Srpska tranzicija: Reforme pod opsadom
Srpska tranzicija: Reforme pod opsadom
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  1. Executive Summary
Report 117 / Europe & Central Asia

Srpska tranzicija: Reforme pod opsadom

Ubistvo Momira Glavrilovića, bivšeg službenika DB, 3. avgusta 2001., poslužilo je kao katalizator pojave dugo skrivanog spora unutar vladajuće koalicije DOS-a u Srbiji.

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REZIME

Ubistvo Momira Glavrilovića, bivšeg službenika DB, 3. avgusta 2001., poslužilo je kao katalizator pojave dugo skrivanog spora unutar vladajuće koalicije DOS-a u Srbiji.  Podstaknuta od strane najbližih savetnika jugoslovenskog predsednika Vojislava Koštunice, 'afera Gavrilović' je zarila klin u DOS koji može da znači kraj ove koalicije kakva je sada.  Time se Koštunicina Demokratska partija Srbije (DSS) jasnije nego ikad ranije pokazala kao konzervativna nacionalistička partija sa ciljem očuvanja nekih elemenata Miloševićevog režima.

Otvoren sukob može da isforsira nepotrebne izbore koji bi bili štetni za tok reformi. Verovatno da će kriza zaustaviti već ionako usporen rad zasedanja Skupštine Srbije.  Istovremeno, ona jasno ukazuje da vlada ima mogućnost  da polaže računa za svoj rad i da ga učini transparentnijim.

Koštunicina DSS predvodila je napade na grupu reformski orijentisanih, relativno pragmatičnih političara uglavnom okupljenih oko Zorana Đinđića, premijera Srbije i njegove Demokratske stranke (DS).  Ozbiljni napadi DSS zadali su težak udarac koaliciji i promenili lice politike u Srbiji.  Mada dve sukobljene strane mogu da izglade razlike, ispad prouzrokovan događajima vezanim za 'aferu Gavrilović' dobiće šire razmere i uticaće ne samo na tempo i obim političkih i ekonomskih reformi,  već i na saradnju Jugoslavije sa međunarodnom zajednicom i njenim susedima.  Isto tako je postao više nego očigledan nedostatak građanske kontrole na Vojsku Jugoslavije (VJ). Regionalno gledano, zbog trenutne borbe unutar DOS-a doveden je u pitanje i nastavak finansiranja Vojske Republike Srpske od strane SRJ, stav Beograda prema UNMIK-u, kao i pitanje dalje saradnje sa Međunarodnim Haškim tribunalom za bivšu Jugoslavije (ICTY).

Otkako je devetnaestočlana koalicija DOS-a porazila režim bivšeg predsednika Jugoslavije, Slobodana Miloševića, na izborima u septembru i decembru 2000, sporovi i sukobi unutar DOS-a usporili su tok reformi u Srbiji.  Pro-reformska grupa okupila se oko Đinđića, dok su se konzervativniji i nacionalistički elementi okupili oko Koštunice.  Do ubistva Gavrilovića izgledalo je da ove razlike mogu da se prevaziđu, ali političke zavade podstaknute ubistvom od tada potresaju vladajuću koalaciju i eksponiraju Koštunicu i DSS kao značajne prepreke nastavku reformi.

U nadi da pomogne pojavu demokratije u Jugoslaviji, međunarodna zajednica je požurila da prihvati Koštunicu.  Ali ne računajući hapšenje i isporučenje Slobodana Miloševića sudu u Hagu, međunarodni pritisak na Jugoslaviju da popusti u cilju regionalne stabilnosti i mira bio je očigledno bezuspešan.[fn]Videti izveštaj ICG o Balkanu br. 112, Pravedna razmena: Pomoć Jugoslaviji za stabilnost regiona, 15. juni 2001.Hide Footnote  DSS još treba da formuliše viziju moderne ekonomije ili društva, osim kad je reč o izgradnji državnosti  i nacionalnih ciljeva za koje je malo verovatno da će doneti bilo unutrašnji razvoj ili regionalnu stabilizaciju.  Još od početka avgusta DSS pokušava da isforsira rane (i sasvim nepotrebne) izbore; da zada ono što je mogao da bude smrtni udarac koaliciji DOS-a; da dovede u pitanje brojne reformske inicijative; i da se pojavi u nekim suštinskim aspektima kao zaštitnik Miloševićeve ostavštine.  Čak i sada, DSS - pod maskom legalizma - nameće mere koje mogu da dovedu do povećanja organizovanog kriminala u regionu, šverca cigareta i nafte, i pogoršanja odnosa sa UNMIK-om.

Ukratko, 'afera Gavrilović' je dala problemima reformi i sudbini DOS-a nov oštar profil.  Ovaj izveštaj opisuje aferu, stavlja ga u kontekst, istražuje njene implikacije u svetlu prioriteta koje međunarodna zajednica ima za Srbiju, SRJ i čitav region.

Beograd/Brisel, 21. septembar 2001.

Executive Summary

The 3 August 2001 murder of former State Security (DB) official Momir Gavrilovic acted as a catalyst for the emergence of a long-hidden feud within Serbia’s ruling DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) coalition.  Inflamed by Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica’s closest advisers, the ‘Gavrilovic Affair’ has driven a wedge into DOS that could spell the end of the coalition in its present form.  In so doing, Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) has been exposed more clearly than before as a conservative nationalist party intent on preserving certain elements of the Milosevic regime. 

The open quarrel may force entirely unnecessary elections that could prove harmful to the reform process.  The crisis is also likely to block the already slow work of the Serbian parliament in its current session.  At the same time, it has presented the government with a clear opportunity to make its work more transparent and accountable.

Kostunica’s DSS led the attacks against a group of reform-oriented, relatively pragmatic politicians centred mostly around Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic and his Democratic Party (DS).  The severity of the DSS attack dealt a heavy blow to the coalition and changed the face of Serbian politics.  Although the two sides may soon patch up their differences, the fallout from the events surrounding the ‘Gavrilovic Affair’ will be widespread and could affect the pace and extent of political and economic reforms, as well as Yugoslavia’s cooperation with the international community and its neighbours.  So too the lack of civilian control over the Yugoslav Army (VJ) has become more apparent.  In regional terms, at stake in the current struggle within DOS are the continuation of FRY funding for the Army of Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Belgrade’s stance towards UNMIK, and the question of further cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 

Since the nineteen-member DOS coalition defeated the regime of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in the September and December 2000 elections, internal DOS rivalries and disputes have hindered Serbia’s reform process. The pro-reform faction centred around Djindjic, while the more conservative and nationalist elements grouped around Kostunica.  The differences seemed manageable until Gavrilovic’s murder, but since then, political feuding triggered by the murder has shaken the foundations of the governing coalition and exposed Kostunica and the DSS as significant obstacles to continued reform.

Hoping to support the emergence of democracy in Yugoslavia, the international community has rushed to accept Kostunica.  But apart from the arrest and transfer of Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague, international leverage on Yugoslavia to comply with international goals for regional stability and peace has been manifestly ineffectual.[fn]See ICG Balkans Report No.112, A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for Regional Stability, 15 June 2001.Hide Footnote   The DSS has yet to formulate a vision of a modern economy or society, except in terms of state-building and nationalist goals that are unlikely to deliver either internal development or regional stabilisation.  Since early August, the DSS has tried to force early (and quite unnecessary) elections; dealt what could have been a terminal blow to the DOS coalition; brought a number of other reform initiatives into question; and emerged as protectors of Milosevic’s legacy in several essential respects.  Even now, the DSS is – under the guise of legalism – pushing measures that could lead to an increase in regional organised crime, cigarette and petroleum smuggling, and worsened relations with UNMIK.

In sum, the ‘Gavrilovic Affair’ has thrown the problems involving reform, elections, and the fate of DOS into newly sharp relief.  This report describes the affair, puts it in context, and examines its implications in the light of international community priorities for Serbia, FRY and the region.

Belgrade/Brussels, 21 September 2001

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