Zimbabwe: A Bold Approach to The Sanctions Issue
Zimbabwe: A Bold Approach to The Sanctions Issue
Briefing 86 / Africa

津巴布韦的制裁僵局

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I. 概述

津巴布韦必须在2013年6月底前举行选举,但想要保证适当的选举条件,亟需改革。区域组织南部非洲发展共同体(Southern African Development Community, SADC)呼吁取消对津制裁,声称制裁是严重妨碍改革的政治障碍。实施制裁的国家和组织——特别是欧盟(EU)和美国,认为改革的欠缺恰恰证明需要继续实施制裁,虽然制裁已经变得更具象征意义而非推动变革的驱动力。目前的制裁僵局反映了津巴布韦政治更大范围的瘫痪。在下次选举前校准并全面撤销制裁以便在改革方面取得广泛进步的机会可能已经错失了。三年前当《全球政治协议》(Global Political Agreement, GPA)新鲜出炉、联合政府刚刚成立的时候,可能还存在这样的机会。但是,通过一种区分制裁类型、关注选举所需具体改革的协调一致的方式,来推动进步并打破目前僵局的机会仍然存在,不容错失。

津巴布韦的政治局势十分脆弱。88岁总统罗伯特·穆加贝的时代正不可避免地接近尾声,选举日渐迫近,人们对这个国家可能正迈向新的镇压和冲突的担忧也与日俱增。穆加贝的津巴布韦非洲民族联盟(爱国阵线)(Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, ZANU-PF)宣称GPA及随后商定的改革进程已照常进行,目前的情况有利于举行一次自由、公正的投票。争取民主变革运动(Movement for Democratic Change, MDC)阵营对此并不赞同,但也未具体指出其认为的必要的最小化改革是什么。SADC和大多数国际观察家认为举行自由、平等选举的基础尚未奠定。尽管津巴布韦已经取得了一些经济和社会进步,但在核心改革和实施一些已达成一致的事宜方面仍然存在大的缺陷,陷入了僵局。最重要的是,ZANU-PF仍保持对安全机构的全面控制,这让人们更有理由担心选举可能导致2008年暴力事件的重演,人民的民主意愿会遭到拒绝。

针对2001年至2008年期间发生的侵犯人权和与选举相关的权力滥用,美国和欧盟采取了一系列旨在推动改革的措施。一些措施针对特定个人(如财产冻结和旅行禁令);其余措施则涉及到与国际金融机构和政府对政府间关系有关的政策(如对贷款、信用和发展援助的限制以及武器禁运)。诸多制裁措施中,尽管出于人道主义援助和开展基础发展合作等目的存在有例外情况,且这些措施也互有区别,但是为简单起见,本简报以术语“制裁”通称之,这也因为津巴布韦和南部非洲的政治对话中通常也如此处理这一概念。实施和保持制裁的国家和组织把制裁与具体的改革或为民主进行的更广泛斗争联系在一起,但他们并未有效传达这个概念,也就从未获得过南部非洲地区对于这个概念的支持。

ZANU-PF试图阻挠改革,动员人们反对它所认为的对国家主权的内部和外部威胁。作为这种企图的一部分,ZANU-PF从政治上操纵制裁事件并对其进行宣传。它提出改革取决于取消制裁,并指责MDC中由总理摩根·茨万吉拉伊领导的一个派系(MDC-T)违背了GPA承诺,没有推动制裁的取消。MDC-T辩称,它对制裁并无控制权,如果停止违背GPA的行为并且ZANU-PF不再阻碍改革,将为撤销制裁提供一个更坚实的基础。穆加贝的政党将对津巴布韦的各种制裁措施混在一起——其中包括多边机构实施的限制措施,指出“制裁”是导致糟糕经济的核心原因。MDC-T派则认为制裁措施相对来说涉及面窄且有针对性,ZANU-PF才是破坏经济的始作俑者。

SADC坚持认为制裁会加剧现有困境,不利于找出建设性的解决办法,撤销制裁可以使已取得的进展得到承认,成为信心建立的重要举措。然而,制裁的取消如何能解决谈判僵局并促进协议的有效实施,就这一点的衡量指标各方尚未达成一致意见,更不用说对此作出保证了。MDC-T在这个问题上闪烁其词,ZANU-PF则采取了专制主义的立场,两方一道扼杀了达成建设性折衷意见的前景。GPA的签署方们不太可能同意一项将完全撤销制裁与改革议程结合起来的实际方案,特别是当他们在起草选举路线图方面陷入僵局的情况下。此外,SADC也不太可能提出这样一个建议。这反过来使得欧盟或美国不可能在其内部或国内迈出艰难一步,单方面解除所有制裁。

只有大胆行动才有机会打破僵局,但问题的解决既不应该与改革议程割裂开来——特别是在这个问题与迅速迫近、具有潜在灾难性的选举季相关的情况下,也不应该采取不全则无的方式。任何方法都必须基于以下根基,那就是可为局势向前发展提供一个更具实质性和微妙的基础——目前尚欠缺这一根基。实施制裁的欧盟、美国和其他各方应该明确区分各类制裁措施,特别是:

  • 对有针对性的措施及其影响进行全面审视,公开将具体个人或实体作为针对目标的附加详细原因,并酌情扩展措施涉及范围,对目标个人的成年家庭成员实施制裁(一些措施已经如是操作);
     
  • 在给予目标个人申请公务旅行签证的机会方面显示更大的灵活性,从而化解关于签证问题阻挠了津巴布韦政府合法公务活动的批评;
     
  • 继续实施武器禁运,但要更努力津巴布韦安全部门接触,促进对话,探讨其在民主秩序中所承担的责任和可能的专业培训所需的条件;
     
  • 发起一项调查,全面研究限制措施对政府与政府间发展合作造成的影响,并寻求与SADC进行谈判,制定一项旨在达成如下目的的战略:(a)暂停那些和实施与选举相关的关键改革有关的禁令;(b)在各方同意的时间框架内,更有力地促进SADC的发展。

GPA签署方和协调人——SADC和南非,特别是作为牵头国的南非——也必须采取如下行动:

  • ZANU-PF应该停止专制姿态,而MDC阵营(特别是MDC-T),作为联合政府中的政党和参与者,应该为缓和并最终解除制裁提出一个一致的行动计划。
     
  • 如选举路线图草案中所提出的,SADC和MDC阵营应与协调方一起,将各种实际方案摆上台面,这些方案要把缓和并最终解除制裁与一个有时限的实际改革议程联系起来;而达成的协议必须有一个受监管的实施框架作为支持。
     
  • 协调方应该更积极地参与进来,采取包括向阻碍改革并违反现有规定的GPA签署方施加更多压力等措施,以最终确定选举路线图及其实施框架。
     
  • SADC应该帮助津巴布韦和国际金融机构就解决债务问题找到共同立场和可持续的解决办法,以使津巴布韦重新获得信贷额度和预算支持。

约翰内斯堡/布鲁塞尔, 2012年2月6日

I. Overview

Zimbabwe must hold elections before the end of June 2013, but the reforms needed to ensure appropriate conditions are critically wanting. The regional organisation – the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – calls for the removal of sanctions, claiming they are a serious political impediment to reform. Those who have imposed the measures – in particular, the European Union (EU) and the U.S. – argue the reform deficits justify their continuation, though they have been more symbolic than drivers of change. The sanctions gridlock now reflects the broader paralysis that characterises Zimbabwean politics. Opportunity for a calibrated, full removal of sanctions before the next elections, geared to broad progress on reform, such as perhaps existed three years ago when the Global Political Agreement (GPA) was fresh and the Inclusive Government formed, has probably passed. But a chance to promote progress and break the current deadlock still exists through a coordinated approach that distinguishes types of sanctions and focuses on specific reforms needed for those elections. It should be seized.

The political situation is fragile, with growing fears the country may be heading toward new repression and conflict as the era dominated by the 88-year old President Robert Mugabe comes inevitably closer to an end, and elections draw nearer. Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) claims the GPA and subsequent negotiated reform process have run their course, and conditions are conducive to a free and fair vote. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations disagree but do not specify what they consider to be the minimum necessary reforms. SADC and most international observers believe the foundation for free and fair elections has not yet been laid. There has been some economic and social progress, but major deficits and deadlock persist on core reforms and implementation of some already agreed matters. Most significantly, ZANU-PF retains full control of the security apparatus, raising legitimate fears elections could lead to a repeat of the 2008 violence and refusal to accept the democratic will of the people.

In response to human rights and election-related abuses perpetrated between 2001 and 2008, the U.S. and EU adopted a variety of measures designed to promote reform. Some are targeted at specific individuals (eg, asset freezes and travel bans); others involve policies that relate to the international financial institutions (IFIs) and government-to-government relations (eg, restrictions on loans, credit and developmental assistance and arms embargoes). While there are exceptions within and distinctions between many of these measures, including for humanitarian aid and basic development cooperation, this briefing applies the generic term “sanctions” to them for the sake of simplicity, but also because this is how Zimbabwean and southern African political dialogue commonly addresses the concept. Those who have imposed and maintained them have not communicated their concept effectively, as linked to specific reforms or the broader struggle for democracy, and have never gained regional support for them.

ZANU-PF manipulates the issue politically and propagandises it as part of its efforts to frustrate reform and mobilise against perceived internal and external threats to national sovereignty.  It argues that reform is contingent on the removal of sanctions and accuses the MDC wing led by Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) of reneging on GPA commitments to facilitate this. MDC-T argues it has no control over sanctions, and there would be a stronger basis for their removal if GPA violations ended, and ZANU-PF did not block reforms. Mugabe’s party conflates the various measures, including restric­tions from multilateral institutions, arguing “sanctions” are centrally responsible for the poor economy. MDC-T contends that the measures are relatively narrow and targeted, and it is ZANU-PF that has destroyed the economy.

SADC maintains that sanctions exacerbate already difficult conditions; do not contribute to constructive solutions; and their removal would recognise progress made and be an important confidence-building measure. There are no agreed indicators let alone guarantees, however, for how removal might enable it to resolve negotiation deadlocks and enforce implementation of agreements more effectively. MDC-T has hedged, and ZANU-PF has adopted an absolutist position, together scotching prospects for constructive compromise. It is unlikely that the GPA signatories can agree on a realistic formula linking full removal of sanctions to the reform agenda, especially as they are deadlocked on the draft election roadmap. It also seems unlikely SADC could impose such a proposal. This in turn makes it improbable the EU or U.S. would take the domestically difficult step of unilaterally lifting all sanctions.

Only bold action offers a chance to break the impasse, but the issue should not be addressed either separately from the reform agenda, particularly as it relates to the fast-approaching, potentially disastrous election season, or as an all-or-nothing matter. Any approach must proceed from a foundation – currently missing – that can provide a more substantive and nuanced basis for moving forward. The EU, U.S. and others imposing sanctions should make clear distinctions between the several categories of measures. In particular, they should:

  • undertake a comprehensive review of targeted measures and their impact; make public additional detailed reasons for including specific individuals and entities; and, where appropriate, consider extending these measures to include (as several already do) adult family members;
     
  • display greater flexibility to give targeted individuals opportunity to apply for visas for official travel, thus addressing criticism that legitimate Zimbabwe government business is hampered;
     
  • maintain the arms embargoes but make greater efforts to engage the security sector in order to promote dialogue about its responsibilities in a democratic order and about conditions for eventual professional training; and
     
  • initiate a comprehensive study of the impact of restric­tions on government-to-government development cooperation and seek to negotiate with SADC a strategy for (a) suspension of the ban linked to implementation of key election-related reforms and (b) more vigorous SADC facilitation within an agreed timeframe.

The GPA signatories and the facilitators – SADC and especially South Africa, the lead country – must also act:

  • ZANU-PF should desist from absolutist posturing, while the MDC formations (in particular MDC-T), as parties and participants in the Inclusive Government, should present a coherent plan of action for relaxation and eventual removal of sanctions.
     
  • ZANU-PF and the MDC formations, in conjunction with the facilitators, should put realistic options on the table tying the relaxation and eventual removal of sanctions to a realistic time-bound reform agenda, as set out in the draft election roadmap; agreements must be backed by a monitored implementation framework.
     
  • The facilitators should engage more vigorously in order to finalise the election roadmap and its implementation framework, including by exerting more pressure on GPA signatories that obstruct reform and violate existing agreements.
     
  • SADC should help Zimbabwe and international financial institutions (IFIs) find common ground and sustainable solutions on debt resolution so as to permit renewed access to credit lines and budget support.

Johannesburg/Brussels, 6 February 2012

Podcast / Africa

Zimbabwe: A Bold Approach to The Sanctions Issue

Zimbabwe must hold elections before the end of June 2013 but the reforms needed to ensure appropriate conditions are critically wanting. The regional organization, the Southern African Development Community, calls for the removal of international sanctions, claiming they are a serious political impediment to reform. Crisis Group’s Southern Africa Project director, Piers Pigou, discusses the broader paralysis that characterizes Zimbabwean politics.

zimbabwe-podcast-10feb16
In this podcast, Piers Pigou discusses the broader paralysis that characterizes Zimbabwean politics. CRISIS GROUP

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