The Syrian conflict since 2011 is a constellation of overlapping crises. Each of its global, regional and sub-national dimensions demands a tailored response set within an overarching framework. Instead, chronic violence and worsening suffering have killed more than 250,000 people, fueling radicalisation, refugee flight and a self-sustaining war economy. Outside stakeholders must learn from the way the Syrian conflict has repeatedly dashed unrealistic expectations on all sides. Crisis Group pursues a comprehensive approach for achieving a sustainable decline in violence and, ultimately, a political settlement. We also seek to correct dominant narratives that focus on jihadism and migrant flows, which are the symptoms, rather than the causes, of the problem.
Since the Syrian uprising began in 2011, Ankara has been drawn ever deeper into the crisis. Its approach will likely hold steady for now. But the choices it makes next matter for the fate of millions of Syrians.
Clashes between local strongmen in south killed dozens, Israeli strike on Iran’s consular facility in Damascus sparked unprecedented direct confrontation, and Iran-backed groups attacked U.S. forces.
In south, deadly clashes between rival local strongmen killed dozens. In bloodiest upsurge in region in years, underscoring insecurity and lack of state authority, IED 6 April killed eight children in Sanamayn city, Deraa province; group led by local leader Mohsen al-Haimed next day blamed explosion on rival group led by Ahmed Jamal al-Labbad, and attacked homes of latter, killing twenty. Separately, tensions 25 April escalated in Suwayda when local factions arrested three govt officers in response to arrest of university student during anti-govt protests in Feb; govt 28 April sent reinforcements to region, raising concerns of potential military operation.
Israel struck Iranian consulate, triggering unprecedented direct confrontation. Airstrike on Iranian consular facility in capital Damascus, widely attributed to Israel, 1 April killed two senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders and five officers; in response, Iran 13 April unleased massive barrage of drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles at Israel (see Iran, Israel-Palestine and Conflict in Focus). While direct hostilities late April subsided, risk remained high of direct or indirect attacks between parties and their allies/proxies in Syria. Rocket fire 8 April targeted Israeli-occupied Golan Heights; Israel next day struck army military infrastructure in Mahajjah area, Deraa province; suspected Israeli airstrike 19 April struck army positions in Deraa province.
In east, Iran-backed groups targeted U.S. bases. Iran-backed groups 1 April launched drone attack on U.S. Al-Tanf base, Homs province, and 6 April launched missile at Conoco gas field, Deir ez-Zor province. Rockets launched from Iraq 21 April targeted U.S. base in Rumalyn, Hassakah province (see Iraq).
In other important developments. Türkiye targeted Kurdish militant targets, amid risk of escalation in coming months (see Türkiye). Tribal militias continued attacks on Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): notably, 3 April killed two SDF members at checkpoint in Dhiban town, Deir ez-Zor province. ISIS insurgency continued as alleged ISIS attacks 18 April killed 22 regime soldiers and affiliated fighters near Sukhna town, Homs province.
Banks are hesitant to change their banking operations [in Syria] when they know that permissions could expire imminently.
Turkey is highly unlikely to compromise on troop withdrawal [from northern Syria].
It's important to remember that [Syrian president] Assad's return to the Arab League is a symbolic measure to begin the process of ending his regional isolation.
The U.S. and Europe have made it clear that they do not agree with Arab states normalizing with the Assad regime, but there doesn’t seem to be much they can do about it.
The UAE has, since 2021, embarked on a policy of diminishing tensions with other countries in the region, and normalizing with Assad is part of that.
If the UN fails to extend its operation [in Syria] via these [Turkish border] crossings, donor states should bypass the UN and do bilateral assistance themselves.
The League of Arab States welcomed President Bashar al-Assad to its May summit, reinstating Syria’s membership, which it had suspended in 2011. The regime may look to have shrugged off the international opprobrium it earned for its brutality in repressing its opponents. But has it?
The rebels who control north-western Syria are dealing harshly with ISIS cells but have not yet crushed them entirely. The best way to stop jihadists from rebounding is to consolidate the area’s ceasefire. Outside powers can also help by sending more humanitarian aid.
Its self-declared caliphate is gone, but ISIS continues to stage attacks and intimidate the public in much of its former domain. The forces fighting the group need to hinder the militants’ movement between Syria’s regions – and, above all, to avoid debilitating conflicts with one another.
To prevent ISIS from resurging, forces fighting the group should stop it from moving across regions and avoid conflict with one another. This timeline catalogues some of the major ISIS attacks and counter-ISIS operations from 2017 to February 2022.
The UN Security Council is considering renewing an understanding whereby UN agencies transport aid to Idlib, an area held by Syrian rebels. In this Q&A, Crisis Group experts Richard Gowan, Dareen Khalifa and Ashish Pradhan explain why the arrangement remains essential.
This week on Hold Your Fire! Richard Atwood talks to experts Dareen Khalifa and Jerome Drevon about ISIS in Syria after the death of its leader Abdullah Qardash, the precarious calm that prevails across the country and the evolution of al-Qaeda’s former affiliate in the north west, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
Aleppo was devastated by bombing and shelling during the Syrian war. It remains unsafe, with residents subject to shakedowns by the regime’s security forces and various militias. Damascus and its outside backers should curb this predation as a crucial first step toward the city’s recovery.
Turkey is increasingly relying on airpower in its fight against the PKK. New parties have been drawn into the conflict as it spreads to new theatres in Iraq and Syria, which, for now at least, complicates potential efforts to settle things down.
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