Arrow Down Arrow Left Arrow Right Arrow Up Camera icon set icon set Ellipsis icon set Facebook Favorite Globe Hamburger List Mail Map Marker Map Microphone Minus PDF Play Print RSS Search Share Trash Crisiswatch Alerts and Trends Box - 1080/761 Copy Twitter Video Camera  copyview Youtube
Why Trump Should Take It Slow With Kim Jong Un
Why Trump Should Take It Slow With Kim Jong Un
Sri Lanka's President Maithripala Sirisena (front) stands for the national anthem during a ceremony to swear in Ranil Wickremesinghe, leader of the United National Party, as Sri Lanka's new prime minister, Colombo, 21 August 2015. REUTERS/Dinuka Liyanawat
Report 278 / Asia

斯里兰卡:启动改革进程

在内战结束七年后,斯里兰卡虽已再次开放民主空间,但局势却——由于反对势力强大、机关管辖分职不清、及经济疲软——日趋紧张。为了使改革真正成功,斯里兰卡的总理和总统应以开放的心态来展开合作、加倍努力解决战争遗留问题——诸如尚逍遥法外的罪犯、在押的泰米尔人、以及军占土地等。

执行摘要

特里帕拉·西里塞纳总统于2015年1月赢得大选,斯里兰卡虽意外得来达成持久和平与和解的机会,但其也因此将面临着更加动荡的前景。西里塞纳政府的初步措施停止并开始扭转马欣达·拉贾帕克萨当权时的独裁和家族统治。其改革议程雄心勃勃:恢复法治、停止纵任腐败和滥权的行为、颁布新宪法、建立与联合国人权理事会(UNHRC)意见一致的战后和解和司法机制、以政策大改来推动经济脱困。然而,改革进展却滞后于大批选民的预期,且因其缺乏连贯性和资源而后续乏力。“国民团结”政府虽扩大了政治中心、并孤立了强硬的民族主义者,但改革的窗口却已开始关闭。若要抓住斯里兰卡前所未有的改革机遇,政府应采取更大胆、更协调的政策,并通过公关活动来提振民众的支持。

步履维艰的进展令政府与其选民之间关系紧张化。北部和东部泰米尔选民几乎一边倒地支持了西里塞纳,但他们却越来越怀疑总统实现和解与正义之承诺的能力。许多僧伽罗“推行善政”的社会活动家则批评政府无能贯彻法治措施,且仍有裙带关系和腐败案件不断滋生;他们还批评政府对腐败和刑事案件的调查软弱无力。随着预算赤字增长、货币储备降低,紧缩政策在遭到抗议后已被搁浅或缩减。与此同时,西里塞纳的斯里兰卡自由党(SLFP)和总理拉尼尔·威克雷明盖的统一国民党(UNP)之间关系亦日趋紧张。而实施改革所需的一线政治曙光则正在消失。

制度因素还妨碍了进展:工作人员太少、专业技能——尤其在涉及和解与过渡司法问题之时——稀缺、权力中心分散且机构臃肿、部门分职重叠、以及总统和总理在治理的重点和方式上各行其是。政府为了得到通过新宪法所需的三分之二多数票,部分此前就滥权的官僚和政客被授予了内阁职位,而政府改革的速度也因此放缓。

西里塞纳斗志受制的另一因素是,他还要和自由党内忠于前总统拉贾帕克萨的派系斗争,这一点在即将到来的地方选举中尤为明显。出于僧伽罗民族主义者对西里塞纳相对温和的和解姿态以及宪法改革提议的不满、以及对会给予对手反击藉口或激怒军方和安全部队的担忧,政府做出了防御性的回应,即,其仅归还了一小部分的军占土地、并只释放了寥寥几名泰米尔囚犯。

自2009年5月内战结束已经七年,和解事宜和问责制度却尚未取得大进展。政府似乎正在放弃过渡期司法计划,特别是在对外国法官和专家职能的撤销。对那些情节严重——尤其是在战争最后几周所犯下的——罪行,政府虽对其置之不理,但对军方和大多数僧伽罗人而言,要他们承认或承担责任却非常困难。政府陷入了两难,其向联合国人权理事会承诺的机制令僧伽罗民族主义者备感疑虑,与此同时,政府安抚僧伽罗人和军方的举措又引起了泰米尔人对政府的怀疑——其是否愿意为战时暴行伸张正义,或是否真心支持宪法改革、并以此达成泰米尔人实现合法自治理想。

为稳固联盟并履行联合国人权理事会规定的义务;政府须精心安排改革,为重建公众信心而加快相关方面的进展,同时为以采取更深入坚实的步骤、提供支持和机构职能所需的资源,并特别是要在极为重要的特别法庭上推动对战争罪的起诉。重要的是,总统和总理之间要建立更好的沟通和合作,实现决策的更透明化,以及权力界定的更清晰化。

为了重塑在北部和东部的泰米尔社区之信心,政府须迅速释放犯人、归还军事占用地、切实追踪失踪者下落、调查并终结虐待行为、并废除“防止恐怖主义法”(PTA)。如要使此类和其他改革具可持续性,总统和总理须掌控军队和国家安全机构,这包括制定可信的安全部门改革计划。如果西里塞纳和主要部长们决心通过推行宪法改革而长久地解决种族冲突,那他们便必须加大对权力下放的公共力度。

不再有罪不罚和恢复法治是受全国瞩目的议题,而在僧伽罗南部,善政和反腐公民运动的普及亦反映出了这一点。为了与所有族群和地区产生更广泛的共鸣,作为法治和善政议程的组成部分,政府和公民社会应就解决战争遗留问题而提出措施。政府如要起诉拉贾帕克萨政府统治下的重要腐败和政治杀戮案件,那其则需要通过持续的公关活动来谋求支持,公关上,政府应阐明国家改革后的广泛前景、并宣传各倡议间的联系以及他们为所有社区带来的好处。

长期运作不良的政治体制已卷土重来,政府将自己与拉贾帕克萨时代区分开来的能力本对其政治生存至关重要,但这种能力却已开始消褪。若要令所有社区的民族主义者和宗教沙文主义者的力量不再壮大,并重新点燃民众对西里塞纳所宣扬的民主改革的信念,那政府便必须协力启动已岌岌可危的改革进程。

科伦坡/布鲁塞尔,2016年5月18日

Op-Ed / United States

Why Trump Should Take It Slow With Kim Jong Un

Originally published in Politico Magazine

Any successful deal with North Korea will require an extraordinary amount of patience and attention to detail.

After three months of palace intrigue, speculation and on-again-off-again pronouncements, the Singapore summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un is finally upon us. The core question is whether this historic meeting between two idiosyncratic leaders who were just months ago exchanging taunts like “Little Rocket Man” and “dotard,” and one-upping each other’s threats of nuclear annihilation, can help find a path toward denuclearization and stability for the Korean Peninsula.

We both worked in the Obama White House but this is not a partisan matter and we are rooting wholeheartedly for this administration’s success. Nobody will benefit if the leaders walk away from the summit disappointed and frustrated, and there’s certainly some risk of that. If the parties try to accomplish too much in Singapore, or if they fail to identify a realistic game plan for the period that follows, then they could return to the escalating standoff that characterized their relations throughout 2017. But toxic frustration is not the only alternative. As a senior U.S. diplomat recently told us, if the complete failure to reach agreement is on one end of the spectrum of possibilities, and a “bad deal” for the United States is on the other, there is plenty of space for a positive result in the middle.

We agree. In a report authored for International Crisis Group, we try to steer the parties toward a so-called “deep freeze” that each party might be able to claim as its own version of that middle ground.

First, during the summit, the two leaders should agree on a short declaration of principles that sets forth each party’s strategic priorities, putting off talk for now of a full-blown treaty — something impossible to do responsibly in the given time. In Washington’s case, the priority would no doubt be a commitment to denuclearization. Pyongyang, which above all else wants a redefined political and security relationship with Washington, might ask the United States to affirm that it harbors no “hostile intent” toward North Korea. The parties could commit to sustain the testing pause already in place and other confidence-building measures — perhaps a ratcheting back of some aspects of joint U.S-South Korean military exercises. And the leaders could commit to meet again.

It took Pyongyang 70 years to acquire a nuclear capability that it regards as fundamental to its security, and there are limits to how far and how fast it will go down a new path.

But while this would set a helpful frame for future talks, Washington and Pyongyang have generated similar documents in the past, and North Korea’s nuclear program has advanced anyway. So beyond the declaration, the parties need to come up with a plan for what needs to happen after the summit so that the odds for success are better this time around. Here again, the plan needs to be informed by a healthy dose of realism. It took Pyongyang 70 years to acquire a nuclear capability that it regards as fundamental to its security, and there are limits to how far and how fast it will go down a new path. The strategic implications are too great, the bilateral trust deficit is too deep, and the North Korean nuclear program is too big and advanced to follow the path that Libya took in 2003 and 2004, when it dismantled its nuclear infrastructure in short order and shipped much of it to Oak Ridge, Tennessee. That is why we believe it may be useful to aim for a way station that would move the parties in the direction of denuclearization without getting them all the way there in one fell swoop.

Our road map to a “deep freeze” would bring the parties to a verifiable cap on the production of nuclear weapons, plutonium and enriched uranium, and long-range missiles—i.e., missiles capable of striking the U.S. and whatever other missiles the parties agree should be part of the arrangement. We don’t set a time frame but this could be done even within the current presidential term if the parties set their minds to it. The plan has four steps:

  • The first step, which could be done very quickly, would be to flesh out and formally commit to the elements of the current pause that Pyongyang has carried out unilaterally. For example, while North Korea has ceased all missile and nuclear testing, it is not clear whether it intends to refrain from all short- and medium-range missile launches, or from space launcher development. These matters should be clarified.
     
  • The second step, which will take months to negotiate and implement, would involve measures to broaden the scope of the pause and make it more resilient. North Korea would sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, thereby committing itself not to test nuclear weapons. And it would permit outside observers or remote monitoring equipment to be introduced at key sites in North Korea, both to begin answering questions about its baseline capabilities and to create some practical obstacles to the resumption of paused activities. (It’s harder to do the wrong thing if observers are on site.)
     
  • The third step, the most challenging of the plan, would involve expanding the monitoring regime to encompass the entirety of North Korea’s nuclear and long-range missile production capabilities, including the science and production base that support these capabilities. By the end of the third step, observers or monitors would be permitted wherever they need to be in order to form a comprehensive baseline of the North Korean nuclear and missile-related activities to be frozen. This step is more difficult than either of those preceding it because it would require North Korea to disclose the location of secret activities to the U.S., which theoretically could use that information for military purposes should relations revert to earlier form. North Korea will almost certainly insist on security guarantees before it permits this step.
     
  • The fourth step would be the establishment of a full production cap and freeze for nuclear weapons, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, long-range missiles and other programs and technology related to the capability to produce them. It might also include limits on the production and stockpiling of components required for nuclear and missile production, such as uranium mining, centrifuge production, and the manufacture of missile engines.
If Washington fails to balance its ambitions with a healthy dose of realism, it could come up empty handed.

In considering this plan, Washington would need to accept that North Korea is not going to move down this path unless it sees the United States taking corresponding measures. For this reason, while Washington has resisted an action-for-action framework for its engagement with Pyongyang, it is the only viable approach. As for what some of those measures might entail, on the political front, North Korea would like to see the United States enter into a peace agreement that ends the Korean War and afford it diplomatic recognition. On the security front, it might want to see the ratcheting back of U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises, a written renunciation of any first strike by one party against the other, and a commitment not to deploy nuclear-capable bombers and submarines in or around the Korean Peninsula. On the economic front, sanctions relief (especially in key economic sectors like seafood and textiles) will be important. While some measures may be relatively straightforward for the United States to take early on in the process, it may hold others for later in the game.

Our plan might be seen as too little by some who want immediate results. We too want rapid results, but we also caution against magical thinking. North Korea won’t be threatened into giving up its nuclear weapons, and if Washington fails to balance its ambitions with a healthy dose of realism, it could come up empty handed — and risk a relapse into the crisis mode that characterized 2017. That scary period seems like a long way away from this week’s circus atmosphere in Singapore, but the parties could be back there very quickly if talks fail. We hope prudence and patience guide them instead, and they see that moving down a calibrated path in the right direction is better than racing back to a stand-off on the edge of a very dangerous cliff.

Contributors

Program Director, United States
StephenPomper
Profile Image
Jon B. Wolfsthal
Non-resident Scholar at Carnegie