Aceh: Kenapa Kekuatan Militer Tidak Akan Membawa Perdamaian Kekal
Aceh: Kenapa Kekuatan Militer Tidak Akan Membawa Perdamaian Kekal
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Report 17 / Asia

Aceh: Kenapa Kekuatan Militer Tidak Akan Membawa Perdamaian Kekal

Hampir selama 50 tahun terakhir Aceh memberontak terhadap kegagalan serentetan pemerintahan Indonesia untuk mengakui aspirasi politik dan ekonomi rakyat Aceh.

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RANGKUMAN IKHTISAR

Hampir selama 50 tahun terakhir Aceh memberontak terhadap kegagalan serentetan pemerintahan Indonesia untuk mengakui aspirasi politik dan ekonomi rakyat Aceh. Asal-usul sejarah dan belahan-belahan sosial bangsa Aceh yang khas tidak pernah tercermin dalam struktur politik daerah tersebut, dan hak ekonomi mereka telah didistorsi oleh pengendalian terhadap pengembangan dan pemanfaatan sumberdaya yang terpusat di Jakarta. Tanggapan militer yang tidak terkendali terhadap perlawanan, terutama sejak akhir dasawarsa 1970an, juga telah menimbulkan sakit hati pada banyak orang Aceh serta memperdalam rasa diperlakukan tidak adil oleh pemerintah pusat. Ketika Orde Baru pimpinan Soeharto runtuh, rasa frustrasi mereka diekspresikan melalui tuntutan akuntabilitas atas kejahatan-kejahatan yang dilakukan dimasa lalu, melalui tuntutan untuk otonomi yang lebih besar, dan melalui tuntutan yang kian tumbuh untuk kemerdekaan. Ini semua  dibarengi gelombang perlawanan bersenjata ketika Jakarta gagal meraih peluang yang timbul sekilas untuk menyelesaikan konflik.

Rencana berbutir enam yang diumumkan pemerintahan Wahid pada tanggal 11 April 2001 dibalut dalam bahasa yang menawarkan solusi komprehensif menyangkut langkah-langkah politik, ekonomi dan sosial, akan tetapi dampaknya tidak akan terasa sementara 80 persen propinsi tersebut secara efektif berada diluar kendali pemerintah. Memperoleh kembali kendali membutuhkan operasi keamanan yang berhasil atau kesepakatan perdamaian dengan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM).[fn]GAM – Gerakan Aceh MerdekaHide Footnote  Peningkatan operasi keamanan bisa memulihkan kendali pemerintah atas areal yang luas dan memberi pukulan yang keras terhadap sayap bersenjata GAM (AGAM)[fn]AGAM – Angkatan Gerakan Aceh MerdekaHide Footnote  akan tetapi masih akan tertinggal suatu pasukan belakang yang alot, dan sementara  itu rakyat Aceh menjadi semakin terpojok.

Solusi militer akan gagal sepanjang pasukan keamanan tidak dapat mengendalikan diri untuk mencegah perilaku yang memusuhi orang Aceh biasa. Masih banyak digunakan praktek-praktek masa otoriter lalu. Kadang kala sistim intelijen seperti dipengaruhi agenda tersembunyi yang sumbernya  internal maupun eksternal. Tindakan brutal dan pembalasan terhadap orang sipil yang tidak bersenjata dan harta benda mereka kebanyakan berlalu tanpa ada sangsi hukuman. Kecuali pada dua kasus yang meragukan, tidak terlihat  tanda-tanda bahwa mereka yang bertanggung jawab atas pelanggaran hak asasi manusia telah, atau akan, dihadapkan ke pengadilan.

Kegagalan menerapkan disiplin dan kendali, sebagian bersumber dari kenyataan bahwa hanya 25 persen dari anggaran keamanan disediakan oleh negara. Artinya baik pasukan militer maupun polisi yang bertugas dilapangan, di Aceh atau tempat lain, harus melakukan berbagai kegiatan yang legal maupun ilegal untuk mendanai kebutuhan operasi dan pribadi lainnya. Penjarahan terhadap ekonomi tersebut dimungkinkan dengan menggunakan atau ancaman menggunakan kekerasan.

Ada petunjuk bahwa  TNI, terutama angkatan darat, mengambil  manfaat dari konflik berkepanjangan di Aceh sekalipun bukan merupakan hasil kebijakan eksplisit. Pertempuran yang berkepanjangan di Aceh memberi peluang bagi TNI untuk memerankan diri sebagai satu-satunya kekuatan yang mampu mencegah disintegrasi Indonesia, dan oleh karenanya pengaruh politiknya dapat dipertahankan. Upaya angkatan darat untuk merebut kembali  wewenang atas  keamanan dalam negeri  dari polisi dengan demikian juga tertolong, yang pada gilirannya memberi justifikasi untuk mempertahankan sistim teritorial angkatan darat yang merupakan sumber pendanaan diluar pemerintah. Pengaruh politik membantu TNI untuk mempertahankan kemandirian lembaganya dan menggagalkan usaha menyeret perwira tingginya ke pengadilan atas pelanggaran-pelanggaran hak asasi manusia di masa lalu.

Presiden Wahid telah berhasil menangkis tekanan untuk mengumumkan keadaan darurat, akan tetapi ia telah mengesahkan pembentukan sebuah komando operasional dibawah pimpinan polisi serta pengiriman bantuan pasukan angkatan darat. Dengan keadaan saat ini penambahan pasukan serta perluasan operasi yang tersamar sebagai upaya pemulihan ketertiban dan hukum tidak urung akan berakibat pada penjarahan yang lebih banyak lagi dan menghalangi tujuan merebut hati dan pikiran rakyat Aceh, apalagi penyelesaian permasalahan politik yang mendasar.

Strategi yang lebih tepat digunakan adalah dengan mempertahankan status quo sementara rundingan berjalan untuk menangggulangi rintangan substantif terhadap perdamaian. Yang menjadi masalah pokok dalam rundingan ini adalah seberapa jauh Jakarta akan memberi otonomi yang luas kepada Aceh. Sementara itu, agar upaya-upaya tidak digagalkan oleh tindakan yang salah kaprah dilapangan di Aceh, dibutuhkan langkah pengendalian yang efektif baik dari pemerintah maupun dari pasukan keamanan.

Apabila pemerintah Indonesia bersedia memberi konsesi yang wajar atas otonomi daerah, maka komunitas dunia dapat berperan dalam menerangkan kepada pimpinan GAM diluar negeri dan di  Aceh mengenai keuntungan dan kerugian berbagai opsi, dalam rangka membantu perundingan dan memantau tercapainya penyelesaian. Indonesia tidak mungkin menerima kehadiran pasukan perdamaian, dan jaminan terbaik bagi suatu penyelesaian yang kekal adalah berhasilnya peralihan kearah demokrasi di negara ini.

Laporan ini terutama membahas mengapa penggunaan operasi militer untuk  mencapai penyelesaian tidak mungkin menghasilkan perdamaian kekal. Laporan berikutnya akan meneliti usulan-usulan bagi otonomi dan prospeknya untuk diterima sebagai alternatif kemerdekaan.

Jakarta/Brussels, 12 Juni 2001

Executive Summary

For much of the last 50 years Aceh has been in rebellion against the failure of successive Indonesian governments to recognise the political and economic aspirations of the Acehnese people. The distinct historical origins and social cleavages of the Acehnese were never reflected in the political structures of the region, and economic equity was distorted by Jakarta’s centralised control of development and resource exploitation. The undisciplined military response to rebellion, especially from the late 1970s onwards, also embittered many Acehnese and deepened their sense of grievance against the central government. When President Soeharto’s New Order collapsed, these frustrations were expressed in demands for accountability for past crimes, in demands for greater autonomy, and in a burgeoning demand for independence. These were accompanied by an upsurge in armed resistance when Jakarta failed to grasp fleeting opportunities to seek an end to conflict.

The six-point plan announced by the Wahid government on 11 April 2001 was clothed in the language of a comprehensive solution involving political, economic and social measures but it can have little effect while 80 per cent of the province is not under effective government control. Regaining control requires either successful security operations or a peace agreement with the Aceh Liberation Movement (GAM).[fn]GAM – Gerakan Aceh MerdekaHide Footnote  Intensified security operations could restore government control over large areas and deal a sharp blow to the armed wing of the Aceh Liberation Movement (AGAM)[fn]AGAM – Angkatan Gerakan Aceh MerdekaHide Footnote  but a hardened rump would remain, and the people of Aceh would have been further alienated in the process.

The military solution is certain to fail as long as the security forces are incapable of exercising the degree of control and discipline over their troops necessary to prevent behaviour that alienates ordinary Acehnese. Many of the practices of the authoritarian past are still in use. The intelligence system seems at times to be subject to hidden agendas set by both internal and external influences. Brutality and reprisals against unarmed civilians and their property also go largely unpunished. With two ambiguous exceptions, there is no indication that those responsible for abuses of human rights have been, or will be, brought to justice.

The failure to impose discipline and control stems in part from the fact that only 25 per cent of the security budget is provided by the state. This means that military and police forces in the field, in Aceh as elsewhere, are compelled to engage in a great variety of legal and illegal activities to provide the remaining funds to support operations and meet personal needs. These depredations on the economy are underpinned by the use or threat of force.

There are also reasons to believe that the military [TNI – Indonesian National Military], particularly the army, benefits from continued conflict in Aceh even if it is not the result of explicit policy. Continued engagement in Aceh allows the TNI to portray itself as the only force capable of preventing the disintegration of Indonesia and thereby helps it to preserve its political influence. It also supports the army’s push to regain responsibility for internal security from the police that in turn justifies the army’s retention of the territorial system that is the fountain of non-government funding. Political influence assists the TNI to preserve its institutional independence and foil efforts to bring senior officers to justice for past human rights offences.

President Wahid has resisted pressure to declare a state of emergency but he has authorised the establishment of an operational command under police leadership and the dispatch of army reinforcements. In present circumstances more troops and the expansion of operations under the guise of restoring law and order will inevitably lead to more depredation and frustrate the objective of winning the hearts and minds of the people, let alone address the underlying political problem.

A more appropriate strategy would be to maintain the status quo while talks are pursued to overcome the substantive obstacles to peace. A central issue in these talks would need to be the extent to which Jakarta was prepared to grant wide autonomy to Aceh.  Meanwhile, to help ensure that efforts are not undermined by inappropriate actions on the ground in Aceh, effective control measures are required from both the government and the security forces.

If the Indonesian government is prepared to make reasonable concessions on regional autonomy, the international community could play a useful role in informing the GAM leadership overseas and in Aceh of the advantages and disadvantages of various options, in assisting negotiations and in monitoring a settlement. Peace keeping forces are unlikely to be acceptable to Indonesia, and the best guarantee that a settlement will endure is a successful democratic transition in the country.

This report is primarily concerned with why military operations to support the imposition of a solution are unlikely to bring lasting peace. A following ICG report will examine the proposals for autonomy and their prospects for acceptance as an alternative to independence.

Jakarta/Brussels, 12 June 2001

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.

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