Crisis Group is monitoring the upsurge in violence in the country triggered by the military's 1 February 2021 coup d'état which deposed the Aung San Suu Kyi administration. The regime has brutally cracked down on protesters, killing hundreds and detaining thousands. Public sector strikes and other forms of civil disobedience have prevented the regime from consolidating its control, and plunged the country into deep economic crisis. Some of the country’s ethnic armed groups have gone on the offensive, and new forms of armed resistance by civilian militias and underground networks have emerged. Although Rakhine State has so far avoided some of the worst of the violence, the plight of the Rohingya remains unaddressed and the prospects for a return of almost one million languishing in camps in Bangladesh looks bleak. Through field research and advocacy, Crisis Group works to understand the new violent dynamics unleashed by the coup and mitigate the impact on the people of the country.
北京对缅甸军事统治者的影响力比任何其他外来国家都来得更大。 虽然北京的影响力是有局限的,但它可以通过打击有组织犯罪和鼓励合法经济来帮助平息边境地区。 其他国家应探索潜在的合作领域,以解决政变后的危机。
China brokered talks between regime and ethnic armed groups in northern Shan state aimed at resuming border trade, while regime lost more territory to Arakan Army in west and Kachin Independence Army in far north.
In north, regime and Three Brotherhood Alliance engaged in talks. As 11 Jan ceasefire held in Shan state (north), regime negotiators early March met Three Brotherhood Alliance in Kunming city, China, for further negotiations on reopening China-Myanmar border trade worth billions annually, which mostly ceased after alliance’s Oct offensive; sticking points include sharing of revenue between sides. In southern Shan state, after Pao National Liberation Army aligned with resistance in Jan, regime 3 March launched destructive offensive to recapture Hsihseng town from group.
In Rakhine state (west), Arakan Army continued to capture regime positions. Arakan Army 4 March captured Ponnagyun town, barely 30km from state capital Sittwe, and 7 March claimed Ramree town – its first in central Rakhine state – located close to major Chinese infrastructure projects in neighbouring Kyaukpyu township, including oil terminal, twin gas and oil pipelines, and proposed deep-sea port and Special Economic Zone. Arakan Army also continued attacks in northern Rakhine, including in Rathedaung, Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships, and 17 March seized Rathedaung. Group 12 March seized Aung Thapyay Border Guard Police post in far northern Maungdaw, prompting 179 regime personnel to flee into Bangladesh. Regime shelling 9 March killed five Rohingya residents in Aung Mingalar ward.
In Kachin state (north), Kachin Independence Army stepped up offensive. After embarking on wave of attacks late Feb against regime positions that for over decade have encircled its Laiza headquarters, Kachin Independence Army-led forces 7-9 March seized total twenty camps in Momauk and Waingmaw townships, and assassinated head of regime-aligned Lisu People’s Militia Force. KIA offensive could impact already-strained communal relations between Jinghpaw majority, which leads KIA, and minority groups in Kachin state, including Shanni and Lisu.
Regime’s conscription drive sparked tensions and recruitment race. Regime’s decision in Feb to enforce dormant military service law reportedly triggered killings of at least dozen local officials tasked with overseeing process, and sparked conscription race with ethnic armed groups, as latter reported increase in recruits.
The [Myanmar] military is clearly facing significant manpower shortages, which is why it is introducing a draft for the first time in its history.
The military [in Myanmar] might not have the ability to vanquish its opponents, but it retains an enormous capacity for violence, especially against civilian targets.
When the Myanmar military feels under pressure, its normal response is to ramp up the level of violence.
Myanmar needs Russia because it doesn't want to be isolated ... and they also need an alternative to China in the region.
If combat persists [in Rakhine State], it will open a significant new front for the regime [in Myanmar], which is already overstretched.
The election [in Myanmar] was the regime's exit strategy from day one, and it doesn't appear to have a backup plan.
In this online event, experts discuss the current state of China-Myanmar relations, Beijing’s tacit support for the rebel offensive launched on 27 October in Myanmar’s northeast, and the implications for international policy on Myanmar.
近一百万罗兴亚人仍然滞留在孟加拉。随着难民营中的暴力事件不断增加,而国际机构也在减少援助,他们近期内回家的希望渺茫。捐助方应扩大援助规模,而达卡则应修改其对应的政策,进行长期规划。
This week on Hold Your Fire!, Richard is joined by Crisis Group’s Myanmar expert Richard Horsey, to discuss ethnic armed groups’ offensive against Myanmar's military in northern Shan State, fighting between resistance forces and the army elsewhere, China’s response to the escalation and the humanitarian consequences.
Fighting has intensified greatly in Myanmar in recent weeks. Having started in northern Shan State, it is now spreading elsewhere. As Crisis Group expert Richard Horsey explains in this Q&A, the military is under significant pressure on the battlefield, with worrying humanitarian implications.
This event brings together analysts and prominent civil society members to discuss the evolution of governance in Myanmar and what this means for stakeholders inside and outside the country.
The Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh looks set to drag on indefinitely. Insecurity in the overcrowded camps is growing. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2023 – Autumn Update, Crisis Group urges Europe to keep providing humanitarian assistance and increase its intake of refugees.
随着缅甸军方在其他战线交战,德昂民族解放军正在该国北部巩固自己的地位。这有可能引发与其他民族武装组织的冲突。因此,德昂军应专注于与民间社会合作,重点改善其地区的治理。
在过去十五年,一个包括非法赌场和网络诈骗各种行动的非法经济已经在老挝和缅甸分界的湄公河沿岸猖獗地发展。该区域的国家必须共同努力,遏制其背后的犯罪集团。
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