津巴布韦:通向改革之路还是再次陷入困境?
津巴布韦:通向改革之路还是再次陷入困境?
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Zimbabwe: The Road to Reform or another Dead End? [Podcast]
Zimbabwe: The Road to Reform or another Dead End? [Podcast]
Report 173 / Africa

津巴布韦:通向改革之路还是再次陷入困境?

执行摘要

针对那些被认为是津巴布韦非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线(ZANU-PF)的敌人的暴力越来越激烈,这暴露了已经大为延误的津巴布韦改革进程的局限性,以及全面政治协议(GPA)遭到破坏的危险。穆加贝总统呼吁提早选举,这加剧了人们对重蹈2008年暴力的担心。茨万吉拉伊总理已向地区发出了求助的呼吁。最终的选举是不可避免的,但没有能强制执行并具有可信性的改革,津巴布韦将面临另一次不合法选举和根深蒂固的两极分化与危机。全面政治协议的担保人——非洲联盟(AU)和南部非洲发展共同体(SADC)及其由南非领导的协调小组——要进行艰苦斗争以确保改革实施。津巴布韦非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线愈加自信自己可以恐吓对手并阻挠改革,而且,对于争取民主变革运动—茨万吉拉伊(MDC-T)的能力,内部和外部的信心都在逐渐减弱。穆加贝的健康和津巴布韦非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线的权力继承带来的政治动荡使问题更为复杂。如果对于津巴布韦非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线没有更强有力的国际压力,目前脆弱的联盟很可能会崩溃,将引发更多的暴力并给南部非洲带来更严重的后果。

由三个政党(津巴布韦非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线、争取民主变革运动—茨万吉拉伊、争取民主变革运动—穆坦巴拉)于2008年9月签署的全面政治协议本来旨在提供一个能应对多重政治和经济危机的基础,但它却已经成为了争夺国家未来控制权的战场。津巴布韦非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线连同未曾改革的安全部门领导(即“安全官僚们”)阻止权力进行民主移交的能力依然如在2008年时一样,丝毫没有受到影响。国家媒体仍然荒诞不公,刑事司法系统继续被用作针对津巴布韦非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线反对者的武器,特别是用来针对争取民主变革运动—茨万吉拉伊。

全面政治协议改革的核心是由议会主导的制宪进程,它接受宪法议会事务(选择)委员会(COPAC)的指导。该机构在2010年下半年发起了一项推广方案,但一些公民社会组织和争取民主变革运动—茨万吉拉伊批评其远不具备包容性和开放性,指责津巴布韦非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线已经占有和操纵了整个进程。然而,许多津巴布韦人仍然认为制定宪法实践对于国家进步十分重要。虽然已经开始起草宪法,并会推进到召开全体利益相关者会议、获得议会批准和举行全民公决,但这每一步都有可能招致反对、拖延和困惑。

争取民主变革运动的两个政党认为宪法议会事务(选择)委员会必须在举行选举前完成制宪工作,但津巴布韦非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线表示,无论有没有新的宪法,选举都可以进行,并将其在民主改革上的合作与取消那些针对津巴布韦的国际制裁联系起来。而对于国际制裁的取消,争取民主变革运动的两个政党都没有控制权。在2011年2月底,协调小组访问哈拉雷,促进了三个政党的领袖承诺实施他们在2010年8月签订的协议,解决的那些悬而未决的全面政治协议问题。这不包括对于在宪法公决后的选举顺序的承诺。然而,由于无法自行商定达成一个相关计划,政党领导者委托调解人来制定选举前的行动路线图。

全面政治协议的担保人和调解团队一直到最近才没有再对解决进展缓慢的协议进程采取直接回避的态度。不过,在2011年3月31日,南部非洲发展共同体的三驾马车(纳米比亚、莫桑比克和赞比亚)已经注意到全面政治协议的实施及相关事宜缺乏进展,并且暴力和恐吓程度有所上升,因此已拟定解决目前情况的必要措施。这是一项重大进展,这公开表明了强硬的态度,并且反映了地区组织内部,对于全面政治协议的签署方(尤其是津巴布韦非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线)的失望。争取民主变革运动—茨万吉拉伊对公报表示欢迎,因为这是对于它以及公民社会群体所表达的多重不满的直接回应。津巴布韦非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线和穆加贝已经对此予以反驳,表示不会容忍外部干涉,哪怕干涉来自邻国。未来几个月将决定南部非洲发展共同体是否能够通过具体行动履行其承诺,包括推动改革议程和可持续过渡的前景。这反过来也将表明举行可信选举的条件的存在。

恐怖和暴力日益恶化,这意味着安全部门改革(SSR)应该是最紧迫的挑战。此外,重要的机构需要得到加强,这包括议会委员会和人权、媒体以及选举委员会。除了这些措施外,全面政治协议还规定,应对民间社会提供持续支持,以使其参与各类机构的事务。然而,如果宪法草案不完成制定,即使全面政治协议中所包括的甚至是有限的安全部门改革也不可能得到有效实施。

调解小组认识到它需要在津巴布韦保持持续存在。它的路线图应该对已经完成和未完成的事项进行审视,并指出各党能够和不能达到的目标。如果进一步分享权力不可避免,那么对当前安排的失败做出务实的评估是必要的。担保人和调解团队在评估方面依赖于由全面和平协议设立的联合监督与执行委员会(JOMIC),该委员会由三个签字方各派出四名成员所组成。但由于缺乏足够的监督能力,没有执法杠杆以及无法解决政府内部的权力失衡,联合监测与执行委员会未能完成其使命。鉴于认识到该委员会表现不佳,南非发展共同体三架马车建议加强调解小组的监控和报告能力,从而可以与其更加密切地合作。定期审议机制规定的应与担保人协商下提供的年度进展回顾尚未完成,尽管政党领袖最近同意对此进行更正。而担保人必须保证进行全面审查。

该路线图应呼吁政治领导者集体确立清晰的优先事项,并应特别关注如何确保创造利于可信选举的条件。正如在最近的三架马车峰会所称道的那样,南部非洲发展共同体的“管理民主选举的原则和准则”提供了可接受的参考框架。为宪法草案举行公决会是测试选举条件是否成熟的一个重要机会。

全面政治协议仍然提供了一个连贯的框架,使可信选举的条件到位。然而,选举进展依旧受到阻碍,因为津巴布韦非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线还没有对民主改革表现出可信的承诺,而争取民主变革运动—茨万吉拉伊也不足以强大到迫使民主改革通过。全面政治协议担保人和南非如今已经表示他们准备采取一个更为实际的方法,虽然目前还不清楚这将如何体现。重要的是他们与津巴布韦政治领袖持续接触,督促他们认真履行承诺,并为达到南部非洲发展共同体公报所设定的具体步骤而制定清晰的基准和时间表。许多关键改革已经获得批准,加快执行这些关键的改革非常必要,因为只有适当的条件到位,才能举行可信的选举。  

哈拉雷/约翰内斯堡/内罗毕/布鲁塞尔, 2011年4月27日

Executive Summary

Intensified violence against those deemed to be ZANU-PF enemies has exposed the limitations of Zimbabwe’s much delayed reform process and threatens to derail the Global Political Agreement (GPA). President Mugabe’s call for early elections has increased fears of a return to 2008’s violence. Prime Minister Tsvangirai has appealed for help from the region. Eventual elections are inevitable, but without credible, enforceable reforms, Zimbabwe faces another illegitimate vote and prospects of entrenched polarisation and crisis. GPA guarantors – the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its South African-led facilitation team – have an uphill battle to secure implementation. ZANU-PF is increasingly confident it can intimidate opponents and frustrate reform, and there is waning faith, internally and externally, in MDC-T capacities. Mugabe’s health and ZANU-PF succession turmoil are further complications. Without stronger international pressure on ZANU-PF, the tenuous current coalition may collapse, triggering further violence and grave consequences for southern Africa.

The GPA, signed by the three political parties (ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M) in September 2008, was intended to provide a foundation for response to the multiple political and economic crises, but it has become a battleground for control of the country’s future. As in 2008, ZANU-PF’s ability, in partnership with the unreformed security sector leadership (the “securocrats”), to thwart a democratic transfer of power remains intact. The state media is still grotesquely unbalanced, and the criminal justice system continues to be used as a weapon against ZANU-PF opponents, in particular the MDC-T.

The centrepiece of GPA reforms is a parliament-led constitution-making process under the direction of the Constitution Parliamentary Affairs (Select) Committee (COPAC). That body launched an outreach program in the latter half of 2010, but several civil society organisations and the MDC-T criticise it for falling far short of being inclusive and open and accuse ZANU-PF of having captured and manipulated the process. Many Zimbabweans, however, still consider the constitution-writing exercise important for moving the country forward. While drafting has begun, leading toward an all-stakeholders conference, parliamentary approval and a referendum, every step presents opportunity for opposition, delay and obfuscation.

Both MDC parties argue that COPAC must finish its work before elections are held, but ZANU-PF says elections can proceed with or without a new constitution and links its cooperation on democratic reforms to removal of targeted international sanctions, over which the parties have no control. In late February 2011, the facilitation team’s visit to Harare resulted in a commitment from the three party leaders to implement their August 2010 agreement on outstanding GPA issues. This did not include a commitment to the sequence of elections after a constitutional referendum. Nevertheless, having failed to produce an agreed plan themselves, the party leaders deferred to the facilitators to produce a roadmap for pre-election action.

The GPA guarantors and the facilitation team have until very recently shied from addressing poor progress directly. On 31 March 2011, however, the SADC troika (Namibia, Mozambique and Zambia) took note of the lack of progress in GPA implementation and related matters and the rise in levels of violence and intimidation and laid out steps that must now be taken to address the situation. This is a significant development that illustrates a public hardening of attitudes and increasing frustration within the regional organisation toward the GPA signatories, in particular ZANU-PF. The MDC-T welcomed the communiqué, which is a direct response to the multiple grievances it as well as civil society groups have expressed. ZANU-PF and Mugabe have countered that they will not tolerate external interference, even from neighbours. The next few months will determine whether SADC can follow its words by producing action that advances the reform agenda and prospects for a sustainable transition. That in turn will indicate whether the conditions necessary for credible elections exist.

The worsening climate of fear and violence means security sector reform (SSR) should be the most immediate challenge. In addition, important institutions need to be strengthened, including parliamentary committees and the Human Rights, Media and Electoral Commissions. These measures should be supplemented by continued support for civil society to engage with those bodies as set out in the GPA. Until the draft constitution is produced, however, it is unlikely that even the limited SSR contained in the GPA will be meaningfully addressed.

The facilitation team recognises that it needs a constant presence in Zimbabwe. Its roadmap should propose an audit of what has and has not been done, what the parties can and cannot achieve. If further power-sharing is inevitable, a pragmatic assessment of the current arrangement’s failure is needed. The guarantors and facilitation team have relied on the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), set up by the GPA – four members from each of the three signatory parties – for evaluations, but it has not fulfilled its mandate, due to inadequate monitoring capacity, no enforcement leverage and problems navigating the distorted balance of power within government. In recognition of its poor performance, the SADC troika recommended strengthening the facilitation team’s monitoring and reporting capacity, so it could work closer with the JOMIC. The annual progress review the Periodic Review Mechanism should provide in consultation with the guarantors has not been done, though the party leaders recently agreed to correct this. The guarantors must ensure a comprehensive review.

The roadmap should call upon the political leadership to collectively establish clear priorities, with a particular focus on how to secure conditions for credible elections. As endorsed by the recent troika summit, the SADC “Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections” provides the accepted frame of reference. The referendum envisaged for the draft constitution would be an important opportunity to test electoral conditions.

The GPA still offers a coherent framework for putting in place conditions for credible elections. However, progress remains stymied because ZANU-PF has not demonstrated a credible commitment to democratic reforms, and the MDC-T is not strong enough to force them through. The GPA guarantors and South Africa have now indicated they are prepared to take a much more hands-on approach, although it is unclear how this will manifest itself. It is important that they continually engage Zimbabwe’s political leaders to take their own commitments seriously and set clear benchmarks and timelines for achieving the concrete steps set out in the SADC communiqué. Accelerating the implementation of key reforms, many of which have already been approved, is all the more necessary because a credible election process cannot take place until the appropriate conditions are in place.

Harare/Johannesburg/Nairobi/Brussels, 27 April 2011

 

Podcast / Africa

Zimbabwe: The Road to Reform or another Dead End? [Podcast]

Piers Pigou, Crisis Group’s Southern Africa Project Director, examines the current political situation in Zimbabwe and talks about the urgent reforms needed in order to avoid a new wave of political violence.

zimbabwe-elections-podcast
In this podcast, Piers Pigou examines the current political situation in Zimbabwe and talks about the urgent reforms needed in order to avoid a new wave of political violence. CRISIS GROUP

You can find below a transcript of this podcast.

Hello and welcome to this podcast from the International Crisis Group. I am Gabriela Keseberg Dávalos, Senior Communications Officer, and with me in the studio today is Piers Pigou, Crisis Group’s Southern Africa Project Director. 

Piers, ICG’s latest report on Zimbabwe says that the situation in the country is deteriorating again under a new wave of political violence and that it faces another illegitimate election and crisis if no credible reforms can be implemented. What reforms are necessary? 

The purpose of the global political agreement that was signed in September 2008 was to lay the foundations for a creditable and sustainable election process. This required a series of reforms to take place that were outlined by the articles set out in that global political agreement. Since the government was formed in February 2009, there has been very little progress in a number of areas of critical reform. These key areas for reform focus primarily on the security sector, the electoral reforms, the media and the issues relating to the implementation of law and order. So those are the primary concerns, and there has been inadequate progress in all of those areas.

Is there a danger that the current coalition collapses, triggering further violence and grave consequences for Southern Africa?

There is a danger that the coalition could collapse. There are interests particularly within ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front) who would like to see the coalition collapse and to force an early election with the hope of being able to force through some kind of solution, which really would not be sustainable. That’s the primary danger at the moment; it is not really clear the extent to which that element of ZANU-PF can actually force through that kind of solution, so we are dealing with a very fluid context at the moment in which a number of possible scenarios could unfold.

And what is the most immediate challenge? 

The most immediate challenge is the implementation of the recommendations by the SADAC Troika (Southern African Development Community), which is a body that met at the end of March in Livingstone, Zambia. They received and accepted a report made by the SADAC facilitator, President Jacob Zuma from South Africa, who has recommended a much more robust engagement by the facilitation group in Zimbabwe. This is in response to a number of calls over the years, by civil society and others, but also an increasing recognition that if the current situation continues, Southern Africa will face a long-term problem with Zimbabwe.

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