重新审视巴基斯坦的反恐战略:机遇与失误
重新审视巴基斯坦的反恐战略:机遇与失误
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
pakistan-22jul15
An army soldier stands guard inside the Army Public School, which was attacked by Taliban gunmen, in Peshawar, December 17, 2014. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra
Report 271 / Asia

重新审视巴基斯坦的反恐战略:机遇与失误

巴基斯坦为期六个月的反恐措施仍未能终结暴力圣战组织的行动,而武力主导的措施则持续削弱文职政府。巴基斯坦的制胜战略应包括在结构和治理上的改革,则方可避免圣战组织继续钻法治缺失的空子并从根本上解决极端暴力的问题。

执行摘要

2014年12月16日,位于白沙瓦的一处军校遭到袭击,其中150人死亡,且多为儿童。巴基斯坦塔利班组织(巴基斯坦塔利班运动——TTP)声称对此负责,而这则从表面上打破了格局。一周后,巴基斯坦穆斯林联盟(纳瓦兹)(PML-N)政府推出了一项新的反恐战略——二十点全国行动计划(NAP)。巴基斯坦总理谢里夫(Nawaz Sharif)和军方总指挥拉希勒·谢里夫(Raheel Sharif)誓要锁定所有恐怖组织且一个不留。六个月后,在恐怖袭击仍持续发生的情形之下,二十点全国行动计划看似更像是政府在危机之时为安抚公众情绪所做的愿望清单,而远非一个连贯的反恐策略。若是单靠有勇无谋的武力来打击恐怖主义,其弊往往大于利。因为这些措施只会削弱宪政、民主治理与法治,从而令圣战分子坐收渔利、并为恐怖主义宣传添油加米。因此,打击恐怖主义威胁并抑制暴力极端主义的关键在于对刑事司法系统的改革和巩固。

反恐政策的军事化将巴基斯坦治理的平民化发展置于险地。即便有采取军事措施的必要,但其却非稳定国内民主过渡的充分条件。尽管本报告强调了反恐政策中强制性的一面以及如何提高其有效性;但若缺乏结构和治理上的改革,恐怖主义和极端主义便得不到根除,而暴力的圣战组织也将继续利用法治缺失的漏洞。自2008年民主政治恢复以来,军方仍持续削弱民治政府,而这对推行实质且可持续的改革是一重大挑战。然而,政治领导层亦应对其信誉和权威的受损负责,因为这也是归咎于他们无力抗衡军方压制。

在于11月24日推出二十点全国行动计划后,谢里夫政府即刻满足了军方的两大要求:取消前任政府于2008年颁布的死刑禁令;并于2015年1月6日通过了第21条宪法修正案。此次修宪则授予了特别军事法庭对所有恐怖主义嫌疑人的审判权,且平民也无一例外。然而,自去年12月以来,军事法庭实行了176起死刑,其中大部分罪行都无关恐怖主义,但军事法院却削弱了宪法保障和程序。而其他新增的平行结构——如省级“最高委员会”——则令军队得以绕开民众代表机构,并在治理中扮演更直接的角色。凭借着这些新的法律工具,军队通过设计和实施反恐政策从而进一步地边缘化了民主机构。

巴基斯坦军方已基本掌握了国家安全和反恐政策,军方虽对此否认,但其仍在把圣战分子划分为:针对安全部队和巴基斯坦人的“坏”组织和可以推进巴在印度和阿富汗的战略目标“好”组织。像改名为受禁虔诚军(LeT)的本达瓦慈善会(JD)等反印组织便已通过其所谓的慈善附属机构扩展了自己的活动范围。又例如哈卡尼网络(Haqqani Network),作为由军方支持的阿富汗反动组织,它并未受到当前在联邦直辖部落地区(FATA)北瓦济里斯坦进行的军事行动的打击。相反,哈卡尼连同虔诚军(或达瓦慈善会)等“好”组织则没有被巴基斯坦列入恐怖主义组织的名单中。

不足为奇的是,全国行动计划中的许多目标都进展甚微。一些组织和个人虽遭巴基斯坦禁止并被列入了联合国安全理事会(UNSC)第1267号决议的黑名单,如今却仍逍遥法外。而巴基斯坦采取的其他措施——如监管宗教学校部门、遏制仇恨言论和文学、以及阻止恐怖主义融资——也顶多只见到了间歇性的成效。

改革并巩固刑事司法系统或将有助于实现全国行动计划的目标。谢里夫政府诚然仍有机会能扭转局势并对反恐战略进行实质性的改革,但这也稍纵即逝,并且还需要他撤回此前对军队做出的政策大让步。政府应接受此挑战,重整反恐策略、以情报为引、并将过于军事化的应对措施取而代之。这些行动应由民治执法机构——尤其是警察——来领导。若要瓦解恐怖网络、拘留并审判圣战头目和士兵、切断恐怖主义融资、并终结挑起激进主义的仇恨言论和文学,巴基斯坦则需要重新分配现有资源、并巩固省级警察力量。其现有的三个司法基础——刑法、刑事诉讼法与证据法——亦需要更新升级;但更为紧迫的却是构建警方的执法能力,因其警力已由于资源、培训、内部问责制和自治力的匮乏而严重衰退。

一个得到充分授权和资源的警察部门是实施可持续且成功的反恐战略最可靠的工具。而巴基斯坦当前的措施却将重点放在了报复、惩罚、剥夺公民基本权利和削弱法制效力。这样存在缺陷作法不仅正在瓦解巴基斯坦民众对政府伸张正义的信心,还会助长社会不满情绪,并为国际行动计划所针对的暴力极端主义者所利用。

伊斯兰堡/布鲁塞尔,2015年7月22日

Executive Summary

The 16 December 2014 attack on an army-run school in Peshawar, which killed 150, mainly children, claimed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan-TTP), was ostensibly a game changer. A week later, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) government unveiled a new counter-terrorism strategy, the twenty-point National Action Plan (NAP), with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Raheel Sharif vowing to target all terror groups without distinction. Six months later, amid continued terror attacks, the NAP looks far more like a hastily-conceived wish-list devised for public consumption during a moment of crisis than a coherent strategy. Reliance on blunt instruments and lethal force to counter terrorism risks doing more harm than good when they undermine constitutionalism, democratic governance and the rule of law and provide grist to the jihadis’ propaganda mill. A reformed and strengthened criminal justice system is pivotal to countering terror threats and containing violent extremism.

The militarisation of counter-terrorism policy puts at risk Pakistan’s evolution toward greater civilian rule, which is itself a necessary but not sufficient condition to stabilise the democratic transition. While the report addresses the coercive side of a counter-terrorism policy and how to make it more efficient, without structural and governance reform, the root causes of terrorism and extremism will remain unaddressed, and violent jihadis will continue to exploit the absence of rule of law. The military’s continual undermining of civilian authority since democracy’s restoration in 2008 will remain a major challenge to meaningful and sustained reform. Yet, the political leadership also bears responsibility for failing to push back and, as a result, undermining its credibility and authority.

After inaugurating the NAP on 24 December, the Sharif government implemented two major demands of the military without delay: lifting the predecessor government’s 2008 moratorium on the death penalty; and passing on 6 January 2015 the 21st constitutional amendment, empowering special military courts to try all terrorism suspects, including civilians. Yet, the vast majority of the 176 executions since late December have been for crimes unrelated to terrorism, and the military courts weaken constitutional protections and due process. Other newly-created parallel structures, including provincial “apex committees”, enable the military to bypass representative institutions and play a more direct role in governance. Armed with new legal tools, the military has further marginalised civilian institutions in devising and implementing counter-terrorism policy.

Despite claims to the contrary, the military, which has almost complete control over national security and counter-terrorism policy, also still distinguishes between “bad” jihadi groups, those targeting the security forces, and “good” jihadi groups, those perceived to promote its strategic objectives in India and Afghanistan. Anti-India outfits such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD), the renamed version of the banned Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), have even expanded their activities through so-called charity fronts. Military-backed Afghan insurgents, such as the Haqqani Network, have not been targeted in ongoing operations in the North Waziristan agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Instead, the Haqqanis, like the LeT/JD, have been kept off Pakistan’s list of terrorist groups.

Unsurprisingly, there is little evidence of progress on many NAP targets. Groups and individuals banned in Pakistan and also blacklisted under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1267, continue to operate freely. Efforts to regulate the madrasa sector, curb hate speech and literature and block terrorist financing have been haphazard at best.

A reformed and strengthened criminal justice system could have helped to achieve NAP’s objectives. The Sharif government still has an opportunity, albeit fast shrinking, to reverse course and meaningfully overhaul counter-terrorism strategy, but this necessitates revoking major policy concessions to the military. The government should take on that challenge in order to replace an overly militarised response with a revamped, intelligence-guided counter-terrorism strategy, led by civilian law enforcement agencies, particularly the police. Dismantling terror networks, detaining and trying jihadi leaders and foot soldiers, disrupting terror financing and ending radicalisation through hate speech and literature will require reallocating limited resources in order to strengthen the capacity of the provincial police forces. While the three basic bodies of law, the Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Evidence Act, need to be modernised, it is even more urgent to build police capacity to enforce them. That capacity has been gravely eroded due to the inadequacy of resources, training, internal accountability and autonomy.

An empowered, resourced police force remains the most credible tool for enforcing a sustained and successful counter-terrorism strategy. The current emphasis on revenge and retribution and the emasculation of fundamental rights and rule of law are undermining citizen confidence in the state to deliver justice, a flawed approach that also fuels grievances that benefit the violent extremists the NAP is aimed at combatting.

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