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Open Letter to the U.S. and Iranian Leadership about the Iran Nuclear Deal
Open Letter to the U.S. and Iranian Leadership about the Iran Nuclear Deal

寄予厚望:伊朗新总统和核谈

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概述

哈桑·鲁哈尼于8月4日宣誓就任伊朗总统,在这个最近坏消息不断的地区,他的就职带来了一线人们乐见的难得希望。目前这一局势带来的仍是问题多于答案:他掌有多少权力?作为长期与核项目有关的人物,他对于伊朗核计划是什么态度?西方社会有无能力展示必要的灵活性和耐心?然而,虽然预计双方都会表现出谨慎态度,但目前局势为将更远大目标摆上桌面提供了时机,应开辟美伊双边协商渠道以作为多边谈判的补充,并扩大谈判内容,把地区安全问题纳入其中。

鉴于鲁哈尼曾直言不讳地批评过伊朗的治国方向,尤其是核问题政策,他的当选让几乎所有的观察人士都大吃一惊,因此人们在回头解读他的胜利时应当持谦虚的态度。伊朗的选民常利用总统选举来寻求国家的变革,所以可能被鲁哈尼所作的改革承诺而打动;鲁哈尼的保守派竞争对手内部存在严重分歧,并且为前总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪-内贾德的政纲涣散所累;由于 2009年的选举饱含争议,领导层合法性受损,因此可能接受了一个强烈批评者的胜利以求重树合法性。有鉴于此,鲁哈尼的获胜最终可能于伊朗最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊有利。选举是伊斯兰共和国的政治基石之一,鲁哈尼的胜利有助于双方修复国民对选举的信心;同时在伊朗因制裁而遭受前所未有的经济创痛时,鲁哈尼上台为减少国际社会的压力创造了机会。

然而,回顾过去并非关键,伊朗此后何去何从才是重点。包括以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡在内的一些人认为鲁哈尼是“披着羊皮的狼”。他们认为伊朗的核野心丝毫没有改变,鲁哈尼只不过是一个温和的假象;另一些人则认为他愿意在核项目上作出广泛的让步,以换取相应程度的制裁解除,并因此视他为拯救伊朗于困境的救世主。同样地,由于伊斯兰共和国在决策方面的不透明性,在讨论伊朗去向的问题时,谦恭态度是必不可少的。

尽管如此,在预测事态发展时,可以考虑以下几个要素。首先是必须考虑到伊朗政治的本质。总统远非全权在握,必须同无数相互较劲的权力和影响力集团进行公开和非公开的竞争,最高领袖只不过是最明显的一个竞争对手。政治的基本构架仍未改变:阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊仍然握有最终话语权;他和总统之间的摩擦几乎是无可避免的;派系之争仍将是无法改变的事实,也是限制鲁哈尼的方式之一。但这并不意味着总统仅是挂名的首脑;阿克巴尔・哈什米・拉夫桑贾尼、穆罕默德·哈塔米和艾哈迈迪-内贾德三者之间大相径庭的风格和政策就是证明。

其次,鲁哈尼并非无名之辈。自伊斯兰共和国成立以来,他就在这个政权牢牢占有一席之地,他是一个终极意义上的内部操手,他有业绩可循,有大量的著作可资考查。这些作品为他所倾向使用的方式提供了一些线索。他推动伊朗与西方签订了第一个也是唯一一个核协议,这在彼此极为不信任的情况下,是一个巨大的成就,但是,就在协议的谈判过程中,他也公开声称该协议允许伊朗完成核设施的建设。他直言不讳地批评他的继任者,但是主要针对的是他们的口出狂言和鲁莽的谈判风格,而不是他们最终的谈判目标。他的谈判经历也传递出混杂的信息:他感到西方辜负了他,使他在国内饱受批评,这可能会促使他采取更为谨慎的态度。尤其是在美国和欧洲意图限制伊朗铀浓缩项目规模的情况下,鲁哈尼可能会更倾向于在项目的透明性而不是规模上作出让步。

这使人联想到第三个要素。总统换人会迎来在执政风格和谈判策略方面的重大转变,但是显然不会改变伊朗的底线要求,那就是承认伊朗有进行铀浓缩的权利,并有意义地解除制裁。因此,比起上次还是由鲁哈尼在负责核问题的时代而言,如今要达成协议变得更难以想象。双方立场变得更加强硬;彼此之间越发不信任对方;核项目已大幅升级;制裁措施激增。西方世界质疑鲁哈尼履行承诺的能力,伊朗方面也同样怀疑西方尤其是美国能否接受伊斯兰共和国的阶段性妥协,或者质疑巴拉克·奥巴马总统是否有取消制裁措施的政治能力。

这些担心无可避免,但不能因此裹足不前。伊朗和P5 +1(联合国安理会5个常任理事国再加上德国)之间的谈判早已死气沉沉;目前是一个希望的时刻,也是一个为谈判重注活力的时刻。要实现这个目标,需要采取以下三个环环相扣的方式:根据危机组织的建议,改变潜在协议的内容,就伊朗20%的铀浓缩项目的信心建设协议进行谈判的同时,也展示终结核项目计划的大致轮廓;改进谈判形式,让美伊进行秘密的双边接触,以作为多边谈判的补充;扩大谈判涉及的内容,把地区安全问题也纳入其中。

由鲁哈尼的当选所带来的曙光可能会继续扩大,也可能很快熄灭。在就任总统开始面对无数来自国内外的挑战之际,西方国家鼓励他朝着正确的方向前进才是明智之举。

华盛顿/布鲁塞尔,2013年8月13日

Open Letter to the U.S. and Iranian Leadership about the Iran Nuclear Deal

Negotiating parties are now within touching distance of reinstating the JCPOA, but a period of stasis threatens to undo the progress made. In this open letter, over 40 former top European officials urge the U.S. and Iranian leadership to see the negotiations through to a successful outcome.

This open letter has been signed by members of the European Leadership Network, Board members of the International Crisis Group and Council members from the European Council on Foreign Relations.

We write to express our growing concern that negotiations to restore Iranian compliance with, and U.S. return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) appear to have entered a period of stasis that threatens to undo the real and welcome progress made in recent months toward reinstating a non-proliferation achievement that is crucial for international peace and security.

At a time when transatlantic cooperation has become all the more critical to respond against Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, for U.S. and European leaders to let slip the opportunity to defuse a nuclear crisis in the Middle East would be a grave mistake.

The JCPOA was a success. Persistent multilateral diplomacy, in which several of the undersigned were personally engaged, secured an agreement that advanced our shared non-proliferation goals. Preserving the benefits of a deal limiting Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium, capping its levels of enrichment and extending the timeline for the accumulation of fissile material that could be used for a potential weapon, all under the watchful eyes of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is the reason why European governments rejected the Trump administration’s reckless decision to abandon the deal without a viable alternative and have worked hard to keep the deal alive following the 2018 U.S. withdrawal.

The strategy that the U.S. followed for more than two years after this withdrawal, based on “maximum pressure” alone, yielded little but nuclear escalation, dangerous regional sparring and economic deprivation for the Iranian people. The legacy of this strategic error can today be measured in the tons of enriched uranium Iran has since accumulated, including uranium enriched to near weapons-grade; in the thousands of advanced centrifuges it is spinning; and in the rapidly dwindling timeframe for Iran to reach a breakout capability. President Biden rightly identified a mutual return, by the U.S. and Iran, to their respective commitments under the 2015 deal as a necessary course correction.

Since April 2021, negotiations in Vienna have painstakingly but productively forged a draft document that will reverse Iran’s nuclear advances, in return for relief from U.S. sanctions imposed during the Trump administration that are inconsistent with the JCPOA. As the EU’s Josep Borrell put it over a month ago, “a final text is essentially ready and on the table”.

There are two possible scenarios ahead. In one, the U.S. swiftly shows decisive leadership and requisite flexibility to resolve remaining issues of political (not nuclear) disagreement with Tehran. In the other, the parties enter a state of corrosive stalemate, serving neither side’s interests, that risks devolving into a cycle of increased nuclear tension, inevitably countered by the further application of coercive tools.

We know that the politics of this issue are difficult, particularly on issues like the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, which is reportedly the last lingering issue of contention. While the details are of course for U.S. policymakers to determine, we believe that there are ways to provide the counter-terrorism benefits of the current designation while still accommodating Iran's specific request, and consider it imperative that these be fully explored. For its part, Iran should not expect a nuclear deal to address broader areas of disagreement between Tehran and Washington. Both sides must approach this final phase of negotiation with an understanding that the strategic implications of failure would be grave and profound.

Based on our long experience in diplomacy and statecraft, we see a deal as eminently possible. Having come within touching distance, we urge President Biden and the Iranian leadership to demonstrate flexibility in tackling an issue of vital significance to the global nonproliferation regime and regional stability, and see these negotiations through to a successful conclusion.

Signatories:

Czech Republic

  1. Jan Kavan, former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, former President of the UNGA, and Chairman of the Board, Czech-Slovak-Iranian Chamber of Commerce (CSIOK)


Denmark

  1. Mogens Lykketoft, former Foreign Minister and President of the UN 70th General Assembly


France

  1. Gérard Araud, former Permanent Representative of France to the UN, former Director-General for Political and Security Affairs
  2. Michel Duclos, former Ambassador and Special Advisor, Institut Montaigne (Paris)
  3. Jean-David Levitte, former Permanent Representative of France to the UN
  4. Général d’armée aérienne (ret) Bernard Norlain, former Commander of Air Defence Command and Air Combat Command


Germany

  1. Wolfgang Ischinger, former Ambassador and Chairman of the Munich Security Conference
  2. Joschka Fischer, former Foreign Minister and former Vice-Chancellor
  3. Angela Kane, former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
  4. Karsten D. Voigt, former Chairman of the German-Russian parliamentary group in the Bundestag and former President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
  5. General (ret) Klaus Naumann, former Chief of Defence Germany and former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee


Hungary

  1. Balázs Csuday, former Permanent Representative of Hungary to the UN (Vienna)


Italy

  1. Giancarlo Aragona, former Ambassador and former Secretary-General of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
  2. General (ret) Vincenzo Camporini, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Chief of Defence General Staff
  3. Admiral (ret) Giampaolo Di Paola, former Minister of Defence
  4. Dr Nathalie Tocci, Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and former Special Advisor to EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borell
  5. Stefano Stefanini, former Ambassador and Executive Board of the European Leadership Network
  6. Carlo Trezza, former Ambassador for Disarmament and non-proliferation, Chairman of MTCR and UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board for Disarmament Affairs


Lithuania

  1. Vygaudas Usackas, former Foreign Minister and former EU Ambassador to Russia and Afghanistan


Netherlands

  1. Prof Klaas de Vries, former Minister of Home Affairs


Norway

  1. Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland, former Prime Minister and former Director-General of the World Health Organisation (WHO), Deputy Chair of The Elders


Poland

  1. Bogdan Klich, former Minister of National Defence
  2. Andrzej Olechowski, former Minister of Foreign Affairs
  3. Prof Adam D. Rotfeld, Warsaw University and former Minister of Foreign Affairs


Serbia

  1. Goran Svilanović, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and former Secretary-General of the Regional Cooperation Council


Spain

  1. Javier Solana, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and former NATO Secretary-General


Sweden

  1. Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister and former Foreign Affairs Minister
  2. Dr Hans Blix, former Foreign Minister and former Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
  3. Rolf Ekéus, former Chairman of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, and former Ambassador of Sweden to the United States


Turkey

  1. Hikmet Çetin, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Speaker of the Grand National Assembly
  2. Vahit Erdem, former Under Secretary of the Defence Industry and former Vice President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
  3. Ahmet Üzümcü, former Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO and former Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
  4. Tacan Ildem, former Assistant Secretary-General, NATO and former Ambassador


United Kingdom

  1. The Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth, former Defence Secretary
  2. Sir Tony Brenton, former Ambassador to the Russian Federation
  3. Lord (Des) Browne of Ladyton, former Defence Secretary and Chairman of the European Leadership Network
  4. The Rt Hon Alistair Burt, former Minister of State for the Middle East at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
  5. Lord (David) Hannay of Chiswick, former Ambassador to the EU and to the UN
  6. The Rt. Hon Baroness (Pauline) Neville-Jones, former Minister for Security and Counter-Terrorism
  7. Sir Nick Harvey, former Member of Parliament and former Minister of State for the Armed Forces
  8. Lord (John) Kerr of Kinlochard, Independent member of the House of Lords
  9. Lord (Tom) King of Bridgwater, former Defence Secretary
  10. Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown, President, Open Society Foundations, and former UN Deputy Secretary-General
  11. Madeleine Moon, former Member of Parliament and former President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
  12. General the Lord (David) Ramsbotham, retired British Army officer, former Adjutant General and ADC General to Her Majesty the Queen
  13. The Rt Hon Jack Straw, former Foreign Secretary
  14. The Rt Hon Lord (David) Triesman, former Parliamentary Under Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and former General Secretary of the Labour Party