salafis, and task it to develop a feasible de-radicalisation methodology and government program. Consider setting up a federal program aimed at de-radicalisation of Islamist extremists, rehabilitation of ex-jihadists and prevention of radicalisation in prisons and enhance cooperation and information exchange with European countries, including Turkey. Brussels, 16 March 2016 Related Tags Jihad in Modern Conflict Russia (Internal) Syria More for you Video / Europe & Central Asia Wagner Rebellion: What to Watch Q&A / Europe & Central Asia Assessing the Wagner Group’s Aborted Run on Moscow: What Comes Next?