Report 244 / Asia 27 二月 2013 3 minutes 中国的中亚问题 Share Facebook Twitter 电子邮件 Linkedin Whatsapp 保存 打印 Download PDF Full Report Also available in English 简体中文 English 执行摘要 自苏联解体后，中国和中亚邻国已经建立起了密切关系，最初仅限于经济联系，但后来逐渐拓展到政治和国家安全方面。能源、贵金属和其他自然资源从该地区流入中国。投资的流动方向则恰恰相反：中国铺设管道，架设电网，修建交通网络，将其西北省份——新疆维吾尔族自治区与中亚连接起来。从新疆流出的廉价消费品充斥着中亚市场。中国向该地区的精英阶层和各国政府提供了的慷慨资金援助，在俄罗斯过于强势之际中国向他们给予谨慎的外交支持，而在国际社会大多数成员质疑该地区的长期稳定时，中国向他们作出的团结一致的温情表示。中国的影响力和知名度正在迅速增长。它已经成为该地区占主导地位的经济力量，并在未来几年内很可能超过美国和俄罗斯，成为该地区实力卓越的外部力量。 北京主要关注的是新疆维吾尔自治区的安全和发展，新疆与哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦共享2800公里的国境边界。中国的核心战略似乎是在新疆和中亚地区之间建立密切联系，其目的是加强两地的经济发展和政治稳定。人们同时希望，这反过来也会保护新疆及其邻国，不受北约2014年从阿富汗撤军所引发的任何负面后果的影响。问题是在过去的一年间，中亚大部分地区的安全稳定状况似乎进一步恶化：腐败盛行，政治上层犯罪行为普遍，社会服务急剧衰退，安全部队实力减弱。与中国展开合作的中亚各国政府正日益被视为问题的制造者，而不是解决者，中国分析人士私下也同意这一观点。眼下的风险是，目前与塔利班并肩战斗的中亚各国圣战者们可能在2014年后将战火带回故里。这将会给中亚和中国带来严重困难。而经济干预可能远远不够。 中国和中亚各国的关系还存在其他缺陷。对中国的怀疑态度以及民族主义情绪目前在中亚已经相当高涨，中国的商业行为进一步加固了其负面形象。中国矿山项目对资源进行破坏性掠夺，中国工厂工作条件恶劣，以及中国商人通过大肆行贿官员排挤竞争对手，诸如此类对中国的指责越积越多。利弊姑且不论，中国作为新经济帝国主义的模式化形象正深深扎根于人们心中。 中国主要通过上海合作组织（SCO）开始在中亚地区尝试采取政治和国防安全举措，但该组织在动荡时刻却无所作为。中亚其他主要外部力量则受限于自身利益或经济能力。美军从阿富汗撤军的速度在中国的决策圈中引起高度关注，虽然俄罗斯声称在中亚地区享有特殊利益，它却缺乏中国所享有的金融资源。中国极有可能在近期和中期发现，自己需要发挥更大的政治作用。 与其他人一样，训练有素、消息灵通的中国中亚专家也担心，如果北约部队从阿富汗的撤军溃乱无序或过于迅速，可能会引发严重的地区动荡。危险可能来自于内乱、急剧弱化的中央政府、或者阿富汗邻国因代理战争的进一步升级而发生动荡，其中巴基斯坦尤其令人担忧。中国的中亚专家对中亚领导人的腐败无能以及该地区政治机构的犯罪行为颇有微词，对两个最薄弱的国家，吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦的长期前景，也私下表示非常关注。对于该区域从内部或外部爆发有组织叛乱的风险，中国同西方国家一样焦虑，甚至可能更为焦虑。 这方面的关注促使中国决策者考虑与塔利班组织的个别派系进行接触，努力诱导他们缩减对像“东突厥伊斯兰运动”（ETIM）这样的维吾尔族分离主义组织的支持。在十年一轮领导换届的前夕，中国派遣当时的国家安全负责人周永康于2012年9月访问喀布尔。这一行动本身证明了中国对可能来自阿富汗的威胁的关注程度。50年以来，在访问该地区的中国领导人当中，周永康的级别最高，他承诺提供重建援助以及通过警察培训的形式提供有限的安保援助。虽然中国决策层公开表示支持中亚领导人，并对他们的政治前途表示充满信心，但他们还没有就阿富汗和中亚地区的稳定拿出一个明确方案。 中国已明确表示，即便在极端动荡的情况下，也不会对中亚邻国采取任何形式的军事干预。然而，在未来的几年里，局势演变可能会迫使中国领导层作出艰难的决定。几乎必然的是，中国至少要通过更积极的外交和经济交流，努力应付对自身经济利益和地区稳定构成威胁的各种挑战。 比什凯克/北京/布鲁塞尔，2013年2月27 Download pdf to continue reading the full report Executive Summary Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China and its Central Asian neighbours have developed a close relationship, initially economic but increasingly also political and security. Energy, precious metals, and other natural resources flow into China from the region. Investment flows the other way, as China builds pipelines, power lines and transport networks linking Central Asia to its north-western province, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Cheap consumer goods from the province have flooded Central Asian markets. Regional elites and governments receive generous funding from Beijing, discreet diplomatic support if Russia becomes too demanding and warm expressions of solidarity at a time when much of the international community questions the region’s long-term stability. China’s influence and visibility is growing rapidly. It is already the dominant economic force in the region and within the next few years could well become the pre-eminent external power there, overshadowing the U.S. and Russia. Related Content Interactive 27 二月 2013 China in Central Asia Beijing’s primary concern is the security and development of its Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which shares 2,800km of borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The core of its strategy seems to be creation of close ties between Xinjiang and Central Asia, with the aim of reinforcing both economic development and political stability. This in turn will, it is hoped, insulate Xinjiang and its neighbours from any negative consequences of NATO’s 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan. The problem is that large parts of Central Asia look more insecure and unstable by the year. Corruption is endemic, criminalisation of the political establishment widespread, social services in dramatic decline and security forces weak. The governments with which China cooperates are increasingly viewed as part of the problem, not a solution, as Chinese analysts privately agree. There is a risk that Central Asian jihadis currently fighting beside the Taliban may take their struggle back home after 2014. This would pose major difficulties for both Central Asia and China. Economic intervention alone might not suffice. There are other downsides to the relationship. Its business practices are contributing to a negative image in a region where suspicions of China – and nationalist sentiments – are already high. Allegations are growing of environmental depredation by Chinese mines, bad working conditions in Chinese plants, and Chinese businessmen squeezing out competitors with liberal bribes to officials. Merited or not, the stereotype of China as the new economic imperialist is taking root. Beijing is starting to take tentative political and security initiatives in the region, mostly through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which, however, has shown itself ineffective in times of unrest. The other major external players in Central Asia are limited by their own interests or financial capacity. The speed of the U.S. military pull-out from Afghanistan is causing concern in Chinese policy circles, and though Russia claims privileged interests in Central Asia, it lacks China’s financial resources. It is highly likely in the near- to mid-term that China will find itself required to play a larger political role. China’s well-trained and well-informed Central Asia specialists are among those who fear that a disorderly or too rapid withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan could lead to serious regional unrest – civil strife possibly, the dramatic weakening of central governments, or the escalation of proxy battles among Afghanistan’s neighbours leading to their destabilisation and, most worryingly, Pakistan’s. They are critical of Central Asian leaders’ corruption and lack of competence, as well of the criminalisation of political establishments in the region, and privately express great concern about the long-term prospects for the two weakest states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. They are as anxious as the West, probably more so, about the region’s vulnerability to a potential well-organised insurgent challenge, from within or without. This concern has led Chinese policymakers to consider engagement with elements of the Taliban, in an effort to induce them to scale back their perceived support for Uighur separatist groups, such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The depth of Beijing’s worry over possible threats emanating from Afghanistan was demonstrated when it sent its then security chief, Zhou Yongkang, to Kabul in September 2012, just before China’s once-in-a-decade leadership transition. Zhou, the most senior Chinese official to visit in 50 years, pledged reconstruction assistance and limited security help in the form of police training. Though publicly they support Central Asian leaders and express confidence in their political viability, Chinese policy makers have yet to come up with a clear plan to work toward stability in both Afghanistan and Central Asia. China has unambiguously ruled out any sort of military intervention in its uneasy Central Asia neighbourhood, even in a case of extreme unrest. In the coming years, however, events may force its leadership to make difficult decisions. It will almost surely need to use at least more active diplomatic and economic engagement to grapple with challenges that pose threats to its economic interests and regional stability. Bishkek/Beijing/Brussels, 27 February 2013 Related Tags China Central Asia More for you Podcast / Asia Blinken in Beijing: Will the Secretary of State's Visit Calm China-U.S. Tensions? 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