为什么开通一个期待已久的热线可以为改善中国日本关系铺条道路
为什么开通一个期待已久的热线可以为改善中国日本关系铺条道路
Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks
Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Op-Ed / Asia

为什么开通一个期待已久的热线可以为改善中国日本关系铺条道路

日本和中国应该使用新的海上和空中沟通机制,通过专业素养,对话协商和外交手段来处理纠纷

由于唐纳德特朗普的鹰派政策转向,东亚一直笼罩在担忧之下,但现在却出现了一线曙光,因为上周中国领导人在八年来首次正式访问了日本。李克强总理与安倍晋三首相举行了建设性会晤,这是一个令人欣慰的迹象,表明双方时达一年的紧密外交努力已取得进展。

这些外交变暖迹象在一定程度上仅是言辞上的,也充满了可变性,但至少有一个具持久性的结果值得称赞:双方同意在30天内建立一个海空通讯机制,以避免意外冲突发生。

中国和日本的军方指挥官可通过双方大使馆之间的新热线联系,这使决策者可以在当双方在海上或空中发生意外时能够更有效地沟通。该公约还规定国防官员将定期举行会议,并实施新机制,使双方的海军舰艇可以通过共同遵循的《海上意外相遇代码》直接交流 。

Despite the evident need, it has taken Beijing and Tokyo a decade to reach agreement.

此种危机管理渠道的必要性愈发突出。中国的雄心是成为一个具有真正的蓝水海军的海上大国。由于它具备庞大的造船能力,目前已经打造了亚洲最大的舰队,拥有大约300艘船只,而现代化改革更能扩展其军事能力,将具备范围更广、更频繁和更具复杂性的海上活动能力。

日本当前则是以适度增加国防预算来回应中国的海上扩张,其计划建立新基地,并在分隔中国东海和太平洋的琉球(南西)群岛上部署导弹。中国人民解放军舰艇和飞机则越来越频繁地试图穿越邻近的宫崎海峡空域和海域到西太平洋进行训练。

中国空军同时也在派遣更多的飞机进入国际海域。当无识别飞机进入防空识别区时,日本自卫队会立即派遣战斗机拦截。2017年发生了500次对解放军飞机的拦截,而这个数字看起来有增加的趋势。

对一船长来说,理解临近船只船长的意图,是他的一个重要责任。去年菲茨杰拉德号潜艇、麦凯恩号潜艇和两艘商船的致命碰撞显示了它的至关重要。在地缘政治动荡的东海和南中国海的水域,船舶可用于创建在“海面上的证据”来维护自己国家占据的位置,严重误解将导致致命性冲突升级。此时,若使用热线可以帮助克服语言障碍,并澄清行动是否具敌意,以核实其是国家行为还仅是某船只的擅自行为。

尽管军方间的热线明显有存在必要,但中日用了十年才达成协议,主要障碍是双方对东海的五个小岛和三个礁岩的争议。中国称之为钓鱼岛,而要求对此行使主权,而日本称为尖阁诸岛,也在实际上控制着它们。谈判在2012年停止,因当时日本政府从私人手里购买了三个岛,以避免民族主义政治家石原慎太郎收购他们。中国的回应则是宣布对东海大部分区域实行防空识别,这意味着它对海域及水下部分行使支配权和主权。中国近来更频繁地在周围岛屿活动,就在今年一月,一艘中国护卫舰、潜艇和海岸警卫队船只在争议岛屿附近出现,引起了东京的抗议。

谈判于2015年1月 重启,但在过去一年里一直没有进展,因为中国要将钓鱼(尖阁岛)包含在协议里,而日本担心这会使中国的主权要求合法化。最后的文本通过不指定地理范围,并指出它对主权无影响,而回避了这个问题。

China’s expanding maritime presence may be an inevitable aspect of its economic and geopolitical rise.

今年四月,两国军队重启了一个自2012年以来停止的交换计划,实现了另一个积极的进展。今年夏天,两国海军将再次参加由美国太平洋舰队发起的环太平洋演习。这些直接接触、对话和培训的机会有助于两国建立熟悉度和相互信心,即便并不是真正的信任,那也是至关重要的进展,值得继续,而且最好是这些活动能包括双方海岸警卫队成员。对此方面的需求,相关的政府和组织也可以加以推进,通过在多边论坛或者一些培训中分享最佳做法来推动。

一旦热线在6月8日开启后,日本和中国应该保持它的运作,确保当事人可以在紧急情况下同时联系到前线人员和高层。飞行员和船长需要授命使用一致的无线电频率和标准信号。此外,在《海上意外相遇代码》或2014年美国与中国防务备忘录的基础上,进一步提供准则和培训也会起到积极作用。

中国在海洋上不断扩大的角色是经济和地缘政治崛起的必然结果,但这并不会直接导致冲突的触发。建立海上和空中通讯机制对于防止冲突发生来说,既是一实用工具也是个表达政治意向的信号。日本和中国应该遵循这个协议,承诺通过具备专业素质的人员,以对话协商和外交手段来处理纠纷,并控制己方飞机和船舶避免做出危险或具威胁性的行为,这样才可能使他们之间的水域真正平静下来。

要了解更多关于中日关系和东海的情况请阅读防止危机小组报告280号:《东中国海:避免冲突造成危机》亚洲258号报告《新仇旧恨恩怨:不断发展的中日紧张关系》和亚洲245号报告《危险水域:处在暗礁上的中日关系》。

Report 245 / Asia

凶险水域:中日关系触礁

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Executive Summary

The world’s second and third largest economies are engaged in a standoff over the sovereignty of five islets and three rocks in the East China Sea, known as the Diaoyu in Chinese and the Senkaku in Japanese. Tensions erupted in September 2012 when Japan purchased three disputed islands from their private owner to keep them from the nationalist governor of Tokyo. In response, Beijing implemented a series of measures including the establishment of overlapping administration in the disputed waters. Both sides’ law enforcement agencies and militaries currently operate in close proximity in disputed naval and aerial space. Unlike foreign ministries, these actors have less institutional interest in containing crises and enjoy an information monopoly allowing them to shape domestic perceptions. The two countries lack the mutual trust and communication mechanisms to manage incidents, let alone to discuss intentions or operating protocols. In the event of a skirmish, heightened nationalism, especially in China, could constrict the room for diplomatic manoeuvres to de-escalate the situation.

China’s actions reflect a “reactive assertive” tactic used previously in the South China Sea, whereby it exploits perceived provocations in disputed areas by other countries to take strong countermeasures to change the status quo in its favour. Interpreting the Japanese government’s decision to purchase the islands as a unilateral change to the status quo, China implemented a series of pre-planned actions with the goal of changing the facts on the ground. The most important was when Beijing declared territorial baselines around the islands in September, thus increasing the number and length of its law enforcement patrols to directly challenge Japan’s de facto control of the area. Many Chinese strategists perceive Japan to be a former empire continuing on a downward slide while China’s star is rising. For them, the time is right to respond resolutely and stake its ground with its eastern neighbour.

Nationalism makes the sovereignty dispute in the East China Sea a highly explosive issue for China, more so than the South China Sea. Due to the brutal Japanese occupation of China in the 1930s, sentiments over the status of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands run deeper in the Chinese psyche than any other territorial dispute in modern Chinese history, with the exception of Taiwan. Beijing has for years exploited anti-Japan sentiment through patriotic education campaigns and has used nationalism to justify assertive actions. But while in the past it could more easily dial up or down nationalism through control of state-run media, the rapid rise of Internet use has eroded that control and begun to shape the context of policymaking. The government must now satisfy increasingly outspoken and critical citizens.

Complementary economic ties – essential to both given China’s prioritised commitment to strong economic growth and Japan’s desire to rebuild its stagnated economy – have provided strong incentives to keep this dispute from escalating into armed conflict, a scenario neither side wants. But despite expressions by both governments that they wish to avoid a war, potential for escalation has increased and there is deepening pessimism on both sides over the prospects of a peaceful settlement. The strategic mistrust that characterises relations has been aggravated by their respective domestic situations. Without top leaders setting the tone for crisis mitigation, a tradition of back-channel diplomacy has disappeared. The relative weakness of China’s foreign ministry complicates bilateral relations and prevents effective crisis management, as it is the official – and often the only – channel open to Tokyo. Meanwhile, the “China hands” in Japan who traditionally helped manage the relationship have been sidelined. While there is little hope of a resolution of the sovereignty dispute in the near future, Tokyo and Beijing urgently need to work toward establishing communication mechanisms and strengthening crisis mitigation in order to avoid a larger conflict.

Beijing/Brussels, 8 April 2013

 

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