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Homepage > Regions / Countries > Middle East & North Africa > Iraq, Iran & the Gulf > Yemen > Yemen’s Southern Question: Avoiding a Breakdown

Yemen’s Southern Question: Avoiding a Breakdown

Middle East Report N°145 25 Sep 2013

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Yemen is at a critical juncture. Its six-month National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was to have closed on 18 September, ushering in constitution drafting, a constitutional referendum and new elections. The timetable has slipped, and, though no end date has been set, there is an understandable urge among many international and some domestic actors to stick closely to agreed deadlines, wrap up the NDC negotiations and finish the transition to-do list. But despite progress, there is no broad-based, implementable agreement on the state’s future structure, and thus on the South’s status. Worse, such a result is unlikely to emerge from the current dialogue, even with a short extension. A rush to declare victory and complete the transition checklist could mean forcing through an outcome without necessary legitimacy or buy-in. It would be better to agree to a time-limited delay of the referendum, put in place modified transitional arrangements and ensure the next round of negotiations is in concert with confidence-building measures and includes a wider, more representative array of Southern voices.

How to structure the state arguably has become the most complicated and divisive political issue and must be a key component of any new constitution and durable political settlement. Parties have presented a wide array of options: from the current unitary system, through multi-region federalism, to two-state federalism (one entity in the North, the other in the South). Even this broad spectrum fails to include what, in the South, has turned into an increasingly attractive rallying cry: the demand for immediate independence.

Indeed, the question of the state’s structure inevitably is tied to the so-called Southern issue, shorthand for the political, economic and social demands emanating from the South, which had been an independent state prior to 1990. There, a loosely aligned mix of organisations and activists, known as the Southern Movement (Hiraak), is calling for separation or, at a minimum, temporary two-state federalism followed by a referendum on the South’s future. Separatist sentiment is running high and appears to have strengthened over the course of the transition.

To an extent, the NDC has made advances. It helped launch a healthy and overdue public debate over the roots of the Southern problem and began the consideration of potential outcomes. But the conference faced severe limitations. Debate in Sanaa is far removed from the increasingly separatist Southern street. Within the NDC, discussion of solutions, bereft of detail, was squeezed into the last two months of negotiations. Although consensus appears to be forming around a federal structure, critical elements remain unresolved: how to define administrative boundaries; redistribute political authority; and share resources. Even a general agreement will be hard to achieve. It will require bridging the yawning gap between Hiraak delegates, who demand a three-year transition under two-part federalism in order to rebuild the Southern state in advance of an ill-defined referendum on the South’s future status, and staunch pro-unity advocates, who passionately reject this option.

Garnering popular support for any eventual agreement will be more challenging still. The Hiraak delegation suspended its participation for nearly three weeks, complaining that negotiations were biased against it; even that delegation hardly is representative of broader and more militant Hiraak sentiment. Only a small slice of the Hiraak – many enjoying close ties to President Abdo Robo Mansour Hadi – agreed to join the NDC. The bulk of the movement chose to stay on the sidelines of talks they deemed illegitimate.

The South’s lack of faith in the NDC process perhaps was inevitable, but it has been exacerbated by the absence of genuine measures to improve security and economic conditions in the region. Government promises notwithstanding, little has changed, further undercutting those Southerners willing to negotiate and providing fodder to those for whom the only way out is separation.

As the time for reaching an agreement nears, all parties appear to be digging in their heels. The Hiraak NDC delegation demands significant concessions, arguing that anything short of two-state federalism and/or a promise to organise a referendum on the South’s future status is unacceptable; leaders from the former ruling party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), and from the predominant Islamist party, Islah, flatly refuse either prospect, clinging to the notion of a federal model with multiple administrative units. Each has made bets on the effect of competing political pressures: the former believe that their more militant rank and file will force the North to move toward them; the latter wager that Hadi’s interest in overseeing a successful transition will lead him to impose a compromise on his Hiraak allies. Both cannot be right, and middle ground remains elusive.

Then there are those on the outside. Most Hiraak members bank on the negotiations’ failure, due to inability to reach a substantive compromise or, if it comes to it, lack of implementation on the ground. They vow to escalate protests and a civil dis­obedience campaign, regardless of NDC decisions, until they achieve independence. A constitutional referendum would provide a focal point for their opposition, triggering a boycott and likely violence. The result would be to further undermine the transition’s legitimacy.

If Yemen hopes to forge a more stable future, it desperately needs to agree on the basic question of its state structure. That much is clear. But it does not mean forcing through a final settlement in circumstances where basic trust, legitimacy and consensus are lacking. That would be more than a fragile state, fragmented country and fractured political class could handle. It likely would further discredit the process, strengthen more militant Southern views and provoke dangerous brinkmanship and bloodshed. The goal instead should be a broad-based agreement that only continued, more inclusive negotiations in the context of improved security and economic conditions potentially can achieve.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To NDC participants, the Yemeni government and international supporters of the transition (including the UN special envoy, U.S., UK, GCC, EU and member states):

1.  Define success of the NDC as reaching agreement on some issues, while others (notably the question of state structure) remain unresolved, save perhaps for broad principles, and discussions continue.

2.  Agree on extended transitional arrangements, such as:

a) a time-limited delay of the constitutional referendum and subsequent elections;

b) confidence-building measures for the South (including, inter alia, addressing employment and land grievances; improving security conditions; and devolving greater financial and administrative responsibility to local government), along with a clearly defined implementation timeline, mechanism, funding and oversight;

c) formation of a technocratic government until elections are held;

d) continued negotiations either on the broad matter of the state’s structure or – if agreement on those principles is reached – on its details; and

e) inclusion of a wider set of Southern activists in negotiations to be held without preconditions, especially Hiraak leaders inside and outside the country.

To the Gulf Cooperation Council states:

3.  Play a more active facilitation and, possibly, mediation role, along with the UN, in continuing negotiations.

To the Hiraak:

4.  Join, in the case of those presently not participating in the NDC, any extended negotiations without preconditions, raising the option of independence for debate.

5.  Continue efforts to develop a coherent leadership structure, with special attention to promoting the younger generation.

6.  Curb provocative rhetoric that pits South against North.

To the General People’s Congress party and Islah:

7.  Support an extension of negotiations over the issue of state structure without preconditions and with a wider range of Hiraak activists.

8.  Emphasise positive aspects of unity and federal arrangements publicly, rather than oppose separation on principle or underscore its negative consequences.

Sanaa/Brussels, 25 September 2013

 
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