Zimbabwe: Election Scenarios [Video]
Zimbabwe: Election Scenarios [Video]
Report 202 / Africa

津巴布韦:选举形势

执行摘要

随着全球政治协议(Global Political Agreement, GPA)接近尾声,持续违反协议,改革缺失,机构公信力有限,以及拒绝联合国选举需求评估团的介入,这些情况都凸显出,尽管2013年3月津巴布韦通过了新的宪法,但仍然还不具备条件来举行和平可信的选举。总统罗伯特·穆加贝被迫放弃在6月举行投票,但是他的政党仍然急切地想要加快进程,几乎没有留出时间来实施重要的改革和新的宪法条款。对暴力的普遍恐惧以及实际发生的恐吓事件,都与口头的和平协议相悖。进行一次有相当自由度的投票,这点依然是可能的;但是,投票时间推迟或者投票极具争议性,甚至发生军事干预,这点也是有可能的。国际社会看来已经准备好要支持南部非洲发展共同体(南共体)。而南共体必须与GPA合作伙伴一起努力,为进行一次可信的投票确定“红线”并予以执行。

津巴布韦非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线(Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front,ZANU-PF)很有可能会抵制进一步的改革。南共体特别把重点放在有民主支持的机构上,但是津巴布韦选举委员会(Zimbabwe Electoral Commission,ZEC)却面临巨大的挑战。政府资金有限,限制了ZEC的能力建设、公关及保证选民投票完整性的能力。津巴布韦人权委员会(Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission,ZHRC)主席辞去了主席一职,理由是该委员会缺乏独立性和政府的支持。随后另一名与ZANU-PF关系紧密的委员出任ZHRC主席。GPA的联合监督和执行委员会(Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee,JOMIC)在应对政治冲突中起到了重要的作用,但却缺乏足够的支持,在处理暴力和恐吓事件时也只是治标而未能治本。

某些支持ZANU-PF的安全官员可能会设法影响民调。他们中的一些人已经要求在政治上有更大的代表性;在2008年的暴力事件中他们扮演了关键角色,保证了穆加贝的胜利,他们中却没有任何人因这场暴力受到追究。津巴布韦共和国警察(Zimbabwe Republic Police,ZRP)表现出了一定的专业水准,但是其领导人公开支持ZANU-PF,频繁骚扰“争取民主变革”(Movement for Democratic Change,MDC)派系和公民社会。争取民主变革-茨万吉拉伊派(MDC-T)无力阻止这些干扰的发生。GPA并没有为警察(或者其它安全部门)进行可信的调查提供基础,警察部门则拒绝向内务的联席部长们和JOMIC进行报告,议会对此基本毫无办法。政党面临着内部挑战。在ZANU-PF内部,“强硬派”和“改革派”阵营正在为谁来接替89岁的穆加贝打得不可开交。MDC-T正在奋力应对以下问题:据称正不断下降的支持率,内讧,以及对其支持者的有限的动员能力。

国际社会积极评价津巴布韦取得的进展,对南共体的努力也表示了支持。就新宪法举行的全民公决让欧盟解除了对大多数个人和实体(穆加贝、穆加贝的夫人格雷斯、一小部分安全官员及津巴布韦矿业开发公司等除外)的限制措施。津巴布韦和英国随后举行了十年以来的首次双边会谈以及一个为津巴布韦提供经济支持的会议,会议名称为“津巴布韦的朋友”。美国取消对两家津巴布韦银行的制裁的行动也显示了西方在支持津巴布韦改革方面所作出的努力。

南共体的首要任务是通过“遏制”来保持稳定,其重要性甚至超过了改革。这个目标仍然是模糊的,但是南共体必须按照选举纲领来巩固其推动改革的立场。改革需要监督,但是JOMIC在这方面的能力有限,而ZANU-PF反对延长其专注选举的任务,这点也让南共体颇为受挫。南共体应当在哈拉雷设立办事处,作为JOMIC的补充,但又要允许JOMIC独立地与政府进行联络。

如果与选举相关的改革持续僵持下去的话,投票可能会改期举行。政治领导人意识到,在处于大规模暴力事件的风险高发期时,以及在各政党和南共体对于可信的选举应设置什么样的可被接受的门槛还存在争议时,举行投票会带来很大危险。分裂会威胁到ZANU-PF和MDC-T在选举中的表现,所以面临分裂状况的这两个党派可能会支持延期的决定。

选举延期的决定,如果再加之来自南共体的强大压力,会为改革的推进创造机会,实现这点的前提是制定严格的时间表,大幅提高监督,让政党了解失败的风险,以及机构的缺陷得到改善和安全机构干预的可能性得到逆转。否则,“赢家通吃”的态度意味着选举很可能会引发激烈的争议。经济机会减少,伴随而来的是政治权力的丧失,这使得ZANU-PF的一些成员产生了危机感,而另一些成员则担心会因侵犯人权遭到起诉。对MDC-T而言,选举失败意味着影响力的丧失。对ZANU-PF而言,就选举结果提出争议可能意味着使国家陷入停顿从而增加它的影响力。

举行一个具有决定性的选举要求所有党派以及他们的支持者接受选举的结果。有迹象表明,穆加贝和茨万吉拉伊已经同意,双方将接受选举结果,无论哪一方失败都会被胜利的另一方所接纳。然而,这样的交易并不会自动表现为他们各自的政党会接受选举的结果,接纳失败的一方。茨万吉拉伊已经同意成为GPA的领导层在选举准备方面的领头人,这可能会使他和他的政党更难以因为选举违规而提出抗议或者退出选举。MDC-T对全民公决的默许更是搅混了政局,因为全民公决的举行是出于GPA签署方的利益,而没有考虑其它政治团体或者是公民社会的关切。

军事夺权不太可能发生,尤其是因为普通士兵的政治忠诚度存在不确定性,以及可能会受到地区的谴责和国际社会的孤立。然而,对军队的偏见的指控以及对军队共谋参与侵犯人权的指控,使得人们担心军队可能会试图影响选举结果。如果党内和党际之间的关系持续恶化的话,军队也可能以维稳力量的形象出现。

2013年是决定性的一年。在分歧严重的情况下举行选举是不太可能带来稳定的。 越来越多的人认识到最好的办法是进一步实行分权,尽管分权只会在目标已设立并被广泛接受的前提下才会有用。人们注意到,目前发生在津巴布韦的暴力事件比2008年发生的要少,但是,在选举开始之前注意到这个事实,意义并不大--因为暴力产生的根源是对权力的争夺。我们清楚的是,选举很有可能会是紧张的,也会出现一些暴力,但我们不清楚的是会出现什么样的暴力,暴力的范围有多大以及会引发什么样的反应。

约翰内斯堡⁄布鲁塞尔,2013年5月6日 

Executive Summary

As the Global Political Agreement (GPA) staggers to an end, continued violations of the agreement, reform deficits, limited institutional credibility and the rejection of a UN election needs assessment mission underscore the continued absence of conditions for peaceful and credible elections, despite the new constitution adopted in March 2013. President Robert Mugabe has been forced to step back from a June vote, but his party still pushes for an expedited process with little time to implement outstanding reforms and new constitutional provisions. The pervasive fear of violence and actual intimidation contradicts rhetorical commitments to peace. A reasonably free vote is still possible, but so too are deferred or disputed polls, or even a military intervention. The international community seems ready to back the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which must work with GPA partners to define and enforce “red lines” for a credible vote.

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The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) is likely to resist further reforms. SADC places particular emphasis on democracy supporting institutions, but the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) faces significant challenges. Limited government funding threatens its capacity building, public outreach and ability to ensure the integrity of the voters’ roll. The chairperson of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) resigned, citing the body’s lack of independence and government support, and was replaced by another commissioner with close ties to ZANU-PF. The GPA’s Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) plays an important role in responding to political conflict, but has insufficient support and addresses symptoms, not causes, of violence and intimidation.

Certain pro-ZANU-PF security officials may seek to influence the polls. Some have demanded greater political representation; they played a pivotal role in the 2008 violence that secured Mugabe’s victory, for which none were held accountable. The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) has demonstrated some professionalism, but its leaders openly support ZANU-PF and frequently harass Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations and civil society, which the MDC-Tsvangirai has been powerless to prevent. The GPA provides no basis for credible investigations of the police (or other security elements), which refuse to answer to the co-ministers of home affairs or JOMIC and expose parliament as largely toothless. Political parties face internal challenges. Within ZANU-PF, “hardliner” and “reformist” camps are fighting over who will succeed 89-year-old Mugabe. MDC-T is struggling with a reported drop in popularity, infighting and limited capacity to mobilise its supporters.

The international community assesses Zimbabwe’s progress positively, demonstrating its support for SADC’s facilitation. The constitutional referendum enabled the European Union (EU) to lift restrictive measures against most of the individuals and entities (excluding Mugabe, his wife Grace, a small group of security officials and the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation). Zimbabwe and the UK subsequently held their first bilateral talks in over a decade, and a “Friends of Zimbabwe” meeting that offered economic support and the lifting of sanctions against two Zimbabwean banks by the U.S. shows Western commitment to supporting Zimbabwe’s reform.

SADC’s priority is “containment” even more than reforms to maintain stability. This objective remains vague, but the organisation must consolidate its promotion of reforms in compliance with its election guidelines. Reforms require monitoring, but JOMIC’s capacity for this is limited and ZANU-PF’s resistance to extending its mandate to focus on elections has frustrated SADC. The regional bloc should establish an office in Harare that complements JOMIC but allows it to independently liaise with the government.

If the impasse on election reforms persists, the vote may be rescheduled. Political leaders recognise that to proceed when the risk of large-scale violence is high and when parties and SADC disagree over what constitutes an acceptable threshold for credible elections would be dangerous. Faced with divisions that threaten their performance in the polls, ZANU-PF and MDC-T may back postponement.

Deferral, if accompanied by firm SADC pressure, presents opportunities to promote reforms, on condition that strict timelines are defined, monitoring is enhanced significantly, political parties understand the risks of failure, and institutional weaknesses and the potential for interference by the security sector are reversed. Otherwise, the “winner-take-all” attitude means the election is likely to be hotly disputed. Some in ZANU-PF feel threatened by the erosion of economic opportunities that would come with losing power, while others fear prosecution for human rights violations. For the MDC-T, an electoral defeat would signify a loss of influence. For ZANU-PF, disputing the results could mean increased influence by bringing the country to a standstill.

A conclusive election requires that all parties and their supporters accept results. There are indications that Mugabe and Tsvangirai have agreed to do so and accommodate whoever loses. However, such a deal does not automatically translate into acceptance by their parties. Tsvangirai has agreed to be the GPA principals’ point man on election preparations, which could make it more difficult for him or his party to cry foul or withdraw because of irregularities. The waters are already muddied by the MDC-T’s acquiescence in the referendum, which proceeded according to the interests of the GPA signatories, disregarding the concerns of other political groups and of civil society.

A military takeover is unlikely, not least because of uncertainty about the political allegiance of the rank and file, probable regional censure and international isolation. However, allegations of the army’s bias and complicity in human rights violations raise concerns it may seek to influence the election outcome. It may also present itself as a stabilising force if inter- and intra-party relations deteriorate further.

2013 is a decisive year. Elections in a context of acute divisions are unlikely to provide stability. There is growing sense that the best way forward is further power sharing, though this is only helpful if objectives are established and widely accepted. To note that Zimbabwe is less violent now than in 2008 means little before the campaign – it is the competition for power that generates violence. That the elections are likely to be tense and see some violence and intimidation is clear; what is not yet clear is the nature of the violence, its extent and the response it will generate.

Johannesburg/Brussels, 6 May 2013 

Video / Africa

Zimbabwe: Election Scenarios [Video]

Piers Pigou, Southern Africa Project Director, and Trevor Maisiri, Southern Africa Senior Analyst, talk about tensions surrounding Zimbabwe's 2013 elections. We recently published the report Zimbabwe: Election Scenarios looking at possible paths towards elections, expected to be held between July and November 2013.

zimbabwe-election-scenarios-video-cover

Zimbabwe: Election Scenarios

Watch the Google+ Hangout with Piers Pigou, Crisis Group’s Southern Africa Project Director, and Trevor Maisiri, Southern Africa Senior Analyst, about tensions surrounding Zimbabwe's 2013 elections. CRISIS GROUP

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