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重新审视巴基斯坦的反恐战略:机遇与失误
重新审视巴基斯坦的反恐战略:机遇与失误
Calming India and Pakistan’s Tit-for-Tat Escalation
Calming India and Pakistan’s Tit-for-Tat Escalation
An army soldier stands guard inside the Army Public School, which was attacked by Taliban gunmen, in Peshawar, December 17, 2014. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra
Report 271 / Asia

重新审视巴基斯坦的反恐战略:机遇与失误

巴基斯坦为期六个月的反恐措施仍未能终结暴力圣战组织的行动,而武力主导的措施则持续削弱文职政府。巴基斯坦的制胜战略应包括在结构和治理上的改革,则方可避免圣战组织继续钻法治缺失的空子并从根本上解决极端暴力的问题。

执行摘要

2014年12月16日,位于白沙瓦的一处军校遭到袭击,其中150人死亡,且多为儿童。巴基斯坦塔利班组织(巴基斯坦塔利班运动——TTP)声称对此负责,而这则从表面上打破了格局。一周后,巴基斯坦穆斯林联盟(纳瓦兹)(PML-N)政府推出了一项新的反恐战略——二十点全国行动计划(NAP)。巴基斯坦总理谢里夫(Nawaz Sharif)和军方总指挥拉希勒·谢里夫(Raheel Sharif)誓要锁定所有恐怖组织且一个不留。六个月后,在恐怖袭击仍持续发生的情形之下,二十点全国行动计划看似更像是政府在危机之时为安抚公众情绪所做的愿望清单,而远非一个连贯的反恐策略。若是单靠有勇无谋的武力来打击恐怖主义,其弊往往大于利。因为这些措施只会削弱宪政、民主治理与法治,从而令圣战分子坐收渔利、并为恐怖主义宣传添油加米。因此,打击恐怖主义威胁并抑制暴力极端主义的关键在于对刑事司法系统的改革和巩固。

反恐政策的军事化将巴基斯坦治理的平民化发展置于险地。即便有采取军事措施的必要,但其却非稳定国内民主过渡的充分条件。尽管本报告强调了反恐政策中强制性的一面以及如何提高其有效性;但若缺乏结构和治理上的改革,恐怖主义和极端主义便得不到根除,而暴力的圣战组织也将继续利用法治缺失的漏洞。自2008年民主政治恢复以来,军方仍持续削弱民治政府,而这对推行实质且可持续的改革是一重大挑战。然而,政治领导层亦应对其信誉和权威的受损负责,因为这也是归咎于他们无力抗衡军方压制。

在于11月24日推出二十点全国行动计划后,谢里夫政府即刻满足了军方的两大要求:取消前任政府于2008年颁布的死刑禁令;并于2015年1月6日通过了第21条宪法修正案。此次修宪则授予了特别军事法庭对所有恐怖主义嫌疑人的审判权,且平民也无一例外。然而,自去年12月以来,军事法庭实行了176起死刑,其中大部分罪行都无关恐怖主义,但军事法院却削弱了宪法保障和程序。而其他新增的平行结构——如省级“最高委员会”——则令军队得以绕开民众代表机构,并在治理中扮演更直接的角色。凭借着这些新的法律工具,军队通过设计和实施反恐政策从而进一步地边缘化了民主机构。

巴基斯坦军方已基本掌握了国家安全和反恐政策,军方虽对此否认,但其仍在把圣战分子划分为:针对安全部队和巴基斯坦人的“坏”组织和可以推进巴在印度和阿富汗的战略目标“好”组织。像改名为受禁虔诚军(LeT)的本达瓦慈善会(JD)等反印组织便已通过其所谓的慈善附属机构扩展了自己的活动范围。又例如哈卡尼网络(Haqqani Network),作为由军方支持的阿富汗反动组织,它并未受到当前在联邦直辖部落地区(FATA)北瓦济里斯坦进行的军事行动的打击。相反,哈卡尼连同虔诚军(或达瓦慈善会)等“好”组织则没有被巴基斯坦列入恐怖主义组织的名单中。

不足为奇的是,全国行动计划中的许多目标都进展甚微。一些组织和个人虽遭巴基斯坦禁止并被列入了联合国安全理事会(UNSC)第1267号决议的黑名单,如今却仍逍遥法外。而巴基斯坦采取的其他措施——如监管宗教学校部门、遏制仇恨言论和文学、以及阻止恐怖主义融资——也顶多只见到了间歇性的成效。

改革并巩固刑事司法系统或将有助于实现全国行动计划的目标。谢里夫政府诚然仍有机会能扭转局势并对反恐战略进行实质性的改革,但这也稍纵即逝,并且还需要他撤回此前对军队做出的政策大让步。政府应接受此挑战,重整反恐策略、以情报为引、并将过于军事化的应对措施取而代之。这些行动应由民治执法机构——尤其是警察——来领导。若要瓦解恐怖网络、拘留并审判圣战头目和士兵、切断恐怖主义融资、并终结挑起激进主义的仇恨言论和文学,巴基斯坦则需要重新分配现有资源、并巩固省级警察力量。其现有的三个司法基础——刑法、刑事诉讼法与证据法——亦需要更新升级;但更为紧迫的却是构建警方的执法能力,因其警力已由于资源、培训、内部问责制和自治力的匮乏而严重衰退。

一个得到充分授权和资源的警察部门是实施可持续且成功的反恐战略最可靠的工具。而巴基斯坦当前的措施却将重点放在了报复、惩罚、剥夺公民基本权利和削弱法制效力。这样存在缺陷作法不仅正在瓦解巴基斯坦民众对政府伸张正义的信心,还会助长社会不满情绪,并为国际行动计划所针对的暴力极端主义者所利用。

伊斯兰堡/布鲁塞尔,2015年7月22日

Students chant slogans under the shade of national flag, after Pakistan shot down two Indian military aircrafts, according to Pakistani officials, during a march in Lahore, Pakistan 28 February 2019. REUTERS/Mohsin Raza
Q&A / Asia

Calming India and Pakistan’s Tit-for-Tat Escalation

Reciprocal airstrikes by India and Pakistan have been accompanied by shelling, troop reinforcements and small arms fire. In this Q&A calling for restraint between the nuclear-armed neighbours, Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director Laurel Miller notes that the airspace violations alone were the worst for 50 years.

What happened exactly?

On Tuesday, 26 February, India claimed that its air force had targeted “the biggest training camp of the Jaish-e-Mohammed … in Balakot”. The strikes – the most significant airspace violations in nearly 50 years – followed a deadly 14 February suicide car bombing in Pulwama in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), which had been claimed by the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed militant group. India said it launched a “preventive strike” based on intelligence that Jaish intended to attack again. At a press conference, Foreign Secretary VK Gokhale said Pakistan “failed to take any concrete action against terrorists” and that the strike on the training facility had “killed a large number”. In its official statement on the airstrike in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the Indian government said, “The existence of such massive training facilities, capable of training hundreds of jihadists could not have functioned without the knowledge of Pakistani authorities”.

Pakistan refutes Indian officials’ claims that more than 300 Jaish militants were killed in the attack. It acknowledges however that eight Indian Air Force jets had violated the Line of Control, which divides Pakistan’s Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Indian-controlled J&K. The Pakistan military’s spokesperson said that its Air Force’s “timely and effective response” had forced the Indian planes to retreat, dropping their bombs in an uninhabited area near Balakot in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, causing no casualty or damage.

On 27 February, Pakistan’s foreign ministry said its Air Force had conducted six strikes on “non-military targets” in India to demonstrate the country’s “right, will and capability for self-defence”. Pakistan downed an Indian jet that entered its airspace in pursuit of the Pakistani aircraft, leading to the pilot’s capture. India claimed to have downed one of the intruding Pakistani jets.

Resort to military force for political ends increases the risks of escalation, no matter how unintended.

Although it is clear that cross-Line of Control attacks and aerial skirmishes between the two sides occurred, it is difficult to verify both countries’ claims and counter-claims of targets and impact. Pakistani officials have provided evidence, also circulated on social media, of the downed Indian jet and the captured pilot, but claims of six successful strikes conducted in Indian-controlled Kashmir are more difficult to verify. Despite ample evidence of its cross-Line of Control attacks, Indian claims of killing hundreds in the airstrike on a Jaish training base and downing a Pakistani jet lack credence since New Delhi did not provide any evidence.

Why did it happen?

India’s and Pakistan’s latest skirmishes are as much aimed at assuaging domestic constituency concerns as they are at convincing each other of their capacity to strike and seriousness of intent. Still, resort to military force for political ends increases the risks of escalation, no matter how unintended.

In the Indian context, Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government felt compelled to react in light of the countrywide outrage in the wake of the 14 February Jaish suicide car bombing. With elections months away, Modi, responding to domestic opinion – particularly that of his hardline BJP constituency – vowed to avenge the dead in Pulwama, including at least 40 Indian paramilitary police officers. “We will give a befitting reply; our neighbour will not be allowed to destabilise us,” he said, giving his security forces “permission to take decisions about the timing, place and nature of their response”. That response came in the shape of the 26 February airstrikes across the Line of Control.

Within Pakistan, given a long history of distrust toward, and war with India, the powerful military establishment had to demonstrate to constituencies at home that India’s hostile designs would be forcefully thwarted. On 22 February, days before the Indian Air Force strikes, the military’s spokesperson warned that, if India were to attack, Pakistan would never “fall short of capacity” and would “dominate the escalation ladder”. The day of the 26 February Indian attack, reiterating these warnings, the spokesperson referred to a meeting of the National Command Authority (NCA), which oversees Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, saying to India, “I hope you know what the NCA means and what it constitutes”. 

What could happen next and why does it matter?

Both sides have left themselves room to climb down. Pakistani and Indian officials insist that their governments have no intention to escalate hostilities further. On 27 February, Pakistan’s military spokesperson said the Pakistan Air Force could have targeted a major Indian military installation in the strike area but chose to attack “in open space”, causing no casualties, so as to avoid escalation. The same day, speaking at a Russia-India-China foreign ministers meeting in Beijing, Indian Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj said the 26 February strike, meant to pre-empt another terror attack, “wasn’t a military operation, no military installation was targeted”. India, she said, “doesn’t wish to see further escalation of the situation”.

For his part, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan called for restraint and diplomatic engagement and at the same time vividly highlighted the risks inherent in the current situation. The same day as his country’s planes launched strikes across the Line of Control, Khan elliptically referenced the nuclear capabilities in a television interview and said, “With the weapons you have and the weapons we have, can we afford miscalculation? Shouldn’t we think that, if this escalates, what will it lead to?” He also offered to release the captured Indian pilot and to cooperate with India in investigating the Pulwama attack.

New Delhi and Islamabad should immediately and urgently revive the hotline between their Directors General for Military Operations, a crucial mechanism to prevent unintended and inadvertent conflict escalation.

Despite Khan’s acknowledgement of escalation risks, and Indian and Pakistani claims of responsibility and restraint, their armies are continuing to clash with artillery shelling and small arms fire along the Line of Control. Meanwhile, tensions are also high within J&K due to an Indian crackdown on Kashmiri dissidents, which could provoke more alienated youth to join militants. This apparently was the case of the 14 February suicide bomber, who came from a village close to the site of the Pulwama attack.

What should be done?

The international community, including China, the EU and European governments, have called on India and Pakistan to exercise restraint and prevent further escalation. In Washington, expressing U.S. concern about the tit-for-tat attacks, a White House official said, “The potential risks associated with further military action by either side are unacceptably high for both countries, their neighbours, and the international community”.

If the two sides are to step down from the brink, their leaders, civil and military, should resist the temptation to pander to domestic constituencies and tone down hostile rhetoric.

There is little foreseeable prospect, no matter how desirable, of the top Indian and Pakistani leaderships re-establishing direct communication channels and bilateral dialogue. These have been frozen since the 2016 terror attacks in Indian Punjab and Indian-administered Kashmir, which New Delhi attributed to Pakistan-based militants. Nevertheless, New Delhi and Islamabad should immediately and urgently revive the hotline between their Directors General for Military Operations, a crucial mechanism to prevent unintended and inadvertent conflict escalation.

In the short and medium terms, New Delhi should rethink its approach toward and within J&K, ending the heavy-handed militarised response that has contributed to growing local alienation and disaffection. Pakistan should rethink its longstanding policy of supporting anti-India jihadist proxies, such as Jaish, that – as this latest round of escalation shows – are far more of a threat to national security than an asset.

This article was corrected on 2 March 2019 to place Balakot in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, not Azad Jammu and Kashmir, as first reported by Pakistan.