菲律宾共产主义叛乱:战术与谈判
菲律宾共产主义叛乱:战术与谈判
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Report 202 / Asia

菲律宾共产主义叛乱:战术与谈判

执行摘要

由于旷日持久的共产主义叛乱,菲律宾政府不能控制和发展国家的大部分地区。冲突已经持续了40多年,成千上万的士兵和平民在冲突中身亡。通过在当地策划袭击,并从当地获得武器和资金,叛乱分子坚实地扎根于他们开展活动的地区。事实证明,他们很难被铲除。政府的反叛乱战略已经减少了叛军数量,却未能摧毁叛乱组织。在军事上,任何一方都不会取得胜利。在阿基诺政府任期内,和平谈判重启。在谈判各方试图达成持久的政治解决方案这较为困难的长期目标时,他们应该立即致力于使现有的人权监督机制运转起来。

菲律宾共产党(CPP)和其新人民军(NPA)于1968年发动了反对菲律宾政府的武装斗争。该组织在20世纪80年代达到鼎盛,因为当时专制的马科斯政府垮台并被阿基诺政府所取代。叛乱活动后来成了社会运动,一大批地上组织与一个地下游击队武装互相呼应。政府的反叛乱行动加之共产党的一次内部分裂削弱了该组织,并使其在90年代早期失去了许多支持者。到2000年,菲律宾共产党-新人民军(CPP-NPA)又重整旗鼓,并且自此展示出了极大的灵活性。它一直活跃在全国范围内的山区和被政府忽视的地区。该组织没有改变其共产主义的意识形态,但成立了政党并且成功地与议会和平相处,还重新参与了与阿罗约政府的和平谈判。谈判于2004年破裂后,菲律宾军方加强了针对游击队的行动,但却未能在2010年6月总统阿基诺宣誓就职前将其彻底消灭。

新人民军只有不到5000名战士,但它仍拥有支持者,并正在招募新成员,在全国范围内获取武器和发动伏击。它为自己的行为辩白,包括对意识形态方面的“人民公敌”进行法外处决。即使新人民军很难招募到受过高等教育的干部,而且难以替换关键的中层指挥官,但它对于士兵、警察和其他任何被它视为向军方告密以及和军方合作的人来说,仍然是一个重大威胁。每年都有上百人死于冲突,包括在2010年,350多名新人民军成员和政府安全部队士兵身亡。

菲律宾军方未能击败新人民军。高级指挥官们觉得他们没有足够的人力,所以依赖于部落民兵和准军事力量。这些团体通常受到的监管不力,并滥用武力。历届政府所采取的反叛乱战略将军事行动和社区恐吓与发展工作结合起来,结果毫无成效并常常适得其反。

叛乱的影响超出了游击队和政府兵相互狙击的偏远山村。菲律宾共产党使用“前线组织 ”来为他们的地下同志筹集和运输资金,使得左派活动分子成了军队和准军事力量报复的目标,结果导致了过去十年中大量的法外处决。冲突使得国家左派支离破碎,而该国其实极其需要团结一致的力量来挑战有权势的家族,这些家族极大的束缚了各个级别的政治部门。对商业征收“革命税”阻碍了投资,并使得叛乱者从资源丰富却贫困的地区攫取利益。

对菲律宾当局来说,与努力和摩洛伊斯兰解放战线(MILF)达成政治解决方案相比,解决菲律宾共产党-新人民军冲突处于次要的位置。而这一问题也常常被国际社会所忽略。但对于许多菲律宾人来说,共产主义叛乱的影响更为直接,因为许多人都有亲戚或朋友在七八十年代曾参与其中或者他们自己当时就是对叛乱分子的同情者。同时,菲律宾政府和捐助者试图解决在穆斯林棉兰老岛的问题,尽管菲律宾共产党-新人民军对于困扰该岛的大量暴力事件负有责任。只关注穆斯林地区并不能解决“棉兰老岛问题”。

阿基诺政府在2010年10月决定与菲律宾共产党-新人民军重返谈判,这是值得欢迎的。但尚不清楚谈判将走向何方。2010年12月的非正式会谈实现了了十年来最长时间的停火,而正式谈判定于2011年2月开始。从历史上来看,谈判对于菲律宾共产党-新人民军来说只是一种战术,它仍然致力于推翻菲律宾政府。该组织大部分的高级领袖都已经六七十岁了,据报道一些人的健康状况不佳。他们中的许多人一辈子投身于与政府对抗的事业,一些人也许渴望在有生之年看到政治解决。但是,有报道称高层中的紧张关系有可能阻碍和平谈判,或者加深内部分裂。阿基诺政府对于政治解决的追求也为军队带来了巨大改变,多年来使得追赶新人民军在军事上畅行无阻。政府需要确保拥有全面支持,这种支持不仅是来自军队各个层级,而且也需要有来自于警察和准军事力量对其新的国内安全计划的支持。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔, 2011年2月14日

The Philippine government is unable to control and develop large parts of the country because of the longstanding communist insurgency. The conflict has lasted more than 40 years and killed tens of thousands of combatants and civilians. Planning their attacks and securing weapons and funds locally, the insurgents have strong roots in the different regions where they operate and have proved hard to defeat. The government’s counter-insurgency strategy has diminished their numbers but has not been able to destroy the organisation. Neither side will win militarily. As peace negotiations resume under the Benigno Aquino administration, the parties to the talks should immediately commit to making existing human rights monitoring mechanisms work, while they try to reach the more difficult long-term goal of a durable political settlement.

The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People’s Army (NPA) launched their armed struggle against the Philippine government in 1968. The organisation was strongest in the 1980s, as the repressive government of Ferdinand Marcos fell and was replaced by the Cory Aquino administration. The insurgency had become a social movement, with an array of above-ground groups intertwined with an underground guerrilla army. Counter-insurgency operations coupled with an internal split crippled the organisation and cost it many of its supporters in the early 1990s. By 2000, the CPP-NPA had regained strength and has since proved remarkably resilient. It remains active in mountainous and neglected areas countrywide. Without altering its communist ideology, the organisation set up political parties that successfully stood for congress and re-engaged in peace negotiations with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s government. Talks fell apart in 2004, and the Philippine military intensified operations against the guerrillas but failed to wipe them out by June 2010, when President Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino was sworn into office.

The NPA has fewer than 5,000 fighters, but it still has supporters and is recruiting new members, securing weapons and launching ambushes across the archipelago. It justifies its actions, including extrajudicial killings of “enemies of the people”, in ideological terms. The NPA remains a serious threat to soldiers, police and anyone it considers a military informant or collaborator, even though recruitment of highly educated cadres is difficult and crucial mid-level commanders are hard to replace. Hundreds die in the conflict every year, including more than 350 NPA regulars and government security forces in 2010.

The Philippine military has failed to defeat the NPA. Senior commanders feel they do not have sufficient resources and so rely on tribal militias and paramilitary forces. These groups are often poorly supervised and commit abuses. The counter-insurgency strategies used by successive governments have combined military operations and intimidation of communities with development work, yielding few results and often proving counter-productive.

The insurgency has effects far beyond the remote villages where guerrillas and soldiers snipe at each other. The CPP’s use of “front organisations” that organise for and channel funds to their comrades underground has made leftist activists targets of military and paramilitary retaliation, resulting in a spate of extrajudicial killings over the past ten years. The conflict has fragmented the left in a country sorely in need of a unified challenge to the stranglehold powerful families have on political office at all levels. “Revolutionary taxes” on businesses discourage investment and permit the rebels to skim profits from resource-rich but impoverished areas.

Resolving the CPP-NPA conflict has often taken a back seat to efforts to reach a political settlement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and is frequently neglected by the international community. But for many Filipinos, the communist insurgency is more immediate, as most have relatives or friends who were once involved or were sympathisers themselves in the 1970s or 1980s. Meanwhile, the Philippine government and donors have tried to address problems in Muslim Mindanao, even though the CPP-NPA is responsible for a considerable amount of the violence plaguing the island. The “Mindanao problem” will not be solved by focusing on Muslim areas alone.

The Aquino administration’s decision in October 2010 to revive negotiations with the CPP-NPA was welcome, but it is unclear where talks will lead. Informal discussions in December 2010 yielded the longest holiday ceasefire in ten years, and formal negotiations are scheduled to begin in February 2011. Historically, talks have been a tactic for the CPP-NPA, which remains committed to overthrowing the Philippine government. Most of the organisation’s senior leaders are now in their 60s and 70s, some reportedly in poor health. Many have devoted their entire lives to the cause, and a few may be eager to see a settlement within their lifetimes. But there are reports of tensions at the top that could have the potential either to derail peace talks or to deepen internal rifts. The Aquino administration’s pursuit of a political settlement also entails a dramatic change for the army, which has had the green light to pursue the NPA militarily for many years. The government needs to ensure that it has full support not only from all ranks of the army, but also from police and paramilitary forces for its new internal security plan.

Jakarta/Brussels, 14 February 2011

 

Soldiers commute on a military truck past destroyed buildings in Marawi on the southern island of Mindanao on May 23, 2019. Two years after the Philippine city of Marawi was overrun by jihadists it remains in ruins. Noel CELIS / AFP
Report 323 / Asia

Addressing Islamist Militancy in the Southern Philippines

The transition to self-rule in the Bangsamoro, the majority-Muslim region in the southern Philippines, is proceeding apace. Militants outside the associated peace process are losing strength but could recover. Regional and national authorities should do all in their power to keep that from happening.

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