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Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: New Challenges for the European Union
Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: New Challenges for the European Union
Tombs in a Muslim cemetery are silhouetted during sunset in the village of Karateren near the Aral Sea, in southwestern Kazakhstan, April 2005. REUTERS/Shamil Zhumatov
Briefing 72 / Europe & Central Asia

叙利亚在呼唤:中亚的激进化

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概述

越来越多的中亚公民正赶赴中东参与战斗或以其他形式支持伊斯兰国,其中男女均有。部分由于政治边缘化和后苏联时代地区常有的经济萧条,在过去三年里有两到四千人抛弃了他们的世俗国家,转而投向激进团体。伊斯兰国不仅吸引那些寻求战斗经历的人,也吸引了那些追求更加虔诚、有目标、原教旨主义宗教生活的人。中亚各国政府因此面临一个复杂的问题。他们意欲利用这个现象来打击异议。但是更有效的解决之道应包括修正政治与行政上的多重失败,修改歧视性法律与政策,实施社区服务项目计划,为劣势群体青年创造国内就业机会,及提高安全部门之间的协调。

如果这些激进化的移民中有相当数量回到中亚,将会影响整个地区的安全与稳定。这个脆弱的地区由哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、土库曼斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦组成,夹在俄罗斯与阿富汗、伊朗和中国之间。每个国家都受困于低下的执政能力、腐败和犯罪。乌兹别克斯坦和土库曼斯坦类似于威权主义警察国家。哈萨克斯坦有一些财富,但国家破损严重,且是独裁的政治体制。五国均无法提供有质量的社会服务,农村地区尤其如此。他们的安全部队资金不足、训练水平低下且倾向于用粗暴的手段来弥补资源与技术上的不足,因此没有能力应对激进伊斯兰这样复杂的挑战。五国本应在促进宗教自由的同时维护世俗宪法,并且学习欧洲或亚洲国家将圣战分子去激进化的经验,但他们通过法律限制宗教发展,并利用警察进行打击,反而进一步推动了激进化。

该地区各处的清真寺和祈祷室都成为了为极端事业进行招募的场所。互联网和社交媒体起到了关键但不是决定性的作用。女性走向激进化通常是由于她们在中亚地区缺乏社会、宗教、经济和政治机会。伊斯兰国控制领土的吸引力并不是经济回报。对一些人来说,这是一次个人冒险;对其他人来说,这是战斗号召。许多人实际的角色是为来自高加索或阿拉伯国家的更有经验的战士提供支持服务。

乌兹别克族人,包括乌兹别克公民,在伊斯兰国的中亚人中数量最大,但吉尔吉斯人、哈萨克人、土库曼人和塔吉克人也为数不少。有一些是从国内招募的;其他则是在国外变得激进的,通常是移民工人。这个问题在吉尔吉斯斯坦南部尤为严重,自从2012年奥什市的暴力事件导致乌兹别克人社区的异化后,风险就被放大了。

该地区民众对政治和社会变革的渴望未能得到满足,圣战主义思想也因此获得了土壤。伊斯兰国的支持者中贫富各异、教育程度各异、年龄各异、男女皆有,但他们的重要共同点是对社会和政治环境的失望。乌兹别克斯坦问题尤为严重。虽然在这里乌兹别克斯坦伊斯兰运动或阿富汗塔利班早就存在,但那些原本并未考虑加入这些组织的人,却因深感压抑与被排挤而认同伊斯兰国是一个新颖的神命的政治秩序。

通过伊斯兰国接受战斗训练并逐步晋升入指挥层的中亚人的数量不断上升,他们所参与的圣战主义网络也在不断壮大。虽然大部分中亚人都被大概根据种族和语言分成不同的小组,但这些小组又联合形成了更大的地区部队,包括了来自前苏联、阿富汗、巴基斯坦和中国新疆地区互相协作的战士。这些网络很有可能在中亚加速发展并且形成自身目标,而本来就缺乏能力应对此类安全威胁的中亚各国政府对此毫无准备。

俄罗斯和中国已经表达了忧虑,敦促中亚各国政府解决伊斯兰国崛起而带来的激进化问题。这个地区的其他国际合作伙伴,包括欧盟和美国,应该认识到有越来越多的中亚人正加入伊斯兰国。在对中亚国家就解决这一问题的建议中,应优先考虑执法改革,以及对宗教采取更宽容的态度。但是如果中亚国家之间缺乏协调,包括安全部队之间的情报分享,地区外国家所希冀的应对措施很可能失败。

比什凯克/布鲁塞尔, 2015年1月20日

Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: New Challenges for the European Union

Despite suffering significant blows in Syria and Iraq, jihadist movements across the Middle East, North Africa and Lake Chad regions continue to pose significant challenges. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2017 – First Update early-warning report for European policy makers, Crisis Group urges the European Union and its member states to prioritise conflict prevention at the heart of their counter-terrorism policy and continue investment in vulnerable states.

This commentary is part of our Watch List 2017 – First Update.

Over the past few months, military operations have eaten deep into the Iraqi and Syrian heartlands of the Islamic State (ISIS). Much of Mosul, the group’s last urban stronghold in Iraq, has been recaptured; Raqqa, its capital in Syria, is encircled. Its Libyan branch, with closest ties to the Iraqi leadership, has been ousted from the Mediterranean coastal strip it once held. Boko Haram, whose leaders pledged allegiance to ISIS, menaces the African states around Lake Chad but has split and lost much of the territory it held a year ago. Though smaller branches exist from the Sinai to Yemen and Somalia, the movement has struggled to make major inroads or hold territory elsewhere.

ISIS’s decisive defeat remains a remote prospect while the Syrian war rages and Sunnis’ place in Iraqi politics is uncertain. It will adapt and the threat it poses will evolve. But it is on the backfoot, its brand diminished. For many adherents, its allure was its self-proclaimed caliphate and territorial expansion. With those in decline, its leaders are struggling to redefine success. Fewer local groups are signing up. Fewer foreigners are travelling to join; the main danger they represent now is their return to countries of origin or escape elsewhere.

Al-Qaeda, meanwhile, is increasingly potent. It, too, has evolved. Its affiliates, particularly its Sahel, Somalia, Syria and Yemen branches, are more influential than the leadership in South Asia. Osama bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, inspires loyalty and offers guidance but has little say in daily operations. Al-Qaeda’s strategy – embedding within popular uprisings, allying with other armed groups and displaying pragmatism and sensitivity to local norms – may make it a more durable threat than ISIS. Its strategy also means that affiliates’ identities are more local than transnational, a shift that has sparked debate among jihadists. Although Western intelligence officials assert that cells within affiliates plot against the West, for the most part they fight locally and have recruited large numbers of fighters motivated by diverse local concerns.

U.S. national security policy looks set to change too. Much about new President Donald Trump’s approach remains uncertain, but aggressive counter-terrorism operations for now dominate his administration’s policy across the Muslim world. Protecting U.S. citizens from groups that want to kill them must, of course, be an imperative for American leaders. But since the 9/11 attacks a decade and a half ago, too narrow a focus on counter-terrorism has often distorted U.S. policy and at times made the problem worse.

The roots of ISIS’s rise and al-Qaeda’s resurgence are complex and varied. Patterns of radicalisation vary from country to country ... though war and state collapse are huge boons for both movements.

Some early signs are troubling. Past months have seen a spike in civilian casualties resulting from U.S. drone and other airstrikes. The degree to which the administration will factor in the potential geopolitical fallout of operations against ISIS and al-Qaeda is unclear. U.S. allies could misuse counter-terrorism support against rivals and deepen chaos in the region. Nor it is clear that the U.S. will invest in diplomacy to either end the wars from which jihadists profit or nudge regional leaders toward reforms that can avert further crises. The new administration may also escalate against Iran while fighting jihadists, creating an unnecessary and dangerous distraction.

Though the influence of European leaders and the European Union (EU) on Arab politics and U.S. counter-terrorism policy has limits, they are likely to be asked to bankroll reconstruction efforts across affected regions. They could use this leverage to:

  1. Promote a judicious and legal use of force: Campaigns against jihadists hinge on winning over the population in which they operate. “Targeted” strikes that kill civilians and alienate communities are counterproductive, regardless of immediate yield. Indiscriminate military action can play into extremists’ hands or leave communities caught between their harsh rule and brutal operations against them. European leaders should press for tactical restraint and respect for international humanitarian law, which conflict parties of all stripes increasingly have abandoned.
     
  2. Promote plans for the day after military operations: Offensives against Mosul, Raqqa or elsewhere need plans to preserve military gains, prevent reprisals and stabilise liberated cities. As yet, no such plan for Raqqa seems to exist – it would need to involve local Sunni forces providing security, at least inside the city. As operations against ISIS and al-Qaeda linked groups escalate, the EU could seek clarity on what comes next and how operations fit into a wider political strategy.
     
  3. Identify counter-terrorism’s geopolitical side effects: The fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda intersects a tinderbox of wars and regional rivalries. Frank discussion of the potential consequences of military operations could reduce risks that they provoke a wider escalation. The Raqqa campaign, for example, should seek to avoid stimulating fighting elsewhere among Turkish and Kurdish forces and their respective allies. Success in Mosul hinges on preventing the forces involved battling for territory after they have ousted ISIS. European powers’ own counter-terrorism support should not result in allies being more resistant to compromise.
     
  4. Reinforce diplomatic efforts to end crises: From Libya to Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan, no country where ISIS or al-Qaeda branches hold territory has a single force strong enough to secure the whole country. Unless the main non-jihadist armed factions in each country can arrive at some form of political accommodation among each other, there is a risk they either ally with jihadists against rivals or misuse counter-terrorism support for other ends. European powers should step up support for UN-led diplomacy if the U.S. neglects such efforts.
     
  5. Protect space for political engagement: Over recent years, as jihadists have gathered force on today’s battlefields, Western powers have tended to draw a line between groups they see as beyond the pale and those whom they envisage as part of settlements. The EU should keep the door open to engagement with all conflict parties – whether to secure humanitarian access or reduce violence. It should be made clear to groups on the wrong side of the line how they eventually can cross it. Al-Qaeda affiliates’ increasingly local focus makes this all the more vital.

  6. Warn against confronting Iran: Such a confrontation would be perilous. Militarily battling Tehran in Iraq, Yemen or Syria, questioning the nuclear deal’s validity or imposing sanctions that flout its spirit could provoke asymmetric responses via non-state allies. Iran’s behaviour across the region is often destabilising and reinforces the sectarian currents that buoy jihadists. But the answer lies in dampening the rivalry between Iran and the Gulf monarchies, not stimulating it, with the attendant risk of escalating proxy wars. This will mean resuming a tough but professional senior-level U.S.-Iranian channel of communication, something the U.S. administration seems reluctant to do but that Europe could encourage. And, for the EU and its members states (notably France, Germany and the UK), it means clearly signalling to the U.S. administration that any step to undermine the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – in the absence of an Iranian violation of the deal – will leave Washington isolated and unable to recreate an international consensus to sanction Iran.

The roots of ISIS’s rise and al-Qaeda’s resurgence are complex and varied. Patterns of radicalisation vary from country to country, village to village and individual to individual. Clearly, though, war and state collapse are huge boons for both movements. Both groups have grown less because their ideology inspires wide appeal than by offering protection or firepower against enemies, or rough law and order where no one else can; or by occupying a power vacuum and forcing communities to acquiesce. Rarely can either group recruit large numbers or seize territory outside a war zone. The EU’s investment in peacebuilding and shoring up vulnerable states is, therefore, among its most valuable contributions against jihadists. European leaders must do everything within their power to disrupt attacks, but they should also put conflict prevention at the centre of their counter-terrorism policy.