UN personal envoy carried on with diplomacy in bid to find common ground aimed at returning to formal talks.

UN Sec-Gen’s Personal Envoy to Cyprus Maria Holguin Cuellar conducted third round of visits to stakeholder countries since Jan. After meetings in Turkish capital Ankara 6 May, Holguin said Turkish FM Hakan Fidan was “willing to listen with an open mind”. Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar 8 May refused to hold trilateral meeting with Holguin and Republic of Cyprus President Christodoulides unless “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) is considered separate and sovereign entity. After briefly meeting Tatar 13 May, Holguin expressed her surprise at Tatar’s refusal to entertain trilateral meetings and reiterated her wish to pursue formal talks until end of her mandate in July. Holguin 13 May met Greek FM Gerapetritis in Greek capital Athens who said Greece was exerting all its influence to bring about trilateral meeting on Cyprus. Tatar 15 May revealed he insisted on “direct flights, direct trade and direct contact” in addition to recognition of “TRNC’s” equal sovereignty as preconditions for return to formal talks. Christodoulides 15 May said sole aim of his govt was return to talks.

Military continued strikes on Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq and northern Syria ahead of expected summer operation in Iraq, while President Erdoğan hosted Greek counterpart in capital Ankara.

Operations against PKK continued in northern Iraq and northern Syria. In northern Iraq, amid ongoing preparations for larger-scale operation in summer, military targeted PKK positions and militants in Hakurk, Gara and Qandil regions; PKK IED attack 22 May killed Turkish soldier in northern Iraq. Defence Minister Yaşar Güler 3 May said military had observed via drones that PKK militants were crossing into Iran after conducting attacks on Turkish forces. Güler 13 May said Bafel Talabani, head of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party in Sulaymaniyah, was “preparing his own end” due to alleged ties with PKK (see Iraq). In northern Syria, defence ministry 10 May claimed it “neutralised” seven “PKK/People’s Protection Units (YPG)” militants. 

Authorities targeted alleged Islamic State (ISIS) members. Police during May detained at least 330 individuals, including one Iraqi national on Interpol’s notice list, suspected of ties to ISIS. Notably, police 14 May detained 44 individuals in Şanlıurfa province (south east) and 20 May detained twenty individuals in Izmir city (west). 

Diplomatic engagement with Greece continued. Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis 13 May met President Erdoğan in capital Ankara to discuss bilateral issues, trade ties, progress on “positive agenda” and confidence-building measures; Erdoğan described meeting as “very productive, constructive and cordial” and that there were “no problems that cannot be resolved”, while Mitsotakis confirmed “bilateral relations were growing in a more positive context”. Sides continue to focus on improving ties in areas of trade and other fields of mutual interest.

Republika Srpska (RS) announced participation in October poll under state-level Election Law; UN adopted resolution on Srebrenica.

RS announced participation in local elections. Ruling coalition of self-governing entity RS 21 May confirmed participation in 6 Oct local elections supervised by Central Electoral Commission, meaning election will be held in accordance with state-level Electoral Law. Move de-escalated rising tensions between entity and High Representative Christian Schmidt over latter’s 26 March amendments to state-level election law. Still, Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik 21 May said decision to participate in poll “does not mean the recognition” of any of Schmidt’s powers and promised RS would apply entity-level Election Law in 2026 general election, which RS National Assembly adopted in April but which is being reviewed by local authorities amid concerns about constitutionality. 

UN approved resolution commemorating Srebrenica. UN General Assembly 23 May voted in favour of resolution declaring 11 July as “International Day of Reflection and Remembrance of the 1995 Srebrenica Genocide”. Dodik same day announced RS govt would send proposal on “peaceful disassociation” to Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity within 30 days; U.S. embassy next day warned move “is dangerous, irresponsible, anti-Dayton, and puts the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and multi-ethnic character of BiH at risk”.

Pristina closed six Serb bank offices in north, while govt faced setback in its bid to join Council of Europe.

Talks over currency issue stalled as Pristina closed branches of Serbian bank. EU 15 May announced that Kosovo and Serbia chief negotiators had failed to reach compromise on currency issue following Central Bank’s 1 Feb decision to ban Serbian dinar, primary currency used among Kosovo Serbs. Days later, Kosovo Police 20 May closed six branches of Serbia-run bank in four northern municipalities, saying move sought “to establish order and legality”. Serbia’s Minister of Internal Affairs Ivica Dačić same day decried move as “terror against Serbian people” and warned such actions could lead to “new conflicts in the Balkans”. EU 21 May said closures were “escalatory” and went “against the spirit of normalisation”. 

Kosovo faced setback in bid to join Council of Europe (CoE). CoE’s executive body, Committee of Ministers, 16-17 May held meeting but did not make decision on Kosovo’s membership to human rights body; FM Gervalla-Schwarz 17 May criticised move and accused Serbia of “lobbying campaign against Kosovo’s membership”. Earlier, Italy, France and Germany 15 May sent letter to PM Kurti stating membership was conditional on govt taking steps toward creating Association of Serb-majority Municipalities — which would enable greater autonomy for Serb municipalities.

Peace talks with Azerbaijan continued, protests against border delimitation deal spread to capital, and relations with Russia remained strained.

Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process saw more positive momentum. Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process gained momentum following border agreement in April, in which Yerevan agreed to return four villages to Baku, with leaders from both sides expressing optimism about signing peace deal by Nov climate conference (COP29) in Azerbaijan. Notably, PM Pashinyan 14 May said “the time has come” to sign deal; earlier, Azerbaijani President Aliyev 23 April said “it is absolutely realistic to reach an agreement… before COP29”. Country’s FMs 10-11 May held talks in Kazakh city Almaty. Countries’ border delimitation commissions 15 May held their ninth meeting, signed protocol confirming demarcation of section of their northernmost border as per April agreement; Baku 24 May assumed control of four villages, with troops from both sides responsible for protecting their respective sections of newly demarcated border segment. 

Protests against border deal led by Archbishop Galstanyan continued. Protests that erupted in Tavush region in response to border deal continued. Archbishop Galstanyan of Tavush Diocese emerged as prominent leader of movement, 4 May instigating march from Tavush to capital Yerevan. Church backed demonstrations, with Supreme Spiritual Council 7 May urging govt to heed protesters’ demands. Upon reaching Yerevan, tens of thousands 9 May converged at Republic Square, where Galstanyan called for govt’s resignation; protests continued in following days, leading to hundreds of arrests amid confrontations with police. Following brief lull, thousands 26 May attended demonstration in Yerevan where Galstanyan reiterated his intention to challenge Pashinyan and declared readiness to lead new interim government. Parliament speaker Alen Simonian 21 May condemned Church for meddling in politics, suggesting govt may take steps to limit its involvement. 

Relations with Russia cooled further. Pashinyan and Russian President Putin 8 May agreed on withdrawal of Russian border guards from several regions in Armenia and Zvartnots International Airport; Foreign Ministry 7 May announced Armenia will cease financial contributions to Russia-led military alliance, Collective Security Treaty Organization; and Kremlin 24 May recalled its ambassador to Armenia for consultations, but gave no reason for move.

Georgia descended further into crisis over ‘foreign influence’ legislation as protests expanded and opponents faced violence and intimidation; foreign partners condemned law.

Legislature approved ‘foreign influence’ bill. Parliament 14 May approved controversial law on ‘Transparency of Foreign Influence’, which requires NGOs and media outlets that receive over one fifth of their funding from abroad to register as organisations representing foreign interests. President Zourabichvili 18 May vetoed law, which parliament 28 May voted to override, paving way for speaker to sign bill into law.

Unrest in streets deepened as activists faced violence. Mass protests, led primarily by young people, continued in capital Tbilisi and spread to other cities amid fears legislation will lead to crackdown on media freedom and civil liberties – vital issues ahead of Oct parliamentary election. Police responded harshly to demonstrators, while activists, opposition politicians and journalists faced beatings and intimidation from unidentified assailants, including physical assaults and threatening phone calls; activists claimed authorities orchestrated actions. 

Efforts to reverse legislation extended beyond streets. On domestic front, President Zourabichvili 26 May proposed roadmap out of crisis, dubbed “Georgian Charter”, inviting fractious opposition parties to unite under one bloc to take on Georgian Dream in Oct elections; if successful at polls, provisional govt made up of opposition representatives would be established, tasked with enacting pro-EU reforms and scheduling early elections in 2025. Group of NGOs 30 May announced intention to contest legislation at Constitutional Court. On international front, U.S. Sec-State Antony Blinken 23 May announced visa restrictions on number of govt officials, while EU High Representative Josep Borrell 28 May warned law “will negatively impact Georgia’s EU path”.

Kobakhidze met Turkish leader in Ankara. PM Kobakhidze 16 May met with Türkiye’s President Erdoğan in Turkish capital Ankara, during which pair signed Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation.

President Putin questioned legitimacy of Ukraine’s leader following his own inauguration, Moscow held tactical nuclear weapons drills with Minsk, and West imposed more punitive measures. 

Putin reshuffled govt following inauguration. President Putin was inaugurated 7 May for fifth presidential term and began reshuffling govt. Notably, Kremlin 12 May announced First Deputy PM Andrei Belousov would replace Sergei Shoigu as Defence Minister. Belousov – an experienced economist and technocrat – is expected to control military spending and fight corruption. 

Putin claimed Zelenskyy could no longer be considered Ukraine’s legitimate leader. Putin 24 May said “legitimacy of the current head of state (in Ukraine) has ended”, referencing expiration of President Zelenskyy’s term on 20 May, extended under martial law. Announcement is part of Russian campaign to delegitimise Zelenskyy as head of state with whom Kremlin will negotiate end to the war. Earlier, Ukraine’s state security service 7 May announced investigators had foiled Russian plot to assassinate Zelenskyy. Meanwhile, Ukraine escalated strikes on border regions in response to Russian offensive in Kharkiv region (see Ukraine); notably, residential building in Belgorod 12 May partially collapsed following missile attack, killing seventeen. Reports emerged late May that U.S President Biden had given Ukraine green light to use U.S. weapons on Russian soil to defend Kharkiv. 

Moscow and Minsk conducted tactical nuclear weapon drills. While Russia conducts regular strategic nuclear weapons drills, Moscow 21 May launched tactical nuclear drills with Belarus close to Ukrainian border for first time since collapse of Soviet Union. Ministry of Defence 6 May said Putin ordered drills in response to “provocative statements and threats by certain western officials”, including those by French President Macron in Feb on sending troops to Ukraine. Meanwhile, U.S. Space Command 21 May reported Russia 16 May launched counterspace weapon capable of inspecting and attacking other satellites.

West imposed more punitive measures. U.S. imposed more sanctions, while EU countries 21 May adopted plan to use windfall profits from frozen Russian central bank assets for Ukraine; Putin 23 May signed decree allowing seizure of U.S. assets in Russia in response to any U.S. seizure of Russian assets. EU 27 May set up new sanctions framework targeting human rights violations in Russia.

Moscow and Minsk conducted joint tactical nuclear drills, crackdown on dissent continued, and Poland pushed to fortify border.

Belarus conducted nuclear drills with Russia. Defence Ministry 7 May conducted surprise inspection of army’s readiness to deploy tactical nuclear weapons. Checks came after Russian President Putin day prior announced joint tactical nuclear weapons drills with Belarus beginning 21 May; move, according to Russian Ministry of Defence, was in response to comments from Western officials about possible troop deployments to Ukraine (see Russia). Meanwhile, Russia 25 May transferred at least ten aircrafts to Belarus for “joint flight tactical exercise” held 27-31 May. 

Crackdown on dissent continued. Notably, Investigative Committee of Belarus 16 May initiated criminal cases against 104 opposition activists in exile for attending 25 March ‘Belarus Freedom Day’, which commemorates country’s 1918 proclamation of independence but which is banned by regime; as part of investigation, authorities same day announced raids and seizures of activists’ property. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 20 May condemned Minsk’s treatment of political prisoners, and warned regime is “increasingly targeting those who have fled the country”.

Poland moved to fortify eastern border with Belarus and Russia. Poland’s PM Donald Tusk 18 May announced Warsaw would invest $2.5bn to strengthen security and deterrence along western border, said move sought to stave off rising threat from Belarus and Russia.

Parliament voted to hold EU membership referendum alongside presidential elections in Oct, while govt deepened defence cooperation with EU.

Parliament 16 May voted to hold EU membership referendum on 20 Oct 2024, same day as presidential elections in which Maia Sandu is seeking re-election. Meanwhile, Chișinău 21 May signed security and defence partnership with EU, first country to sign such a pact with bloc, according to High Representative Josep Borrell. EU gave few details about agreement, but according to media outlet Financial Times, it will see Moldova step up intelligence sharing, conduct joint military drills and “be included in the bloc’s joint weapons procurement”. U.S. Sec-State Antony Blinken 29 May announced $135mn in aid to Moldova to bolster energy security and combat Russian disinformation.

Moscow intensified attacks in north east, forcing Ukraine to reinforce troops amid likely easing of restrictions on use of western-supplied weapons inside Russia.

Russia stepped up attacks in north as fighting in east ground on. In north east, Russian forces 10 May launched ground assault into Kharkiv region, advancing 5-10km deep into Ukraine; attack marked Russia’s largest territory grab in eighteen months and displaced over 14,000 people. President Zelenskyy 10 May announced redeployment of troops, which helped stall offensive; still, speed of Russian advance indicated defensive lines along northern frontier are at best porous and likely non-existent in some areas, which could mean further Russian probes of weak spots, as with reported troop concentration near Sumy city, forcing Ukraine to keep troops redeployed from east stationed there. Russian President Putin 17 May claimed offensive’s aim was to create “sanitary zone” to protect Belgorod region. In east, Ukrainian troops struggled to hold embattled Chasiv Yar in Donetsk region; fall of strategically important town would bring fight near urban hubs of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. Meanwhile, military 2 May said Russian forces gained foothold in Ocheretyne town, moving frontline near Pokrovsk city, primary logistics hub in west Donetsk.

Russian airstrikes continued as Ukraine targeted Crimea. Russia continued striking energy infrastructure in bid to exploit Ukraine’s degraded air defence before effects of $61bn U.S. aid package set in. Kyiv launched drone and missile strikes in Russian-annexed Crimea; notably, missiles 15-17 May likely destroyed three fighter jets at Belbek airbase. Meanwhile, NATO Sec-Gen Jens Stoltenberg 24 May urged NATO allies to consider lifting restrictions on use of western-supplied weapons on “legitimate military targets on Russian territory”. Reports emerged late May that U.S. President Biden had given Ukraine green light to use U.S. weapons on Russian soil to defend Kharkiv.

In important international developments. EU member states 8 May reached deal to use interest generated from frozen Russian Central Bank assets for Ukraine, while several European countries pledged additional military support. Over fifty of the 160 invited countries confirmed attendance at peace conference 15-16 June in Switzerland, including India; Biden will likely skip conference. 

Mob attack in capital prompted hundreds of foreign students to leave Kyrgyzstan, concerns about free speech continued, and incident occurred at Kyrgyz-Tajik border.  

Mob attack in capital Bishkek triggered exodus of foreign students. Hundreds of Kyrgyz youths 17 May stormed hostel in Bishkek and attacked foreign students, including Pakistanis and Indians, following 12-13 May brawl in student dormitory between Kyrgyz youths and Pakistani nationals. Violence injured dozens, prompted hundreds of Pakistani students to leave Kyrgyzstan and triggered diplomatic tensions with Pakistan and India. Bishkek 22 May announced arrest of six Kyrgyz and four foreign citizens for suspected involvement in 12 May incident.

Watchdog condemned media censorship. Media watchdog Reporters Without Borders 3 May published its annual World Press Freedom Index, warning that media censorship has intensified “in a spectacular mimicry of Russian repressive method” in Kyrgyzstan, among other countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Meanwhile, Alamu district court 14 May sentenced journalist and govt critic Oljobai Shakir to five years in prison for inciting “mass unrest”.

Incident occurred at border with Tajikistan. State Committee for National Security 7 May said security forces fired warning shots at Tajik shepherds, who had crossed border into Batken region to graze their livestock and reportedly thrown stones at military; Kyrgyz and Tajik border services next day issued statement saying sides had organised meeting in Batken to discuss ways to prevent further such incidents. 

Incident occurred at Kyrgyz-Tajik border.  

Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security 7 May said security forces fired warning shots at Tajik shepherds, who had crossed border into its Batken region to graze their livestock and reportedly thrown stones at military; Kyrgyz and Tajik border services next day issued statement saying sides had organised meeting in Batken to discuss ways to prevent further such incidents. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy 24 May urged Central Asian leaders to attend peace summit in Switzerland in June (see Ukraine).

Tashkent signed regional deal on energy systems with Baku and Astana; Russian President Putin visited Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan 1 May signed memorandum of understanding (MoU) in capital Tashkent to link their power grids; MoU aims to ensure integration of energy systems and efficient use of renewable energy sources. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy 24 May urged Central Asian leaders to attend peace summit in Switzerland in June (see Ukraine). Two days later, Russian President Putin 26 May travelled to Uzbekistan for two-day visit; President Mirziyoyev 27 May announced Russia would build Central Asia’s first nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan, one of several agreements signed during meeting between the two leaders.

Israel launched long-feared Rafah offensive, displacing around 1m and exacerbating risk of famine, as international prosecutor sought arrest warrants for Israeli and Hamas leaders; domestic pressure mounted on Netanyahu.

Israel launched deadly and destructive offensive in Rafah. Israel killed over 1,700 Palestinians in May, bringing death toll since Oct to at least 36,224. Israeli forces 7 May launched ground invasion in eastern Rafah and gradually expanded assault into city, prompting around 1m of 1.4m seeking refuge there to flee; Israel same day occupied Rafah crossing and closed all humanitarian aid deliveries, worsening famine conditions. World Food Programme 22 May warned humanitarian operations are “near collapse”. International Court of Justice 24 May ordered Israel to halt Rafah offensive yet Israel continued advance; Israeli strike in Rafah 27 May killed at least 45, including many women and children. Alleged Israeli strike next day targeted camp in so-called “safe zone” hosting displaced in al-Mawasi, killing at least 21. Exchange of fire with Egyptian forces at border crossing 27 May killed Egyptian soldier; Israel 29 May announced full control of 14km “Philadelphi Corridor” along Gaza-Egyptian border (see Egypt). Meanwhile, Israel continued ground incursions in north, namely Jabalia city and areas around Gaza city, where Hamas demonstrated its ability to regroup and battle Israeli forces in areas previously “cleared”. Hamas 3-6 May launched attacks on Kerem Shalom crossing, killing four Israeli soldiers, and 26 May launched first rockets at Tel Aviv since Jan. Gaza’s authorities 8 May announced discovery of seventh mass grave of Palestinian bodies at a hospital.

Israel rejected ceasefire; International Criminal Court (ICC) mulled leaders’ arrest. Hamas 6 May accepted Qatar- and Egypt-mediated ceasefire proposal, which Israel 8 May rejected. ICC prosecutor Karim Khan 20 May sought arrest warrants against Israeli PM Netanyahu, Defence Minister Yoav Gallant and three Hamas leaders.

Israel’s war cabinet faced widening cracks. Gallant 15 May criticised Netanyahu for failure to provide “day-after” Gaza plan. War cabinet member Benny Gantz 18 May criticised Netanyahu for acting in personal interests and 30 May proposed vote to dissolve parliament to bring elections.

Israel raided West Bank and battled Hizbollah. In West Bank, Israeli forces conducted deadly raids and demolitions, displacing hundreds, and settlers continued attacks. Tit-for-tat strikes with Hizbollah remained intense (see Lebanon).

Hizbollah and Israel continued to trade heavy cross-border blows, underscoring risk of expanded conflict; EU bolstered financial support as security forces cracked down on Syrians amid surging anti-refugee sentiment.

Border clashes between Hizbollah and Israel continued. Lebanon continued to face spectre of all-out war, as Hizbollah expanded territorial range of attacks and deployed more sophisticated weaponry. Notably, Hizbollah missile attack 14 May killed Israeli civilian and injured five soldiers. Hizbollah 15 May struck Israel’s Tel Shamayim military base, some 35km from border – marking group’s deepest strike inside Israel since Oct 2023. Hizbollah 16 May launched Russian-made air-to-surface rockets from drone for first time. Israeli airstrike 5 May killed four civilians in Mays al Jabal town. Israel 18 May said it killed around 300 Hizbollah personnel since Oct; strikes, however, appear to have had little discernible impact on group’s offensive capabilities. Israeli airstrikes 26 May killed at least eight across south; Hizbollah same day reportedly responded by launching over 150 missiles at Israeli targets. Harsh rhetoric and warnings of escalation continued. Hizbollah’s chief Hassan Nasrallah 13 May said fighting would continue as long as war in Gaza persists, reiterating Hizbollah’s months-long position (see Israel/Palestine). Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 8 May warned of “hot summer” in border region. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich 20 May said Israel should threaten to occupy southern Lebanon if Hizbollah does not withdraw north of Litani river. 

Crackdown on Syrian refugees intensified following EU financial support. Following upsurge in violence against Syrian refugees in April, and after Lebanon stopped taking back Syrian refugees crossing to Cyprus “illegally”, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides 2 May announced €1bn support package for refugee relief and migration control, much of which repackaged pre-existing funding commitments; announcement caused public outcry accusing EU of “bribing” Lebanon to permanently settle refugees. General Security 8 May announced measures to crack down on “illegal” Syrian refugees, including forced closure of shops and seizure of vehicles, adding to climate of fear among 1.5mn refugees. First “voluntary return” convoy of over 300 Syrian refugees 14 May left Lebanon, as human rights organisations warned of increased forced deportations.

Opposition to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) rule continued in east as Islamic State (ISIS) staged attacks, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) cracked down on protesters, and tensions surfaced among Türkiye-aligned groups.

In east, Iran-backed groups contested SDF rule, as ISIS escalated strikes. Amid months-long tensions between SDF and Arab tribes backed by govt and Iran, new militia Saraya al-Bu Shaaban 5 May joined uprising against SDF. SDF leader Mazlum Abdi same day met leaders from Baggara and al-Aqidat tribes to discuss regional security and administration. Meanwhile, Islamic State (ISIS) killed dozens; notably, 3 May killed fifteen National Defence Forces members near al-Sukhna town, Homs province. Car bomb 10 May killed three SDF members in al-Shuhayl. ISIS ambush 21 May killed three govt soldiers in Homs province.

In north west, HTS quashed protests; rifts surfaced between Turkish-backed forces. Protests 17 May erupted across towns in Idlib province demanding release of detainees and for HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani to step down; HTS cracked down with unprecedented force, injuring 36 in Binnish city, sixteen in Idlib city, and ten in Jisr al-Shughour city. Elsewhere, clashes between factions of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army broke out: fighting between Jaysh al-Islam and Ahrar Olan 7 May killed two in Al-Bab city, Aleppo province. Türkiye 10 May announced neutralising seven Kurdistan Workers’ Party militants (see Türkiye).

In south, Israel continued airstrikes. Israeli airstrike 2 May injured eight soldiers in Najha town. In response to missile launched from Nawa area towards occupied Golan Heights, Israel 5 May shelled launch area, killing govt forces member. Israeli airstrike 20 May killed at least six pro-Iran militants in Qusayr city, Homs province.

Govt appointed new loyalists to security and administrative positions. In ongoing effort to shore up control, govt 10 May appointed new heads of branches of Air Force Intelligence agency and 12 May appointed new governors in Rif Dimashq, Deir ez-Zor, Hama, and Suwayda provinces. President Assad 16 May attended 33rd Arab League Summit in Bahrain and discussed inter-Arab cooperation in meeting with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

President Raisi and FM Amir-Abdollahian were killed in helicopter crash, nuclear watchdog’s chief visited Tehran amid transparency concerns, and deterrence with Israel held after April escalation.

Helicopter crash killed President Raisi and FM Amir-Abdollahian. Govt 20 May confirmed helicopter crash in north-western Iran previous day killed President Raisi and FM Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, as well as six others. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei approved VP Mohammad Mokhber in executive branch caretaker capacity while preparations get underway for presidential elections set for 28 June; Amir-Abdollahian’s deputy Ali Bagheri-Khan, lead interlocutor on nuclear negotiations, took over as acting FM. Following 1 March elections and 10 May run-off votes, which saw hardline victory and record low turnout, new parliamentarians 27 May took seats; Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was re-elected as speaker.

Amid transparency concerns, nuclear watchdog’s chief visited Iran. Director General of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi 6-7 May travelled to Iran, met with senior officials and “proposed set of concrete practical measures for revitalisation of 4 March 2023 Joint Statement” aiming to restore confidence and increase transparency in Iran’s nuclear program, which continues to advance; Grossi also noted Iran’s willingness to cooperate rather than continue divergent course risking “more escalation […] including war”, but noted “huge question mark about what they are doing and why they are doing it” and criticised “loose talk about nuclear weapons” among senior officials. It remained unclear how much progress was made ahead of next IAEA Board of Governors meeting 3-7 June.

Regional tensions simmered; West imposed more sanctions. After April’s unprecedented escalation between Iran and Israel, pair refrained from further direct hostilities; however, Iran-backed Iraqi armed groups claimed over two dozen missile and drone attacks against Israel during May, while Israeli strikes in Syria persisted and exchanges between Houthis and U.S.-led forces in and around Yemen continued apace (see Iraq, Syria and Yemen). Meanwhile, Australia 14 May sanctioned total of eight persons and entities, including Iran’s defence minister and commander of Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force. Council of EU next day announced expansion of sanctions on Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) activity to include “persons and entities supplying, selling or otherwise being involved in transferring Iran’s missiles”.

Iran-backed armed groups targeted Israel, Turkish airstrikes on Kurdish militants persisted, and Islamic State (ISIS) attacks killed several soldiers; govt requested end to UN assistance mission.

Iran-backed groups maintained regional pressure on Israel. Following unprecedented escalation between Iran and Israel in April, Tehran-aligned Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed over two dozen drone and missile attacks on Israel, including cities of Tel Aviv, Haifa, Eilat, Ashkelon as well as Nevatim military base; attacks proved ineffectual. Israeli military 30 May reported interception of cruise missile, likely launched from Iraq, aimed at Israel-occupied Golan Heights.

Türkiye targeted Kurdish militants; Kurdistan leader made rare visit to Iran. Amid ongoing preparations for potential large-scale operation in summer, Türkiye carried out airstrikes targeting alleged Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Hakurk, Gara and Qandil regions of Kurdistan region, claiming to have killed dozens of PKK members (see Türkiye); PKK IED attack 22 May killed Turkish soldier. Kurdistan President and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Nechirvan Barzani 5 May arrived in Iranian capital Tehran, meeting President Raisi and Supreme Leader Khamenei; meetings sought to normalise ties and overcome historic tensions. Barzani sought Iran’s support to delay Kurdistan regional elections, reflecting KDP’s perceived disadvantage vis-à-vis its rival after Supreme Court annulled eleven quota seats under de facto control of KDP.

ISIS staged deadly attacks. In deadliest ISIS attack in months, group 13 May killed six soldiers in Mutaibijah town between Salah al-Din and Diyala governorates. ISIS 15 May killed one soldier in al-Dibis district, Kirkuk governorate; 22 May killed one between Diyala and Salah al-Din provinces.

Govt requested end of UN assistance mission in Iraq (UNAMI). Govt 12 May confirmed PM Sudani had requested that UN Sec-Gen end UNAMI mandate by end of 2025, arguing mission established in 2003 is no longer necessary for political stability; minority groups opposed decision given UNAMI’s role in resolving territorial disputes and tensions over budget between Erbil and Baghdad. Meanwhile, parliament 18 May convened to elect speaker of parliament for second time since Nov but failed to award either of top nominees required simple majority; brawl between two opposing Sunni MPs ended session prematurely.

Negotiations over Saudi-U.S. defence pact inched ahead.

Bilateral deal with U.S. appeared to advance. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman 19 May met U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan in Dhahran city to discuss bilateral agreements on nuclear energy, defence and security cooperation, reportedly in exchange for Riyadh limiting Chinese investment and arms purchases; U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 22 May said agreements “could be weeks away”. Regional dimension that includes Saudi Arabia’s normalisation with Israel and pathway to Palestinian statehood remained stalled amid Israel’s reluctance to end war in Gaza and withdraw from territory – Riyadh’s reported requirements for normalisation (see Israel/Palestine).

In other important developments. In sign of ongoing rapprochement with Iran, Saudi ambassador to Iran 6 May attended International Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology in Iranian city Isfahan to discuss plans to work together to develop peaceful nuclear energy. FM Prince Faisal bin Farhan 2 May held phone calls with leaders of Sudanese warring parties and promised to resume expanded Jeddah talks including Gulf and African actors (see Sudan).

Houthis announced fourth phase of escalation in Red Sea crisis, while military build-up and clashes with govt forces along frontlines in Marib and Sana’a provinces pointed to possible offensive and escalation.

Houthis announced new phase of strikes on international shipping. Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi 2 May announced new round of attacks on international shipping, citing Israeli and U.S. “intransigence” (see Israel/Palestine); group next day said Houthis would target ships heading to Israel regardless of their nationality, including in Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, potentially threatening alternative Cape of Good Hope route used by shipping companies. Houthis 18 May struck Panama-flagged, Greek-owned oil tanker in Red Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. and UK continued strikes on Houthi targets: notably, 2 May reportedly targeted Houthi-controlled Hodeida airport. Houthis 17 May claimed downing U.S. drone over Marib province and 21 May claimed destroying another over al-Bayda province. Houthis 27 May announced missile attacks on three commercial ships and two U.S. destroyers in Indian Ocean and Red Sea; U.S. said group fired five anti-ship ballistic missiles. U.S. and UK forces 30 May struck thirteen Houthi targets in three areas of Hodeida; Houthis claimed attacks killed sixteen.

In north, Houthi and govt forces clashed in Marib. Despite de facto truce, Giants Brigades (aligned with govt) and Houthis 17 March clashed on southern Marib governorate front following Houthi attacks on govt forces in Marib’s Harib district; both sides sent reinforcements to consolidate positions, including districts in Sana’a governorate bordering Marib. Govt forces are preparing for Houthi offensive that may seek to seize oil sites in Marib to address economic hardship facing group and pre-empt potential U.S./Western support to govt forces as Red Sea crisis persists.

In south, Southern Transitional Council (STC) clashed with Houthis and Al-Qaeda. STC 18 May accused Houthis of launching drone attack on STC military position in Abyan province. STC and Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula 11, 16 and 17 May clashed.

In Aden, security forces cracked down on protesters. Govt security forces 13-14 May cracked down on hundreds of demonstrators protesting electricity cuts in Aden city, 15 May deployed armoured vehicles across city. 

Peace talks with Armenia continued, death of Iranian president raised concerns in Baku about impact on rapprochement, and relations with France deteriorated further.

Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process saw more positive momentum. Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process gained momentum following border agreement in April, in which Yerevan agreed to return four villages to Baku, with leaders from both sides expressing optimism about signing peace deal by Nov climate conference (COP29) in Azerbaijan. Notably, Armenian PM Pashinyan 14 May said “the time has come” to sign deal; earlier, President Aliyev 23 April said “it is absolutely realistic to reach an agreement… before COP29”. Country’s FMs 10-11 May held talks in Kazakh capital Almaty. Countries’ border delimitation commissions 15 May held their ninth meeting, signed protocol confirming demarcation of section of their northernmost border as per April agreement; Baku 24 May assumed control over four villages, with troops from both sides responsible for protecting their respective sections of newly demarcated border segment. 

Death of Iranian officials overshadowed Azerbaijan-Iran rapprochement. Helicopter carrying Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi 19 May crashed in Iran, killing Raisi and other Iranian officials who were returning from inauguration of Qiz Qalasi and Khoda Afarin dams at Iran-Azerbaijan border alongside Aliyev. Meeting between the two leaders had marked important step forward after Jan 2023 attack on Azerbaijani Embassy in Iran’s capital Tehran. Concern rose in Azerbaijan that Raisi’s death could jeopardise rapprochement; Aliyev 21 May visited Iranian embassy in capital Baku, offered condolences and expressed hope that agreements reached during meeting with Raisi would be honoured.

In important international developments. French Interior Minister Gerald Darmanin 16 May accused Azerbaijan of aggravating unrest in New Caledonia, special overseas collectivity of France, which has seen weeks of protests by indigenous Kanak population (see New Caledonia); Baku same day denied allegation. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 1 May signed memorandum of understanding in Uzbek capital Tashkent to link power grids for better-integrated energy systems.

Security situation in south west sharply deteriorated amid violent armed group attacks on state targets and clashes between rival FARC dissident factions.

FARC dissident violence escalated along Pacific coast. Clashes between security forces and splinter group of dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) faction known as EMC accelerated along Pacific Coast, leaving dozens dead. Argelia municipality (Cauca department) witnessed multiple clashes early May as military tried to seize control of Caño de Micay trafficking corridor. EMC 20 May launched series of coordinated assaults against state targets in south west: fronts in Cauca attacked police station in Morales town, while bomb exploded in Jamundí town (Valle de Cauca department). Security forces throughout May warned of EMC expansion into previously calm departments of Tolima and Quindío. Meanwhile, skirmishes 24 May erupted between rival EMC factions, Frente 57 and Dagoberto Ramos, in rural area of Toribío municipality (Cauca), apparently linked to Frente 57 offensive to capture Indigenous lands in Tacueyo and San Francisco. 

Peace efforts with ELN struggled as group clashed with rival outfits. Govt and ELN 25 May signed agreement in Venezuelan capital Caracas, charting roadmap for public participation in peace talks. Accord generated cautious optimism at tense moment in negotiations. Notably, ELN 6 May said it would restart kidnapping for ransom, while confrontations with other armed groups escalated, likely impacting ELN’s calculations at talks. Insurgency faced pressure from Gaitanista Army of Colombia (EGC) (previously Gaitanista Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) in southern Bolívar state, one of ELN’s gold mining strongholds, with UN 14 May reporting significant civilian harm due to clashes. Local front Comuneros del Sur 7 May also announced separation from ELN and participation in dialogue initiative in Nariño department as separate organisation, reflecting broader trend toward armed group fragmentation across Colombia.

EGC sought to capture Sierra Nevada mountains. EGC accelerated push to seize Sierra Nevada mountains, Magdalena Department (north), from local outlet known as ‘Los Pachenos’; control of area would provide key strategic refuge for group, and connect trafficking route from Atlantic coastline to Venezuelan border. UN 6 May said skirmishes confined 300 members of ethnic Wiwa population.

President Noboa announced state of emergency to counter criminal violence as probes into official corruption continued; govt closed consulates in Mexico. 

Noboa decreed state of emergency in seven provinces. Criminal violence remained high in drug trafficking hotspots, such as Guayas and Manabí provinces. Notably, in Guayas, authorities in port city of Guayaquil 9 May recorded nineteen violent deaths, including massacre of six people in neighbourhood of Nueva Prosperina district, one of Ecuador’s most violent areas; and in canton of Durán, local gang 14 May killed six. In Manabí, attackers 25-26 May killed seven across Manta, Montecristi and Jaramijó cities. President Noboa 22 May declared state of emergency in Guayas, El Oro, Santa Elena, Manabí, Sucumbios, Orellana and Los Rios provinces, as well as one area of Azuay province, citing rise in violent deaths and other crimes. Meanwhile, anti-corruption efforts continued. Notably, Police and Prosecutor’s Office 14 May arrested seven police officers and two civilians for their possible participation in corruption network that marketed and transported fuel used in illegal mining. 

Fallout with Mexico over embassy raid continued. Relations with Mexico continued to deteriorate after latter severed ties with Quito over embassy raid and arrest of former VP Jorge Glas in April. Foreign Ministry 16 May closed its consulates in Mexico, having late April announced it was filing lawsuit against Mexico before International Court of Justice for granting Glas asylum. FM Sommerfeld 28 May expressed willingness for dialogue, which Mexico’s FM next day rejected.

Authorities cancelled invitation to EU election observation mission, dealing major blow to hopes of relatively free and fair poll, as opposition and govt campaigning gained momentum.

Govt-controlled election authority rejected EU election observation mission. National Electoral Council (CNE) President Elvis Amoroso 28 May announced it had withdrawn its invitation to EU to send observation mission for July presidential poll, arguing it would be ‘immoral” to allow EU participation given its “neo-colonial practices and interventionism”. Govt-controlled National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez had previously urged authority do this, saying that while govt was committed under Oct 2023 Barbados Agreement to invite EU observers, this was conditional on impartiality and respect for Venezuelan sovereignty, and claimed it was “evident that the European Union favours the candidate of the United States” (referring to opposition coalition Unitary Platform’s candidate, Edmundo González); Rodríguez cited EU’s 13 May decision to maintain all individual sanctions except those targeting several current and former CNE members. CNE’s move indicated govt may be planning to tighten conditions ahead of poll. 

Unitary Platform launched ‘double-headed’ election campaign. Govt and opposition campaigned hard throughout May as elections drew closer. Unitary Platform’s original candidate, María Corina Machado, who is banned from standing for elected office, urged voters at well-attended rallies to support González, who does not have political infrastructure to engage in an intense campaign of his own. Pair 18 May appeared in public together for first time at rally in La Victoria town, González’ birthplace, amid concerns he is perceived to be under Machado campaign’s control. As in other places Machado has campaigned, ruling party same day held parallel rally in La Victoria.

Oil companies scrambled to obtain licences following partial sanctions snapback. After U.S. announced in April that it would not renew General Licence 44, under which Venezuela could sell oil and gas on open market, U.S. Treasury Department 22 May announced up to 50 firms had requested individual licences to continue doing business with state oil corporation PDVSA, which is permitted under new GL-44a licence. 

Authorities renewed state of exception and sought to prosecute alleged MS-13 gang members en masse; human rights organisations criticised late April amendment to constitution. 

Authorities once again renewed state of exception. Legislative Assembly 9 May extended state of exception for 30 days, while National Defence Minister Rene Merino Monroy 14 May said authorities had arrested over 80,000 gang members since measure’s inception. President Bukele 25 May announced deployment of over 3,000 security officers to several neighbourhoods of Apopa city amid allegations of gang activities. Attorney General’s Office made multiple requests throughout month to try thousands of alleged Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang members in various groups, where they would be jointly prosecuted for crimes such as money laundering, illegal possession of firearms and drug trafficking. Concerns about human rights continued, with NGO Humanitarian Legal Aid 27 May announcing they had registered 301 deaths in state custody. 

Human rights organisations criticised constitutional amendment. Multiple human rights groups criticised late April amendment to Article 248 of Constitution, which allows a single legislature to pass constitutional reforms with two thirds of vote, rather than two separate Legislative Assemblies. Notably, Amnesty International 6 May warned amendments “could undermine human rights in the future and limit people’s opportunities to participate in public affairs”. Group of citizens 13 May urged Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice to declare reform unconstitutional. Observers have predicted Assembly may next authorise indefinite presidential re-election.

Silencing of civil society, political figures and religious groups continued; U.S. announced more sanctions on regime and affiliated companies.

Crackdown on dissent continued as authorities targeted Ortega’s brother. Retired general Humberto Ortega, President Ortega’s brother, 19 May called Ortega’s rule “dictatorial” during interview with news outlet Infobae; police same day reportedly surrounded his house and confiscated his devices, 21 May announced instalment of medical unit, in move critics say amounts to house arrest. Meanwhile, repression of civil society and religious freedom continued. According to U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s annual report published 1 May, Nicaragua was one of seventeen countries designated as “of particular concern” due to “severe violations of religious freedom”. Ortega regime 2 May closed fifteen NGOs, including four affiliated with evangelical church, 21 May disbanded fifteen more; govt 13, 24 May prohibited public processions in honour of Catholic saints. 

U.S. imposed new sanctions. U.S. 15 May introduced new sanctions against regime and affiliated companies for human rights abuses and complicity in migrant smuggling. It imposed visa restrictions on over 250 govt members for “supporting attacks on human rights”, and sanctioned two mining companies and Russian-operated military training centre in capital Managua, which it said has helped govt crackdown on civil society. U.S. Departments of State, Homeland Security and Treasury 15 May issued international alert to airlines and charter flight companies, warning about exploitation of transportation services by migrant trafficking networks. 

U.S. removed Cuba from list of countries not fully cooperating on counterterrorism efforts. 

U.S. State Department 15 May removed Cuba from list of countries deemed uncooperative on counterterrorism efforts, known as Not Fully Cooperating Countries (NFCC) list; other countries include North Korea, Iran, Syria and Venezuela. Justifying decision, State Department cited resumption of law enforcement cooperation between Washington and Havana in 2023, and Colombia’s decision to suspend arrest warrants for National Liberation Army commanders living in Cuba (meaning Havana was no longer refusing to collaborate with Bogotá on extradition requests). Cuba, however, remains designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. FM Bruno Rodríguez same day welcomed removal from NFCC list but urged U.S. to end “Cuba’s arbitrary and unjust inclusion in the list of State sponsors of terrorism”.

Kenya’s president announced security mission would begin deploying in June, raising risk of violent gang response; Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) named Gary Conille as Prime Minister. 

Violence continued, with gangs notably targeting police stations. In bid to block deployment of Kenya-led security mission, gang alliance known as Viv Ansanm continued their attacks in capital Port-au-Prince and other cities, displacing thousands. Notably, UN humanitarian agency 4 May reported that 2 May attack on Delmas commune of Port-au-Prince forced over 3,700 people to flee. Gangs 10-11 May stormed police station in Gressier town, 20km south west of Port-au-Prince; police 12 May regained control, while International Organization for Migration next day said gang violence had forced around 4,500 residents from area. Gangs 17-18 May demolished Croix-des-Bouquets police station on northern outskirts of capital; 21 May torched police station in Cesselesse area. Gangs 21 May partially destroyed Martissant’s police station, 22-23 May demolished police station in Grand Ravine. Meanwhile, police 2 May reopened roads to Varreux oil terminal, blocked by gangs since 22 April; Toussaint-Louverture airport in Port-au-Prince 20 May reopened after nearly three-month closure.

Deployment of Kenya-led security mission in June could fuel violence. Preparations for multinational security mission continued, with Kenyan President Ruto 24 May announcing first batch of police would arrive in June despite hopes it would deploy around 23 May to coincide with his state visit to U.S. Contingent could be met with fierce gang attacks upon arrival.

TPC agreed on decision-making norms and chose new Prime Minister. Newly-established TPC late April-early May held negotiations after it emerged that four of the seven groups which make up body had agreed to always vote in unison and thus control council’s decisions. Majority bloc 7 May agreed to minimum of five votes for all major decisions, namely appointments to key posts, and five-month rotating presidency. Council 12 May issued call for candidates to take over from interim PM Michel Patrick Boisvert; TPC 28 May selected UN children’s agency regional director for Latin America and the Caribbean, Garry Conille, as new PM.

Anglophone region violence surged around National Day; election tensions continued to mount. 

Separatist tensions and violence escalated in North West (NW) and South West (SW). Ambazonia rebels and security forces heavily clashed in lead-up to 20 May National Day celebration, killing at least sixteen. Notably, govt forces 5 May targeted separatist strongholds in Ndop town (NW), eliminating prominent commander and two fighters. Separatists 10 May ambushed and killed six gendarmes near Mamfe town (SW) and 14 May clashed with soldiers in Bambui town (NW), killing at least four including two civilians. Govt forces 16 May killed four rebels in Kumbo town (NW), while separatist fighters same day killed two soldiers in Akwaya town (SW). On day of celebrations, suspected separatists 20 May assassinated mayor of Belo town (NW); separatist-imposed “ghost town” strikes 17-20 May paralysed business and movement in NW and SW. Meanwhile, former spokesperson of Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF) armed group, alias “Capo Daniel”, 4 May urged ceasefire and direct negotiations with Yaoundé; govt dismissed move while ADF denounced him as “traitor”.

Far North unrest continued. Boko Haram attacks persisted as Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) continued “Operation Lake Sanity II”, launched in April to reclaim territory. Fishermen 11-12 May clashed with JAS Bakura faction in three villages around Lake Chad, seizing guns and three motorbikes, casualties unknown. Jihadist militants 12 May carried out multiple attacks, including cattle rustling and abduction of at least two women in Djibrili village, Mayo-Tsanaga division. Meanwhile, govt forces 14 May announced rescue of 300 Boko Haram captives after week-long operation along northern border with Nigeria.

Tensions continued to mount in run-up to 2025 elections. Concerns over govt manipulation of election process grew as senior govt official 2 May cautioned electoral commission against inciting public voting drive amid calls from opposition politicians for mass registration to challenge President Biya; ruling party mayor 4 May halted registration process in a district of Yaoundé reportedly attended overwhelmingly by opposition supporters. Meanwhile, protests early May erupted in West region over alleged registration irregularities by ruling party, while pro-Biya demonstrators in South region 5 May blocked roads to hinder opposition activity.

Transitional justice efforts faced challenges as court issued arrest warrant for former president but govt dissolved reconciliation commission; insecurity persisted. 

Authorities’ transitional justice record remained mixed. President Touadéra 8 May ordered dissolution of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission (CVJRR), created as part of 2019 peace agreement between govt and fourteen armed groups; presidential decree remained unpublished so uncertainty persisted over whether move only removes current office holders or dismantles institution entirely. Communication Minister 14 May attributed dissolution to governance, operational and financial issues within CVJRR. Earlier, UN-backed Special Criminal Court 30 April issued warrant for former President Bozizé’s arrest for allegedly ordering crimes against humanity committed Feb 2009-March 2013 by army and presidential guard; NGO Human Rights Watch 3 May said move provided chance for Bozizé to “face justice” but presidential adviser Fidèle Gouandjika same day suggested warrant aims to incite ethnic tensions. President Umaro Embaló Sissoco of Guinea-Bissau, where Bozizé is in exile, 1 May said he would not extradite former president, citing lack of legal framework.

Climate of insecurity persisted against backdrop of intercommunal tensions. Intercommunal and rebel violence continued in hinterland, notably in south west. Suspected armed herders 5 May destroyed two churches in Boganangone town, Lobaye prefecture, resulting in unconfirmed number of casualties. Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) fighters 12 May attacked mining site in Gaga town, Ombella-M’Poko prefecture, killing four Chinese miners and injuring seven. Meanwhile, 100 ethnic Azandé fighters officially integrated into army 1 May after intensive training by Russian paramilitary Africa Corps, formerly Wagner Group, in Obo town, Haut-Mbomou prefecture; despite govt portraying step as improving army integration, militants reaffirmed tribal allegiance by calling themselves “Azandé Wagner”, while fears grew over group’s escalating tensions with Fulani-led armed group Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) in south east. U.S. 30 May imposed sanctions on two companies based in country for supporting “malign activities” of Russian paramilitaries. Meanwhile, risk of unrest grew in capital Bangui as security forces continued search operations in Muslim neighbourhood, which have resulted in arbitrary arrests since April.

President Déby secured election win amid reports of voting irregularities and repression of opposition, tightening grip on power.

Déby clinched victory, cemented his control despite opposition challenges. Following 5-6 May presidential polls, electoral authority 9 May declared Déby winner with 61% of vote, marking end of transition period; rivals including former PM Padacké and incumbent PM Masra initially contested results, filing unsuccessful appeals with Constitutional Court which 16 May certified results. Déby 17 May rejected calls for national unity govt, further isolating opposition, as Masra same day acknowledged defeat and 22 May resigned as PM; Déby inaugurated next day and appointed Allamaye Halina as PM; Halina 27 May announced new govt formed of pro-Déby ministers and no opposition members. 

International actors welcomed vote amid reports of irregularities and repression. As military deployed significant presence around polling stations and in major cities, security forces 6 May detained 79 Masra supporters over alleged fraud. Reports of electoral irregularities emerged with some polling stations inadequately equipped or opening late while opposition observers reported under-age voting and regime supporters confiscating ballot boxes. Meanwhile, independent election observers faced restrictions, with civil society 5 May and EU 7 May condemning denial of access for 2,900 trained observers. Following vote, canton chief and aide 10 May assaulted opposition activist in Koumra town, while opposition journalist same day reported intimidation from armed men in capital N’Djamena and later went into hiding. NGO Human Rights Watch 13 May expressed concerns over political repression and govt’s consolidation of power. International actors largely welcomed Déby’s election, however. Regional body Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 12 May congratulated Déby, as did French President Emmanuel Macron 17 May. U.S. 16 May acknowledged transition milestone but highlighted “troubling shortcomings”. Amid growing ties with Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin 14 May sent congratulatory message.

Banditry and herder-farmer-related insecurity persisted. Farmer and herder groups 9 May clashed in Lac-Iro area of Moyen-Chari region, killing at least five civilians and injuring others, after alleged cattle raid by herders. Governor of Ennedi-East region 17 May announced arrest of eight bandits on murder charges in Amdjarass city on Libyan border.

Security situation deteriorated amid series of deadly grenade attacks in Bujumbura that marked worst violence in city in recent years, as govt blamed rebel group.

Series of grenade attacks struck country’s largest city Bujumbura. Grenade 5 May detonated in Kamenge area in north of city, resulting in three deaths and eight injuries, although conflicting casualty reports emerged. Another attack struck city’s bus park 10 May, reportedly claiming six lives and leaving dozens wounded, but Interior Minister Pierre Nkurikiye refuted reports of any fatalities. Same day, attacker carried out grenade assault in Ngagara district, resulting in his injury and arrest. Nkurikiye 11 May accused RED-Tabara rebels, group reportedly backed by Rwanda, of orchestrating attacks with Rwandan and diaspora support; Rwanda 12 May issued statement dismissing involvement, while RED-Tabara also denied accusations of being responsible same day.

Security situation continued to deteriorate across country. Ruling party youth wing Imbonerakure member suspected of being responsible for 2 May killing of civilian in Mukoro hill, Gitega province. Arbitrary arrests continued as police, in collaboration with Imbonerakure, 16 May detained 44 individuals in Nyanza-lac commune, Makamba province, on charges of “rebellion”. Human rights group Ligue Iteka 2 May released monthly report detailing dozens of murders as well as case of torture of opposition National Congress for Freedom (CNL) member, with police, intelligence agents, soldiers and Imbonerakure suspected as main perpetrators.

In other important developments. Economy continued to plummet due to inflation, fuel and electricity shortages, exacerbated by delayed infrastructure projects and govt mismanagement, while food and transport costs rose. Meanwhile, concerns remained high over continued rise of waters of Lake Tanganyika, which has displaced hundreds of thousands in past seven months, flooded homes and destroyed crops, prompting April govt and UN appeals for support.

Security and humanitarian situation worsened in east after deadly bombing of displacement camp as rebels took more territory; security forces thwarted apparent coup attempt. 

M23 crisis escalated following attack on IDP sites near North Kivu capital Goma. Rockets allegedly fired from rebel positions west of Goma 3 May struck Mugunga and Lac Vert displacement camps, resulting in 35 deaths, deadliest M23-related attack since Nov 2022. Govt and U.S. accused Rwanda, prompting Kigali to vehemently deny involvement. Meanwhile, M23 continued advance following late April capture of strategic mining town Rubaya. Violence also threatened South Kivu province, with 7 May M23-attributed rocket attack in Kisongati village, resulting in seven fatalities and six injuries; rebels may in June pose threat to pivotal town of Minova, possibly opening route to advance further into South Kivu. Southern African regional bloc (SADC) mission SAMIDRC 5 May announced plans to offensively counter M23 rebellion but faced persistent financial challenges.

Diaspora member orchestrated unsuccessful apparent coup in capital Kinshasa. Army 19 May claimed to have foiled coup attempt led by Christian Malanga – American resident and promoter of New Zaire movement – in Kinshasa’s Gombe district, resulting in death of Malanga, one other assailant and two police officers. Gunmen targeted largely symbolic locations – including residences of top officials and empty state house – prompting widespread questions about security protocols and motives of attack.

Armed group violence plagued Ituri and North Kivu. In North Kivu, seven suspected victims of Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels found 3 May along Mangina-Mantumbi road in Beni-Mbau sector. In Ituri, ADF 6 May killed three in Kianangazi village, Irumu territory, abducting one child. Subsequent attacks 9, 12 and 13 May in both provinces resulted in further casualties and abductions, raising doubts about efficacy of joint Congolese-Ugandan anti-ADF operations. 

Ruling party faced discord over formation of new administration. President Tshisekedi 29 May announced new govt – rewarding loyalists and campaign organisers with top jobs while axing foreign and defence ministers – following months of intense haggling amongst his political coalition. Meanwhile, opposition warned against potential power grabs amid concerns over Tshisekedi’s 3 May proposal to overhaul constitution.

Regional and international actors continued to accuse Rwanda of complicity in security challenges faced by its neighbours. 

Govt firmly denied involvement with neighbouring rebel groups. Rwanda 4 May rejected U.S. and Congolese claims that it had, alongside M23 rebel group, attacked displacement camp in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), branding accusations “ridiculous” and “absurd”. Authorities also 12 May issued statement denying any connection or reason to be involved in series of grenade attacks in Burundian city of Bujumbura, urging Burundi to “address its internal issues”. Meanwhile, DRC Mine Minister 8 May called for international embargo on metal exports from Rwanda, alleging its support for rebel groups stealing natural resources.

In another important development. Army spokesperson Ronald Rwivanga 27 May announced govt had deployed additional 2,000 soldiers to assist Mozambique in combating resurgent attacks by Islamic State-linked insurgents in Cabo Delgado province, amid southern African military mission withdrawal (see Mozambique).

Political tensions grew amid threats of further strikes, while govt engaged with DR Congo (DRC) on anti-militant cooperation.

Threats of strikes continued amid persistent fiscal policy discontent. Fear of further industrial action persisted, as business groups 8 May threatened two-month long strike from 20 June after failed talks with President Museveni, spurred by discontent over fiscal and tax policies and govt’s promotion of electronic tax payments. Parliament 16 May approved new taxes on fuel and construction materials despite protests, potentially leading to price increases. Meanwhile, Museveni same day signed deal with Kenya to import refined petroleum directly, aiming to offset impact of fuel tax hikes.

Army chief scrutinised operations against Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Newly appointed head of army and Museveni’s son Lt-Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba 6 May engaged in talks with Congolese military leadership to assess progress in joint operations against Islamic State-affiliated ADF rebels in DRC; joint force 18 May captured prominent ADF commander skilled in explosives in Ituri province in eastern DRC. Security forces 4 May said they had discovered four suspected ADF bombs in capital Kampala.

Disputes within opposition political parties escalated. Former opposition leader Mathias Mpuuga faced continued censure from National Unity Platform (NUP) party for accepting financial parliamentary awards, sparking tensions with party leader Robert Kyagulanyi, alias ‘Bobi Wine’. Similarly, Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) appeared set for split, with former presidential candidate Kizza Besigye poised to lead breakaway faction over alleged ties between current leadership and Museveni. 

In other important developments. Opposition parties 2 May welcomed UK late April announcement of corruption-related sanctions on three politicians, including Parliament Speaker Anita Among, as potential deterrent against mismanagement of public resources, while govt expressed surprise and promised both investigation and examination of legality of sanctions. Meanwhile, U.S. 30 May also announced corruption-related sanctions on trio and one other politician, alongside sanctioning former deputy army chief for alleged “gross violations of human rights” including extrajudicial killings by military.

China maintained naval activity in East China Sea and held high-level talks with Tokyo, while Japan sought to strengthen defence ties with Western partners. 

Beijing continued maritime presence. As of 27 May, Japan reported 104 Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone, while Japanese coast guard 8 May detected four Chinese vessels in Japan’s territorial waters off disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; one vessel was reportedly armed with automatic cannon. Japan coast guard 19-20 May detected two Chinese vessels in Japan’s territorial waters and 24 May detected four Chinese vessels in Japan’s territorial waters. Ten-month impasse persisted over China’s deployment of buoy in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone in East China Sea, as Tokyo demands its removal. Meanwhile, Japan, U.S. and New Zealand 11-13 May conducted trilateral maritime exercise in East China Sea. 

Tokyo and Beijing held high-level talks. Senior Chinese diplomat Liu Jianchao and Japanese PM Fumio Kishida 29 May met in Japanese capital Tokyo, where pair discussed bilateral relations and issues such as Taiwan and discharge from Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant into sea. Earlier, Tokyo 22 May lodged protest with China after Chinese ambassador to Japan reportedly warned that Japanese people would be dragged into fire if they supported Taiwan independence (see Taiwan Strait). 

Japan sought enhanced defence cooperation with Western partners. Defence ministers of Japan, Philippines, U.S. and Australia 2 May met in U.S. to deepen cooperation; officials confirmed Japan will work closely with U.S. and Australia to introduce counter-strike capabilities, while Japan and U.S. cabinet ministers will start talks on Japan’s “extended deterrence” capabilities, including nuclear weapons. Japan and France 3 May commenced talks on new security agreement on reciprocal access. U.S. senators 8 May introduced bipartisan bill requiring “AUKUS” – trilateral security partnership between Australia, UK and U.S. – officials to engage Japan on its potential inclusion under second pillar for advanced technology projects; China in April expressed “grave concern” over alliance’s expansion. 

South Korea hosted China and Japan at first trilateral summit since 2019, which North Korea protested by attempting fourth spy satellite launch in two years. 

Seoul hosted summit with China and Japan. Leaders of South Korea, Japan and China 26-27 May met in capital Seoul, marking first such meeting since 2019. In joint statement dominated by shared economic concerns, trio reconfirmed three issues – respectively reflecting China’s, South Korea’s and Japan’s concerns – regarding North Korea, saying that they “reiterated positions on regional peace and stability, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the abductions issue”; all noted that “maintaining peace, stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia serves our common interest”. Pyongyang responded that discussion of denuclearisation was “insult never to be pardoned and a declaration of war”.

North Korea attempted satellite launch and launched missiles. Responding to first day of South Korea-hosted summit, which saw meeting between South Korea and Japan, North Korea 26 May announced its intention to launch a satellite (using banned ballistic missile technology) in window spanning 27 May to 4 June. Pyongyang next day launched satellite that failed due to technical issue; video taken by Japanese journalists from Chinese city of Dandong on North Korean border showed rocket exploding two minutes after launch. Leader Kim Jong-un 28 May condemned South Korea drills involving fighter jets near border. South Korea’s military 29 May reported around 260 North Korean balloons carrying waste were found countrywide, in apparent retaliation for South Korean activists flying leaflets across border into north. North Korea 30 May fired ten suspected short-range ballistic missiles into waters off east coast.

Seoul and Tokyo imposed sanctions on Russia-North Korea arms trade. Japan 25 May announced sanctions on eleven organisations and one individual linked to military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow, while South Korea same day designated “seven North Korean individuals and two Russian vessels” for “involvement in the provision of materials and financing for North Korea’s nuclear and missile development”.

Cross-strait tensions rose as new Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te articulated tougher cross-strait posture in inaugural address, prompting China to issue threats and launch major military drills.

Incoming president signalled new posture, triggering China’s “punishment” drills. Marking start of unprecedented third term for Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), President-elect Lai Ching-te 20 May assumed office and gave inaugural address in which he firmly asserted Taiwan’s sovereignty and refrained from reaffirming predecessor Tsai Ing-wen’s conciliatory nod to Beijing’s “one China” position; he urged China “to cease their political and military intimidation against Taiwan” and cautioned that so long as Beijing does not renounce use of force its “ambition to annex Taiwan will not simply disappear”. In response, China next day described Lai as “disgraceful” and remarked “all Taiwan independence separatists will be nailed to the pillar of shame in history”. In first such drills since April 2023 when then-U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy visited Taiwan, China 22 May commenced two-day military exercises in five zones encircling Taiwan as well as around Taiwan’s islands of Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, and Dongyin near Chinese coast. Chinese law enforcement vessels took part in exercises around Taiwan’s outlying islands, as well as to Taiwan’s south west and east. Beijing said activities were aimed at “punishing” Lai and testing Beijing’s ability to “seize power” and “occupy key areas”. U.S. 25 May expressed deep concern and urged Beijing to act with restraint. 

Domestic political tensions rose in Taiwan. Legislation tabled by opposition parties Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) to grant legislature increased scrutinising powers over the executive passed 28 May; ruling DPP sees bill as attempt to undermine its control of executive and said it would seek constitutional review of bill. Protests took place over multiple days, totalling tens of thousands outside parliament, over opposition’s attempt to fast-track bill’s passage and its contents. 

U.S. continued support for Taiwan. Reports 14 May revealed that U.S. and Taiwan in April conducted unofficial joint naval drills in Pacific to boost cooperation, involving multiple military assets and basic operations. Since Lai’s inauguration, two U.S. congressional delegations visited Taiwan. 

Afghanistan and Pakistan engaged in sporadic clashes along disputed border, killing two soldiers, as Islamic State continued attacks and thousands in north east protested Taliban’s poppy eradication campaign.

Deadly border hostilities resumed between Pakistan and Taliban forces. Pakistani aircraft 10 May conducted strikes inside Afghanistan, killing at least four suspected Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants. As Pakistani forces 13 May tried to fortify positions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Kurram district, clashes erupted with Taliban forces, which lasted six days and killed at least one Pakistani soldier and Taliban forces member; sides 18 May agreed to ceasefire reportedly negotiated by tribal elders. Notably, Taliban rocket 15 May struck Pakistani border post, causing aforementioned fatality. Tensions with Afghanistan could escalate further if another major militant attack within Pakistan is traced back to Afghan havens (see Pakistan).

Islamic State targeted Taliban and foreigners. Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) 8 May claimed bomb attack in Faizabad city, Badakhshan province (north east). ISKP gunman 18 May shot at two buses carrying foreign tourists in Bamiyan province (centre), killing three Spanish nationals and injuring others. ISKP militants 20 May hurled grenade at bus carrying Taliban members in Kandahar (south), killing at least four. 

Thousands protested in north east against Taliban. In Badakhshan province, local residents early May staged protests against Taliban’s poppy eradication campaign in province. Taliban security forces 3-13 May killed several, prompting thousands in region, namely Argo and Darayim districts, to hold protests to demand halt to eradication effort, livelihood support for poppy farmers and compensation for eradicated crops as well as slain protestors; senior Taliban delegation visited region, reportedly agreeing to compensate families of victims but insisting eradication efforts will persist unabated. Authorities mid-May deployed reinforcements to region and resumed destruction of opium fields.

Taliban continued to clamp down on independent media. Taliban authorities 8 May attempted to restrict reporting by Afghanistan International – overseas-based media channel that emerged immediately after Taliban’s takeover and became most-viewed media outlet inside Afghanistan – by ordering Afghan journalists to stop all forms of collaboration with outlet. 

Conflict in Myanmar’s Rakhine state fuelled recruitment drive by Rohingya armed groups in Bangladesh’s refugee camps, raising prospect of greater spillover to come. 

War in Myanmar reverberated in Bangladesh’s refugee camps. In Myanmar, Arakan Army (AA) continued advance in northern Rakhine state after months-long campaign against regime and allegations of abuses against Rohingya community, including extrajudicial killings, torching villages and forced relocations (see Myanmar). In response, Rohingya armed groups – notably Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) – stepped up mostly forced recruitment in refugee camps in Bangladesh, including potentially several thousand young men and children as young as 14, with some refugees reportedly transferred to Myanmar military for training. Forced recruitment triggered wave of panic across camps; since 17 May, refugees staged nightly gatherings to oppose recruitment, in some cases beating RSO members. Fighting in Rakhine likely to escalate, forcing larger numbers of Rohingya across border or sparking wider conflict between AA and Rohingya armed groups as latter build up their forces further to curtail AA’s advance. Meanwhile, turf war in refugee camps between RSO and rival Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) resurged, with five killings reported mid-May. 

Insecurity persisted in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in south east. Security forces continued operations targeting Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) – which claims to represent six Kuki-Chin subgroups, largest of which is Bawm. Security forces 17 May announced detention of chief coordinator of KNF’s women’s wing in Bandarban’s Sadar district. Shootout 23 May killed two KNF members in Sadar. Human rights group Amnesty International 22 May said over 100 Bawm had been arbitrarily detained amid anti-KNF crackdown. PM Sheikh Hasina 23 May claimed there was international conspiracy to establish “Christian state” in CHT. Govt official in India’s Mizoram state mid-May said 127 Bangladeshis fled into Mizoram in previous week due to anti-KNF operation; state now hosts 1,368 refugees from CHT. 

Opposition boycotted local polls. Authorities 8 May held first phase of local polls for districts known as upazila parishad, which saw voter turnout of 36% – lowest since voting was introduced in 2009; opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party boycotted vote and claimed people had rejected election.

Ethnic conflict in Manipur in north east marked first anniversary, national elections entered final phases amid suspicions of voting irregularities, and security forces continued deadly anti-Maoist operations.

In Manipur, ethnic conflict entered second year amid ongoing violence. Conflict in Manipur 3 May reached one-year mark with 67,000 displaced in 2023 and over 220 killed; Kuki and Meitei communities show no sign of compromise and hill areas remain beyond state govt’s control. In Kangkokpi district, leader of United Kuki National Army 5 May was reportedly killed by bodyguard. In Bishnupur district, security forces 17 May rescued 75 Meitei women from Kuki militants. In Imphal West district, unidentified gunmen 18 May killed labourer. In sign of conflict spilling across regional borders, The Hindu 14 May reported National Agency Investigation had charged “China-Myanmar module” of militant group National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) – presently in peace talks with New Delhi – of facilitating infiltration of Meitei militants into Manipur to “destabilise state”; NSCN-IM rejected allegations and accused Indian forces of supporting Kuki insurgents in Myanmar to target Meitei rebels.

Elections neared completion. Ahead of completion of seven phases of national elections on 1 June, media in May continued to report allegations of voter exclusion of Muslims. Election Commission’s decision not to share polling in real time fuelled suspicion of potential voting manipulation in favour of ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Meanwhile, BJP continued polarising and communal-based campaign speech: notably, Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh 18 May declared Pakistan-administered Kashmir would become part of India within six months of BJP’s next term.

Anti-Maoist security operations continued. In Chhattisgarh state (centre), security forces 10 May killed twelve Maoists in Bijapur district and 23 May killed seven Maoists on border of Narayanpur and Bijapur districts; 34 Maoists 25 May surrendered in Bijapur. In Maharashtra state (west), security forces 13 May killed three Maoists in Gadchiroli district. 

Relations with China remained tense. China’s new ambassador 10 May arrived in New Delhi, declaring “our two countries are each other’s development opportunities and not threats”. FM S. Jaishanskar 14 May described China’s deployment of forces at Line of Actual Control as “very abnormal”.

Militant attacks and security operations increased in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), while authorities held first ballots in region since 2019 as part of national elections. 

Militant attacks and security operations intensified after winter lull. In Jammu division, security forces 1 May killed alleged infiltrator from Pakistan in Samba district; militants 4 May attacked Air Force convoy in Poonch district, injuring four and killing one. In Kashmir division, security forces 6-8 May killed three Resistance Front militants, including top commander, during three-day operation in Kulgam district; security personnel 16 May allegedly killed four militants trying to infiltrate Line of Control in Kupwara district; militants 19 May shot dead ruling Bharatiya Janata Party worker in Anantnag district.

Voters cast ballots in three parliamentary constituencies representing J&K. Citizens had first chance to cast ballots in J&K since govt abrogated special status in 2019, with polls held in three parliamentary constituencies as part of national election (see India). In Srinagar city on 13 May, voter turnout reached 38%, highest since 1989; PM Narendra Modi next day claimed “abrogation of Article 370 has enabled potential and aspirations of people to find full expression”, prompting opposition political parties People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and National Conference next day to reject declaration, claiming vote reflected people’s expression against administrative changes made by New Delhi since 2019. In Baramulla on 21 May, voter turnout reached 59% – highest in four decades. Voter turnout in Anantnag-Rajouri election 25 May reached 54.3%, highest in 35 years.

Proscribed Islamist group announced intent to contest assembly elections. Prohibited socio-religious organisation Jamaat-e-Islami, banned by govt in 2019, 13 May announced it would contest assembly elections – mandated to be held by 30 Sept – if govt lifted ban; militant group The Resistance Front condemned group’s decision as betrayal of people’s wishes, while former chief minister Omar Abdullah welcomed announcement and urged govt to overturn ban.

Pakistan and Afghanistan engaged in sporadic border clashes, killing two soldiers, while militant attacks continued in border provinces and protests over prices turned violent in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Deadly border hostilities resumed between Pakistan and Taliban forces. Pakistani aircraft 10 May conducted strikes inside Afghanistan, killing at least four suspected Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants. As Pakistani forces 13 May tried to fortify positions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Kurram district, clashes erupted with Taliban forces which lasted six days and killed at least one Pakistani soldier and Taliban forces member; sides 18 May agreed to ceasefire reportedly negotiated by tribal elders. Interior minister and top counter-terrorism chief 26 May held Pakistani Taliban responsible for 26 March suicide attack that killed five Chinese engineers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Sangla district, requested Kabul to arrest or hand over alleged planners along with TTP leadership; minister warned of “unilateral action” if Kabul does not cooperate. 

Militant attacks continued in border provinces and spread into Punjab. In sign of expanding Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks into Punjab province, heavily-armed militants 1 May attacked checkpoint in Taunsa district, injuring seven police constables, and gun battle between police and TTP militants in Rawalpindi city same day killed constable.In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, two militant attacks 11 May killed seven military personnel in North Waziristan, marking one of deadliest attacks of May. Military 27 May said operation previous day killed 23 militants in Peshawar’s Hassan Khel area. In Balochistan province, suspected Baloch militants 9 May shot dead seven Punjabis in Gwadar district.

Unrest erupted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Alliance of civil society organisations 11 May commenced protest march over high prices of flour and electricity. Clashes lasted several days with security forces, killing five, including constable, and injuring over 100. PM Sharif 14 May accepted demands for subsidies to offset high prices.

Relations between former PM Imran Khan and military plummeted further. Ahead of first anniversary of 9 May 2023 anti-military unrest led by Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), military 7 May called on Khan to publicly apologise and abandon “politics of anarchy and hate”. PTI same day condemned military’s “irrational, illogical and venomous press conference”. 

Civil war commemorations drew large crowds in eastern and northern provinces, UN criticised govt inaction over unsolved enforced disappearances, and proposed economic reforms divided parties. 

Wave of events marked 15th anniversary of civil war’s end. Ahead of fifteenth anniversary of end of civil war on 18 May, known increasingly by Tamil activists as “Tamil Genocide Remembrance Day”, Tamils in north and east of island, and in diaspora communities worldwide, organised series of commemorations: notably, police 12 May in eastern town of Trincomalee arrested four Tamil women serving “kanji” dish to commemorate Tamils killed in final weeks of 2009 war; other commemorations in north and east were allowed to proceed under tight police and military surveillance. Thousands 18 May gathered at Mullivaikkal beach, scene of final massacres of thousands of Tamil civilians and fighters in 2009; marking first ever attendance of international dignitary at war commemoration event, Amnesty International Sec Gen Agnès Callamard spoke at Mullivaikkal, criticising govt’s “clampdown on memory initiatives, including arrests, arbitrary detentions and deliberately skewed interpretations of Tamil community’s attempts to remember people lost to war”. Consortium of Buddhist and Tamil groups 17 May held first-ever inter-religious and inter-ethnic event in capital Colombo’s centre to commemorate all those killed.

UN report highlighted enforced disappearances. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 17 May issued major report detailing decades of unsolved, un-investigated enforced disappearances of tens of thousands of people, urging govt to acknowledge involvement of “state security forces and affiliated paramilitary groups” and stating that “alleged perpetrators, including current and former senior officials and diplomats, continue to evade justice”; report criticised govt’s poor record in addressing issues and urged it to establish independent persecutorial authority.

Govt’s economic policies courted criticism. Cabinet 6 May approved twenty-year power purchase agreement for development of 484 MW of wind power generated by stations in north west; economists and opposition politicians criticised lack of competitive bidding for deal, as environmentalists highlighted threat to migratory birds. Former president Mahinda Rajapaksa 16 May attacked proposed sale of state-owned enterprises, a central pillar of International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) economic reform agenda.

Arakan Army expanded control in west, fuelling communal Rakhine-Rohingya violence that could escalate further in coming weeks; regime lost further ground in north, while hostilities in centre killed over 50. 

In west, Arakan Army’s (AA) headway against regime worsened communal violence. In Rakhine state (west), AA made progress across Rakhine state as it sought to control northern townships of Buthidaung and Maungdaw, capturing former 18 May then launching offensive on latter, while also encircling military’s Western Command headquarters in Ann and pushing south into Thandwe. Regime responded to losses with artillery barrages and airstrikes. AA’s advance further stoked communal tensions with Rohingya amid allegations of AA extrajudicial killings, torching twenty villages and forced relocations. In response, Rohingya militias in Maungdaw 6-9 May targeted at least two Rakhine villages, burning dozens of homes and killing pregnant woman; allegations subsequently surfaced of AA retaliation on Rohingya villages around Buthidaung, while AA 17 May allegedly shelled school in Buthidaung on 17 May, killing eighteen Rohingya; its forces were accused of burning thousands of Rohingya homes. Rohingya armed groups have ramped up their recruitment in Bangladesh’s refugee camps (see Bangladesh). As Rohingya community increasingly becomes party to conflict, there is serious risk of large-scale communal violence and armed group atrocities against civilians (see Conflict in Focus). 

In north, Kachin forces made further gains against regime. In Kachin state (north), Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and allied forces early May launched fresh wave of attacks against regime bases along Myitkyina-Bhamo highway and 5 May captured Sumprabum town in state’s north. KIA 21 May captured light infantry base in Waingmaw, across river from state capital Myitkyina.

In centre, regime and resistance attacks killed dozens. In Magway region (centre), regime airstrike 9 May killed at least twenty in Saw township. In Mandalay region (centre), regime accused resistance forces of killing 32 villagers in Myingyan township; resistance group claimed residents were caught in crossfire. 

In south east, regime convoy sought to reinforce Myawaddy town. In Kayin state (south east), after Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and allied resistance groups in April temporarily overran Myawaddy on Thai border, regime convoy to bolster forces made slow progress through Dawna mountain range. 

Clan feuds and militant attacks continued in south as region geared up for 2025 elections, while govt forces battled Communist militants. 

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). In Lanao del Sur province, five gunmen 1 May ambushed three militiamen in Marogong town in likely clan feud. In Basilan province, gunmen 4 May ambushed group of men in Akbar town, sparking firefight that wounded six, including municipal councillor of Tuburan town. In Cotabato city, assailants 19 May lobbed grenade at Catholics, injuring two. On political front, Bangsamoro Grand Coalition, composed of several parties representing ruling political clans in different provinces in BARMM, 18 May endorsed Sulu Governor Abdusakur Tan as their candidate for Bangsamoro chief minister in autonomous region’s first elections scheduled for May 2025; Tan will be pitted against Bangsamoro interim Chief Minister Ahod Ebrahim, supported by parties affiliated with Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Clashes continued between security forces and Communist rebels. Hostilities between military and Communist militants in Mindanao (Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato) in south and Visayas (Samar, Negros and Iloilo) in centre killed twelve combatants and civilians and injured three.

Maritime encounters between Philippines and China in South China Sea (SCS) continued to fuel tensions and strain relations. 

Maritime incidents ratcheted up tensions between Manila and Beijing. Philippines 1 May accused China’s coast guard of escalating tensions in SCS after Chinese vessels fired water cannons at two Philippine ships en route to Scarborough Shoal, causing damage to both; U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin next day accused China of “irresponsible behaviour”. Reports surfaced mid-May that Philippines had deployed ships to monitor Chinese activity amid allegations Beijing had created artificial island on Escoda (Sabina) Shoal. Philippine National Security Advisor Eduardo Ano 10 May called for expulsion of Chinese diplomats over alleged leak of phone conversation between Philippine Vice Admiral Alberto Carlos and Chinese attaché in which former purportedly agreed to Chinese demands related to Second Thomas Shoal; Ano accused China’s embassy of “disinformation” to sow discord. Admiral Carlos 28 May denied making “secret deal” with China. Philippine civilian group Atin Ito (“This is Ours”) 14 May embarked on resupply mission to local fishermen in Scarborough Shoal despite threat of Chinese blockades; Chinese coast guard 16 May claimed it drove away flotilla near shoal, while Atin Ito claimed “major victory”. Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro 24 May called rules permitting Chinese Coast Guard to fire on foreign vessels in SCS “provocation”.

U.S. and Philippines concluded annual exercises. U.S. and Philippines 10 May concluded annual Balikatan military drills, which commenced 22 April, involving over 16,000 personnel and held in sensitive areas like Bashi Channel – critical waterway between Taiwan and Philippines. U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer 10 May sailed near contested Paracels to challenge “unlawful and sweeping maritime claims”; China, Vietnam and Taiwan claim island chain. U.S. Navy 26 May announced transit of SCS by Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt following Singapore port visit 24 May.

In other important developments. Group of twenty Taiwanese lawmakers of opposition Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party 18 May visited Taiping Island, urging President-elect Lai Ching-te publicly reaffirm Taiwan’s claim over island; island is also claimed by China, Vietnam and Philippines. Three Indian naval ships 7 May arrived in Singapore as part of deployment to SCS. 

Deep south peace dialogue resumed amid militant attacks; activist’s death in detention sparked controversy and authorities convicted opposition MP and charged former PM Thaksin Shinawatra for lèse-majesté.

Deep south peace dialogue resumed as militants staged attacks. Govt delegation and representatives of main southern separatist group Barisan Revolusi Nasional 19-21 May held 10th Joint Technical Committee Meeting of Joint Working Group Peace Dialogue Process (JWG-PDP) in Malaysia’s capital Kuala Lumpur; sides discussed reduction of violence, monitoring mechanisms and Terms of Reference for monitoring teams. Malaysian facilitator’s office 21 May declared itself “gratified” with progress. Meanwhile, in Pattani province, officers 1 May killed two suspected militants in Thung Yang Daeng district; IED secreted in motorcycle 6 May wounded two defence volunteers and two civilians in Muang district. In Narathiwat province, IED explosions 20 May killed two defence volunteers in Sukhirin district.

Activist died in custody, as authorities used lèse-majesté to stifle dissent. Following 110-day hunger strike, imprisoned activist Netiporn Bung Saneysangkhom 14 May died after suffering heart attack; Netiporn was awaiting trial on charges including lèse-majesté for conducting public opinion polls about royal motorcades. After PM Srettha Thavisin 15 May pledged transparent investigation, lawyer next day said autopsy found her stomach empty, raising questions about treatment. Opposition Move Forward Party (MFP) MP Rangsiman Rome 15 May assessed “faith that people of Thailand have in our justice system is at an all-time low”. As Constitutional Court considered case to ban MFP, Court in Pathum Thani province 27 May convicted Chonthicha Jangrew, MFP parliamentarian, of defaming monarchy for 2021 speech calling for release of political prisoners. Office of the Attorney-General 29 May announced former PM Thaksin Shinawatra will be indicted on charges of lèse-majesté and computer crimes for 2015 speech in South Korea.

Caretaker senators sought dismissal of PM. Forty senators 17 May petitioned Constitutional Court to dismiss PM Srettha Thavisin and PM’s Office Minister Pichit Chuenban from office for ethics violations; senators maintain that Srettha’s appointment of Pichit breached standards as Pichit served six months in jail in 2008 for contempt of court. Pichit 21 May resigned. 

France’s proposed voting reforms triggered worst unrest in four decades, killing at least seven.

In New Caledonia – a special overseas collectivity of France – pro-independence alliance of parties 13 May organised protests in capital Nouméa against electoral reform bill debated in National Assembly in French capital Paris to expand voting rights in provincial polls; voting rights are restricted to Indigenous Kanaks and those who arrived from France before 1998, but bill proposed to include French residents who have lived in New Caledonia for ten years; Indigenous community – comprising around 40% of 271,000 population – widely fear bill would dilute vote share. Protests quickly morphed into worst riots and unrest since 1984–88 troubles, with widespread reports of torched vehicles, looting, erection of road barricades and clashes with police; after National Assembly 14 May approved reform, unrest intensified, leaving three young Kanaks and police officer dead. Paris 15 May declared state of emergency and announced deployment of additional 1,000 police officers and gendarmes. France 16-17 May accused Azerbaijan of meddling and identified Azeri social media accounts of spreading anti-French propaganda, and banned social media platform TikTok until 29 May. Police 18 May reported gun battle between unidentified groups killed one at roadblock in Kaala-Gomen, North Province. President Macron 22 May visited Nouméa and next day delayed voting reform after talks with leaders; Macron called for new political agreement on New Caledonia’s future, acknowledged widening inequality and described unrest as “unprecedented insurrection”. Police 24 May shot dead individual following group attack, bringing death toll of unrest to at least seven. Pro-independence Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front 25 May stated that solution must be “political and non-repressive”. France 28 May lifted state of emergency, but international airport remained closed.

Political jostling continued ahead of Sept presidential elections; relations with United Arab Emirates (UAE) remained tense.

Parties continued positioning for 7 Sept vote. Anticipation for presidential polls grew as several politicians announced candidacies. Belkacem Sahli, president of nationalist party National Republican Alliance, 5 May reiterated intention to run on behalf of coalition of several small parties, while Louisa Hanoune, Sec Gen of Workers’ Party and three-time previous candidate, 18 May announced she would be on ballot. Meanwhile, amid persistent reports of internal splits within security forces over who to support in vote, President Tebboune 8 May gave pro-military speech at army headquarters.

Tebboune boycotted Arab League summit due to tensions with Emiratis. Tebboune 16 May avoided Arab League summit in Bahrain’s capital Manama reportedly due to strains with UAE. Tensions may be linked to Emirati support for military authorities in Mali whose ties with Algeria have become strained, with reports govt rejected several Gulf countries’ mediation initiatives. Reuters media 6 May reported Algeria may cancel gas delivery to Spanish company Naturgy if firm’s shares are bought by Emirati firm TAQA. 

New regional grouping held first external meeting. Interior ministers of Algeria, Libya and Tunisia 2 May met Italian counterpart Matteo Piantedosi in Italian capital Rome as part of new three-party grouping, amid ongoing Algiers-Rabat tensions and persistent rumours of creation of new bloc of central North African states as alternative to pre-existing body Arab Maghreb Union that includes Mauritania and Morocco. 

In other important developments. Worker’s Party head Hanoune early May demanded govt reverse ban on demonstrations in support of Palestinian cause; govt 28 May shared draft UN Security Council resolution demanding immediate ceasefire in Gaza. Military 2 May announced it had killed jihadist in Tinzaouatine commune on Malian border; operation followed late April killing of another jihadist in Bordj-Badji-Mokhtar sector also on border. 

Tensions with Israel worsened amid deadly border incident and as govt suspended humanitarian coordination in Gaza; new external credit offered financial reprieve. 

Tensions soared at border after Israel launched Rafah offensive in Gaza. Exchange of fire with Israeli forces at border crossing at southern Gazan city of Rafah 27 May left one soldier dead and others injured; although much remained unclear about what happened, incident marked heightened tensions throughout month. Earlier, after Israeli troops 7 May took over Palestinian side of Rafah border point (see Israel/Palestine) – traversing Philadelphi Corridor in which Cairo maintains limited military presence – Foreign Ministry same day issued statement condemning move as “dangerous escalation”; state media 11 May announced authorities’ refusal to coordinate humanitarian operations with Israel, halting flow of aid through Rafah border. Govt 15 May rejected Israeli proposal to reopen Rafah crossing under Israeli supervision, instead reiterating border point must be in hands of Palestinian authorities; FM Shoukry 20 May justified deadlock and suspension of aid by arguing Israeli military endangers aid convoys. Following diplomatic engagement with Washington, aid deliveries restarted through nearby Kerem Shalom crossing 26 May, although Israel 29 May announced it had taken full control of Philadelphi Corridor. Meanwhile, amid deteriorating Gaza situation, govt 12 May said it would support South Africa in legal action against Israel alleging genocide at International Court of Justice.

Short-term economic outlook stabilised as Cairo negotiated key financing deals. Govt 15 May received $14bn from United Arab Emirates in second tranche of funds from Ras al-Hekma deal for development of real estate on Mediterranean coast. Authorities 18 May met with International Monetary Fund delegation to discuss possible additional loan of $1.2bn for promotion of climate and green transition projects.

In another important development. Amid govt’s ongoing crackdown on pro-Palestinian protesters, authorities 8-9 May arrested two students and 13 May issued order to detain them for fifteen days on charges of joining terrorist organisation and publishing false news. Court 27 May upheld one year prison sentence for former presidential hopeful Ahmed Tantawi on forgery chargers, banning him from running in elections for five years.

Political deadlock continued as parallel govts engaged internationally; corruption and insecurity persisted. 

Outgoing UN envoy decried stalemate amid Western officials’ visits to parallel govts. Abdoulaye Bathily, who resigned as head of UN mission in April, 14 May said Libyan leaders not interested in stabilising country or holding elections and had “fuelled rivalries” among armed groups to maintain status quo. However, deputy UN special representative Stephanie Koury 21 May launched new discussions with Libyan officials. Meanwhile, parallel administrations both engaged with Western officials. Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba 15 May met EU Council President Charles Michel and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels to discuss migration issues and renewable energy, while earlier in month, Italian PM Giorgia Meloni 7 May visited Tripoli to sign agreements including on education and health; Meloni later same day met with eastern military commander Khalifa Haftar, whose entourage also received visits from other international officials including from EU and U.S.; engagement with Haftar occurred amid his growing military cooperation with Russia and proposal for Russian-built oil refinery in east announced 18 May. 

IMF noted positive economic prospects despite need for public sector reform. International Monetary Fund’s monitoring mission to Libya 13 May estimated GDP to grow by 8% in 2024 thanks to rise in oil exports, despite lack of budgeting accountability and high public sector wages and subsidies; IMF urged authorities to adopt governance reforms to fight corruption and called for reunification of central bank. Meanwhile, court 12 May ordered arrest of four customs officials accused of “conspiring to smuggle” 26 tonnes of gold worth over $1.8bn through Misrata airport in Dec 2023.

Insecurity persisted. Members of Stability Support Authority and First Support Force armed groups 18 May clashed in Al-Zawiya city, west of Tripoli, killing one and injuring six others. Benghazi MP Ibrahim al-Dressi went missing 16 May amid concerns he may have been kidnapped and calls for his immediate release.

In another important development. Interior ministers of Algeria, Libya and Tunisia 2 May met Italian counterpart Matteo Piantedosi as part of new three-party grouping (see Algeria).

Tensions with Mali remained high over cross-border incidents.

Following April incident in which Malian soldiers and allied Russian paramilitary Africa Corps, formerly Wagner Group, reportedly killed and wounded Mauritanian civilians in cross-border anti-jihadist operations, govt 2 May said it was ready to defend “territorial integrity of the country” and said it would protect its citizens; military 5 May said it had held military exercises along border with Mali.

Tensions erupted as authorities launched string of arrests of journalists, lawyers and activists, provoking widespread uproar. 

Repression of civil society sparked protests and stretched political tensions. Wave of arrests and attacks on activists, journalists and lawyers – including several regime critics – highlighted govt’s authoritarian drift. Notably, police 11 May stormed lawyer association and arrested media commentator and lawyer Sonia Dahmani, and later same day arrested journalists Mourad Zeghidi and Borhen Bsaies; hundreds protested next day in capital Tunis, demanding their release and date for presidential election, mandated for Sept-Oct 2024 but as yet unscheduled. Police 13 May again stormed association and arrested lawyer Mehdi Zagrouba, known critic of President Saïed; lawyers and rights groups alleged security forces tortured Zagrouba while in custody 13-15 May. Lawyers 16 May staged general strike and protested in Tunis to denounce torture of Zagrouba, while Interior Ministry denied accusations. Court 22 May sentenced Zeghidi and Bsaies to one year imprisonment on charges of publishing false news, prompting hundreds to demonstrate in Tunis 24 May. Meanwhile, amid continued migration crisis, govt also cracked down on immigration NGOs. Police early May raided premises of organisations involved in defence of migrants and arrested affiliated activists, including head of Mnemty anti-racist organisation Saadia Mosbah 5 May and asylum rights activist Sherifa Riahi 7 May over supposed financial crimes. Earlier, several hundred people 4 May demonstrated in eastern city of Sfax, demanding departure of migrants, while concerns also grew over presence of vigilante groups. 

Crackdown provoked international backlash and forceful govt defence. After EU, France, U.S. and UN expressed concern over repression, Saïed 15 May ordered Foreign Ministry to summon several foreign ambassadors to protest against external interference; 850 people 19 May demonstrated in Tunis supporting govt and protesting against alleged foreign meddling in domestic affairs. Earlier, Saïed 6 May blamed Western NGOs for migration crisis.

In another important development. Interior ministers of Algeria, Libya and Tunisia 2 May met Italian counterpart Matteo Piantedosi as part of new three-party grouping (see Algeria).

Polisario attacked Morocco-controlled area; Algerian and Moroccan officials sparred at UN meeting over Sahrawi independence.

Polisario Front launched attack on Morocco-controlled city. Low-intensity nature of conflict continued as Polisario military units 18 May attacked Smara inside Morocco-controlled Western Sahara, third attack on city since Oct; rockets, however, fell 12km from city in area Morocco claimed is uninhabited, although Polisario argued they hit military targets.

Algeria and Morocco exchanged provocative remarks at international meeting. Algerian UN representative Amar Bendjema proclaimed support for Western Sahara’s right to self-determination at UN decolonisation committee 14-16 May in Venezuelan capital Caracas. In response, Morocco’s UN representative Omar Hilale highlighted his country’s support for same rights for Algeria’s Berber majority region Kabylia. Earlier, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune 8 May delivered speech reiterating Algiers’s steadfast commitment to Sahrawis right to govern themselves. 

In another important development. Over 30 UK lawmakers 23 May signed open letter calling on UK govt to support Moroccan autonomy plan for Western Sahara, which would give Rabat control over area’s national security and foreign affairs.

Ruling MORENA party’s presidential candidate on course to win June poll amid fears of violence on and around election day; U.S. and Mexico strengthened cooperation on migration.

MORENA’s Claudia Sheinbaum poised to win election amid high levels of political violence. Ruling MORENA party’s candidate Claudia Sheinbaum looked poised to defeat Xóchitl Gálvez of PAN-PRI-PRD opposition alliance in 2 June election, with over 20-point lead in polls (await next month’s edition for full coverage). Gálvez 13 May accused President López Obrador of influencing elections by openly supporting Sheinbaum from presidential podium; López Obrador 14 May rejected claims. Meanwhile, political violence remained rampant. Notably, armed individuals 11 May killed eight in Huitzilac municipality, Morelos state; state security delegate 17 May said 34.4% uptick in homicides in Morelos Jan-April 2024 compared to same period in 2023 owed to multiple crime groups seeking to influence elections. Attackers 16 May killed Partido Popular Chiapaneco mayoral candidate for La Concordia municipality and six others following campaign event. Unknown assailants 27 May attacked PRI mayoral candidate for Hueypoxtla. Violence could escalate on and around election day.

Criminal violence continued at high levels. After April witnessed highest number of homicides in 2024, with 2,349 officially recorded cases, armed confrontations and killings continued. Notably, in Chiapas State’s Chicomusuelo municipality, confrontations 10-14 May between Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel, two main groups competing for control of state, left eleven dead. In Michoacán state, army 9 May killed ten alleged Jalisco Cartel members in Tocumbo municipality. In Guanajuato state, search collective 16 May announced it had discovered 21 bodies in clandestine graves in Abasolo municipality.

U.S. and Mexico stepped up efforts to curb migration. According to data published 4 May, number of migrant detentions in Mexico tripled Jan-March compared with same period in 2023, though govt said overall migration had decreased. U.S. authorities 15 May reported that detentions at U.S.-Mexico border decreased by 6% in April compared to March, credited tougher measures introduced by Mexico. Announcement followed late April agreement between U.S. President Biden and López Obrador to strengthen collaboration on migration. 

Ethiopia’s efforts to settle Tigray-Amhara territorial dispute continued to fuel security concerns in Asmara.

Ethiopia-Eritrea relations remained riddled with tensions. Amid concern in Asmara that Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) may return to administer Western Tigray Zone in Ethiopia, Tigray region’s interim VP Tadesse Worede 2 May said federal efforts to dissolve local Amhara administrations and resettle displaced persons in disputed areas – part of Addis Ababa’s plan to settle Tigray-Amhara territorial dispute – would be completed by late June. Ethiopia’s ruling Prosperity Party and TPLF 15 May convened third round of party-to-party political dialogue in Tigray’s capital Mekelle as part of efforts to address political issues underlying conflict in Tigray, deepening Asmara’s fears that Ethiopia’s PM Abiy may be consolidating alliance with TPLF. 

U.S. bodies criticised Eritrea’s human rights record. Embassy of Eritrea to U.S. 2 May dismissed as “fallacious” U.S. State Department’s 2023 Human Rights Report published late April, which documented “significant human rights issues” in Eritrea. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 13 May said religious freedom conditions remain “extremely poor” in Eritrea, urged U.S. President Biden to pressure Asmara to end persecution of unregistered religious communities and release religious prisoners.

In another important development. Eritrea 24 May celebrated 33 years of independence with official gathering in capital Asmara. Anniversary gave rise to scuffles between pro-regime and anti-regime Eritreans living abroad, leaving one killed and several wounded 27 May in Israel’s Tel Aviv city.

Govt’s plan to address Tigray-Amhara territorial dispute continued to fuel tensions in Western Tigray; federal forces pursued efforts to stem insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia regions.

Tensions lingered over Tigray-Amhara territorial dispute in Western Tigray. Implementation of Addis Ababa’s plan to address Tigray-Amhara territorial dispute continued, with Tigray’s interim VP Tadesse Worede 2 May saying dissolution of local Amhara administrations and resettlement of displaced Tigrayans in Southern and Western zones would be completed by late June. Plan fuelled more violence, however; notably, skirmishes 3 May broke out between Ethiopian military and Amhara nationalist militias known as Fano on outskirts of Maksegno Gebeya town in Western Tigray Zone after Fano militants previous day briefly entered town. Tigray’s interim President Getachew Reda 24 May announced withdrawal of Tigray’s forces from two villages near Alamata town (Southern Tigray Zone), in move designed to ease tensions with Amhara administrations and facilitate return of Tigrayans.

Fighting continued between federal forces and Fano militias in Amhara. After easing of hostilities early May between federal forces and Fano militias, fighting picked up toward end of month, with clashes reported in North Shewa, East Gojjam, West Gojjam, North Gojjam, North Gondar, South Wollo and North Wollo zones. PM Abiy 12 May visited Amhara capital Bahir Dar, called on insurgents to lay down arms and reintegrate into civilian life. Adding to region’s instability, thousands of Sudanese refugees late April-early May fled Kumer and Awlala camps in West Gondar Zone after kidnappings for ransom and armed robberies late April left at least one person injured.

Army intensified counter-insurgency operations in Oromia. Federal forces conducted operations against Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in East Wollega, West Wollega, Horo Guduru Wollega, West Shewa, Arsi, West Arsi and East Borena zones. Notably, regional broadcaster 2 May reported joint operation by federal and regional security forces in East Borena; Addis Ababa claimed to have inflicted heavy OLA casualties. In rare visit to rebel stronghold of western Oromia, PM Abiy 8 May attended pro-govt rally in Nekemte town, East Wollega, in attempt to shore up Oromo support amid deepening unpopularity and OLA insurgency. 

Kenya hosted talks between holdout opposition groups and govt, intercommunal violence remained rampant, and disruption of oil exports deepened economic crisis. 

Govt and holdout opposition groups held peace talks in Kenya. High-level mediation 9 May started in Kenyan capital Nairobi, bringing together govt and some opposition groups that did not sign 2018 peace accord, including South Sudan United Front, Real-Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and South Sudan People’s Movement/Army (SSPM/A); National Salvation Front led by Thomas Cirillo and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition Kitwang led by Simon Gatwech did not participate, dimming hopes for wider deal. SSPM/A leader Stephen Buay 20 May accused govt of sending agents to Nairobi to target him and threatened to withdraw from talks. Kenyan authorities same day launched investigation into claims; in the meantime, Buay agreed to continue participating.

Communal violence persisted in several regions. Notably, in Jonglei region alleged Murle ambush 9 May killed three in Duk county; suspected armed Lou Nuer youth from Jonglei 12 May reportedly raided villages in Likuangole county, Greater Pibor Administrative Area, abducting nine people and raiding cattle. Authorities from Abyei area and Warrap State early May traded blame for deadly violence and cattle raids. Fighting between Balanda and Azande in Tombura county, Western Equatoria, reportedly displaced over 10,000 by 2 May. 

Disruption of oil exports fuelled fiscal crisis. Breakdown of main oil pipeline continued to threaten currency collapse and fuel spike in food costs, raising risk of renewed instability and violence. Central Bank governor 3 May said oil reserves are “at historically low levels”, affecting foreign currency reserves. Official 28 May claimed operations would resume imminently, though acknowledged oil had gelled along pipeline; industry experts maintained that repairs necessary to restart exports would take at least months to complete.

Concerns over election preparedness persisted. U.S. 9 May warned it would not support electoral process without urgent govt action to implement 2018 peace agreement. Body tasked with tracking implementation of agreement 23 May said there was “no evidence of sufficient preparation” for elections. Meanwhile, UN Security Council 30 May renewed sanctions on South Sudan for one year, including arms embargo, travel bans and asset freezes.

Full-scale conflict pitting Sudanese army (SAF) and allied Darfuri armed groups against Rapid Support Forces (RSF) erupted in North Darfur’s capital El-Fasher, threatening to inflame intercommunal conflict further in coming weeks.

Fighting broke out in El-Fasher. Clashes 10 May erupted between SAF in alliance with Darfuri armed groups and RSF in El-Fasher, killing and displacing thousands. SAF and armed groups held western and central neighbourhoods, and RSF controlled north and east sectors while besieging city. Outside El-Fasher, RSF-affiliated militias attacked non-Arab villages, while SAF airstrikes targeted RSF positions but also communities allegedly supporting paramilitary, including mostly Arab El-Zurug and Kutum villages; attacks threaten to aggravate intercommunal conflict in coming weeks. UN special adviser on the prevention of genocide 21 May warned “the risk of genocide exists” and is “growing”. Fighting obstructed aid deliveries as World Food Programme 3 May warned of “widespread starvation and death”.

Hostilities escalated across several other states without decisive gains. SAF-RSF clashes expanded from flashpoints including Babanussa town, West Kordofan state, North Kordofan’s capital El-Obeid, and Gezira state capital Wad Madani, to multiple towns and rural villages, increasing displacement and civilian casualties; RSF 19 May announced seizure of Um Rawaba area, North Kordofan. SAF continued offensives in capital Khartoum and sister cities Omdurman and Bahri, particularly in Bahri’s Jiali oil refinery area, but failed to secure clear-cut victory. Parties continued mobilising local communities, exacerbating violence and complicating future peacemaking efforts. In and beyond Darfur, restrictions on free movement, arbitrary killings, arrests and lootings by both sides and their supporters underscored growing lawlessness and impunity across country.

Several political coalitions called for transfer of power to civilians. SAF-aligned political coalition “National Forces Coordination”, which includes over 40 political parties, armed groups, community leaders and civil society organisations, 8 May endorsed political charter proposing three-year transitional govt with joint military-civilian Sovereign Council and transitional legislative council. Anti-war coalition Tagadum, which claims neutrality between warring parties, 26 May launched founding conference of expanded coalition in Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, attended by over 600 key stakeholders; conference led to adoption of Tagadum’s political position, new leadership structure and basic principles for political process.

Extreme levels of violence caused hundreds of civilian casualties as insecurity raged; military authorities extended rule by five years.

Extreme levels of violence against civilians continued, leaving hundreds dead. Armed forces 3-9 May allegedly killed over 250 civilians across country; in Sahel region, troops reportedly killed 150 civilians in four villages between Dori and Mansila towns in Yagha province, while in East region, military allegedly killed at least 100 others between towns of Fada N’Gourma and Tankoualou, Komandjari province. Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants reportedly attacked civilians across Centre-North, North, East, and Centre-East regions; notably, JNIM militants 2 May killed twenty civilians in Tagalla village, Sanmatenga province (Centre-North). JNIM also clashed against govt forces and civilian auxiliaries (VDPs); militants 5 May attacked security forces and VDPs in Tapoa-Barrage village, Tapoa province (North), leading to deaths of three JNIM militants, two soldiers and eighteen civilians. In Centre-North’s Namentenga province JNIM 9 May reportedly killed seven VDPs in Bonam village and same day killed six soldiers and 33 VDPs in Boko village. 

Govt delayed transition by five years. Ahead of 1 July supposed end of military rule and after 25 May national conference on state of transition, military authorities announced extension of their rule until 2029, dealing heavy blow to hopes of democratic transition; many civil society and political groups boycotted conference. Earlier, thousands of supporters of military govt 11 May gathered in capital Ouagadougou to endorse an extension of transition and acknowledge “positive results” of regime.

Amid tensions with Côte d’Ivoire, govt strengthened ties with Sahel neighbours. Foreign Ministers of Alliance of Sahel States (AES) 17 May convened in Nigerien capital Niamey to finalise alliance documents; AES 20 May began joint military exercises alongside Chadian and Togolese troops in western Niger. Tensions with Côte d’Ivoire remained high amid series of border incidents; after reported VDP incursions into Ivorian territory throughout May, Ivorian forces 16 May allegedly deployed for one day to Helintira town, Djigoué department, South-West region. 

Amid political tensions, inter-Malian dialogue ended and recommended extension of transition; conflict persisted in centre and north. 

Inter-Malian dialogue concluded, recommending transition extension. Final stage of national dialogue took place in capital Bamako 6-10 May as key armed groups remained outside of the process and several opposition parties and civil society groups boycotted initiative. Concerns grew that military would use process to prolong hold on power as consultations concluded with report recommending three-year extension of transition and allowing transitional President Col. Goïta to be presidential candidate when elections held; opposition grouping 12 May called dialogue “grotesque political trap” while leader of opposition African Socialist Democratic Party said dialogue only “about securing benefits for ruling junta”. Meanwhile, in continued suppression of civil and political freedoms, court 21 May sentenced university professor to two years imprisonment for harming state’s reputation and defamation over criticism of govt.

Violence remained widespread in centre and north. Clashes between armed forces, Russian paramilitary Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) and militants continued. In centre, al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 3 May attacked base in Diafarabe town, Segou region, killing at least ten soldiers. In north, jihadists attacked civilians in Gao region including Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) 22 May killing at least three civilians in Balga village, Ansongo commune. Reports of killings of civilians during anti-jihadist operations persisted; notably army and Russian paramilitary patrol 16 May allegedly killed nine civilians in Tahaganet village and same day two in Jenchichi village in Kidal region (north). Meanwhile, following April clash between JNIM and armed groups of Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP), reports emerged 17 May that CSP leadership was seeking non-aggression pact with JNIM. 

Govt strengthened ties with Sahel neighbours, tensions persisted with Mauritania. Foreign Ministers of Alliance of Sahel States (AES) 17 May convened in Niger to finalise alliance documents; AES 20 May began joint military exercises alongside Chadian and Togolese troops in western Niger. Tensions, however, persisted with Mauritania over cross-border incidents (see Mauritania) as govt remained agitated by alleged presence of rebel groups and jihadists on Mauritanian side of border. 

U.S. troops announced Sept withdrawal date, govt strengthened ties with Sahelian neighbours amid tensions with Benin, and jihadist violence persisted. 

Govt and Washington agreed for U.S. troop withdrawal by mid-Sept. U.S. delegation 15-19 May met with Nigerien officials in capital Niamey to plan formal withdrawal of around 1,000 U.S. military personnel, agreeing to complete manoeuvres by 15 Sept; PM Zeine 14 May stated lack of U.S. military support in combating jihadists had led to severed security ties but also welcomed engagement with U.S. on economic investments. Meanwhile, EU 27 May announced military mission would end 30 June but Germany 29 May announced temporary deal allowing its troops to remain at air transport base outside Niamey while new agreement on presence negotiated.

Row with Benin prompted Chinese mediation and threatened oil exports. Amid continued dispute as govt maintained closure of border with Benin, Beninese authorities 6 May announced they would prevent Niger using its port to export crude oil through March inaugurated 2,000km-long Niger-Benin pipeline. PM Zeine 11 May announced border would remain closed for supposed security reasons. However, following mediation efforts by China – whose state oil company owns shares in Niger’s oil – Beninese President Patrice Talon 15 May reversed decision to block exports and agreed to hold dialogue with govt, although 27-28 May dialogue attempt in Niamey faltered. Meanwhile, Foreign Ministers of Alliance of Sahel States (AES) 17 May convened in Nigerien capital Niamey to finalise alliance documents; AES 20 May began joint military exercises alongside Chadian and Togolese troops in west. 

Jihadists conducted attacks in Diffa and Tillabery regions. In Diffa (south east), military 1 May clashed with militants likely from Boko Haram JAS faction near N’Guigmi town, killing three jihadists. In Tillabery (south west), hundreds of al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 20 May attacked Boni military post, as govt reported seven soldiers killed, while Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) same day allegedly killed around twenty civilians in Diambala village.

In another important development. State court decision on immunity of former President Bazoum originally scheduled for 10 May delayed to 7 June. 

Al-Shabaab-related insecurity continued in north east while govt burnished international standing including through security mission to Haiti and President Ruto’s visit to U.S. 

Militant activity persisted in several areas. Notably, Al-Shabaab 10 May killed border police officer in attack in Garissa county’s Yumbis village near border with Somalia. Meanwhile, military 1 May said forces had killed six Al-Shabaab fighters during operation in Kumba area of Lamu; operation follows stepped-up troop deployment in late April to address insecurity amid reported increases in attacks in Garrissa, Lamu and Mandera counties in recent months.

Police mission to Haiti delayed again as Ruto visited U.S. As part of UN-mandated Nairobi-led multinational security force to combat gang violence in Haiti, high-level Kenyan delegation including mission commander 20 May arrived in Haitian capital Port-au-Prince to assess preparations for force arrival; Ruto 24 May said first batch of police would arrive in three weeks, in further delay to deployment amid reports of logistics issues (see Haiti). Meanwhile, Ruto 22-24 May took high-profile trip to Washington, marking first African state visit to U.S. in sixteen years, with Kenya being given Major Non-NATO Ally status, allowing govt increased access to defence cooperation with U.S. 

In another important development. Following severe floods that began in April that killed hundreds and exposed gaps in govt preparedness for natural disasters, residents decried forceful eviction of people living in settlements next to rivers in capital Nairobi as part of authorities’ evacuation orders.

Security deteriorated in northern Cabo Delgado province as Islamic State militants launched assault on strategic town; attacks may continue in June amid upcoming withdrawal of regional troops. 

Jihadists carried out large-scale attack, displacing thousands. Over 100 Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) militants 10 May launched attack on strategic Macomia town that lies on main road connecting northern and southern districts of Cabo Delgado province; insurgents engaged govt and South African troops in clashes lasting almost two days before returning to their base near Mucojo town. Attack came days after Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) had left town, as militants ambushed South African troops who provided reinforcements to Macomia during attack. Number of casualties unknown but local sources reported between ten and 23 killed, while civilians fled into bush. Militants also stole equipment and goods including vehicles and medicines. Several NGOs suspended operations in town following attack, including Médecins Sans Frontières 13 May, adding to existing shortages. Rights group Human Rights Watch 15 May said ISMP had used children to raid town, while UN 22 May reported 4,500 displaced 10-21 May in Macomia and nearby Quissanga district. Attacks also continued in other areas of Cabo Delgado including Ancuabe and Chiúre districts. Timing of Macomia attack after SAMIM troop movements raised further concerns; scale of ISMP attacks may increase in June as SADC pulls out mission by 15 July, with Islamic State propaganda explicitly referring to SAMIM withdrawal. EU 14 May, however, announced extension of training mission until June 2026 and Rwanda 27 May said it had deployed extra 2,000 troops to Cabo Delgado, boosting security presence in province; Rwandan and govt soldiers 29 May reportedly repelled attack on Limala village, Mocímboa da Praia district.

Main parties announced candidates for Oct general elections. After months of uncertainty, ruling-FRELIMO 5 May announced governor of southern Inhambane province Daniel Chapo as presidential candidate. Meanwhile, main opposition party RENAMO 17 May re-elected Ossufo Momade as leader following April moves that prevented his main opponent Venâncio Mondlane from running; party officials 20 May said Momade would be presidential candidate.

Tight general elections held as ruling African National Congress (ANC) projected to lose majority; dispute over Zuma’s eligibility increased risk of unrest. 

Polls held as ANC projected to lose majority for first time. General elections took place 29 May as voting day went peacefully, with high voter turnout expected to be reported; full results announced in June. Amid heightened tensions in lead-up to vote, Constitutional Court 20 May barred former President Zuma, leader of newcomer uMkhonto weSizwe party (MKP), from contesting polls due to his 2021 conviction for contempt of court; decision overturned Electoral Court’s April ruling permitting Zuma to run. MKP alleged that Independent Electoral Commission and Constitutional Court colluded with ANC to rig elections. MKP members 25 May broke into ballot storage sites in Chesterville and Hammarsdale towns in KwaZulu-Natal province, alleging voting material had been altered, and also threatened election officer in Chesterville; electoral commission condemned incidents. President Ramaphosa 26 May listed govt achievements in speech on South African Broadcasting Corporation, prompting MKP and opposition Democratic Alliance to each file urgent affidavit in Electoral Court accusing Ramaphosa of violating electoral code of conduct by using presidential office to influence elections outcome; Ramaphosa 29 May said he merely provided update on country’s state of readiness for elections. 

Ruling party members clashed with opposition supporters. ANC members and supporters 19 May clashed with members of populist opposition Economic Freedom Fighters during ANC campaign event in Seshego township, Limpopo province, as rival party members reportedly threw stones escalating into exchange of gunfire that wounded two bystanders. Electoral Commission 23 May convened both parties to diffuse tensions in area ahead of polls. Suspected political dispute between ANC and MKP members 26 May in Kathlehong township, Gauteng province, resulted in two MKP members shot and killed. 

Ruling party supporters disrupted public hearings on controversial NGO bill while police cracked down on informal money traders amid implementation of new currency.

Govt-linked groups disturbed public consultations on contentious law. Govt 13-17 May held public hearings on controversial proposed Private Voluntary Organisations Amendment Bill that critics argue will be used to control civil society organisations. Suspected ruling party ZANU-PF supporters disrupted hearings in cities of Chinhoyi, Gweru, capital Harare and Masvingo; participants 16 May fled consultation in Masvingo due to fight between ZANU-PF supporters and residents that reportedly left several people injured. 

Govt targeted dissenters of new currency. Govt cracked down on informal money traders in effort to enforce acceptance of new Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) currency – inaugurated in April and facing struggles to win consumer confidence – as police 15 May announced they had arrested 224 alleged illegal currency traders and frozen 90 bank accounts since ZiG introduced; govt 9 May announced it will levy $14,800 fines on businesses who refuse to use official exchange rate while Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube 14 May urged war veterans in Bulawayo city to “protect” ZiG by “fighting” informal money traders. Meanwhile, police 13 May arrested Neville Mutsvanga, son of ZANU-PF spokesperson Chris Mutsvangwa, on charges of illegally dealing in foreign currency, in case reportedly linked to suspected ZANU-PF factional battle between President Mnangagwa and VP Chiwenga. 

In another important development. Harare court 21 May ordered army chief Lt. Gen. Sanyatwe and Defence Minister Oppah Muchinguri to pay $29,000 compensation to protester who was attacked and shot during 2019 demonstrations, when authorities deployed military to crush countrywide anti-govt protests sparked by increase in fuel prices. 

Federal govt met member states amid continued political tensions, while clan violence surged in several areas; conflict with Al-Shabaab remained largely quiet. 

Govt held consultations with most member states to discuss key issues. Federal govt and member state leaders 14-17 May gathered in capital Mogadishu for National Consultative Conference (NCC) to discuss contentious issues, including constitutional review process, operations against Al-Shabaab and status of Nov 2024 member state elections amid speculation they may be delayed; officials from Puntland did not attend following March suspension of recognition of Mogadishu-based central govt and pulling out of NCC process in Jan 2023. At NCC conclusion, govt reported participants had endorsed federal parliament’s approval of first four chapters of constitution. Independent constitutional review commission 18 May began discussion of five further chapters. Political figures who oppose govt’s constitutional changes remained vocal, including Puntland President Said Deni 18 May and former federal Presidents Sheikh Sharif and Farmajo next day criticising govt and NCC. 

Clan conflicts erupted in Southwest, Hirshabelle and Galmudug states. In Bay region in Southwest, state security forces and clan militia early May clashed several times in Berdale town, killing elder and militia member, after state govt sent troops to dismantle militia group; tensions remained high throughout month. Significant violence 13 May also erupted in Hirshabelle between Abgal sub-clans in Bur Shiiq and Biyo Adde villages in Middle Shabelle region, killing over 30. Clashes also reported in Galmudug in late April between Marehaan and Dir clans in Abudwaq district of Galgaduud region.

Govt offensive against Al-Shabaab remained at stalemate. Military conducted episodic airstrikes targeting militants in Galmudug and Hirshabelle states with support from international partners, but launched no major ground operations. Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab conducted several small-scale bombings and assassinations, particularly in Mogadishu including 3 May shooting of senior police officer, but also did not carry out large-scale attack.

In other important developments. Amid rising concerns over resurgence of piracy off Somali coast, EU naval force 10 May arrested six suspected pirates attempting to hijack oil tanker in Gulf of Aden and 23 May rescued cargo ship being hijacked.

Govt continued to prepare for November elections while tensions with Dhulbahante fighters remained high along Sool frontline.

Authorities progressed with vote arrangements. Ahead of 13 Nov concurrent party and presidential elections, House of Representatives 12 May approved presidential appointees to committee overseeing registration of political associations that will run in polls to decide which can become political parties; step further eases fears elections could be delayed. 

Tensions remained high but stable along Sool region frontline. Despite late April clashes in Sanaag region between Haber Jeclo sub-clan of Isaaq (Somaliland’s largest clan) and Dhulbahante clan members, frontlines between govt troops and those from SSC-Khatumo (self-declared administration for Dhulbahante community) in Sool region stayed largely quiet. Meanwhile, SSC-Khatumo leader Abdulkadir Firdhiye 14 May visited Somali capital Mogadishu for consultations between Somali federal govt and member states (see Somalia), but did not participate as full federal member state.

Authorities pursued preparations for implementation of Jan port deal with Ethiopia. Technical committee from Hargeisa early May announced it had finished its work and was awaiting counterparts from Addis Ababa, while President Bihi 18 May said he was certain agreement would be implemented “shortly”.

Row with Niger prompted Chinese mediation; security front remained quiet as U.S. military official visited.

Chinese diplomatic efforts attempted to cool bilateral tensions with Niger. Amid continued dispute as Niger kept its land border closed – which has disrupted trade and led to increased food prices in Benin – govt 6 May prevented Nigerien authorities using Seme terminal port to export crude oil through March inaugurated 2,000km-long Niger-Benin pipeline and 8 May banned maize exports to neighbours, including Niger. Nigerien PM Ali Lamine Zeine 11 May announced border would remain closed for supposed security reasons, further inflaming tensions. China – whose state oil company owns shares in Niger’s oil – 15 May sent delegation to mediate with President Talon, who reversed decision to block crude oil exports and agreed to hold dialogue with Nigerien authorities on potential border reopening and repair of bilateral ties. Media, however, 23 May reported govt had blocked river crossing with Niger used for informal trade, while 27-28 May dialogue attempt in Nigerien capital Niamey faltered.

Jihadist threat remained latent in Northern departments. Head of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), Gen. Michael Langley, 1-3 May met Talon and military officials to discuss defence collaboration amid latent jihadist threat in north. Military 14 May reportedly killed eight militants during operation in Bogo-Bogo district, Alibori department, while no significant jihadist attack reported during month.

In another important development. Amid cost-of-living crisis, trade unions 1 May organised protest in country’s largest city Cotonou but police repressed demonstrations and arrested 72 people; opposition party Les Démocrates demanded their release.

Political jostling continued ahead of 2025 presidential election; govt further deepened military ties with U.S.

Political focus remained on next year’s vote. At party convention in Abidjan city, opposition African People’s Party-Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI) 10 May officially declared former President Gbagbo as candidate for 2025 presidency polls; Gbagbo’s candidacy, however, faces major obstacles including his ineligibility due to 2018 criminal conviction for looting Central Bank of West African States during 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis and competition from several parties run by previous allies, including his former wife, that will be chasing similar parts of electorate. Meanwhile, former PM Soro – in exile since 2019 and sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia in 2021 for undermining national security – 8 May said he would continue dialogue with Ouattara on national reconciliation, amid his attempts to return from exile. 

Discussion with Washington over expanded security ties continued. After U.S. delegation led by head of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), Gen. Michael Langley, late April visited Ouattara to discuss establishment of American military base, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana 13-24 May jointly hosted annual AFRICOM-led special operations exercise featuring dozens of countries. 

In other important international developments. Relations with Senegal boosted by 7 May visit of new Senegalese President Faye. Tensions with Burkina Faso, however, remained high following series of incidents along border with reports of reciprocal security forces’ provocations during May.

Govt defended stalled transition, while crackdown on protests continued.

As opposition continued calling for elections, PM Bah justified transition delays. Bah 10 May responded to demands from opposition urging regime to respect timetable for restoration of civilian govt, claiming transition’s objective was not just to organise vote but to lay foundations for “institutionalisation to stabilise country and consolidate unity”; PM declared “things are progressing”. Opposition calls to progress transition, however, grew louder; coalition National Alliance for Alternation and Democracy (ANAD) 18 May urged govt to restore constitutional order before 31 Dec 2024, and said it “vigorously denounces junta’s renunciation” of its “commitments”; ANAD threatened to organise protests if timetable not respected. Meanwhile, opposition grouping National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC) 21 May announced it will oppose any extension of transition timetable, and also threatened to resume demonstrations. 

Popular protests continued amid crackdown and media repression. Police 3 May arrested 126 people after demonstrations took place over ten days in late April in Lero town (Kankan region) protesting against employment practices of local gold mining company and lack of public services including water and electricity. Also, authorities 14 May arrested spokesperson for victims of Dec gas depot explosion in Conakry that killed at least 23 and 17 May gave him three months suspended sentence for defaming govt; hundreds on same day demonstrated in capital in support of spokesperson. In continued repression of media, authorities 22 May withdrew six radio and television stations licences, with govt 24 May blaming outlets’ “regular abuses”; Union of Guinean Press Professionals 27 May said they were preparing calls for a general strike. 

In another important development. Small fires reported throughout month in capital Conakry including at headquarters of Culture Ministry and public energy company; official state media 7 May attributed cause of fires to “acts of sabotage”, but much remained unclear about incidents.

Military operations continued against jihadists, bandits and other armed groups, but killings and abductions persisted while herder-farmer and separatist violence also flared. 

Army reported gains in anti-jihadist campaign in North East. Govt continued “clearance campaign” against Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram militants around Lake Chad and Sambisa Forest in Borno state. Notably, troops 9 May raided ISWAP enclave and killed six fighters near Goniri village, Damboa area, while army 19 May said it rescued 386 people from Boko Haram strongholds in Sambisa Forest. ISWAP 28 May killed 31 fishermen with 40 others missing in Kukawa area, and 30 May ordered all residents of area to leave by 1 June or be killed. 

Criminal group violence remained high in North West and North Central zones. Despite govt operations, armed groups continued killings and abductions in several states including Kaduna, Katsina, Kogi, Niger, Plateau and Zamfara. Notably in Zamfara, gunmen 7-11 May killed almost 50 and abducted over 100 civilians in eight villages in Anka and Birnin-Magaji areas. In Plateau, armed group 20 May killed around 50 in attack in Wase area. In Niger, armed groups 24-27 May reportedly killed at least six people, raped at least ten women and girls, and abducted 160 others in Munya area.

Herder-farmer violence persisted in North Central zone. In Benue state, armed group 3 and 14 May attacked Ogbaulu village in Agatu area, killing at least thirteen villagers; local official blamed attacks on herders. Meanwhile in Plateau, gunmen 8 May killed two herders and hundreds of cattle in Bassa area; chair of local Fulani organisation condemned attempts to “annihilate” community.

Biafra separatists and military continued to clash in South East zone. In Imo state’s Orsu area, army 7 May said troops had killed key commander of separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) armed wing Eastern Security Network and two of his lieutenants near Ihiteukwa town. In Abia state, gunmen 17 May killed two soldiers and civilian in Aba city and 30 May killed five soldiers and six civilians in Obingwa area; military blamed attacks on IPOB, vowed fierce response. 

Ruling party won overwhelming majority in April elections and new constitution expected to extend President Gnassingbé’s decades-long rule came into effect.

Following 29 April legislative and regional votes, provisional results released 4 May showed ruling Union for the Republic party won 108 out of 113 parliamentary seats and 137 of 179 council seats, which Constitutional Court 13 May confirmed. Opposition parties expressed doubts about results but international actors including African Union and West African regional bloc ECOWAS commended electoral process. Meanwhile, President Gnassingbé 6 May signed new constitution into effect, marking beginning of Fifth Republic and transition from presidential to parliamentary system, amid persistent concerns president would use new structure to extend stay in power.