iran-15dec15
Ayatollah Khamenei receives Iranian officials, ambassadors of Muslim countries, on 18 May 2015. khamenei.ir
Report 166 / Middle East & North Africa

签订核协议之后的伊朗

一些西方国家希望伊朗核协议能助其国内温和派上位;但若直接操纵伊朗国内政治,则会适得其反。西方国家应认识到,任何改变都应是循序渐进的,解决伊朗问题最好的方式是实施核协议、重启对伊贸易,以及利用外交手段平衡伊朗和阿拉伯国家在中东的利益。

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执行摘要

德黑兰与世界大国签订伊朗核协议,一个重要的问题也随之浮出水面——核协议对伊朗来说意味着什么?伊朗国内各派对国家未来有着不同的设想,而该协议的签订则加剧了不同声音之间的矛盾。伊朗国内外都有不少人认为这一协议将重新平衡伊朗内政的局势:它不仅增强了推动核协议一派的势力;更重要的是,它一改伊朗过去十年来核问题主导内政之风,并为其他问题的讨论创造了条件。然而,伊朗的政治系统拥有多个权力中心和监护机构,且其本质上希望持续现状。在各权力监护者尽力平息核协议的影响、维系权力分配平衡的情况下,西方国家任何干预伊朗内政的尝试——如,迫使伊朗当局向“温和”方向转变——都会弄巧成拙。

该协议诞生在一个敏感的时间节点上。在未来的18个月内,伊朗将经历三次重要的选举。2016年2月,伊朗将完成对议会和专家委员会的选举,而这两个机构的主要任务则是选出伊朗的下一任领导人;在2017年6月,伊朗将举行总统大选。由于现任最高领导人年事渐高,人们都想知道专家委员会是否——会在其8年任期内——会为另择继任者,并整肃这个伊斯兰共和国的政治进程。哈桑•鲁哈尼总统的竞争对手则担心,鲁哈尼和他的同僚会充分借助其在外交政策上的成果来赢得选举。

伊朗伊斯兰共和国内部的紧张关系在很大程度上源于人民主权和宗教权威的融合。神权势力要保持最高领导人和其他监管机构的主导地位,而共和势力则主张民选机构应拥有更大影响力;每个阵营则又在——追求渐进式政治变革的——实用主义者和——或抵制变革、或推动革命的——激进分子之间进一步分化。而其最高领袖虽强大,却并非无所不能;他需要通过平衡神权与共和两股派势来维持稳定;然而他与宗教势力之间错综复杂的联系又使得这种平衡不能十全十美。

内政平衡的不稳定性意味着,当自下而上的压力得到高层普遍共识时,政策便会有所变化;核谈判正是如此。鲁哈尼的参选、加之公众——因苦于核制裁而——追求政治正常化加速了核协议的进程,然而协议签订并非仅凭一己之力便能达成。最高领导人阿里•哈梅内伊在鲁哈尼竞选前就认可了其和美国的双边谈判。接着,他支持了新总统的外交施压手段,使其对手始终处于困境之中。但出于对风险的延误,哈梅内伊在对鲁哈尼的支持上有所保留,因此鲁哈尼仍需要联合其它权力中心。

现任总统来自共和党,这令他获得了其最重要的盟友——控制非选举机构的务实神权派的支持。几乎每一个权力集团在协议中都有发言权,这则反映出伊朗的国家战略决策,即,尽管其尚不完全信任大国的承诺,但伊朗仍做出了要在核危机上翻篇的决定。伊朗当局对核协议的承诺既在于落实也在于执行,而这都是出于要复苏经济的原因——为此,伊朗或是如协议预计地被取消制裁,亦或是从中证明伊朗并非协议失败的责任方。

鲁哈尼在其他方面也遇到了困难。他被强制冻结财产,故而不能为其社会和政治自由化的理想而拉拢足够的选民。但他的经济议题——如何经济年年衰退之下刺激增长——则或会得到推进,尽管这会损害在受制裁政权下盘根错节的利益。

一切迹象都表明鲁哈尼将保持审慎,而改变则可能是艰巨、缓慢而又温和的。尽管美国及其欧洲盟国可能会催促他加快进程,但他实则无计可施,但破坏改革的方法却是多种多样。壮大共和党权力——某些领域将其推销为核协议的副产品——亦是不可行的,因为许多神权政客将这种策略视为是对政权更迭的特洛伊木马。

然而这并不代表德黑兰当局能在此事上拥有国家或是区域层面上的全部决策权;而这则需要各方经过再三思量,尤其考虑到德黑兰当局在合法性上的争议不亚于其对手。换言之,伊朗虽或会首先承认其政府体系的不完善,但他们仍应在不受外界干扰的情况下决定自己国家的立场。

外界试图通过奖惩兼备之法来左右德黑兰的地缘策略是其标准的外交政策实践,但若试图以此而左右或缩短伊朗的决策过程,这便是另一回事。正如核协议及其现经济状况所示,唯有通过可信的国内进程来达成的内部共识,才能为取得进展搭建扎实的基础。

对西方各国和伊朗而言,最好的选择便是,通过全面落实核协议,来逐步扭转近双方几十年来——因为相互猜忌和敌对而造成——的负面印象。他们应为解决其他有共同利益的问题,而创造独立且不政治化的渠道,并且在顾及伊朗和阿拉伯双方利益的情况下,逐步推动区域安全架构的搭建。最后,西方国家和伊朗虽可能难以就一系列问题而达成一致,但若西方执意在伊朗政治体系中博弈,那双方的“不一致”便会只多不少。

德黑兰/伊斯坦布尔/布鲁塞尔,2015年12月15日

Executive Summary

With the nuclear accord between Tehran and world powers in force, a chief question is what it means for Iran. The clash between competing visions of the country’s future has heightened since the deal. Many, there and abroad, believe it could rebalance domestic politics. It not only has boosted the profile of those who promoted it, but, more fundamentally, it has opened space for new debates in a domestic sphere that was dominated by the nuclear issue for more than a decade. Yet, the political system, with its multiple power centres and tutelary bodies, inherently favours continuity. As its guardians try to quell the deal’s reverberations and preserve the balance of power, any attempt by Western countries to play politics within the Iranian system – for instance by trying to push it in a “moderate” direction – could well backfire. If world powers hope to progress on areas of concern and common interest, they must engage Iran as it is, not the Iran they wish to see. To start, all sides should fulfil their commitments under the nuclear deal.

The accord comes at a sensitive moment. Over eighteen months, three pivotal elections are scheduled. February 2016 will see polls for parliament and the Assembly of Experts, whose key mandate is to choose the next supreme leader; in June 2017, there will be a presidential poll. With the supreme leader aging, many wonder if the next Assembly (during its eight-year term) will choose his successor, who could reshape the Islamic Republic’s course. President Hassan Rouhani’s competitors are concerned that he and his allies will parlay their foreign policy achievements into electoral victories.

Tensions within the Islamic Republic stem in no small part from its blend of popular sovereignty and religious authority. Theocratic forces seek to maintain the dominance of the supreme leader and other tutelary bodies, while republican forces advocate more clout for popularly-elected institutions. Each camp is further split between pragmatists who seek incremental political evolution and radicals who either resist any change or promote revolutionary transformation. The supreme leader – powerful but not omnipotent – maintains stability by accommodating both theocratic and republican trends. But his affiliation with the former makes for a balancing act that is as complex as it is imperfect.

The precariousness of this equilibrium means that policy shifts when pressure from below is accompanied by substantial consensus at the top. The nuclear talks illustrate this. Rouhani’s election and the sanctions-battered public’s demand for normalcy catalysed the process, but the agreement was not a single man’s achievement. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had endorsed bilateral negotiations with the U.S. before Rouhani ran for office. He then supported the new president’s diplomatic push and kept his opponents at bay. But given the leader’s aversion to risk, his support was qualified and did not obviate Rouhani’s need for a coalition with other power centres.

The president, who is from the republican camp, brought on board the most important allies: the pragmatic theocrats, who control the unelected institutions. Almost every powerful group had a say in the accord, which reflected a national, strategic decision to turn the page on the nuclear crisis even as concern remains over the world powers’ commitment. The establishment appears as determined to implement the deal as it was to seeing the negotiations through – and largely for the same reason: to resuscitate the economy by removing sanctions, either as envisioned in the accord or by showing that Iran is not to blame for failure.

Rouhani has encountered difficulties in other spheres. He was forced to freeze priorities behind which he could not generate sufficient consensus, including social and political liberalisation. But his economic agenda, aimed at stimulating growth after several years of recession, is likely to move forward, even though it damages entrenched interests that have profited under the sanctions regime.

Everything suggests Rouhani will continue with a prudent approach, and change is likely to be arduous, slow and modest. Though the U.S. and its European allies might nudge him to move faster, there is no way to speed the reform process and many ways to undermine it. Seeking to empower republicans – touted in certain quarters as a potential by-product of the nuclear deal – will not work, as many theocrats view that tactic as a stalking horse for regime change.

This does not mean giving Tehran carte blanche, domestically or regionally, but issues of concern will need to be addressed judiciously, taking account of Tehran’s legitimate concerns no less than its adversaries’. It also means Iranians – notwithstanding the imperfection of their governance system, which many are the first to acknowledge – should determine their country’s positions without undue external interference. Trying to shape Tehran’s regional calculus through a variety of carrots and sticks is standard foreign policy practice, but trying to shape or short-circuit the decision-making process itself is another matter. As seen in the nuclear deal and now in the economic realm, internal consensus, reached through a credible domestic process, is the only stable basis for progress.

The best option for Western states and Iran is to continue reversing the negative narratives from decades of suspicion and hostility by fully implementing the nuclear accord; creating discrete and non-politicised channels to address other issues of concern or common interest; and, eventually, pushing for regional security architecture that takes account of both Iranian and Arab interests. In the end, Iran and the West may not be able to agree on a range of issues, but trying to game the Iranian system will ensure that they will not.

Tehran/Istanbul/Brussels, 15 December 2015

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