Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev attends his swear-in ceremony in Astana on 29 April 2015. AFP/Ilyas Omarov Briefing 74 / Europe & Central Asia 13 五月 2015 4 minutes 哈萨克斯坦之压力测试 相比于其推动政治变革的意愿，在执政已久的总统纳扎尔巴耶夫（Nazarbayev）领导下的哈萨克斯坦如今——尤其是在俄罗斯周边地区动荡之际——更渴望维持政局的稳定的延续。但是，若没有经济改革、全面的民族平等、和政权交接计划，哈萨克斯坦或会成为苏联解体后，又一个易受外局不稳因素干扰的国家。 Share Facebook Twitter 电子邮件 Linkedin Whatsapp 保存 打印 Download PDF Full Report (en) Also available in English 简体中文 English 概述 俄罗斯在乌克兰的行动，改变了哈萨克斯坦在俄罗斯对前苏联国家的意图上的判断，并加强了其危机感。纳扎尔巴耶夫总统及其政府采取了应对措施——巩固政权、维护经济稳定、并尽力减除对其北部省份会步入乌克兰后尘的担忧和猜测。俄罗斯族人作为北部省份少数民族，虽人口在不断减少，但基数依旧庞大。他们对哈萨克族本就怨言纷纷，且还要面对哈政府以“平衡”为由、对哈萨克族移民迁入的鼓励。尽管如此，至少现在俄罗斯不太可能在哈萨克斯坦复制其在乌克兰的行为，且其外交官员也表示俄罗斯决无此意。在哈萨克斯坦总统执政已久、且其威望和领导力依然稳固之际，哈萨克斯坦应采取更多措施去应对国内挑战，其重点包括经济发展、民族关系和政权交接。 由于俄罗斯受到国际制裁、油价不断下跌、卡什干（Kashagan）油田开发遭遇技术瓶颈，哈萨克斯坦经济已陷入迟滞，而经济增长则正是纳扎尔巴耶夫维护国家团结统一的主要手段。哈萨克斯坦于2015年4月26日提前举行了总统选举。7月便将年过75岁的纳扎尔巴耶夫，自哈萨克斯坦独立25年来，便一直担任总统。此次选举，因其人气尚未受经济措施严峻的影响，他再获连任。但上述仅是权宜之计；哈萨克斯坦中期前景仍如国际预防危机组织在2013年所估：体制脆弱、且过分依赖于一个缺乏明确政权交接计划的总统，社会经济发展不平衡更是雪上加霜。这些内部问题在乌克兰危机之前便已非常严重；而今还可能使外国动乱势力找到可乘之机。 受历史上的沙皇和前苏联定居政策的影响，与其他前苏联地区一样，哈萨克斯坦在独立时拥有庞大的俄罗斯族人口。俄罗斯语此前在当地亦得到推广，因此俄罗斯族人享有明显的优势。与在其它前苏联国家一样，自哈萨克斯坦独立后，许多俄罗斯族人迁往俄罗斯，而俄罗斯政府也一直鼓励其本族人的回归，并积极获取俄罗斯侨民的忠诚。与此同时，哈萨克斯坦也采取了类似的回归政策，尤其是通过推动吸引境外侨民（Oralmans）的政策，并鼓励他们迁往俄罗斯族仍占多数人口的北方省份。 俄罗斯声称，其在乌克兰行动是为了保护身处异地而受到歧视的俄罗斯族人。这个理由在哈萨克斯坦的北部省份看似难以成立，但也并非绝无可能。哈萨克斯坦需认识到，自1991年独立以来，国家和民族团结便一直是其治国的薄弱环节，且过于依赖对纳扎尔巴耶夫个人的忠诚。由他创立的、代表少数民族的机构——哈萨克斯坦人民代表大会（APK）——应采取更多行动来加强该国的多民族、多元文化特征。在哈萨克和其他族裔群体中，政府应促进温和派伊斯兰形象，这则将有助于打击极端主义。极端主义是中亚地区的一个潮流，哈萨克斯坦也难免受其影响。不过此举应妥善处理，否则这将在俄罗斯少数民族人口中引发矛盾。俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦在保持区域稳定方面有共同利益。哈萨克斯坦邻国的情况不佳——乌兹别克斯坦和吉尔吉斯坦均政权薄弱——以及与阿富汗的地域邻近，这意味着哈俄双方急需制定可以促进共同利益的政策。 乌克兰危机使哈萨克斯坦一贯面临的挑战更复杂化和尖锐化，即，如何在与俄罗斯保持友好关系的同时、建设自己的国家意识。自2014年该问题变得严峻以来，阿斯塔纳当局一直试图制定外交政策得——使其既有别于莫斯科、又不至于惹恼莫斯科，且还能重修与西方的关系。纳扎尔巴耶夫在乌克兰问题调解上的努力则部分基于生存战略，他强调哈萨克斯坦是前苏联体系里的一个独立国家。他与欧盟继续会谈，并致力减少由俄领导的欧亚经济联盟（哈萨克斯坦和白俄罗斯是另外两个成员国）中的政治因素，而这也都是出于上述因素。考虑到哈萨克斯坦与俄罗斯有着7,951公里的边境线、基数庞大的俄罗斯族人口、以及紧密的经济关系，哈萨克斯坦需达到微妙的平衡。然而目前，这一切努力则过多地依赖于总统的个人领导力。 为了应对变幻莫测的国际环境、确保内部稳定，哈萨克斯坦应： 坚持给予俄罗斯、欧盟、以及伊朗和中国同等重视的外交政策，包括重视囊括了这些国家或地区的国际机构，如，欧洲安全与合作组织（欧安组织（OSCE），俄罗斯和欧盟成员国为其成员）、及上海合作组织（俄罗斯和中国皆为成员国）； 在寻求解决乌克兰危机方面发挥国际认可的作用；在此过程中，其应为塑造俄罗斯与前苏联其他成员国之间关系发挥重要作用，并同时建立其作为调停者的声望； 让——除纳扎尔巴耶夫之外的——国家高层领导人在政治舞台上露面，消除国际的偏见，即，纳扎尔巴耶夫是唯一领导人，并可独断专行； 在敏感的语言问题（如用哈萨克语替代俄语地名）上谨慎行事，同时提升各级政府部门组成人员的民族多元化；鼓励俄罗斯人民融入并学习哈萨克斯坦语；加强APK的活跃度和工作，为公众讨论民族和公民问题创造条件，以免这些问题被恶势力、哈萨克或俄罗斯民族主义者或外部人士利用； 优先考虑其它区域的经济发展，而非只关注阿斯塔纳。 比什凯克/布鲁塞尔，2015年5月13日 Download pdf to continue reading the full report (English(英语)) I. Overview Actions in Ukraine have altered how Kazakhstan views Russian intent in the former Soviet Union and increased its sense of vulnerability. In response, the administration of President Nursultan Nazarbayev has undertaken measures to strengthen government, protect economic stability and shut down speculation that a Ukrainian scenario could unfold in its northern provinces. A dwindling but still substantial ethnic Russian minority with many grievances faces inward migration in those provinces by ethnic Kazakhs encouraged by official policy to “balance” the region. While it is, for the moment at least, highly unlikely Russia could replicate there what it has done in Ukraine, and Russian diplomats insist it does not want to, Kazakhstan needs to do more to address its internal challenges while its aging president’s prestige and mandate are secure. Priority areas should include economic development, ethnic issues and orderly succession. International sanctions against Russia, falling oil prices and technical problems at the Kashagan oil field have dulled Nazarbayev’s chief tool for national unity: economic growth. The snap presidential elections held on 26 April 2015 may have been called to ensure that the only president the country has had in a quarter century of independence and who will be 75 in July would obtain a new term while his popularity has not yet been dented by painful economic measures. But this was a short-term expedient; the medium-term outlook remains as Crisis Group described in 2013: Kazakhstan is institutionally weak, overly dependent on a leader with no clear succession plan and riven by uneven social and economic development. These internal problems were serious before the Ukraine crisis; now, they could also offer an entry point for external destabilisation. Like other former Soviet regions, Kazakhstan had, on independence, a large ethnic-Russian population, a result of Tsarist and then Soviet settlement policies. The Russian language was promoted, and ethnic Russians enjoyed significant advantages. With independence, many, as they did elsewhere, left for Russia, whose government continues to encourage return and actively solicits the loyalty of diaspora Russians. Kazakhstan promoted a similar national ingathering, notably through its policy of attracting Oralmans (Kazakhs from outside its borders). They are encouraged to relocate in particular to the northern provinces that recently had Russian majorities. The stated basis for much of Russia’s actions in Ukraine – the need to protect Russians suffering discrimination wherever they may be – would be difficult to make plausible in northern Kazakhstan but not impossible. Astana needs to recognise that national and ethnic unity since independence in 1991 has been a thin construction, far too dependent on fealty to Nazarbayev. The Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan (APK), a representative body for ethnic minorities he created, should do more to shore up the state’s multi-ethnic, multi-denominational character. Promoting a moderate Islamic identity among Kazakhs and other ethnic groups, while problematic for the Russian minority unless carefully handled, would also assist the fight against extremism, a trend in Central Asia to which Kazakhstan is not immune. Moscow and Astana share an interest in preserving regional stability. The situations of Kazakhstan’s neighbours – Uzbekistan is a brittle regime; Kyrgyzstan is politically unstable – and its proximity to Afghanistan should reinforce the need for policies advancing that common interest. The Ukraine crisis complicates and brings into sharper focus the task Kazakhstan has always faced: to maintain friendly ties with Russia while building its own national identity. Since it became acute in 2014, Astana has been trying to forge a foreign policy that differentiates it from but does not antagonise Moscow, while also reframing its relations with the West. Nazarbayev’s mediation efforts on Ukraine are in part a survival strategy to underscore that Kazakhstan is an independent actor within the former Soviet Union. So are continued talks with the European Union (EU) and persistent efforts to depoliticise the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (of which Kazakhstan and Belarus are the other members). With a 7,951-km common border, a sizeable ethnic Russian population, and crucial economic ties with Russia, Kazakhstan must strike a delicate balance. Too much presently hinges on the president’s personal leadership. To navigate the changing international environment and ensure internal stability, Kazakhstan should: continue to chart a foreign policy with equal emphasis on Russia and the EU, as well as Iran and China, including emphasis on international bodies to which one or more belong, eg, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, in which Russia and EU member states participate) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (both Russia and China are members); take a recognisable role in the search for resolution of the Ukraine crisis; and in so doing contribute importantly to shaping relations between Russia and other members of the former Soviet Union, while building its prestige as a mediator; give senior figures other than Nazarbayev some time on the stage to dispel the perception that he works and leads alone; exercise restraint on sensitive language issues (such as substitution of Kazakh for Russian place names) and promote ethnic diversity at all layers of government; encourage Russians to integrate and learn Kazakh; increase the APK’s visibility and work and create conditions for public discussion of ethnicity and citizenship lest these issues be hijacked by malcontents, Kazakh or Russians nationalists or outsiders; and prioritise economic development in the regions, not just in Astana. 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