Indonesia: Mencegah Kekerasan Dalam Pemilu Kepala Daerah
Indonesia: Mencegah Kekerasan Dalam Pemilu Kepala Daerah
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Report 197 / Asia

Indonesia: Mencegah Kekerasan Dalam Pemilu Kepala Daerah

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Ringkasan Ikhtisar

Indonesia perlu segera belajar dari kasus kekerasan yang terjadi di beberapa tempat dalam pemilihan umum kepala daerah (pemilu kada) di dalam tahun 2010 karena ada beberapa bukti bahwa insiden-insiden yang seharusnya dapat mudah dicegah ini telah meningkat dibandingkan putaran yang lalu. Meskipun sebagian besar pelaksanaan pemilu kada berjalan dengan damai, sejumlah kecil yang melibatkan kekerasan, memperlihatkan kelemahan-kelemahan kelembagaan yang harus dibenahi. Pemilu kada seringkali menjadi persaingan pribadi memperebutkan kekuasaan di daerah yang bisa sangat emosional, dan apabila tidak diawasi dengan ketat, bisa berujung pada kekerasan. Meskipun isu agama dan kesukuan sering muncul dalam persaingan pemilu kada, tapi untungnya sejauh ini tidak memicu perpecahan SARA. Konfrontasi bisa dihindari dalam pemilu kada yang akan datang dengan melakukan perubahan-perubahan yang relatif mudah dalam praktek-praktek, kebijakan maupun peraturan pemilu. Persaingan politik daerah ini bukanlah masalah lokal yang bisa diacuhkan di tingkat nasional. Mereka berpengaruh karena sejak desentralisasi, pemerintahan tingkat daerah-lah yang memiliki dampak terbesar terhadap kehidupan warga. Bagaimana pemilu kada ini berlangsung bisa menentukan penilaian pemilih mengenai kesuksesan atau kegagalan demokrasi di Indonesia.

Jumlah kekerasan yang terjadi dalam 244 pemilu kada yang terjadwal di tahun 2010 tak sampai 10 persen. Namun ini saja sudah merupakan peningkatan dari putaran yang lalu. Sebuah studi menemukan ada 13 kasus kekerasan dalam pemilu kada yang berlangsung dari tahun 2005 ke 2008. Di tahun 2010 saja, tercatat paling tidak ada 20 kasus. Diantara faktor-faktor yang menjadi penyebab peningkatan ini adalah kemarahan masyarakat atas politik kekerabatan, yaitu pengajuan anggota keluarga sebagai kandidat bagi petahana yang ingin menyiasati batasan masa jabatan, dan frustrasi yang meningkat terhadap buruknya tata pemerintahan. Apapun dasarnya, ketika pemilu berujung pada kekerasan, korban jiwa timbul, bangunan dirusak, pemungutan suara ditunda, dan legitimasi negara ditantang. Dari penelitian di kabupaten Mojokerto, Tana Toraja dan Tolitoli, kubu yang terlibat kekerasan memiliki harapan yang berlebihan bahwa kandidat mereka bisa menyingkirkan petahana atau calon yang dijagokannya. Dalam kasus-kasus ini, KPUD dan polisi gagal atau tidak membaca gejala yang ada.

Pemilu kada di tahun 2010 ada juga aspek positifnya. Di daerah-daerah yang belajar dari kesalahan masa lalu, seperti di kabupaten paska konflik Poso, aparat keamanan, penyelenggara pemilu dan para pemuka masyarakat berhati-hati dengan ancaman kekerasan dan bekerja sama sejak awal untuk menghindari dampak buruk yang bisa keluar dari pemilu di daerah. Dengan kesadaran semacam itu, pemilu berjalan tanpa insiden karena semua pihak bertindak secara bertanggung jawab, menghormati hukum, dan memperlihatkan akal sehat. Pejabat pusat maupun daerah perlu mempelajari kisah-kisah sukses pemilu semacam ini sebagai bagian dari sebuah evaluasi pelaksanaan pemilu yang sistematis dan menyeluruh.

Cara anggota Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah (KPUD) dipilih perlu dipertimbangkan kembali dalam rangka meningkatkan legitimasi dan efektifitas mereka. Keragu-raguan KPUD dalam mengambil keputusan disebabkan karena banyak anggota yang terpilih dalam proses seleksi sebenarnya tidak memiliki kewibawaan di dalam masyarakat, ketrampilan memimpin, dan kemampuan berkomunikasi secara efektif dengan konstituen. Anggota KPUD yang terpilih seringkali adalah orang muda berpendidikan yang sedang mencari pekerjaan dan mampu melewati proses seleksi yang birokratis. Di tiga kasus kekerasan yang dikaji dalam laporan ini, KPUD setempat dianggap berat sebelah dan tidak punya cukup pengaruh dalam melakukan tugas mereka. Mereka bertindak lambat, kurang transparan, dan tidak siap menghadapi situasi yang tak terduga, sebuah kombinasi yang hanya menambah kecurigaan, ketegangan dan menimbulkan dugaan bias.

Selain itu, pendanaan penyelenggaran pemilu yang berasal dari anggaran pemerintah daerah melemahkan independensi mereka. Sebaiknya dipertimbangkan untuk menggunakan pendanaan pusat untuk membiayai pemilu kada. Sementara itu tidak banyak batasan-batasan hukum terhadap petahana yang bisa mengeksploitasi fasilitas negara dan kelembagaan untuk membantu mereka terpilih kembali. Tingkat kepercayaan dalam proses pemilu daerah yang rendah ini diperburuk dengan maraknya pembelian suara, intimidasi dan mobilisasi kelompok-kelompok suku untuk mendukung kandidat tertentu. Aparat keamanan setiap saat harus menjaga kenetralannya dalam setiap tahapan pemilu.

Masalah-masalah ini dapat diperbaiki dengan pengaturan pendanaan yang terpusat, proses seleksi anggota-anggota KPUD and Panitia Pengawas Pemilu (Panwaslu) yang lebih baik, dan memberikan kewenangan pada Badan Pengawas Pemilu (Bawaslu) untuk menangani sengketa-sengketa ini. Di samping itu, dana yang dialokasikan bagi penyelenggaraan pemilu dan keamanan tidak boleh dialihkan untuk penggunaan yang lain, atau disalahgunakan.

Jakarta/Brussels, 8 Desember 2010

Executive Summary

Indonesia needs to learn promptly the lessons from the sporadic violence witnessed in its local elections during 2010 as there is some evidence these easily preventable incidents could be increasing in frequency since the last cycle. While most district polls pass peacefully, the small number that do not reveals nationwide institutional weaknesses that should be fixed. These contests are often intense personal rivalries for community power that can be highly emotive and, if not closely watched, can quickly turn violent. While religious and ethnic ties are accentuated by these tense races, to date they have not triggered any sectarian schisms. Many confrontations could be avoided in future polls by relatively simple changes in practices, policies and laws. Rather than being too small for national attention, these political battles matter to this large country because, since decentralisation, it is this level of public administration that has the greatest impact on the lives of citizens. How these elections take place can determine the judgments that voters make on the success or failure of democracy throughout the archipelago.

Violence occurred in fewer than 10 per cent of the 244 scheduled races. While one study found only thirteen incidents in local elections from 2005-2008, they appear to be rising as at least twenty have been recorded in 2010. Among the factors contributing to the increase in this round are anger with incumbents using family members as proxies to get around term limits and growing frustration with poor governance. When polls became violent people died, property was destroyed, voting was delayed and the legitimacy of the state was challenged. In Mojo­kerto district in East Java, Tana Toraja in South Sulawesi and Tolitoli in Central Sulawesi, campaigns linked to violence had exaggerated expectations that their candidate could oust an incumbent or his handpicked successor. In these cases, lax election commissions and police missed or ignored the warning signs.

There are also some positive aspects to this round. In places where lessons were learnt from the past, like the post-conflict district of Poso in Central Sulawesi, security forces, election organisers and community leaders were alert to the dangers and worked together early to avoid any ugly consequences. In such communities the elections proceeded without incident as all sides acted responsibly, lawfully and showed common sense. More success stories need to be studied by national and district authorities as part of a systematic review of all elections.

The way district election commissions are chosen needs to be reconsidered to boost their legitimacy and effectiveness. Their indecisiveness lies in the selection of weak members who lack local authority, leadership skills and the ability to communicate effectively with constituents. Rather than seek out those who are respected and qualified, the commissions are often staffed by young and clever job-hunters looking for work and who are able to navigate the bureaucratic selection process. In the three violent cases in this report, the local commissions seemed too partial and had insufficient clout to do their job. They moved slowly, lacked transparency and were unprepared for unforeseen situations, a combination that only increased suspicions, raised tensions and drew allegations of bias. Security forces should maintain strict neutrality at all times during elections.

The funding of electoral administration from the regional government’s budget undermines its independence. Consideration should be given to paying for local election authorities from the national coffers. There are few legal restrictions on local executives who can quite legitimately exploit state facilities and agencies to aid their re-election. The low level of trust in the process is compounded by prevalent vote buying, intimidation and the mobilisation of ethnic groups to support specific candidates. Better training and regulation of funding, improved selection processes for election bodies and national supervision could address these issues. Money allocated for election administration and security should not be fungible, diverted to other uses or misappropriated.

Jakarta/Brussels, 8 December 2010

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.

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