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Opasni bosanski tango: Islam i nacionalizam
Opasni bosanski tango: Islam i nacionalizam
Briefing 70 / Europe & Central Asia

Opasni bosanski tango: Islam i nacionalizam

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Pregled

Bošnjačka zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini (BiH) je duboko frustrirana zbog dis­funk­­cionalnosti državne uprave, nedostatnog ustava i ekonomske stagnacije BiH, kao i ponovnim dovođenjem u pitanje teritorijalnog integriteta zemlje od strane Hrvata i Srba. Islamska zajednica je preuzela vodeću ulogu u kanalisanju bijesa naroda, popunjavajući vakum koji su napravile bošnjačke političke partije, čije je rukovodstvo izgubljeno. Politički Islam je u BiH novost a njegova pojava se smatra prijetnjom za sekularne partije i nemuslimane. Na marginama društva se pojavilo obilje nepozna­tih salafijskih i drugih Islamističkih grupa dovodeći do porasta straha od terorizma. One su male, podijeljene i uglavnom nennasilne, no međutim, i država i Islamska zajednica bi trebale poraditi na njihovoj daljoj integraciji u društvo. Stvarna nesta­bilnost i nasilje će vjerovatnije proizaći iz sukobljenih nacionali­zama. Najveći doprinos Islamske zajednice bi bio u podršci stvaranju vizije Bosne i Herce­govine sa kojom bi se složili i Hrvati i Srbi.

Islamska zajednica (IZ) u BiH je narasla od religijske organizacije u važnog poli­ti­čkog igrača koji je oblikovao bošnjački nacionalni identitet. Međutim u zadnje vrijeme je postala podijeljena i dezorganizovana. Njen još uvijek utjecajni i kariz­matični bivši vođa, Mustafa ef. Cerić, je osigurao da Islam postane snažan element u poslijeratnom bošnjačkom nacionalizmu čiji je on bio glavni autor i promoter. On je isto tako povezao bošnjačku ideju sa BiH, koja bi, iako multi­etnička, po njegovom mišljenju trebala biti nacionalna država Bošnjaka, pošto i Srbi i Hrvati već imaju svoje države.

Prijetnja fundamentalističkog Islama se opetovano pojavljivala u BiH od kako su tu stigli mudžahedini početkom 1990tih, koliko god to bilo strano većini muslimanske populacije. Posebno nakon 11. septembra 2001., kad su krenule u globalni rat protiv terorizma, SAD su posebno izvršile pritisak na BiH vlasti da uhapse ili deportiraju pojedince za koje se pretpostavljalo das u povezani sa Al-Qaedom i drugim terorističkim grupama. Nedavno, u decembru 2012., samopro­glašeni Islamski pobunjenik je osuđen na osamnaest godina zatvora zbog pucanja na ambasadu SADa u Sarajevu predhodne godine. Mjesec dana ranije, Bosanac sa državljanstvom SADa je osuđen na doživotnu robiju zbog planiranja napada u Njujorku 2009.

Ovi slučajevi podržavaju percepciju da radikalne Islamske grupe predstavljaju ozbiljnu i ujedinjenu prijetnju stabilnosti. Ustvari činjenica je da su nekoliko pos­to­jećih grupa male i podijeljene. Neke su integrisane u IZ; druge odbacuju njen autoritet i povlače se u izolovane zajednice. Doslovno niti jedan domaći radikal nije bio uključen u nasilje; velika većina napada su bili djelo emigranata ili osoba sa postojećim krimi­nal­nim ili psihijatrijskim dosijeima. Postoji rizik od sličnih, manjih napada u budućno­­­sti, ali nema naznaka da postoji organizacija sposobna ili zainteresirana za masovno nasilje ili terror. Međutim da bi se zaštitili od budućih incidenata:

  • Islamska zajednica i država BiH bi trebali surađivati na uključivanju nenasilnih salafija u dijalog, posebno onih koji se vraćaju iz dijaspore, da bi se podržala njihova integracija.

Vjerovatnije je da će do pojačavanja tenzija doći zbog korištenja bošnjačkog nacio­na­li­zma od strane IZ, dijelom kao odgovor na provokacije srpskih i hrvatskih nacionalista. To je danas slučaj u Mostaru, gdje IZ zagovara tvrdu liniju, pokuša­va­jući ujediniti Bošnjake u političkoj borbi sa glavnim hrvatskim partijama oko izabira lokalnih vlasti i formiranja opštine. Iako je to mandat gradske uprave a budžet nije usvojen, Mostar nije uspio održati izbore 2012.; bez pravosnažne gradske uprave, postoji rizik da će usluge biti obustavljene u narednim mjesecima. Bez kompromisa, koliko god težak on bio, svi građani će ispaštati. Da bi se prevazišla ova kriza:

  • Mostarski vjerski lideri bi trebali podržati kompromisnu poziciju prihvatljivu sve trima zajednicama, suzdržati se od retorike podjele i pozvati gradske političke vođe da se slože oko rješenja bez daljeg odgađanja.

Izbor novog Reisa, Huseina Kavazovića, krajem 2012., nudi priliku za restrukturi­ranje i depolitizaciju IZ i fokusiranje na njenu institucionalnu reformu. No biće teško odustati od političkog Islama koji je promovisao Cerić, zasnovanog na afir­ma­ciji snažnog bošnjačkog identiteta, dok god mnogi Bošnjaci imaju osjećaj da je integritet njihove države na udaru. Cerić ostaje aktivan; pokrenuo je Svjetski bošnjački kong­res 29. decembra 2012. koji uključuje jako prisustvo iz Sandžaka, miješovite regije sa većinskim muslimanskim stanovništvom na granici Srbije i Crne Gore. Više nego bilo koja mala salafijska zajednica koja djeluje u BiH, dalja politizacija bošnja­čkog pitanja može doprinijeti nestabilnosti ako se razvije kao opozicija drugim zajednicama u ovoj zemlji. Da bi se izbjegla opasna eskalacija nacionalističkog kon­fli­kta, IZ i ruge religijske zajednice u BiH bi trebale:

  • da se povuku iz zauzimanja jednostranih pozicija u političkoj areni suzdržavajući se od davanja podrške partijama ili kandidatima; i
     
  • da se posvete međureligijskom dijalogu u potrazi za zajedničkom osnovom i oblikuju viziju BiH kao zajedničke imovine sve tri glavne zajednice.

Sarajevo/Brisel 26. februar 2013.

Report 232 / Europe & Central Asia

Bosnia’s Future

While the physical scars of the 1992-1995 Bosnia war have healed, political agony and ethnic tension persist. Real peace requires a new constitution and bottom-up political change.

Executive Summary

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH, or Bosnia) poses little risk of deadly conflict, but after billions of dollars in foreign aid and intrusive international administration and despite a supportive European neighbourhood, it is slowly spiralling toward disintegration. Its three communities’ conflicting goals and interests are a permanent source of crisis, exacerbated by a constitution that meets no group’s needs. The political elite enjoys mastery over all government levels and much of the economy, with no practical way for voters to dislodge it. The European Union (EU) imposes tasks BiH cannot fulfil. A countrywide popular uprising torched government buildings and demanded urgent reforms in February 2014, but possible solutions are not politically feasible; those that might be politically feasible seem unlikely to work. Bosnia’s leaders, with international support, must begin an urgent search for a new constitutional foundation.

The international project to rebuild Bosnia has had success: war’s physical scars are largely gone, and the country is peaceful. The political agonies, however, show the intervention’s limits. Years of well-intentioned reforms, imposed or urged, have left a governing structure leaders circumvent, ignore or despise. May’s floods left scores dead and thousands homeless, exposing the price of poor governance. With growing frequency, Bosnians ask the questions that preceded the 1992-1995 war: shall it be one country, two, or even three; if one country, shall it have one, two or three constituent entities, and how shall it be governed?

The heart of the problem is in Annex 4 to the Dayton Peace Agreement, known as the constitution (and in several changes imposed by courts and international officials). It defines BiH as a state of two entities, in effect but not explicitly federal, but also the state of three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs), and yet, simultaneously, of all citizens. A suffocating layer of ethnic quotas has been added, providing sinecures for officials increasingly remote from the communities they represent. The tensions created by constitutional schizophrenia are pushing BiH to the breaking point. A new design is needed: a normal federation, territorially defined, without a special role for constituent peoples, but responsive to the interests of its three communities and the rights of all citizens.

The state administration’s need to reform is made acute by a 2009 decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that in effect requires BiH to change the ethnicity-based way it chooses its chief executive and part of its legislature. Existing proposals try to squeeze the constituent peoples into an ostensibly ethnicity-blind structure on top of which a complicated network of indirect elections would allow party leaders to choose the executive with as little democratic input as possible. The EU and the outside world support this tinkering with Dayton to satisfy the decision, though such proposals have manifestly failed. Bosnians need to rebuild their political structure from the bottom up.

There is no consensus on where to start, but Bosnia may have to break from its political system based on constituent peoples and their rights. Crisis Group has not reached this conclusion lightly. It reflects long experience and observation that no one has been able to frame a broadly attractive vision on the existing flawed basis. With stresses and frustrations accumulating in all communities, Bosnia must conceive new foundations to survive. Agreement may take years and much experimentation and debate, but the search should begin.

BiH is home to three political communities: those primarily loyal to the Bosnian state, usually but not always Bosniaks; those loyal to Republika Srpska (RS), usually Serbs; and those desirous of Croat self-government, usually Croats. Giving the Croats what they want, their own entity to make a three-entity Bosnia, is absolutely rejected by Bosniaks. Building virtual representative units for the three communities, possibly with new emphasis on municipalities as basic building blocks, is intellectually plausible but requires a leap of faith few seem ready to take. A purely civic state is inconceivable to Serbs and Croats.

Neither leaders nor civil society have deeply explored alternatives to three constituent peoples in two entities; any consensus would take time. Nevertheless, the goal should be clear. The head of state should reflect Bosnia’s diversity, something a collective does better than an individual. The same body could be the executive government. Some decisions should require consensus, others a majority. All three communities should be represented, not necessarily in equal numbers. There should be no ethnic quotas; representation should reflect self-defined regions and all their voters. Poorly performing, unnecessary state agencies and ministries should be slimmed or abolished, with powers reverting to the entities; but the state would need new ministries and agencies required for EU membership. The ten cantons in the larger of BiH’s two entities, the Federation (FBiH), are an underperforming, superfluous layer. They could be abolished, their powers divided between the municipalities and the entity government.

Political culture is part of the problem; an informal “Sextet” of party leaders in effect controls government and much of the economy. A multi-ethnic coalition persists, election to election, with only minor adjustments. Membership is earned by winning opaque intra-party competitions in which voters have little say. Change in this system can only come from within: Bosnians should join parties and participate in genuine leadership contests. Sextet power is further buttressed by control of hiring, investment and commercial decisions at state-owned firms, a situation that chokes private investment and growth.

Bosnia is unimaginable without the work of international officials who did much to shape political institutions and implement peace, but the international community has become more obstacle than help. BiH is trapped in a cycle of poorly thought-out, internationally-imposed tasks designed to show leaders’ readiness to take responsibility but that put that moment forever out of reach. The only way to encourage leaders to take responsibility is to treat the country normally, without extraneous tests or High Representatives. The EU could signal a new start by stating it will receive a membership application – the first of many steps on the long accession road. It should then be an engaged, not over-didactic partner in Bosnia’s search for a way to disentangle the constitutional knot.