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Standoff in Zimbabwe as Struggle to Succeed Mugabe Deepens
Standoff in Zimbabwe as Struggle to Succeed Mugabe Deepens
Report 202 / Africa

津巴布韦:选举形势

执行摘要

随着全球政治协议(Global Political Agreement, GPA)接近尾声,持续违反协议,改革缺失,机构公信力有限,以及拒绝联合国选举需求评估团的介入,这些情况都凸显出,尽管2013年3月津巴布韦通过了新的宪法,但仍然还不具备条件来举行和平可信的选举。总统罗伯特·穆加贝被迫放弃在6月举行投票,但是他的政党仍然急切地想要加快进程,几乎没有留出时间来实施重要的改革和新的宪法条款。对暴力的普遍恐惧以及实际发生的恐吓事件,都与口头的和平协议相悖。进行一次有相当自由度的投票,这点依然是可能的;但是,投票时间推迟或者投票极具争议性,甚至发生军事干预,这点也是有可能的。国际社会看来已经准备好要支持南部非洲发展共同体(南共体)。而南共体必须与GPA合作伙伴一起努力,为进行一次可信的投票确定“红线”并予以执行。

津巴布韦非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线(Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front,ZANU-PF)很有可能会抵制进一步的改革。南共体特别把重点放在有民主支持的机构上,但是津巴布韦选举委员会(Zimbabwe Electoral Commission,ZEC)却面临巨大的挑战。政府资金有限,限制了ZEC的能力建设、公关及保证选民投票完整性的能力。津巴布韦人权委员会(Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission,ZHRC)主席辞去了主席一职,理由是该委员会缺乏独立性和政府的支持。随后另一名与ZANU-PF关系紧密的委员出任ZHRC主席。GPA的联合监督和执行委员会(Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee,JOMIC)在应对政治冲突中起到了重要的作用,但却缺乏足够的支持,在处理暴力和恐吓事件时也只是治标而未能治本。

某些支持ZANU-PF的安全官员可能会设法影响民调。他们中的一些人已经要求在政治上有更大的代表性;在2008年的暴力事件中他们扮演了关键角色,保证了穆加贝的胜利,他们中却没有任何人因这场暴力受到追究。津巴布韦共和国警察(Zimbabwe Republic Police,ZRP)表现出了一定的专业水准,但是其领导人公开支持ZANU-PF,频繁骚扰“争取民主变革”(Movement for Democratic Change,MDC)派系和公民社会。争取民主变革-茨万吉拉伊派(MDC-T)无力阻止这些干扰的发生。GPA并没有为警察(或者其它安全部门)进行可信的调查提供基础,警察部门则拒绝向内务的联席部长们和JOMIC进行报告,议会对此基本毫无办法。政党面临着内部挑战。在ZANU-PF内部,“强硬派”和“改革派”阵营正在为谁来接替89岁的穆加贝打得不可开交。MDC-T正在奋力应对以下问题:据称正不断下降的支持率,内讧,以及对其支持者的有限的动员能力。

国际社会积极评价津巴布韦取得的进展,对南共体的努力也表示了支持。就新宪法举行的全民公决让欧盟解除了对大多数个人和实体(穆加贝、穆加贝的夫人格雷斯、一小部分安全官员及津巴布韦矿业开发公司等除外)的限制措施。津巴布韦和英国随后举行了十年以来的首次双边会谈以及一个为津巴布韦提供经济支持的会议,会议名称为“津巴布韦的朋友”。美国取消对两家津巴布韦银行的制裁的行动也显示了西方在支持津巴布韦改革方面所作出的努力。

南共体的首要任务是通过“遏制”来保持稳定,其重要性甚至超过了改革。这个目标仍然是模糊的,但是南共体必须按照选举纲领来巩固其推动改革的立场。改革需要监督,但是JOMIC在这方面的能力有限,而ZANU-PF反对延长其专注选举的任务,这点也让南共体颇为受挫。南共体应当在哈拉雷设立办事处,作为JOMIC的补充,但又要允许JOMIC独立地与政府进行联络。

如果与选举相关的改革持续僵持下去的话,投票可能会改期举行。政治领导人意识到,在处于大规模暴力事件的风险高发期时,以及在各政党和南共体对于可信的选举应设置什么样的可被接受的门槛还存在争议时,举行投票会带来很大危险。分裂会威胁到ZANU-PF和MDC-T在选举中的表现,所以面临分裂状况的这两个党派可能会支持延期的决定。

选举延期的决定,如果再加之来自南共体的强大压力,会为改革的推进创造机会,实现这点的前提是制定严格的时间表,大幅提高监督,让政党了解失败的风险,以及机构的缺陷得到改善和安全机构干预的可能性得到逆转。否则,“赢家通吃”的态度意味着选举很可能会引发激烈的争议。经济机会减少,伴随而来的是政治权力的丧失,这使得ZANU-PF的一些成员产生了危机感,而另一些成员则担心会因侵犯人权遭到起诉。对MDC-T而言,选举失败意味着影响力的丧失。对ZANU-PF而言,就选举结果提出争议可能意味着使国家陷入停顿从而增加它的影响力。

举行一个具有决定性的选举要求所有党派以及他们的支持者接受选举的结果。有迹象表明,穆加贝和茨万吉拉伊已经同意,双方将接受选举结果,无论哪一方失败都会被胜利的另一方所接纳。然而,这样的交易并不会自动表现为他们各自的政党会接受选举的结果,接纳失败的一方。茨万吉拉伊已经同意成为GPA的领导层在选举准备方面的领头人,这可能会使他和他的政党更难以因为选举违规而提出抗议或者退出选举。MDC-T对全民公决的默许更是搅混了政局,因为全民公决的举行是出于GPA签署方的利益,而没有考虑其它政治团体或者是公民社会的关切。

军事夺权不太可能发生,尤其是因为普通士兵的政治忠诚度存在不确定性,以及可能会受到地区的谴责和国际社会的孤立。然而,对军队的偏见的指控以及对军队共谋参与侵犯人权的指控,使得人们担心军队可能会试图影响选举结果。如果党内和党际之间的关系持续恶化的话,军队也可能以维稳力量的形象出现。

2013年是决定性的一年。在分歧严重的情况下举行选举是不太可能带来稳定的。 越来越多的人认识到最好的办法是进一步实行分权,尽管分权只会在目标已设立并被广泛接受的前提下才会有用。人们注意到,目前发生在津巴布韦的暴力事件比2008年发生的要少,但是,在选举开始之前注意到这个事实,意义并不大--因为暴力产生的根源是对权力的争夺。我们清楚的是,选举很有可能会是紧张的,也会出现一些暴力,但我们不清楚的是会出现什么样的暴力,暴力的范围有多大以及会引发什么样的反应。

约翰内斯堡⁄布鲁塞尔,2013年5月6日 

Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe and his wife Grace attend a meeting of his ruling ZANU-PF party's youth league in Harare, Zimbabwe, on 7 October 2017. Philimon Bulawayo/REUTERS
Commentary / Africa

Standoff in Zimbabwe as Struggle to Succeed Mugabe Deepens

President Robert Mugabe plunged Zimbabwe into political crisis by firing his long-time ally and enforcer Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa on 6 November 2017. In this Q&A prior to an apparent army coup in Mnangagwa's favour on 14-15 November, Crisis Group’s Senior Southern Africa Consultant Piers Pigou gives the background to the struggle to succeed the 93-year-old president.

This Q&A on the background to Zimbabwe’s political crisis of November 2017 was published just before an apparent army coup on the night of 14-15 November.

What’s behind the new political crisis in Zimbabwe?

The crisis began on 6 November when President Mugabe fired Emmerson Mnangagwa and expelled him from the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. This was not unexpected. The powerful vice president had become a serious rival and threat to the physically weakened but still astute Mugabe.

Since Vice President Joice Mujuru’s unceremonious removal from office in late 2014, there has been a debilitating factional battle within ZANU-PF over who would succeed the aging president. It pitted Mnangagwa and his supporters against a group of powerful senior and vocal party members – dubbed the “G40”. They rallied around First Lady Grace Mugabe and by mid-2016 it was evident Mugabe tacitly favoured his wife’s associates, who dominated ZANU-PF’s Youth and Women’s Leagues.

During this period, veterans of the liberation war, a key pillar of Mugabe’s support, broke ranks and fell behind Mnangagwa. However, Mnangagwa was unable to embrace them, fearful this would be used against him as further evidence of disloyalty. Instead, he distanced himself from those who supported and promoted him, which made him look weak and indecisive.

His eventual fall played out in awkward slow motion, with the pendulum of his political fortunes swinging back and forth as analysts feverishly speculated whether or not his ambitions to succeed the president would be thwarted. Some expected Mnangagwa’s removal to play out at the party’s extraordinary congress in December. There is speculation that Mugabe acted ahead of this out of fear that his health might rapidly deteriorate.

Where does the army and security sector stand on Mnangagwa’s firing?

Mnangagwa’s support within the security sector, which is crucial to ZANU-PF’s continued rule, supposedly made him too big to fall. Evidently, this was not the case. But his removal has lifted the lid on growing discontent.

A public statement on 13 November by the commander of the defence forces, General Constantine Chiwenga, sent an unambiguous warning that internal dynamics in ZANU-PF, including counter-revolutionary infiltration into the party and hostile attitudes toward the security sector from certain politicians, were destabilising Zimbabwe and generating insecurity. Without mentioning Mnangagwa, Chiwenga called for an end to the unfolding purge of party elements with a liberation history, warning that if the integrity of Zimbabwe’s revolution was threatened, the army would intervene. Although couched in defence of the Zimbabwe’s commander in chief, President Mugabe, Chiwenga implicitly was pointing his finger at him, the first lady and certain G40 elements.

This unprecedented public intervention has sharpened tensions within both ZANU-PF and the security forces. How Mugabe responds to this will be critical if further tensions are to be avoided. He has allowed senior officers to make political statements before, but generally when these were about the opposition. On several occasions in the last two years, he publicly has expressed displeasure at their intervention in internal party affairs. Chiwenga’s statement goes beyond previous interventions, and Mugabe will have to employ all his guile if he intends to ensure continued accommodation with the armed forces.

What does Mnangagwa’s dismissal mean for Zimbabwe’s mutating political landscape?

Mnangagwa’s networks within the party and state administration insulated him to some extent from Mugabe’s machinations and the clear intent of the first lady to bring him down. By mid-2017, it was clear that the G40 was in fact Mugabe’s own project (albeit one he may not have full control over), employed along with his wife as a foil to contain Mnangagwa’s ambitions. As the noose tightened, the crude choreography of accusations against him crescendoed into a series of public humiliations, during which he was accused of disloyalty, deceit and tribalism. It all pointed to his inevitable removal. Yet, inexplicably, he hung on, seemingly without a coherent plan and unable to convincingly push back.

G40 acolytes in the provinces have drawn up a list of Mnangagwa allies they want purged. This includes long-time State Security Minister Kembo Mohadi and recently fired Finance Minister Patrick Chinamasa, who has been the public face of re-engagement with international financial institutions. Some may be expelled from the ZANU-PF, but most will be enmeshed in internal disciplinary processes that will significantly frustrate any possible organised pushback from within ZANU-PF’s provincial structures. A purge of senior civil servants perceived as aligned to Mnangagwa also is expected.

President Mugabe turns 94 in February and remains the party’s presidential candidate for the 2018 election. What kind of succession is he planning and will he support the elevation of his wife, Grace Mugabe, to the vice presidency?

Having removed his major rival, Mugabe can now stage-manage his own succession, which likely will occur only after he dies in office. ZANU-PF’s extraordinary congress, scheduled 12 to 17 December, will see a reconfiguration and possible expansion of ZANU-PF’s presidium to include three vice presidents (also known as 2nd secretary), most likely the incumbent, Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko, Grace Mugabe and Defence Minister Sydney Sekeremayi. The latter has been enthusiastically promoted over the last few months by Grace and the G40 as the man Mugabe trusts most. But, like everyone else, Sekeremayi is a mere appointee and serves at the president’s pleasure. He does not have his own power base, and in late 2014 he had to be rescued by Mugabe after being caught in the cross-hairs of the anti-Mujuru purge.

ZANU-PF’s Women and Youth Leagues, now supported by Vice President Mphoko, have called on Mugabe to appoint Grace as vice president. She is undoubtedly ambitious and may well have her sights on the top job. Mugabe, the final arbiter, has supported his wife’s controversial foray into the political battlefield, where she has been effectively promoting his political interests. But he is aware that she is not popular and that such a blatant dynastic move may well galvanise the fragmented opposition, as well as disgruntled elements within ZANU-PF. Her elevation to first vice president would also not guarantee that she take over once Mugabe dies. Indeed, her political cachet is likely to be significantly diminished when her husband is no longer in office.

Can Mnangagwa stage a comeback?

When the axe fell last week, Mnangagwa fled to Mozambique, fearing for his own safety. This was an irony not lost on those who welcome the downfall of a man nicknamed the Crocodile, with a reputation for brutality and once regarded as untouchable. His first public pushback, a statement from an unknown location, attacked the first family for treating ZANU-PF as their personal property and promising he would be back to take control of the situation within a matter of weeks.

Mnangagwa’s options are certainly now more constrained. It is unclear whether he will attempt to undermine ZANU-PF’s election preparations or if he has the capacity to do so. There is also the question of how he should relate to the opposition and especially its principal leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, who heads the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T), with whom he has been accused of secretly conspiring. To join the opposition would be used as further “evidence” of his alleged complicity, and may well further divide the opposition, many of whom want nothing to do with a man accused of an array of gross human rights violations and of having sought to disrupt the opposition. But to strike out on his own (as Mujuru did when she formed her National People’s Party) likely would have him heading only a small and marginal party in a fragmented political landscape.

What does this development mean in terms of improving Zimbabwe’s prospects for re-engagement with international creditors, reform and recovery?

There is widespread uncertainty regarding what will happen next. Tsvangirai, whose own health problems have fed speculation that he may not be able to lead the major opposition coalition, the MDC Alliance, in national elections expected in April 2018, has rightly warned that the political environment is dangerously unstable.

Economic conditions have visibly deteriorated over the last two months. The volume of physical money circulating in both the formal and informal economy has contracted sharply. Inflationary pressures exacerbated by this liquidity crisis have driven up the cost of living, leading to a crash in the purchasing power of salaries paid into bank accounts. At the same time, the government is continuing along a dangerous path of deficit financing, with the new Finance Minister Ignatius Chombo announcing the budget deficit will climb to $1.82 billion this year (the total budget is $5.6 billion). The government has no plan beyond the limited option of domestic borrowing, which has skyrocketed since 2013. Zimbabwe is once again heading back into hyperinflationary territory.

Mnangagwa was held out by many as the best hope within ZANU-PF for piloting an economic recovery predicated on re-engagement with international creditors and a package of reform that would instil a measure of much needed confidence. Yet evidence that he would or could deliver on this front is not persuasive.

Those now in the ascendency within ZANU-PF in any event are unlikely to explore these options, especially before the elections. They have demonstrated no intention of doing so. In theory, Mnangagwa could lay out the re-engagement, reform and recovery plan that he apparently was unable to deliver because he was constrained by internal ZANU-PF factionalism. That said, if he does not come up with a coherent strategy that moves beyond efforts to clawback power within ZANU-PF, few will be convinced that he has the vision to pilot such a comeback, let alone confront the bigger challenge of a national recovery plan.