English Español English Loading video Visual Explainer U.S. Sanctions, Peacemaking and Reform The U.S. is using sanctions more than ever before to further peace and security goals. But these tools are not cost-free. Sanctions sometimes hinder violence prevention and conflict resolution. SCROLL Share Facebook Twitter Email SCROLL Table of Contents A Timeline of Sanctions Key Figures Action Under the Biden Administration Conclusion and Recommendations Share Facebook Twitter Email ENGLISH Türkçe Chinese French Published September 2023 Sanctions have become a key U.S. foreign policy tool Statecraft in the 20th century periodically featured economic coercion, but the use of economic sanctions accelerated after the Cold War ended. In recent decades, they have emerged as a key instrument of U.S. foreign policy – and a main component of Washington’s responses to crises and conflicts. Protesters call for sanctions against Russia during a demonstration the day before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. REUTERS / Peter Nicholls Key moments shaped U.S. sanctions history Click on a dot to jump to a key moment in sanctions history or click on the orange arrows below to navigate in time from 1945 to the present. 26 Jun 1945 UN Charter The UN Charter adopted reforms to the international legal system in 1945, enabling the UN Security Council to mandate sanctions that might previously have been understood as a violation of neutrality and an act of war. 26 Feb 1949 Export Control Act Congress restricts exports to the Soviet Union and its European allies. 3 Feb 1962 Cuba embargo President John F. Kennedy proclaims an embargo on trade between the United States and Cuba, which remains in place today. 28 Dec 1977 International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) Congress enacts IEEPA with the aim of limiting the president’s power to declare a national emergency. However, future presidents use the act liberally to declare the national emergencies that underpin most U.S. sanctions programs. 6 Aug 1990 The “sanctions decade” With the imposition of sanctions on Iraq by the UN Security Council, the “sanctions decade” begins. The Council proceeds to impose sanctions on the former Yugoslavia (1991, 1992, 1998), Libya (1992), Liberia (1992), Somalia (1992), parts of Cambodia (1992), Haiti (1993), parts of Angola (1993, 1997, 1998), Rwanda (1994), Sudan (1996), Sierra Leone (1997 and 2000), Afghanistan (1999) and Eritrea (2000). It had imposed sanctions only twice previously, in Rhodesia (1966) and South Africa (1977). Scholars David Cortright and George A. Lopez coin the phrase “sanctions decade” in their 2000 book with that title. 8 Oct 1997 First Foreign Terrorist Organizations are listed The U.S. secretary of state, in consultation with the attorney general and secretary of the Treasury, designates the first fourteen foreign terrorist organizations. The designations block access to assets, impose immigration restrictions and make it a criminal offence to provide the groups with material support. Among the groups listed in this first tranche are al-Qaeda, Hizbollah and Hamas. 3 Dec 1999 The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act President Bill Clinton signs into law the Kingpin Act, which becomes the primary authority for applying U.S. sanctions to combat international drug trafficking. The act addresses the drug trade globally; earlier counternarcotics sanctions efforts focused on groups in Colombia. 23 Sep 2001 Executive Order 13244 The attacks of 11 September 2001 prompt a series of innovations in the use of sanctions, as U.S. officials expand the toolkit of economic coercion to address terrorism threats to the homeland and to U.S. interests abroad. Through Executive Order 13244, the Bush administration creates a new mainstay authority for terrorism-related sanctions, enabling U.S. officials to freeze the assets of individuals and groups who commit, or threaten to commit, acts of terrorism, as well as their supporters. 28 Jan 2002 “Smart sanctions” Mindful of the harmful effects on civilians when sanctions are imposed on entire economies and populations, policymakers increasingly choose “smart sanctions” – a term that scholars David Cortright and George A. Lopez coin in their book on targeted sanctions, published on 28 January 2002. “Smart sanctions” are selective penalties devised to put pressure on specific groups and individuals. 15 Sep 2005 Sanctions on Banco Delta Asia The U.S. Treasury designates this Macau-based bank for its support for the North Korean government, and the bank collapses soon thereafter. Financial institutions around the world take note of the high potential costs of doing business with states under heavy U.S. sanctions. 1 Jul 2010 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act Congress passes sanctions legislation targeting foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate transactions that support Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or its support for international terrorism. Three years later, in 2013, Congress passes the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act, which significantly expands the scope of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s energy, shipping and shipbuilding sectors. More sanctions on Iran follow. 6 Mar 2014 Executive Order 13660 President Barack Obama signs Executive Order 13660, authorising sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and for stealing the assets of the Ukrainian people. The U.S. also limits technology transfers to Russia and imposes other economic restrictions. 17 Dec 2014 Sanctions relaxation for Cuba President Obama orders the restoration of diplomatic relations with Cuba. Sanctions easing follows, with executive branch sanctions lifted and, significantly, Cuba removed from the State Sponsor of Terrorism list. 16 Jan 2016 The Iran nuclear deal comes into effect The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known as the Iran nuclear deal, comes into effect. Iran agrees to curb its nuclear program in return for significant easing of sanctions by the U.S. and other signatories to the deal. 23 Dec 2016 Global Magnitsky Human Rights and Accountability Act Congress gives the president authority to impose targeted sanctions on any foreign person who has committed or enabled acts of corruption or gross violations of human rights. The act allows the executive branch to sanction corrupt actors and human rights abusers without having to declare a national emergency by invoking IEEPA. 20 Jan 2017 "Maximum pressure" sanctions President Donald Trump assumes office. During his presidency, he launches “maximum pressure” campaigns that combine sabre rattling with sanctions to pursue non-proliferation and political goals in North Korea and Iran as well as to press for regime change in Venezuela. He reimposes sanctions on Cuba and Iran that had been lifted during the Obama presidency. 20 Dec 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act President Trump signs into law new sanctions legislation targeting institutions and individuals with certain ties to the conflict in Syria, including actors located outside of Syria. The legislation is named after an individual known as Caesar, who documented industrial-scale torture of civilians by the government of President Bashar al-Assad. 18 Oct 2021 Treasury Sanctions Review Following the election of President Joe Biden, who takes office in January 2021, the Department of the Treasury releases the results of a broad review of the economic and financial sanctions that it administers and enforces. It also issues recommendations for preserving and enhancing the sanctions’ effectiveness in supporting national security and U.S. interests. 9 Dec 2021 UN Security Council Resolution 2664 The U.S. champions a landmark UN Security Council resolution that establishes a humanitarian carveout from certain Council sanctions. Soon thereafter, the U.S. Treasury promulgates a series of general licences that not only implement the Council’s humanitarian carveout in Treasury-administered sanctions programs but also authorises carveouts from those programs for peacebuilding, conflict resolution and conflict prevention activities. 22 Feb 2022 The U.S. imposes sweeping sanctions on Russia The U.S. imposes sweeping sanctions on Russian financial institutions, sovereign debt and elites two days before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. When the war begins on 24 February 2022, the U.S. – together with Western and other partners – ramps up its sanctions significantly and subsequently adds to this baseline as fighting continues. 1945 26 Jun 1945 UN Charter Read More 1949 26 Feb 1949 Export Control Act Read More 1962 3 Feb 1962 Cuba embargo Read More 1977 28 Dec 1977 International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) Read More 1990 6 Aug 1990 The “sanctions decade” Read More 1997 8 Oct 1997 First Foreign Terrorist Organizations are listed Read More 1999 3 Dec 1999 The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act Read More 2001 23 Sep 2001 Executive Order 13244 Read More 2002 28 Jan 2002 “Smart sanctions” Read More 2005 15 Sep 2005 Sanctions on Banco Delta Asia Read More 2010 1 Jul 2010 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act Read More 2014 6 Mar 2014 Executive Order 13660 Read More 2014 17 Dec 2014 Sanctions relaxation for Cuba Read More 2016 16 Jan 2016 The Iran nuclear deal comes into effect Read More 2016 23 Dec 2016 Global Magnitsky Human Rights and Accountability Act Read More 2017 20 Jan 2017 "Maximum pressure" sanctions Read More 2019 20 Dec 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act Read More 2021 18 Oct 2021 Treasury Sanctions Review Read More 2021 9 Dec 2021 UN Security Council Resolution 2664 Read More 2022 22 Feb 2022 The U.S. imposes sweeping sanctions on Russia Read More Today, U.S. sanctions affect more people, in more places, than ever More than 0 Individuals, groups and firms are on the U.S. Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals list. 0 THEMATIC AND COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SANCTIONS are administered by the U.S. Treasury Source: U.S. Treasury 0 jurisdictions where individuals and entities fall under U.S. sanctions Source: Gibson Dunn 0 PER CENT OF ALL SANCTIONS IMPOSED WORLDWIDE SINCE 1950 HAVE BEEN IMPOSED BY THE U.S. Source: Global Sanctions Database - Drexel University Más acerca de este mapa El mapa muestra ubicaciones relacionadas con actores sancionados en la lista de Nacionales Especialmente Designados del Departamento del Tesoro de EE. UU., es decir, individuos y entidades que actúan en nombre de países señalados o designados en virtud de programas que no son específicos de un país, al 19 de agosto de 2023. El mapa no captura las ubicaciones de los muchos actores que aparecen en otras listas, como aquellos sujetos a controles de exportación estadounidenses, programas de sanciones administrados por el Departamento de Estado y otras listas de sanciones del Departamento del Tesoro. La ubicación está determinada por las direcciones que corresponden a esos actores. Un país catalogado como “bajo” tiene de 0 a 100 direcciones vinculadas a actores sancionados; un país catalogado como “medio” tiene entre 100 y 1000 direcciones vinculadas a actores sancionados; y un país catalogado como “alto” tiene más de 1000 direcciones vinculadas a actores sancionados. En algunos casos, los actores sancionados están vinculados a más de una dirección en más de un país. Hide Why have sanctions become so popular as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy? In the realm of peace and security, there are four main reasons why policymakers use them The U.S. sanctioned the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Osama Bin Laden, who led al-Qaeda. REUTERS / Russell Boyce-Files Restricting resources Washington uses sanctions to restrict the access of belligerents and other dangerous actors to weapons, money and other resources. For example, sanctions have been a key part of U.S. efforts to deprive al-Qaeda of money and resources. The 9/11 hijackers had used bank accounts in their own names to finance the attacks, and policymakers sought to prevent a future actor from doing the same. Washington’s sanctions in response to the Ukraine crisis explicitly aim to constrain Moscow’s resources for fighting the war in Ukraine, among other goals. U.S. officials note that sanctions restrict access to advanced technologies, compromising Russia’s ability to modernise its military and degrading its fighting capability. A drone attack destroyed this Kyiv building in October 2022. U.S. officials say sanctions make it harder for Moscow to obtain drones and other weapons. AFP / Yasuyoshi Chiba Russian whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky exposed government misconduct, was imprisoned and died in detention. The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act expanded U.S. capacity to use sanctions against corrupt actors and human rights abusers. VOA / via Wikimedia Foundation Addressing abuses U.S. policymakers use sanctions to confront corruption and serious human rights abuses. They often have the overlapping goals of punishing abusers, signalling that their behaviour is transgressive and deterring them and others from committing additional crimes. In the absence of other means for bringing such “bad actors” to justice, they see sanctions as “vehicles of accountability”. Officials and civil society actors also see using sanctions as a way to champion journalists, human rights defenders and others who have risked their lives to shed light on abuses. Raising the cost of destablising behaviour U.S. officials use sanctions to signal their priorities in crisis settings and heighten the consequences for those who oppose them. They impose sanctions to complement diplomacy and other measures by creating a consequence that is intended to affect the calculations of foreign actors engaged (or potentially engaged) in behaviour that Washington wishes to discourage. A Western official told Crisis Group, “A message is forgotten; sanctions stick” Joseph Kabila, president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, greets supporters on 30 September 2018 in Kinshasa. The U.S. used sanctions in an effort to deter him from running for an unconstitutional third term. AFP / John Wessels Pushing negotiations forward U.S. officials use sanctions to nudge parties in conflict toward negotiations and to keep talks that are already under way on track. They levy them as part of efforts to create momentum toward negotiations, or in existing ones, counting on the idea that the reward of sanctions lifting will be an incentive to the parties. Diplomats involved in putting together the Iran nuclear deal said sanctions helped get Iran to the table. According to them, sanctions encouraged Iran to join the negotiations, remain in the talks and make concessions. Delegates gather in Vienna to discuss the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on 19 October 2015. AFP PHOTO / Dieter Nagl But sanctions sometimes obstruct peacemaking – that is, violence prevention and conflict resolution activities As a former fighter put it, “We weren’t affected by sanctions in the war, but we were affected in peace” While sanctions have found favour as a tool that allows the U.S. government to pursue policy objectives in conflict settings without the blood and treasure required for military campaigns, these tools are not cost-free. Some of the downsides manifest themselves as impediments to peacemaking priorities, including Washington’s own. Inhibiting post-conflict recovery and peace process implementation Even though the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a peace deal with the Colombian authorities in 2016, the group remained designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization until 2021. Sanctions made it harder for former rebels to integrate into society as had been envisioned by the 2016 peace deal. Some former fighters said sanctions posed less of a problem for them during their decades-long guerrilla campaign than after they demobilised. As a former fighter put it, “We weren’t affected [by sanctions] in the war, but we were affected in peace”. A former FARC member walks on the outskirts of a demobilisation site where former guerrillas were relocated after the peace deal. She told Crisis Group of the difficulties she faced in adjusting to civilian life. CRISIS GROUP / Delaney Simon For example, after the peace deal, 1,500 of the 13,000 demobilised FARC fighters signed up to remove mines they had planted during the war. But they did not receive the landmine removal training or the certificates required for them to begin, due to concerns that providing these would violate U.S. laws. Former combatants told Crisis Group that certification delays pushed several of their peers to leave demining projects, lose hope in the peace process and rejoin armed groups. Landmine removal stalled. Sanctions can also impede efforts to encourage private-sector investment in post-conflict situations. Investors often lack the confidence to enter markets where sanctions exist or where sanctions were recently lifted in part or in full. In these settings, said a former U.S. official, sanctions “hang over the country like a black cloud”. U.S. sanctions affected the calculations of many companies that were active in Afghanistan before the Taliban takeover. They pulled out of the country despite the general licences published by the U.S. permitting extensive private-sector transactions as part of efforts to stave off state collapse. Sanctions can inflict a heavy toll. Poverty has forced Afghan children to scavenge for scrap metal, often from the bombs dropped by U.S. and NATO aircraft. Explosions from leftover bombs kill and injure about 80 children per month, according to the UN. Stefanie Glinski Undercutting negotiations Sanctions can only help bring parties to the table, and provide leverage when they get there, if negotiators can credibly promise meaningful and enduring sanctions relief. But too often, U.S. negotiators cannot persuade the parties that such pledges are within their purview – and, indeed, they rarely are. Take the case of Iran. Tehran was reluctant to re-enter the 2015 nuclear deal after the U.S. reneged on its promises of sanctions relief three years later. Iranian negotiators feared that the benefits of any deal involving sanctions relief would be short-lived, given the risk that a future president might exit an agreement once again. Sudan offers another example. In 2016, the Obama administration used the promise of sanctions relief to motivate Sudan to cooperate on counter-terrorism, humanitarian access, and other topics. While Khartoum appeared to satisfy most of the conditions that were set for it, Washington slow-rolled the sanctions relief that was supposed to be Khartoum’s reward, and Sudanese officials accused U.S. diplomats of backtracking on their commitments. While the Trump administration eventually lifted some sanctions in 2017, a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation lingered until 2020. It remained even after enormous protests in 2019 led to the ouster of President Omar al-Bashir, whose actions had motivated many of the sanctions in the first place. Entrenching divisions U.S. sanctions also sometimes reinforce tensions with targeted groups, individuals and countries in a way that is difficult to reverse even when the circumstances underlying the sanctions have changed. For example, sanctions can complicate U.S. diplomatic outreach to sanctions targets because they end up shaping policy decisions on whether to engage in such outreach. At the furthest end of the spectrum, sanctions – especially terrorism sanctions – can even go so far as to help cement rationales for the use of force although, legally, sanctions are unrelated to force authorisations. The designation of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the Trump administration may have played a subtle role in the strike on the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani by conditioning the national security bureaucracy to think of Corps members in the same light as ISIS and al-Qaeda, both Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and ultimately to use the same tools to counter them. Sanctions can hinder peacemaking for many reasons, but a few stand out 1. They are hard to change U.S. sanctions are sticky: they are hard to change, ease or lift because of domestic politics and bureaucratic inertia. The stickiness poses challenges for peacemaking, as officials struggle to use sanctions as effective leverage in peace negotiations and find peace-related policy goals difficult to achieve when sanctions backfire or outlive the circumstances that prompted them. 2. There is no system for comprehensive evaluation Washington has no system for comprehensively assessing sanctions’ costs or effectiveness – and thus the U.S. cannot gauge whether they are helping or hurting efforts to achieve the peace and security goals in whose name they were imposed. 3. They are increasingly complex The U.S. sanctions policy infrastructure has ballooned, as have the legal mechanisms that underpin it. Today’s sanctions are so numerous, grounded in so many different legal authorities, and overseen by so many different parts of the U.S. government that they are hard to understand, untangle, rescind or reform. The size of sanctions programs can vary greatly Más sobre esta gráfica Esta gráfica muestra la cantidad de personas, grupos y empresas designadas bajo diferentes programas de sanciones estadounidenses. Sólo incluye los objetivos de sanciones que figuran en la lista de Nacionales Especialmente Designados del Departamento del Tesoro estadounidense al 19 de agosto de 2023. No refleja designaciones bajo otros programas de sanciones, como los administrados por el Departamento de Estado o el Departamento de Comercio, o individuos o entidades en otras listas de sanciones del Departamento del Tesoro aparte de la lista de Nacionales Especialmente Designados. Varios programas que se aplican al mismo país se agregan a una única referencia de programa. Por ejemplo, las personas incluidas en la Orden Ejecutiva 13687 relacionada con Corea del Norte y la Ley de Mejora de Sanciones y Políticas de Corea del Norte de 2016 se cuentan una vez, en “Corea del Norte”. Las personas y entidades se cuentan una vez si figuran en varios programas que se aplican al mismo país, y más de una vez si figuran varias veces en diferentes programas que no se han agregado en una referencia de programa de país. Por ejemplo, el Banco Central de la República Islámica de Irán (Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran) se cuenta dos veces pero figura en cuatro programas. Se cuenta bajo el programa de sanciones “Irán”, pero entra en el ámbito de tres autoridades sancionadoras diferentes relacionadas con Irán (“Irán”, “IRGC” e “IFSR”) y bajo el programa no específico de país “Terrorista Global Especialmente Designado”. Hide Many parts of the U.S. government play a role in sanctions policy Various government bodies are responsible for conceptualising, implementing or enforcing sanctions. President Biden has taken landmark steps to address sanctions’ downsides Among other measures, the Biden administration has: 1. Commissioned a review of U.S. sanctions policy; 2. Co-sponsored a resolution at the UN Security Council to create a carveout for humanitarian activities in some Council sanctions; 3. Issued general licences (through the Treasury Department) that implemented and expanded on these carveouts – broadening them to cover peacebuilding, conflict resolution and conflict prevention activities. Official White House Photo by Adam Schultz But recent reforms do not solve the problems that sanctions cause for peace and conflict resolution Serious measures to modify the way sanctions are used will be needed in order to put this powerful tool to best use in the service of peace and security. The U.S. government could: 1. Clarify which foreign policy objectives sanctions are intended to achieve, what behaviour prompted the sanctions, and what sanctioned parties can do to be removed from the sanctions lists; 2. Review sanctions’ performance, including their impact on peacemaking, and recalibrate them as needed; 3. Codify sanctions carveouts in legislation so that peacemaking activities are permanently allowed; 4. Better address private-sector reluctance to do business in sanctioned or previously sanctioned countries. Conclusion Sanctions have enduring importance as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy – one that Crisis Group has supported in many instances. As U.S. officials consider Washington’s response to wars and crises, they will almost certainly continue to reach for a powerful lever readily at hand. But sanctions’ utility will be undermined if policymakers do not also address the downsidesas they relate to peacemaking. As it stands, sanctions too often impede talks, hinder conflict resolution efforts and post-conflict recovery, and limit the work of peace organisations, including those working to advance U.S. policy goals, often with U.S. funding. The costs of these failures tend to be most keenly felt in places where the stakes for regional and global peace and security are highest – in war zones and post-conflict settings. Bryan Olin Dozier / NurPhoto / NurPhoto via AFP Related Content Statement 18 March 2022 Avoiding an Even Worse Catastrophe in Ukraine Podcast 21 January 2021 U.S. Sanctions: An Overused Foreign Policy Tool? Statement 29 June 2015 South Sudan: No Sanctions without a Strategy Report 25 February 2013 Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions Change is possible, but it will require a concerted commitment to reform. U.S. policymakers have already shown an important interest in reforming sanctions to make them more effective and to better manage their collateral effects. But much more needs to be done. Serious measures to modify the way sanctions are assessed, calibrated and removed – and their after-effects addressed – will be needed in order to put this powerful tool to best use in the service of peace and security. For an in-depth look into the issues addressed above, see Crisis Group’s report, Sanctions, Peacemaking and Reform: Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers. The report is a product of more than three years of research in Ankara, Bogotá, Brussels, Caracas, Dubai, Geneva, Harare, Idlib, Istanbul, Kabul, Kinshasa, London, Mogadishu, New York, Tripoli, Tunis, Washington and elsewhere. It draws on hundreds of interviews with current and former U.S. officials, diplomats, practitioners, experts, civil society representatives, conflict parties, lawyers and financial service providers, as well as Crisis Group’s body of previous work on sanctions in conflict settings. 4 October 2022 “In some places, peacebuilding organisations simply cannot function unless they work with service providers that are sanctioned”. Speaking at the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission of the U.S. House of Representatives Delaney Simon Senior Analyst, U.S. Program
26 Jun 1945 UN Charter The UN Charter adopted reforms to the international legal system in 1945, enabling the UN Security Council to mandate sanctions that might previously have been understood as a violation of neutrality and an act of war.
26 Feb 1949 Export Control Act Congress restricts exports to the Soviet Union and its European allies.
3 Feb 1962 Cuba embargo President John F. Kennedy proclaims an embargo on trade between the United States and Cuba, which remains in place today.
28 Dec 1977 International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) Congress enacts IEEPA with the aim of limiting the president’s power to declare a national emergency. However, future presidents use the act liberally to declare the national emergencies that underpin most U.S. sanctions programs.
6 Aug 1990 The “sanctions decade” With the imposition of sanctions on Iraq by the UN Security Council, the “sanctions decade” begins. The Council proceeds to impose sanctions on the former Yugoslavia (1991, 1992, 1998), Libya (1992), Liberia (1992), Somalia (1992), parts of Cambodia (1992), Haiti (1993), parts of Angola (1993, 1997, 1998), Rwanda (1994), Sudan (1996), Sierra Leone (1997 and 2000), Afghanistan (1999) and Eritrea (2000). It had imposed sanctions only twice previously, in Rhodesia (1966) and South Africa (1977). Scholars David Cortright and George A. Lopez coin the phrase “sanctions decade” in their 2000 book with that title.
8 Oct 1997 First Foreign Terrorist Organizations are listed The U.S. secretary of state, in consultation with the attorney general and secretary of the Treasury, designates the first fourteen foreign terrorist organizations. The designations block access to assets, impose immigration restrictions and make it a criminal offence to provide the groups with material support. Among the groups listed in this first tranche are al-Qaeda, Hizbollah and Hamas.
3 Dec 1999 The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act President Bill Clinton signs into law the Kingpin Act, which becomes the primary authority for applying U.S. sanctions to combat international drug trafficking. The act addresses the drug trade globally; earlier counternarcotics sanctions efforts focused on groups in Colombia.
23 Sep 2001 Executive Order 13244 The attacks of 11 September 2001 prompt a series of innovations in the use of sanctions, as U.S. officials expand the toolkit of economic coercion to address terrorism threats to the homeland and to U.S. interests abroad. Through Executive Order 13244, the Bush administration creates a new mainstay authority for terrorism-related sanctions, enabling U.S. officials to freeze the assets of individuals and groups who commit, or threaten to commit, acts of terrorism, as well as their supporters.
28 Jan 2002 “Smart sanctions” Mindful of the harmful effects on civilians when sanctions are imposed on entire economies and populations, policymakers increasingly choose “smart sanctions” – a term that scholars David Cortright and George A. Lopez coin in their book on targeted sanctions, published on 28 January 2002. “Smart sanctions” are selective penalties devised to put pressure on specific groups and individuals.
15 Sep 2005 Sanctions on Banco Delta Asia The U.S. Treasury designates this Macau-based bank for its support for the North Korean government, and the bank collapses soon thereafter. Financial institutions around the world take note of the high potential costs of doing business with states under heavy U.S. sanctions.
1 Jul 2010 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act Congress passes sanctions legislation targeting foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate transactions that support Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or its support for international terrorism. Three years later, in 2013, Congress passes the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act, which significantly expands the scope of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s energy, shipping and shipbuilding sectors. More sanctions on Iran follow.
6 Mar 2014 Executive Order 13660 President Barack Obama signs Executive Order 13660, authorising sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and for stealing the assets of the Ukrainian people. The U.S. also limits technology transfers to Russia and imposes other economic restrictions.
17 Dec 2014 Sanctions relaxation for Cuba President Obama orders the restoration of diplomatic relations with Cuba. Sanctions easing follows, with executive branch sanctions lifted and, significantly, Cuba removed from the State Sponsor of Terrorism list.
16 Jan 2016 The Iran nuclear deal comes into effect The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known as the Iran nuclear deal, comes into effect. Iran agrees to curb its nuclear program in return for significant easing of sanctions by the U.S. and other signatories to the deal.
23 Dec 2016 Global Magnitsky Human Rights and Accountability Act Congress gives the president authority to impose targeted sanctions on any foreign person who has committed or enabled acts of corruption or gross violations of human rights. The act allows the executive branch to sanction corrupt actors and human rights abusers without having to declare a national emergency by invoking IEEPA.
20 Jan 2017 "Maximum pressure" sanctions President Donald Trump assumes office. During his presidency, he launches “maximum pressure” campaigns that combine sabre rattling with sanctions to pursue non-proliferation and political goals in North Korea and Iran as well as to press for regime change in Venezuela. He reimposes sanctions on Cuba and Iran that had been lifted during the Obama presidency.
20 Dec 2019 Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act President Trump signs into law new sanctions legislation targeting institutions and individuals with certain ties to the conflict in Syria, including actors located outside of Syria. The legislation is named after an individual known as Caesar, who documented industrial-scale torture of civilians by the government of President Bashar al-Assad.
18 Oct 2021 Treasury Sanctions Review Following the election of President Joe Biden, who takes office in January 2021, the Department of the Treasury releases the results of a broad review of the economic and financial sanctions that it administers and enforces. It also issues recommendations for preserving and enhancing the sanctions’ effectiveness in supporting national security and U.S. interests.
9 Dec 2021 UN Security Council Resolution 2664 The U.S. champions a landmark UN Security Council resolution that establishes a humanitarian carveout from certain Council sanctions. Soon thereafter, the U.S. Treasury promulgates a series of general licences that not only implement the Council’s humanitarian carveout in Treasury-administered sanctions programs but also authorises carveouts from those programs for peacebuilding, conflict resolution and conflict prevention activities.
22 Feb 2022 The U.S. imposes sweeping sanctions on Russia The U.S. imposes sweeping sanctions on Russian financial institutions, sovereign debt and elites two days before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. When the war begins on 24 February 2022, the U.S. – together with Western and other partners – ramps up its sanctions significantly and subsequently adds to this baseline as fighting continues.