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Zimbabwe: An Opportunity for Reform?
Zimbabwe: An Opportunity for Reform?
Briefing 86 / Africa

津巴布韦的制裁僵局

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I. 概述

津巴布韦必须在2013年6月底前举行选举,但想要保证适当的选举条件,亟需改革。区域组织南部非洲发展共同体(Southern African Development Community, SADC)呼吁取消对津制裁,声称制裁是严重妨碍改革的政治障碍。实施制裁的国家和组织——特别是欧盟(EU)和美国,认为改革的欠缺恰恰证明需要继续实施制裁,虽然制裁已经变得更具象征意义而非推动变革的驱动力。目前的制裁僵局反映了津巴布韦政治更大范围的瘫痪。在下次选举前校准并全面撤销制裁以便在改革方面取得广泛进步的机会可能已经错失了。三年前当《全球政治协议》(Global Political Agreement, GPA)新鲜出炉、联合政府刚刚成立的时候,可能还存在这样的机会。但是,通过一种区分制裁类型、关注选举所需具体改革的协调一致的方式,来推动进步并打破目前僵局的机会仍然存在,不容错失。

津巴布韦的政治局势十分脆弱。88岁总统罗伯特·穆加贝的时代正不可避免地接近尾声,选举日渐迫近,人们对这个国家可能正迈向新的镇压和冲突的担忧也与日俱增。穆加贝的津巴布韦非洲民族联盟(爱国阵线)(Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, ZANU-PF)宣称GPA及随后商定的改革进程已照常进行,目前的情况有利于举行一次自由、公正的投票。争取民主变革运动(Movement for Democratic Change, MDC)阵营对此并不赞同,但也未具体指出其认为的必要的最小化改革是什么。SADC和大多数国际观察家认为举行自由、平等选举的基础尚未奠定。尽管津巴布韦已经取得了一些经济和社会进步,但在核心改革和实施一些已达成一致的事宜方面仍然存在大的缺陷,陷入了僵局。最重要的是,ZANU-PF仍保持对安全机构的全面控制,这让人们更有理由担心选举可能导致2008年暴力事件的重演,人民的民主意愿会遭到拒绝。

针对2001年至2008年期间发生的侵犯人权和与选举相关的权力滥用,美国和欧盟采取了一系列旨在推动改革的措施。一些措施针对特定个人(如财产冻结和旅行禁令);其余措施则涉及到与国际金融机构和政府对政府间关系有关的政策(如对贷款、信用和发展援助的限制以及武器禁运)。诸多制裁措施中,尽管出于人道主义援助和开展基础发展合作等目的存在有例外情况,且这些措施也互有区别,但是为简单起见,本简报以术语“制裁”通称之,这也因为津巴布韦和南部非洲的政治对话中通常也如此处理这一概念。实施和保持制裁的国家和组织把制裁与具体的改革或为民主进行的更广泛斗争联系在一起,但他们并未有效传达这个概念,也就从未获得过南部非洲地区对于这个概念的支持。

ZANU-PF试图阻挠改革,动员人们反对它所认为的对国家主权的内部和外部威胁。作为这种企图的一部分,ZANU-PF从政治上操纵制裁事件并对其进行宣传。它提出改革取决于取消制裁,并指责MDC中由总理摩根·茨万吉拉伊领导的一个派系(MDC-T)违背了GPA承诺,没有推动制裁的取消。MDC-T辩称,它对制裁并无控制权,如果停止违背GPA的行为并且ZANU-PF不再阻碍改革,将为撤销制裁提供一个更坚实的基础。穆加贝的政党将对津巴布韦的各种制裁措施混在一起——其中包括多边机构实施的限制措施,指出“制裁”是导致糟糕经济的核心原因。MDC-T派则认为制裁措施相对来说涉及面窄且有针对性,ZANU-PF才是破坏经济的始作俑者。

SADC坚持认为制裁会加剧现有困境,不利于找出建设性的解决办法,撤销制裁可以使已取得的进展得到承认,成为信心建立的重要举措。然而,制裁的取消如何能解决谈判僵局并促进协议的有效实施,就这一点的衡量指标各方尚未达成一致意见,更不用说对此作出保证了。MDC-T在这个问题上闪烁其词,ZANU-PF则采取了专制主义的立场,两方一道扼杀了达成建设性折衷意见的前景。GPA的签署方们不太可能同意一项将完全撤销制裁与改革议程结合起来的实际方案,特别是当他们在起草选举路线图方面陷入僵局的情况下。此外,SADC也不太可能提出这样一个建议。这反过来使得欧盟或美国不可能在其内部或国内迈出艰难一步,单方面解除所有制裁。

只有大胆行动才有机会打破僵局,但问题的解决既不应该与改革议程割裂开来——特别是在这个问题与迅速迫近、具有潜在灾难性的选举季相关的情况下,也不应该采取不全则无的方式。任何方法都必须基于以下根基,那就是可为局势向前发展提供一个更具实质性和微妙的基础——目前尚欠缺这一根基。实施制裁的欧盟、美国和其他各方应该明确区分各类制裁措施,特别是:

  • 对有针对性的措施及其影响进行全面审视,公开将具体个人或实体作为针对目标的附加详细原因,并酌情扩展措施涉及范围,对目标个人的成年家庭成员实施制裁(一些措施已经如是操作);
     
  • 在给予目标个人申请公务旅行签证的机会方面显示更大的灵活性,从而化解关于签证问题阻挠了津巴布韦政府合法公务活动的批评;
     
  • 继续实施武器禁运,但要更努力津巴布韦安全部门接触,促进对话,探讨其在民主秩序中所承担的责任和可能的专业培训所需的条件;
     
  • 发起一项调查,全面研究限制措施对政府与政府间发展合作造成的影响,并寻求与SADC进行谈判,制定一项旨在达成如下目的的战略:(a)暂停那些和实施与选举相关的关键改革有关的禁令;(b)在各方同意的时间框架内,更有力地促进SADC的发展。

GPA签署方和协调人——SADC和南非,特别是作为牵头国的南非——也必须采取如下行动:

  • ZANU-PF应该停止专制姿态,而MDC阵营(特别是MDC-T),作为联合政府中的政党和参与者,应该为缓和并最终解除制裁提出一个一致的行动计划。
     
  • 如选举路线图草案中所提出的,SADC和MDC阵营应与协调方一起,将各种实际方案摆上台面,这些方案要把缓和并最终解除制裁与一个有时限的实际改革议程联系起来;而达成的协议必须有一个受监管的实施框架作为支持。
     
  • 协调方应该更积极地参与进来,采取包括向阻碍改革并违反现有规定的GPA签署方施加更多压力等措施,以最终确定选举路线图及其实施框架。
     
  • SADC应该帮助津巴布韦和国际金融机构就解决债务问题找到共同立场和可持续的解决办法,以使津巴布韦重新获得信贷额度和预算支持。

约翰内斯堡/布鲁塞尔, 2012年2月6日

Commentary / Africa

Zimbabwe: An Opportunity for Reform?

A new presidential administration in Zimbabwe offers an opportunity for much-needed democratic and economic reform after years of stagnation. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2018, Crisis Group proposes four key areas on which the EU and its member states should focus its support: the security sector, elections, the economy and national reconciliation.

This commentary on the oppurtunity for reform in Zimbabwe is part of our annual early-warning report Watch List 2018.

Amid a rise in authoritarian tendencies across parts of the continent, Robert Mugabe’s resignation and the November 2017 appointment of his former deputy, Emmerson Mnangagwa, as president make Zimbabwe a potential exception, carrying fresh prospects for reform and economic recovery. Mnangagwa and his administration have set a different tone, promising to clean up government, reach across political, ethnic and racial lines, strengthen Zimbabwe’s democracy and reform its moribund economy. Re-engaging with Western partners and financial institutions is an integral component of his strategy. Questions remain, however, as to whether Mnangagwa’s administration represents a genuine change or simply a reconfiguration of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), now dominated by security sector interests and factions aligned to the new president. International actors will have an important role in encouraging the reforms that will determine whether the country can recover economically and steer a more open and democratic course.

African and non-African governments alike agree that Zimbabwe’s continued isolation would be counterproductive. Following the lead of the AU and Southern African Development Community (SADC), actors including Western governments and China – most of which were happy to see the back of Mugabe – stopped short of calling the “military-assisted transition” a coup d’état, thus ensuring they could maintain diplomatic relations with and provide assistance to the government. Most also agree that the new government should be given an opportunity to demonstrate it is serious about its commitments. But while encouragement and incentives are important, Zimbabwe’s partners, including the EU, should calibrate support to maintain pressure on the government to enact both political and economic reforms, particularly given ZANU-PF’s long track record of backtracking on its promises.

So far, Mnangagwa has set an encouraging tone, focusing on the need to resuscitate the economy and open the political system. But doubts remain. Questions surround in particular the government’s willingness to address structural economic issues through fiscal discipline, transparency and accountability. They also surround its commitment to a genuinely inclusive political system; in response, the opposition and civil society – although weak and fragmented – have united in calling for a level electoral playing field, enhanced participation, and strengthened institutional checks and balances.

A calibrated framework for EU engagement in Zimbabwe

Although relations have long been strained, the EU resumed direct development cooperation with Harare in November 2014. Since then, with member states, it has engaged in limited senior-level political dialogue. The EU set out a framework for engagement in the National Indicative Program for Zimbabwe 2014-2020, focusing on three sectors: health, agriculture-based economic development, and governance as well as institution-building.

While this framework remains relevant, Mugabe’s ouster provides the EU an opportunity to adjust its approach and offer Zimbabwe the promise of a deeper relationship should certain conditions be met (a promise which is explicit in the 22 January 2018 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on Zimbabwe). This would require determining levels of support based on realistic deliverables and deadlines, based partly on timelines set by the new president and government themselves (such as in Mnangagwa’s December presentation to ZANU-PF’s extraordinary Congress, his State of the Nation address and the government’s commitments to deliverables within the first 100 days in office). Specifically, the EU could link its support to reforms in four key areas:

  • Security sector, including initiatives to professionalise the police forces and provide for civilian supervision, improve parliamentary oversight of the defence sector and repeal legislation inconsistent with the 2013 constitution, such as the Public Order and Security Act (which curtails rights such as freedom of assembly) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (which allows the state to severely control the work of the media and limit free speech).
     
  • Elections, including guaranteeing greater independence for the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and credible voter rolls for Zimbabweans at home and abroad. The EU also should follow up on the president’s recent offer to allow EU observers to monitor the 2018 elections.
     
  • Economic sector, including organisation of a broad dialogue on the government’s economic reform strategy to be led by an independent committee, including representatives from the opposition, civil society, the churches and important commercial sectors.
     
  • National reconciliation, notably by bolstering the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission and extending its mandate so as to form a truly independent body able to deal with past government abuses.

In parallel, the EU should step up support for institutions such as the Auditor General, Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission and Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission while continuing to engage civil society organisations, and support their efforts to track government reforms, particularly those related to security, governance, fiscal accountability and anti-corruption.