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Standoff in Zimbabwe as Struggle to Succeed Mugabe Deepens
Standoff in Zimbabwe as Struggle to Succeed Mugabe Deepens
Briefing 86 / Africa

津巴布韦的制裁僵局

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I. 概述

津巴布韦必须在2013年6月底前举行选举,但想要保证适当的选举条件,亟需改革。区域组织南部非洲发展共同体(Southern African Development Community, SADC)呼吁取消对津制裁,声称制裁是严重妨碍改革的政治障碍。实施制裁的国家和组织——特别是欧盟(EU)和美国,认为改革的欠缺恰恰证明需要继续实施制裁,虽然制裁已经变得更具象征意义而非推动变革的驱动力。目前的制裁僵局反映了津巴布韦政治更大范围的瘫痪。在下次选举前校准并全面撤销制裁以便在改革方面取得广泛进步的机会可能已经错失了。三年前当《全球政治协议》(Global Political Agreement, GPA)新鲜出炉、联合政府刚刚成立的时候,可能还存在这样的机会。但是,通过一种区分制裁类型、关注选举所需具体改革的协调一致的方式,来推动进步并打破目前僵局的机会仍然存在,不容错失。

津巴布韦的政治局势十分脆弱。88岁总统罗伯特·穆加贝的时代正不可避免地接近尾声,选举日渐迫近,人们对这个国家可能正迈向新的镇压和冲突的担忧也与日俱增。穆加贝的津巴布韦非洲民族联盟(爱国阵线)(Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, ZANU-PF)宣称GPA及随后商定的改革进程已照常进行,目前的情况有利于举行一次自由、公正的投票。争取民主变革运动(Movement for Democratic Change, MDC)阵营对此并不赞同,但也未具体指出其认为的必要的最小化改革是什么。SADC和大多数国际观察家认为举行自由、平等选举的基础尚未奠定。尽管津巴布韦已经取得了一些经济和社会进步,但在核心改革和实施一些已达成一致的事宜方面仍然存在大的缺陷,陷入了僵局。最重要的是,ZANU-PF仍保持对安全机构的全面控制,这让人们更有理由担心选举可能导致2008年暴力事件的重演,人民的民主意愿会遭到拒绝。

针对2001年至2008年期间发生的侵犯人权和与选举相关的权力滥用,美国和欧盟采取了一系列旨在推动改革的措施。一些措施针对特定个人(如财产冻结和旅行禁令);其余措施则涉及到与国际金融机构和政府对政府间关系有关的政策(如对贷款、信用和发展援助的限制以及武器禁运)。诸多制裁措施中,尽管出于人道主义援助和开展基础发展合作等目的存在有例外情况,且这些措施也互有区别,但是为简单起见,本简报以术语“制裁”通称之,这也因为津巴布韦和南部非洲的政治对话中通常也如此处理这一概念。实施和保持制裁的国家和组织把制裁与具体的改革或为民主进行的更广泛斗争联系在一起,但他们并未有效传达这个概念,也就从未获得过南部非洲地区对于这个概念的支持。

ZANU-PF试图阻挠改革,动员人们反对它所认为的对国家主权的内部和外部威胁。作为这种企图的一部分,ZANU-PF从政治上操纵制裁事件并对其进行宣传。它提出改革取决于取消制裁,并指责MDC中由总理摩根·茨万吉拉伊领导的一个派系(MDC-T)违背了GPA承诺,没有推动制裁的取消。MDC-T辩称,它对制裁并无控制权,如果停止违背GPA的行为并且ZANU-PF不再阻碍改革,将为撤销制裁提供一个更坚实的基础。穆加贝的政党将对津巴布韦的各种制裁措施混在一起——其中包括多边机构实施的限制措施,指出“制裁”是导致糟糕经济的核心原因。MDC-T派则认为制裁措施相对来说涉及面窄且有针对性,ZANU-PF才是破坏经济的始作俑者。

SADC坚持认为制裁会加剧现有困境,不利于找出建设性的解决办法,撤销制裁可以使已取得的进展得到承认,成为信心建立的重要举措。然而,制裁的取消如何能解决谈判僵局并促进协议的有效实施,就这一点的衡量指标各方尚未达成一致意见,更不用说对此作出保证了。MDC-T在这个问题上闪烁其词,ZANU-PF则采取了专制主义的立场,两方一道扼杀了达成建设性折衷意见的前景。GPA的签署方们不太可能同意一项将完全撤销制裁与改革议程结合起来的实际方案,特别是当他们在起草选举路线图方面陷入僵局的情况下。此外,SADC也不太可能提出这样一个建议。这反过来使得欧盟或美国不可能在其内部或国内迈出艰难一步,单方面解除所有制裁。

只有大胆行动才有机会打破僵局,但问题的解决既不应该与改革议程割裂开来——特别是在这个问题与迅速迫近、具有潜在灾难性的选举季相关的情况下,也不应该采取不全则无的方式。任何方法都必须基于以下根基,那就是可为局势向前发展提供一个更具实质性和微妙的基础——目前尚欠缺这一根基。实施制裁的欧盟、美国和其他各方应该明确区分各类制裁措施,特别是:

  • 对有针对性的措施及其影响进行全面审视,公开将具体个人或实体作为针对目标的附加详细原因,并酌情扩展措施涉及范围,对目标个人的成年家庭成员实施制裁(一些措施已经如是操作);
     
  • 在给予目标个人申请公务旅行签证的机会方面显示更大的灵活性,从而化解关于签证问题阻挠了津巴布韦政府合法公务活动的批评;
     
  • 继续实施武器禁运,但要更努力津巴布韦安全部门接触,促进对话,探讨其在民主秩序中所承担的责任和可能的专业培训所需的条件;
     
  • 发起一项调查,全面研究限制措施对政府与政府间发展合作造成的影响,并寻求与SADC进行谈判,制定一项旨在达成如下目的的战略:(a)暂停那些和实施与选举相关的关键改革有关的禁令;(b)在各方同意的时间框架内,更有力地促进SADC的发展。

GPA签署方和协调人——SADC和南非,特别是作为牵头国的南非——也必须采取如下行动:

  • ZANU-PF应该停止专制姿态,而MDC阵营(特别是MDC-T),作为联合政府中的政党和参与者,应该为缓和并最终解除制裁提出一个一致的行动计划。
     
  • 如选举路线图草案中所提出的,SADC和MDC阵营应与协调方一起,将各种实际方案摆上台面,这些方案要把缓和并最终解除制裁与一个有时限的实际改革议程联系起来;而达成的协议必须有一个受监管的实施框架作为支持。
     
  • 协调方应该更积极地参与进来,采取包括向阻碍改革并违反现有规定的GPA签署方施加更多压力等措施,以最终确定选举路线图及其实施框架。
     
  • SADC应该帮助津巴布韦和国际金融机构就解决债务问题找到共同立场和可持续的解决办法,以使津巴布韦重新获得信贷额度和预算支持。

约翰内斯堡/布鲁塞尔, 2012年2月6日

Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe and his wife Grace attend a meeting of his ruling ZANU-PF party's youth league in Harare, Zimbabwe, on 7 October 2017. Philimon Bulawayo/REUTERS
Commentary / Africa

Standoff in Zimbabwe as Struggle to Succeed Mugabe Deepens

President Robert Mugabe plunged Zimbabwe into political crisis by firing his long-time ally and enforcer Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa on 6 November 2017. In this Q&A prior to an apparent army coup in Mnangagwa's favour on 14-15 November, Crisis Group’s Senior Southern Africa Consultant Piers Pigou gives the background to the struggle to succeed the 93-year-old president.

This Q&A on the background to Zimbabwe’s political crisis of November 2017 was published just before an apparent army coup on the night of 14-15 November.

What’s behind the new political crisis in Zimbabwe?

The crisis began on 6 November when President Mugabe fired Emmerson Mnangagwa and expelled him from the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. This was not unexpected. The powerful vice president had become a serious rival and threat to the physically weakened but still astute Mugabe.

Since Vice President Joice Mujuru’s unceremonious removal from office in late 2014, there has been a debilitating factional battle within ZANU-PF over who would succeed the aging president. It pitted Mnangagwa and his supporters against a group of powerful senior and vocal party members – dubbed the “G40”. They rallied around First Lady Grace Mugabe and by mid-2016 it was evident Mugabe tacitly favoured his wife’s associates, who dominated ZANU-PF’s Youth and Women’s Leagues.

During this period, veterans of the liberation war, a key pillar of Mugabe’s support, broke ranks and fell behind Mnangagwa. However, Mnangagwa was unable to embrace them, fearful this would be used against him as further evidence of disloyalty. Instead, he distanced himself from those who supported and promoted him, which made him look weak and indecisive.

His eventual fall played out in awkward slow motion, with the pendulum of his political fortunes swinging back and forth as analysts feverishly speculated whether or not his ambitions to succeed the president would be thwarted. Some expected Mnangagwa’s removal to play out at the party’s extraordinary congress in December. There is speculation that Mugabe acted ahead of this out of fear that his health might rapidly deteriorate.

Where does the army and security sector stand on Mnangagwa’s firing?

Mnangagwa’s support within the security sector, which is crucial to ZANU-PF’s continued rule, supposedly made him too big to fall. Evidently, this was not the case. But his removal has lifted the lid on growing discontent.

A public statement on 13 November by the commander of the defence forces, General Constantine Chiwenga, sent an unambiguous warning that internal dynamics in ZANU-PF, including counter-revolutionary infiltration into the party and hostile attitudes toward the security sector from certain politicians, were destabilising Zimbabwe and generating insecurity. Without mentioning Mnangagwa, Chiwenga called for an end to the unfolding purge of party elements with a liberation history, warning that if the integrity of Zimbabwe’s revolution was threatened, the army would intervene. Although couched in defence of the Zimbabwe’s commander in chief, President Mugabe, Chiwenga implicitly was pointing his finger at him, the first lady and certain G40 elements.

This unprecedented public intervention has sharpened tensions within both ZANU-PF and the security forces. How Mugabe responds to this will be critical if further tensions are to be avoided. He has allowed senior officers to make political statements before, but generally when these were about the opposition. On several occasions in the last two years, he publicly has expressed displeasure at their intervention in internal party affairs. Chiwenga’s statement goes beyond previous interventions, and Mugabe will have to employ all his guile if he intends to ensure continued accommodation with the armed forces.

What does Mnangagwa’s dismissal mean for Zimbabwe’s mutating political landscape?

Mnangagwa’s networks within the party and state administration insulated him to some extent from Mugabe’s machinations and the clear intent of the first lady to bring him down. By mid-2017, it was clear that the G40 was in fact Mugabe’s own project (albeit one he may not have full control over), employed along with his wife as a foil to contain Mnangagwa’s ambitions. As the noose tightened, the crude choreography of accusations against him crescendoed into a series of public humiliations, during which he was accused of disloyalty, deceit and tribalism. It all pointed to his inevitable removal. Yet, inexplicably, he hung on, seemingly without a coherent plan and unable to convincingly push back.

G40 acolytes in the provinces have drawn up a list of Mnangagwa allies they want purged. This includes long-time State Security Minister Kembo Mohadi and recently fired Finance Minister Patrick Chinamasa, who has been the public face of re-engagement with international financial institutions. Some may be expelled from the ZANU-PF, but most will be enmeshed in internal disciplinary processes that will significantly frustrate any possible organised pushback from within ZANU-PF’s provincial structures. A purge of senior civil servants perceived as aligned to Mnangagwa also is expected.

President Mugabe turns 94 in February and remains the party’s presidential candidate for the 2018 election. What kind of succession is he planning and will he support the elevation of his wife, Grace Mugabe, to the vice presidency?

Having removed his major rival, Mugabe can now stage-manage his own succession, which likely will occur only after he dies in office. ZANU-PF’s extraordinary congress, scheduled 12 to 17 December, will see a reconfiguration and possible expansion of ZANU-PF’s presidium to include three vice presidents (also known as 2nd secretary), most likely the incumbent, Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko, Grace Mugabe and Defence Minister Sydney Sekeremayi. The latter has been enthusiastically promoted over the last few months by Grace and the G40 as the man Mugabe trusts most. But, like everyone else, Sekeremayi is a mere appointee and serves at the president’s pleasure. He does not have his own power base, and in late 2014 he had to be rescued by Mugabe after being caught in the cross-hairs of the anti-Mujuru purge.

ZANU-PF’s Women and Youth Leagues, now supported by Vice President Mphoko, have called on Mugabe to appoint Grace as vice president. She is undoubtedly ambitious and may well have her sights on the top job. Mugabe, the final arbiter, has supported his wife’s controversial foray into the political battlefield, where she has been effectively promoting his political interests. But he is aware that she is not popular and that such a blatant dynastic move may well galvanise the fragmented opposition, as well as disgruntled elements within ZANU-PF. Her elevation to first vice president would also not guarantee that she take over once Mugabe dies. Indeed, her political cachet is likely to be significantly diminished when her husband is no longer in office.

Can Mnangagwa stage a comeback?

When the axe fell last week, Mnangagwa fled to Mozambique, fearing for his own safety. This was an irony not lost on those who welcome the downfall of a man nicknamed the Crocodile, with a reputation for brutality and once regarded as untouchable. His first public pushback, a statement from an unknown location, attacked the first family for treating ZANU-PF as their personal property and promising he would be back to take control of the situation within a matter of weeks.

Mnangagwa’s options are certainly now more constrained. It is unclear whether he will attempt to undermine ZANU-PF’s election preparations or if he has the capacity to do so. There is also the question of how he should relate to the opposition and especially its principal leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, who heads the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T), with whom he has been accused of secretly conspiring. To join the opposition would be used as further “evidence” of his alleged complicity, and may well further divide the opposition, many of whom want nothing to do with a man accused of an array of gross human rights violations and of having sought to disrupt the opposition. But to strike out on his own (as Mujuru did when she formed her National People’s Party) likely would have him heading only a small and marginal party in a fragmented political landscape.

What does this development mean in terms of improving Zimbabwe’s prospects for re-engagement with international creditors, reform and recovery?

There is widespread uncertainty regarding what will happen next. Tsvangirai, whose own health problems have fed speculation that he may not be able to lead the major opposition coalition, the MDC Alliance, in national elections expected in April 2018, has rightly warned that the political environment is dangerously unstable.

Economic conditions have visibly deteriorated over the last two months. The volume of physical money circulating in both the formal and informal economy has contracted sharply. Inflationary pressures exacerbated by this liquidity crisis have driven up the cost of living, leading to a crash in the purchasing power of salaries paid into bank accounts. At the same time, the government is continuing along a dangerous path of deficit financing, with the new Finance Minister Ignatius Chombo announcing the budget deficit will climb to $1.82 billion this year (the total budget is $5.6 billion). The government has no plan beyond the limited option of domestic borrowing, which has skyrocketed since 2013. Zimbabwe is once again heading back into hyperinflationary territory.

Mnangagwa was held out by many as the best hope within ZANU-PF for piloting an economic recovery predicated on re-engagement with international creditors and a package of reform that would instil a measure of much needed confidence. Yet evidence that he would or could deliver on this front is not persuasive.

Those now in the ascendency within ZANU-PF in any event are unlikely to explore these options, especially before the elections. They have demonstrated no intention of doing so. In theory, Mnangagwa could lay out the re-engagement, reform and recovery plan that he apparently was unable to deliver because he was constrained by internal ZANU-PF factionalism. That said, if he does not come up with a coherent strategy that moves beyond efforts to clawback power within ZANU-PF, few will be convinced that he has the vision to pilot such a comeback, let alone confront the bigger challenge of a national recovery plan.