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Briefing 66 / Europe & Central Asia

Brčko: Nesupervizirano

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Pregled

Vrijeme je za zatvaranje međunarodne supervizije Distrikta Brčko. Nekada smatran modelom posljeratnog pomirenja i dobre uprave, sada se guši u korupciji i lošoj upravi koje su procvjetale uprkos najboljim naporima supervizora. Teritorija je vitalna za stabilnost Bosne i Hercegovine; povezuje dva dijela kako Republike Srpske tako i Federacije BiH, i tehnički pripada oba entiteta ali ima neovisnu upravu i multietničnost. Mnogi od njegovih bivših lidera su pod sumnjom u istrazi zbog korupcije koja je možda samo zagrebala površinu; nekoliko visoko profiliranih razvojnih projekata se urušava u bankrotu i sudskim procesima. RS ima jak utjecaj u distriktu ali ne prijeti narušavanjem njegovog statusa. Ipak bi međunarodna zajednica trebala osigurati da lideri RSa nemaju nikakve sumnje da bi svaki pokušaj preuzimanja Brčkog doveo do snažne reakcije. Stabilnost sada ovisi o tome da li lokalni političari, institucije za sprovođenje zakona i sudstvo mogu preuzeti odgovornost. Međunardna supervizija više ne pomaže i potrebna je nova strategija. 
Specijalni međunarodni Arbitražni Tribunal uspostavljen kao dio Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma je stvorio Brčko Distrikt u avgustu 1999. (“Finalna odluka”), pod isključivim suverenitetom Bosne i Hercegovine kao multietničku, demokratsku jedinicu lokalne samouprave. Međunarodni supervizor, koji je i u funkciji zamjenika Visokog predstavnika, je također bio naimenovan 1997. za nadzor implementacije Dejtonskog sporazuma u Brčkom sa izvršnim autoritetom da proglašava obvezujuće regulacije i naredbe. 
U 2009. međunarodna zajednica je procijenila da institucije u Brčkom funkcinišu efikasno i naizgled trajno, što je glavni uvjet koji je postavljen da bi se omogućilo zatvaranje specijalne supervizije. Od tada su uvođeni dodatni uvjetu uglavnom za RS da bi se pokazalo da ona nema namjeru uzurpirati autoritet Brčkog. RS nema potraživanja prema distriktu i izgleda da je formalno ispunila i zadnji uvjet priznavanjem da međunetitetska granična linija (IEBL), koja dijela dva BiH entiteta, ne prolazi kroz Brčko. 
Ovo je naizgled loš trenutak za zatvaranja međunarodne supervizije. Distrikt se suočava sa najvećom krizom uprave i ekonomskog razvoja usljed radikalizacije političkih pozicija i endemske korupcije. Cijela BiH je potresena političkom i ekonomskom krizom. Više od godinu dana nakon izbora u oktobru 2010. nije formirana državna vlast niti su usvojeni budžeti za 2011. i 2012. Neki se plaše da je RS sve opredjeljenija da proglasi nezavisnost od BiH i da bi Brčko bilo mjesto gdje bi takvi potezi doveli do novih nasilja. Ali supervizija u Brčkom se odnosi samo na unutrašnju vlast; ne može uticati na bezbjednost u čitavoj BiH, što ostaje odgovornost već oslabljenog Visokog predstavnika (OHR) i bezbjedonosnih snaga EU (EUFOR). 
Međunarodni supervizori za Brčko nisu iskorijenili korupciju u proteklih deset godina i nemaju niti resursa niti međunarodne podrške da sada nametnu promjene. Zadržavanje supervizora kao nekoga ko snosi završnu odgovrnost u Distriktu daje mogućnost lokalnim političarima da na lak način izbjegnu konačno prihvatanje odgovornosti. Bosanci i Hercegovci će prije ili kasnije morati pokazati da su sposobni da zaštite svoje osnovne interese. 
FBiH je od samog početka zanemarivala Brčko district, stvarajući vakum koji je RS rado popunjavala. Vlada i političke partije FBiH, koje su prisutne u Brčkom trebaju raditi na popravljanju odnosa sa lokalnim kompanijama i političkim elitama kako bi izbalansirali uticaj Banja Luke. Sa svoje strane RS ima legitimne interese u Distriktu i bitno je doprinijela njegovom ekonomskom oživljavanju; ovaj benigni uticaj bi trebao biti podržan i treba da raste. Radeći skupa kroz BiH državu, Srbi, Bošnjaci i Hrvati trenaju surađivati i dogovoriti se da lociraju barem jednu značajniju lokalnu državnu agenciu u Brčko distriktu. Svi bi trebali intenzivirati napore u borbi protiv lokalne korupcije, posebno jačajući nezavisnost policije, tužilaštva i suda. 
U isto vrijeme dok međunarodna zajednica radi na tome da navede lokalne zvaničnike da preuzmu odgovornost za vlastita djela, ona bi trebala da napravi paralelne korake kako bi stavila svima do znanja da je njena opredjeljenost ka nezavisnosti i teritorijanom integritetu BiH i dalje čvrsta i da bilo koji pokušaj RSa da naruši odredbe Dejtonskog sporazuma, uključujući specijalni status Brčkog, će biti odlučno sankcionisane. Interesi RSa u Brčkom ne smiju dovesti do toga da se vjeruje da oni mogu uspješno dovesti u pitanje finalnu odluku. Shodno s tim:

  • na sastanku Vijeća za implementaciju mira (PIC) 12. i 13. decembra supervizor za Brčko bi trebao predložiti zatvaranje supervizije u okviru određenog broja mjeseci, ali bi Arbitražni Tribunal trebao ostati otvoren kao sigurnosni mehanizam. U slučaju ozbiljnog narušavanja autonomije Brčkog od strane RS (ili FBiH) Tribunal bi ponovo mogao otvoriti superviziju ili čak izmjeniti Finalnu odluku i dodijeliti Distrikt drugom entitetu. Zatvaranje supervizije i zadržavanje tribunala nije bilo predviđeno u Dejtonskom mirovnom sporazumu i finalnoj odluci iz 1999 ali članice PICa to sada ozbiljno razmatraju. Čini se manje vjerovatno da bi se tvrdnje protiv ove strategije mogle održati ukoliko bi se PIC, Brčko supervizor, Predsjedavajući Arbitražnog Tribunala za Brčko, američki diplomata Roberts B. Oven složili oko ovog poteza, kao što su se složili sa zadržavanjem tribunala 12 godina nakon donošenja Finalne odluke.
     
  • EU bi trebala dodatno staviti do znanja svoje namjere da će posvetiti veću pažnju Brčkom. EU delegacja u BiH treba pomoći BiH zvanićnicima da se bore protiv korupcije kroz jačanje vladavine zakona i relevantnih institucija i pripremanje za pristupanje EU, uključujući otvaranjem ureda u Distriktu, kada se regionalni ured na čijem je čelu supervisor zatvori. Veći dio odgovornosti za donošenje i implementaciju (acquis com¬¬mu¬nau-taire) EU zakona, pripada BiH entitetima i kantonima, i Brčko distriktu, koji ima bitno slabiji kapacitet. On zahtijeva podršku kroz postepenu reformu. Koristan prvi korak bi bio da supervizor u svojim finalnim mjesecima radi sa vlastima kako bi podržao usvajanje strategije protiv korupcije za 2009-2014, čiju bi implementaciju pomogla EU. 

 

Sarajevo/Istanbul/Brisel, 8. decembar 2011.

Report 232 / Europe & Central Asia

Bosnia’s Future

While the physical scars of the 1992-1995 Bosnia war have healed, political agony and ethnic tension persist. Real peace requires a new constitution and bottom-up political change.

Executive Summary

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH, or Bosnia) poses little risk of deadly conflict, but after billions of dollars in foreign aid and intrusive international administration and despite a supportive European neighbourhood, it is slowly spiralling toward disintegration. Its three communities’ conflicting goals and interests are a permanent source of crisis, exacerbated by a constitution that meets no group’s needs. The political elite enjoys mastery over all government levels and much of the economy, with no practical way for voters to dislodge it. The European Union (EU) imposes tasks BiH cannot fulfil. A countrywide popular uprising torched government buildings and demanded urgent reforms in February 2014, but possible solutions are not politically feasible; those that might be politically feasible seem unlikely to work. Bosnia’s leaders, with international support, must begin an urgent search for a new constitutional foundation.

The international project to rebuild Bosnia has had success: war’s physical scars are largely gone, and the country is peaceful. The political agonies, however, show the intervention’s limits. Years of well-intentioned reforms, imposed or urged, have left a governing structure leaders circumvent, ignore or despise. May’s floods left scores dead and thousands homeless, exposing the price of poor governance. With growing frequency, Bosnians ask the questions that preceded the 1992-1995 war: shall it be one country, two, or even three; if one country, shall it have one, two or three constituent entities, and how shall it be governed?

The heart of the problem is in Annex 4 to the Dayton Peace Agreement, known as the constitution (and in several changes imposed by courts and international officials). It defines BiH as a state of two entities, in effect but not explicitly federal, but also the state of three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs), and yet, simultaneously, of all citizens. A suffocating layer of ethnic quotas has been added, providing sinecures for officials increasingly remote from the communities they represent. The tensions created by constitutional schizophrenia are pushing BiH to the breaking point. A new design is needed: a normal federation, territorially defined, without a special role for constituent peoples, but responsive to the interests of its three communities and the rights of all citizens.

The state administration’s need to reform is made acute by a 2009 decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that in effect requires BiH to change the ethnicity-based way it chooses its chief executive and part of its legislature. Existing proposals try to squeeze the constituent peoples into an ostensibly ethnicity-blind structure on top of which a complicated network of indirect elections would allow party leaders to choose the executive with as little democratic input as possible. The EU and the outside world support this tinkering with Dayton to satisfy the decision, though such proposals have manifestly failed. Bosnians need to rebuild their political structure from the bottom up.

There is no consensus on where to start, but Bosnia may have to break from its political system based on constituent peoples and their rights. Crisis Group has not reached this conclusion lightly. It reflects long experience and observation that no one has been able to frame a broadly attractive vision on the existing flawed basis. With stresses and frustrations accumulating in all communities, Bosnia must conceive new foundations to survive. Agreement may take years and much experimentation and debate, but the search should begin.

BiH is home to three political communities: those primarily loyal to the Bosnian state, usually but not always Bosniaks; those loyal to Republika Srpska (RS), usually Serbs; and those desirous of Croat self-government, usually Croats. Giving the Croats what they want, their own entity to make a three-entity Bosnia, is absolutely rejected by Bosniaks. Building virtual representative units for the three communities, possibly with new emphasis on municipalities as basic building blocks, is intellectually plausible but requires a leap of faith few seem ready to take. A purely civic state is inconceivable to Serbs and Croats.

Neither leaders nor civil society have deeply explored alternatives to three constituent peoples in two entities; any consensus would take time. Nevertheless, the goal should be clear. The head of state should reflect Bosnia’s diversity, something a collective does better than an individual. The same body could be the executive government. Some decisions should require consensus, others a majority. All three communities should be represented, not necessarily in equal numbers. There should be no ethnic quotas; representation should reflect self-defined regions and all their voters. Poorly performing, unnecessary state agencies and ministries should be slimmed or abolished, with powers reverting to the entities; but the state would need new ministries and agencies required for EU membership. The ten cantons in the larger of BiH’s two entities, the Federation (FBiH), are an underperforming, superfluous layer. They could be abolished, their powers divided between the municipalities and the entity government.

Political culture is part of the problem; an informal “Sextet” of party leaders in effect controls government and much of the economy. A multi-ethnic coalition persists, election to election, with only minor adjustments. Membership is earned by winning opaque intra-party competitions in which voters have little say. Change in this system can only come from within: Bosnians should join parties and participate in genuine leadership contests. Sextet power is further buttressed by control of hiring, investment and commercial decisions at state-owned firms, a situation that chokes private investment and growth.

Bosnia is unimaginable without the work of international officials who did much to shape political institutions and implement peace, but the international community has become more obstacle than help. BiH is trapped in a cycle of poorly thought-out, internationally-imposed tasks designed to show leaders’ readiness to take responsibility but that put that moment forever out of reach. The only way to encourage leaders to take responsibility is to treat the country normally, without extraneous tests or High Representatives. The EU could signal a new start by stating it will receive a membership application – the first of many steps on the long accession road. It should then be an engaged, not over-didactic partner in Bosnia’s search for a way to disentangle the constitutional knot.