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Toward Compromise between Kosovo and Serbia
Toward Compromise between Kosovo and Serbia
Sri Lanka's President Maithripala Sirisena (front) stands for the national anthem during a ceremony to swear in Ranil Wickremesinghe, leader of the United National Party, as Sri Lanka's new prime minister, Colombo, 21 August 2015. REUTERS/Dinuka Liyanawat
Report 278 / Asia

斯里兰卡:启动改革进程

在内战结束七年后,斯里兰卡虽已再次开放民主空间,但局势却——由于反对势力强大、机关管辖分职不清、及经济疲软——日趋紧张。为了使改革真正成功,斯里兰卡的总理和总统应以开放的心态来展开合作、加倍努力解决战争遗留问题——诸如尚逍遥法外的罪犯、在押的泰米尔人、以及军占土地等。

执行摘要

特里帕拉·西里塞纳总统于2015年1月赢得大选,斯里兰卡虽意外得来达成持久和平与和解的机会,但其也因此将面临着更加动荡的前景。西里塞纳政府的初步措施停止并开始扭转马欣达·拉贾帕克萨当权时的独裁和家族统治。其改革议程雄心勃勃:恢复法治、停止纵任腐败和滥权的行为、颁布新宪法、建立与联合国人权理事会(UNHRC)意见一致的战后和解和司法机制、以政策大改来推动经济脱困。然而,改革进展却滞后于大批选民的预期,且因其缺乏连贯性和资源而后续乏力。“国民团结”政府虽扩大了政治中心、并孤立了强硬的民族主义者,但改革的窗口却已开始关闭。若要抓住斯里兰卡前所未有的改革机遇,政府应采取更大胆、更协调的政策,并通过公关活动来提振民众的支持。

步履维艰的进展令政府与其选民之间关系紧张化。北部和东部泰米尔选民几乎一边倒地支持了西里塞纳,但他们却越来越怀疑总统实现和解与正义之承诺的能力。许多僧伽罗“推行善政”的社会活动家则批评政府无能贯彻法治措施,且仍有裙带关系和腐败案件不断滋生;他们还批评政府对腐败和刑事案件的调查软弱无力。随着预算赤字增长、货币储备降低,紧缩政策在遭到抗议后已被搁浅或缩减。与此同时,西里塞纳的斯里兰卡自由党(SLFP)和总理拉尼尔·威克雷明盖的统一国民党(UNP)之间关系亦日趋紧张。而实施改革所需的一线政治曙光则正在消失。

制度因素还妨碍了进展:工作人员太少、专业技能——尤其在涉及和解与过渡司法问题之时——稀缺、权力中心分散且机构臃肿、部门分职重叠、以及总统和总理在治理的重点和方式上各行其是。政府为了得到通过新宪法所需的三分之二多数票,部分此前就滥权的官僚和政客被授予了内阁职位,而政府改革的速度也因此放缓。

西里塞纳斗志受制的另一因素是,他还要和自由党内忠于前总统拉贾帕克萨的派系斗争,这一点在即将到来的地方选举中尤为明显。出于僧伽罗民族主义者对西里塞纳相对温和的和解姿态以及宪法改革提议的不满、以及对会给予对手反击藉口或激怒军方和安全部队的担忧,政府做出了防御性的回应,即,其仅归还了一小部分的军占土地、并只释放了寥寥几名泰米尔囚犯。

自2009年5月内战结束已经七年,和解事宜和问责制度却尚未取得大进展。政府似乎正在放弃过渡期司法计划,特别是在对外国法官和专家职能的撤销。对那些情节严重——尤其是在战争最后几周所犯下的——罪行,政府虽对其置之不理,但对军方和大多数僧伽罗人而言,要他们承认或承担责任却非常困难。政府陷入了两难,其向联合国人权理事会承诺的机制令僧伽罗民族主义者备感疑虑,与此同时,政府安抚僧伽罗人和军方的举措又引起了泰米尔人对政府的怀疑——其是否愿意为战时暴行伸张正义,或是否真心支持宪法改革、并以此达成泰米尔人实现合法自治理想。

为稳固联盟并履行联合国人权理事会规定的义务;政府须精心安排改革,为重建公众信心而加快相关方面的进展,同时为以采取更深入坚实的步骤、提供支持和机构职能所需的资源,并特别是要在极为重要的特别法庭上推动对战争罪的起诉。重要的是,总统和总理之间要建立更好的沟通和合作,实现决策的更透明化,以及权力界定的更清晰化。

为了重塑在北部和东部的泰米尔社区之信心,政府须迅速释放犯人、归还军事占用地、切实追踪失踪者下落、调查并终结虐待行为、并废除“防止恐怖主义法”(PTA)。如要使此类和其他改革具可持续性,总统和总理须掌控军队和国家安全机构,这包括制定可信的安全部门改革计划。如果西里塞纳和主要部长们决心通过推行宪法改革而长久地解决种族冲突,那他们便必须加大对权力下放的公共力度。

不再有罪不罚和恢复法治是受全国瞩目的议题,而在僧伽罗南部,善政和反腐公民运动的普及亦反映出了这一点。为了与所有族群和地区产生更广泛的共鸣,作为法治和善政议程的组成部分,政府和公民社会应就解决战争遗留问题而提出措施。政府如要起诉拉贾帕克萨政府统治下的重要腐败和政治杀戮案件,那其则需要通过持续的公关活动来谋求支持,公关上,政府应阐明国家改革后的广泛前景、并宣传各倡议间的联系以及他们为所有社区带来的好处。

长期运作不良的政治体制已卷土重来,政府将自己与拉贾帕克萨时代区分开来的能力本对其政治生存至关重要,但这种能力却已开始消褪。若要令所有社区的民族主义者和宗教沙文主义者的力量不再壮大,并重新点燃民众对西里塞纳所宣扬的民主改革的信念,那政府便必须协力启动已岌岌可危的改革进程。

科伦坡/布鲁塞尔,2016年5月18日

President Donald Trump participates in a signing ceremony with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Kosovo Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti, 4 September 2020. WHITE HOUSE

Toward Compromise between Kosovo and Serbia

While Kosovo and Serbia have been at peace since 1999, the unresolved dispute over the former’s independence is a potential source of instability in the western Balkans. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2020 – Autumn Update, Crisis Group urges the EU and its member states to determine whether there is possibility to expressly focus on achieving a final agreement based on mutual recognition, help establish communication channels between the parties, and highlight that both Begrade and Pristina should address pervasive misinformation about the dispute, and communicate with their respective peoples in a more concerted way.

This commentary is part of our Watch List 2020 - Autumn Update.

The unresolved dispute between Kosovo and Serbia over the former’s independence is the greatest potential source of instability in the western Balkans and an impediment to the European integration of both. While Belgrade and Pristina have been at peace since 1999, and through EU-led mediation arrived at certain technical solutions that facilitate trade, border management and other shared challenges, the rift between them will persist until both sides arrive at a deal that addresses two key sets of issues. The first concerns Serbia’s non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence and Kosovo’s concomitant refusal to recognise Serbia. The second concerns who will govern Serb-majority communities in Kosovo. 

While the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia, already decades old, has no natural expiration date, there are new reasons to hope that the parties might be able to arrive at a shared vision for how to end it. Leaders in Belgrade and Pristina have in recent years begun publicly to explore the contours of a new potential deal. One path to compromise might involve recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty in exchange for important concessions such as the creation of highly autonomous districts for Serbs in northern Kosovo and Albanians in Preševo, Serbia. Another, albeit more contentious one, would see a redrawing of borders so that the governments swap jurisdiction over those two regions.

But the challenges and obstacles remain significant. Much of the public in both countries, driven by years of irresponsible political messaging, is committed to an uncompromising hard line and Serbia’s constitution requires recognition of Kosovo to be approved in a referendum. On top of that, the mediators are not on the same page. In recent talks, Washington, Brussels and European capitals pursued sharply differing negotiating strategies and agendas, generating confusion and little real progress.

To help put the parties on a path to resolution, the EU and its member states should:

  • Assess whether there is support for changing their common position so that it expressly focuses on achieving a final agreement based on mutual recognition (something that the five EU states that do not recognise Kosovo have resisted);
     
  • Empower mediators to encourage a solution broadly acceptable to as many citizens of Kosovo and Serbia as possible, without a prioriruling out any solution to which the parties agree, including territorial exchange, so long as it is compatible with human rights and international law;
     
  • Work with the United States to encourage the Kosovo government to develop a viable negotiating strategy, based on the understanding that recognition is possible but will require concessions;
     
  • Help establish communication channels between the parties, including confidential and unofficial ones, to enable them to safely explore various potential solutions without fear of immediate blowback or politicisation. One goal is to encourage Belgrade to quietly convey that it would be prepared to recognise Kosovo’s independence under the right circumstances – a step it cannot take publicly at this stage; and
     
  • Emphasise that Belgrade and Pristina should address pervasive misinformation about the dispute and prospects for resolution in both countries and communicate with their respective peoples in a more concerted way, advocating the need for realistic compromise.

A Long and Costly Impasse

The impasse over Kosovo’s independence is costly to both parties and to regional stability. Following Serbia’s lead, five EU member states, four NATO members and nearly half the world’s nations have denied it recognition (or, in some cases, withdrawn earlier recognition). As a result, Kosovo has been frozen out of the UN, NATO and the EU. The EU has made clear that resolution of the dispute with Kosovo is a necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition for Serbia’s membership. 

The inability of either country to improve its international status fuels resentment in both. As long as the impasse persists, both parties may be tempted to expand their influence on the ground where they still can. Belgrade could seek to reassert some of the control it ceded over the four Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo and over the border; in response, Pristina might attempt to forcibly integrate these areas, drive out Serbia’s remaining institutions on its territory, question the status and security of the medieval Serbian Orthodox monuments, or encourage separatism in Serbia’s Albanian-majority Preševo valley. In the long run, whatever measure of stability and security Kosovo’s Serbs and Serbia’s Albanians have is hostage to good relations between their respective capitals.

The main challenge is to find a compromise that rewards Serbia for extending recognition – a step it has put off in part because of the prevalent view among Serbs that Kosovo is an illegitimate breakaway – but is also acceptable to Kosovo. Because Serbia’s constitution requires that sovereign recognition of Kosovo be affirmed by referendum, any deal will have to command majority popular support. Pristina does not face the same kind of constitutional requirement, but its officials also might decide to put the agreement to a vote in order to ensure it legitimacy, likewise constraining their manoeuvring room. The internationally brokered plan that led to Kosovo’s independence in 2008 sought to balance benefits and concessions between both sides. Kosovo got independence, albeit with an initial period of international supervision, but had to decentralise its administration and give its Serb-majority municipalities additional rights, including receiving funding from Serbia. That leaves mediators with a difficult puzzle: to come up with a compromise that differs from that plan, which Serbia rejected, and yet strikes a deal in which everyone both gains and loses something in rough proportion. 

Threading this needle will be no small task, but there are cautious grounds for hope. Some political leaders in both capitals want a deal and show signs of willingness to compromise. Serbia has one big concession to make: to recognise its former province as an independent equal. Kosovo arguably could match this move with one of two concessions. The first would be to offer its Serbian minority much broader autonomy; in that event, Belgrade should likewise offer similar arrangements to communities in Preševo that house major Albanian populations. The other would be for the two states to exchange territory along their border, swapping Preševo for the northern Kosovo municipalities.

Some European capitals believe that redrawing borders could create a destabilising precedent that would reverberate elsewhere in the Balkans and possibly beyond.

Between these options, autonomy is both the better alternative and the preferred choice of many European governments. There are several successful European models of significant local autonomy for areas in which the central government’s hand is scarcely felt – for example, Finland’s Åland Islands, Italy’s Trentino-Alto Adige and Spain’s Basque Country. By contrast, some European capitals – most prominently Berlin – believe that redrawing borders could create a destabilising precedent that would reverberate elsewhere in the Balkans and possibly beyond. 

The parties do not necessarily share this perspective, however. Although there are critics of autonomy and land swaps in both Kosovo and Serbia, autonomy appears to provoke the strongest negative reactions on both sides. Crisis Group’s reporting suggests that these come largely from Kosovo leaders, who view it as a prelude to secession or a recipe for the kind of gridlock that plagues nearby Bosnia and Herzegovina, where most decisions require leaders of both entities and all three main ethnic groups to agree. Absent a change of heart, this could make land swaps, which historically Serbian leaders have also seemed to prefer, the only viable route to resolution. If that is the case, European officials will face the decision whether to stand in the way of such a deal, which some have hinted they have previously done. (This is certainly plausible since, as gatekeepers to EU membership, member states have considerable leverage over aspirants such as Belgrade and Pristina.)

The EU Role

The EU can help the parties reach agreement in five ways. 

First and most important, EU member states should review their common position with respect to the objectives of the Belgrade-Pristina negotiation. To date, the EU has been hindered from expressly stating that recognition is a goal by its five member states that do not recognise Kosovo’s independence. Although their positions are informed by domestic politics and unlikely to change, it is nevertheless worth exploring. As the member state that has most actively sought to unlock the impasse, Germany could probe whether the non-recognisers would be willing to soften their stance in order to facilitate negotiations. Further, even while they may express a preference for a different outcome, the EU and its member states should lift any refusal to countenance a deal incorporating a border change so long as it is consistent with human rights and international law, and should make clear they will not impede the EU accession process on this account. 

Secondly, the EU and its member states should convey that they read the EU special representative’s mandate to allow for discussion of all potential solutions to the dispute that comport with human rights and international law. On its face, the mandate requires the special representative to seek “a legally binding agreement that addresses all outstanding issues” and to work toward a deal that encourages “regional stability” – language that is read by some to preclude discussion of land swaps. That reading, however, would seem to dismiss the possibility that mutual agreement on land swaps could lead to greater stability by resolving the main outstanding dispute in the region, laying a foundation for good relations between Belgrade and Pristina, and removing an obstacle to integrating both Kosovo and Serbia into international organisations and institutions like the EU that put a premium on human rights protections for minority populations.

The EU can work with the U.S. to help Pristina consolidate a viable approach to talks.

Thirdly, the EU can work with the U.S. to help Pristina consolidate a viable approach to talks. Little can be done as long as Kosovo’s delegation cannot speak for a reasonably united government. But right now that is a struggle: its president is facing likely indictment for war crimes and his party is in disarray; the country’s largest and most popular party is in opposition; and the governing coalition itself is divided on how to approach dialogue with Serbia. For many reasons, including the role the U.S. played in the 1999 conflict and in the 2008 declaration of independence, Pristina’s elite trusts Washington more than it does any European actor, and the U.S. will likely need to play a leading role in helping Pristina clarify its negotiating platform. The EU should support this.

Fourthly, talks require a variety of safe forums, including some far from the public eye, in which leaders can explore options without fear of being accused of betraying the national interest. The rhythm of working groups and summit meetings hosted in Brussels should be supplemented by other opportunities for the parties to speak candidly in the company of trusted interlocutors. The delicacy of the main issue of recognition, as well as whatever Pristina might need to offer in return, makes this a necessity. The EU can offer diplomatic channels for parallel track discussions as can its member states and friendly nations such as Norway and Switzerland.

The search for a final agreement is hampered by pervasive misinformation in the western Balkan public sphere.

Finally, the search for a final agreement is hampered by pervasive misinformation in the western Balkan public sphere, for which Belgrade and Pristina are largely to blame. For many years, both have encouraged their peoples to believe that strategic victory was possible without meaningful compromise, and that certain lines would never be crossed. But crossing those lines is the only realistic way to reach an agreement. Having repeatedly been told they can get something for nothing, Serbs and Kosovars are understandably reluctant to support compromises that are at least symbolically painful. They are also in no position to make an informed choice between the status quo and its alternatives. European and other actors have perhaps unwittingly contributed to this situation, by implying an ability to deliver a win for either party by exerting irresistible pressure on its counterpart, or by offering it inducements. The special representative should start making clear that European pressure will not resolve the dispute, and that the only way to a political settlement is through compromise between the parties.