Sri Lanka's President Maithripala Sirisena (front) stands for the national anthem during a ceremony to swear in Ranil Wickremesinghe, leader of the United National Party, as Sri Lanka's new prime minister, Colombo, 21 August 2015. REUTERS/Dinuka Liyanawat
Sri Lanka's President Maithripala Sirisena (front) stands for the national anthem during a ceremony to swear in Ranil Wickremesinghe, leader of the United National Party, as Sri Lanka's new prime minister, Colombo, 21 August 2015. REUTERS/Dinuka Liyanawat
Report / Asia 7 minutes

斯里兰卡:启动改革进程

在内战结束七年后,斯里兰卡虽已再次开放民主空间,但局势却——由于反对势力强大、机关管辖分职不清、及经济疲软——日趋紧张。为了使改革真正成功,斯里兰卡的总理和总统应以开放的心态来展开合作、加倍努力解决战争遗留问题——诸如尚逍遥法外的罪犯、在押的泰米尔人、以及军占土地等。

执行摘要

特里帕拉·西里塞纳总统于2015年1月赢得大选,斯里兰卡虽意外得来达成持久和平与和解的机会,但其也因此将面临着更加动荡的前景。西里塞纳政府的初步措施停止并开始扭转马欣达·拉贾帕克萨当权时的独裁和家族统治。其改革议程雄心勃勃:恢复法治、停止纵任腐败和滥权的行为、颁布新宪法、建立与联合国人权理事会(UNHRC)意见一致的战后和解和司法机制、以政策大改来推动经济脱困。然而,改革进展却滞后于大批选民的预期,且因其缺乏连贯性和资源而后续乏力。“国民团结”政府虽扩大了政治中心、并孤立了强硬的民族主义者,但改革的窗口却已开始关闭。若要抓住斯里兰卡前所未有的改革机遇,政府应采取更大胆、更协调的政策,并通过公关活动来提振民众的支持。

步履维艰的进展令政府与其选民之间关系紧张化。北部和东部泰米尔选民几乎一边倒地支持了西里塞纳,但他们却越来越怀疑总统实现和解与正义之承诺的能力。许多僧伽罗“推行善政”的社会活动家则批评政府无能贯彻法治措施,且仍有裙带关系和腐败案件不断滋生;他们还批评政府对腐败和刑事案件的调查软弱无力。随着预算赤字增长、货币储备降低,紧缩政策在遭到抗议后已被搁浅或缩减。与此同时,西里塞纳的斯里兰卡自由党(SLFP)和总理拉尼尔·威克雷明盖的统一国民党(UNP)之间关系亦日趋紧张。而实施改革所需的一线政治曙光则正在消失。

制度因素还妨碍了进展:工作人员太少、专业技能——尤其在涉及和解与过渡司法问题之时——稀缺、权力中心分散且机构臃肿、部门分职重叠、以及总统和总理在治理的重点和方式上各行其是。政府为了得到通过新宪法所需的三分之二多数票,部分此前就滥权的官僚和政客被授予了内阁职位,而政府改革的速度也因此放缓。

西里塞纳斗志受制的另一因素是,他还要和自由党内忠于前总统拉贾帕克萨的派系斗争,这一点在即将到来的地方选举中尤为明显。出于僧伽罗民族主义者对西里塞纳相对温和的和解姿态以及宪法改革提议的不满、以及对会给予对手反击藉口或激怒军方和安全部队的担忧,政府做出了防御性的回应,即,其仅归还了一小部分的军占土地、并只释放了寥寥几名泰米尔囚犯。

自2009年5月内战结束已经七年,和解事宜和问责制度却尚未取得大进展。政府似乎正在放弃过渡期司法计划,特别是在对外国法官和专家职能的撤销。对那些情节严重——尤其是在战争最后几周所犯下的——罪行,政府虽对其置之不理,但对军方和大多数僧伽罗人而言,要他们承认或承担责任却非常困难。政府陷入了两难,其向联合国人权理事会承诺的机制令僧伽罗民族主义者备感疑虑,与此同时,政府安抚僧伽罗人和军方的举措又引起了泰米尔人对政府的怀疑——其是否愿意为战时暴行伸张正义,或是否真心支持宪法改革、并以此达成泰米尔人实现合法自治理想。

为稳固联盟并履行联合国人权理事会规定的义务;政府须精心安排改革,为重建公众信心而加快相关方面的进展,同时为以采取更深入坚实的步骤、提供支持和机构职能所需的资源,并特别是要在极为重要的特别法庭上推动对战争罪的起诉。重要的是,总统和总理之间要建立更好的沟通和合作,实现决策的更透明化,以及权力界定的更清晰化。

为了重塑在北部和东部的泰米尔社区之信心,政府须迅速释放犯人、归还军事占用地、切实追踪失踪者下落、调查并终结虐待行为、并废除“防止恐怖主义法”(PTA)。如要使此类和其他改革具可持续性,总统和总理须掌控军队和国家安全机构,这包括制定可信的安全部门改革计划。如果西里塞纳和主要部长们决心通过推行宪法改革而长久地解决种族冲突,那他们便必须加大对权力下放的公共力度。

不再有罪不罚和恢复法治是受全国瞩目的议题,而在僧伽罗南部,善政和反腐公民运动的普及亦反映出了这一点。为了与所有族群和地区产生更广泛的共鸣,作为法治和善政议程的组成部分,政府和公民社会应就解决战争遗留问题而提出措施。政府如要起诉拉贾帕克萨政府统治下的重要腐败和政治杀戮案件,那其则需要通过持续的公关活动来谋求支持,公关上,政府应阐明国家改革后的广泛前景、并宣传各倡议间的联系以及他们为所有社区带来的好处。

长期运作不良的政治体制已卷土重来,政府将自己与拉贾帕克萨时代区分开来的能力本对其政治生存至关重要,但这种能力却已开始消褪。若要令所有社区的民族主义者和宗教沙文主义者的力量不再壮大,并重新点燃民众对西里塞纳所宣扬的民主改革的信念,那政府便必须协力启动已岌岌可危的改革进程。

科伦坡/布鲁塞尔,2016年5月18日

Executive Summary

The unexpected chance for lasting peace and reconciliation in Sri Lanka that followed President Maithripala Sirisena’s January 2015 election faces increasing turbulence. Initial moves by Sirisena’s government halted and began to reverse the slide into authoritarianism and family rule under Mahinda Rajapaksa. Its reform agenda is ambitious: restoring the rule-of-law and ending impunity for corruption and abuse of power; a new constitution; a complex package of post-war reconciliation and justice mechanisms agreed with the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC); and major policy changes to jump-start a beleaguered economy. Progress, however, has been slower than key constituencies expected and lacks the coherence and resources needed to sustain it. The “national unity” government expanded the political centre and isolated hard-line nationalists, but the window for change has begun to close. Seizing Sri Lanka’s unprecedented opportunity for reform requires bolder and better coordinated policies, backed by a public relations campaign to restore sagging popular support.

The stuttering progress strains ties between the government and the constituencies that brought it to power. Tamils in the north and east voted overwhelmingly for Sirisena but are increasingly doubtful he will fulfil his reconciliation and justice promises. Many Sinhala “good governance” activists criticise the failure to follow through on rule-of-law measures, continued cases of alleged nepotism and corruption and what they consider the lethargic pursuit of corruption and criminal investigations. As the budget deficit grows and currency reserves dwindle, belt-tightening has been blocked or scaled back due to protests. At the same time, strains are growing between Sirisena’s Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. The small window for threading the political needles essential for reforms is shrinking. 

Institutional factors hamper progress: too few staff and too little expertise, particularly on reconciliation and transitional justice issues, multiple power centres and unwieldy, often overlapping ministries, and the different priorities and governance styles of president and prime minister. Governance reforms are slowed by need to work through bureaucrats and politicians implicated in past abuses, some of whom were given cabinet posts to help the government achieve the two-thirds parliamentary majority needed to approve a new constitution.

Boldness is limited by Sirisena’s struggle to counter the faction loyal to ex-President Rajapaksa within his SLFP, especially in upcoming local elections. Reacting defensively to Sinhala nationalists’ attacks against Sirisena’s relatively modest reconciliation gestures and proposed constitutional reform and scared of giving opponents ammunition or angering the military and security services, the government has returned only a small portion of military-occupied land and released few Tamil detainees. 

Seven years after the end of the civil war in May 2009, issues of reconciliation and accountability remain largely unaddressed. The government appears to be backtracking on transitional justice plans, particularly the role of foreign judges and experts. The enormity of the crimes, especially in the final weeks of the war, makes them impossible to ignore but hard for the military and most Sinhalese to acknowledge or accept responsibility for. Mechanisms promised to the UNHRC feed Sinhala nationalist suspicions, while attempts to reassure Sinhalese and the military encourage doubts among Tamils about government willingness to pursue justice for wartime atrocities or back constitutional changes that satisfy legitimate Tamil aspirations for meaningful autonomy. 

To hold its coalition together and meet UNHRC obligations, the government must sequence reforms carefully, speeding progress on some fronts to rebuild public confidence, while committing resources to build support and institutional capacity for deeper and harder steps, particularly making progress on the critically important special court for prosecuting war crimes. Better communication and cooperation between president and prime minister, more transparent policymaking and clearer lines of authority are essential.

To rebuild confidence among Tamil communities in the north and east, the government must quickly release detainees and military-occupied land, begin credible inquiries into the fate of the disappeared, investigate and end abuses and repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). For these and other reforms to be sustainable, the president and prime minister will have to assert authority over the military and national security apparatus, including by developing a credible security sector reform plan. If they are serious about constitutional changes that will contribute to a lasting solution to the ethnic conflict, Sirisena and key ministers must make a much stronger public case for greater devolution of power.

Ending impunity and restoring rule-of-law are concern to the whole country, as seen in the popularity of good governance and anti-corruption citizen movements in the Sinhala south. To resonate more broadly with all ethnic groups and regions, measures for addressing the war’s legacy should be presented by the government and civil society as an integral part of the rule-of-law and good governance agenda. Moves to prosecute key cases of corruption and political killing under the Rajapaksa regime need to be backed by a sustained public relations campaign that articulates a broad vision of a reformed state, the links between the various initiatives and the benefits they bring all communities. 

As longstanding dysfunctional political dynamics reassert themselves, the government’s ability to distinguish itself from the Rajapaksa era, which is essential to its political survival, has begun to fade. If ethnic and religious chauvinists in all communities are not to grow stronger and belief in democratic reform that Sirisena’s election reflected and encouraged is to be rekindled, the government must make a concerted push to jump-start the flagging reform process.

Recommendations

To strengthen rule-of-law and democratic governance 

To the government of Sri Lanka: 

  1. Ratify the UN Disappearances Convention and pass enabling legislation criminalising disappearances; terminate the Paranagama commission on missing persons and transfer its investigation files to dedicated police investigation units. 
     
  2. Pass the pending Right to Information (RTI) Act and legislation to establish a well-resourced and empowered Audit Commission. 
     
  3. Repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and replace it, in consultation with lawyers and human rights defenders, with legislation in line with Sri Lanka’s international human rights obligations; and develop and publish guidelines for expediting cases against existing PTA detainees and releasing those against whom there is insufficient evidence to bring charges.
     
  4. Overhaul the Victims and Witness Protection Act, in consultation with human rights activists, to establish a well-resourced witness protection authority fully independent of police and security forces.
     
  5. End the longstanding conflict of interest in the Attorney General’s Department by establishing a permanent, independent special prosecutor for serious human rights cases in which state officials are alleged perpetrators. 
     
  6. Establish a clear focal point in the Attorney General’s Department, staffed by state counsels vetted for conflict of interest or involvement in past cover-ups, to oversee and prosecute emblematic cases of political killings and abduction currently under investigation.

To promote reconciliation, reestablish effective civil administration in the north and east and begin security sector reform

To the government of Sri Lanka: 

  1. Take immediate steps to end remaining military involvement in civil administration; remove the military from all shops, farms, hotels and other commercial businesses; and immediately suspend construction or expansion of military camps in the north and east.
     
  2. Establish, in consultation with communities and the military, transparent principles, processes and timetables for the return of military-occupied land or payment of compensation for land that is not to be returned. 
     
  3. End intimidating monitoring of civil society activists and ex-detainees by security services and appoint an independent, multi-ethnic, well-resourced internal affairs unit to investigate credible allegations of arbitrary detentions, abductions and torture in custody.
     
  4. Begin developing a longer-term plan for comprehensive security sector reform that includes job training for demobilised personnel; and devise and implement in the short term policies for handling individuals credibly alleged to be responsible for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.  

To support constitutional reform needed for lasting political stability

To the government of Sri Lanka:

  1. Launch a public outreach campaign, led by the president and prime minster, in support of expanded devolution of power to provinces.
     
  2. Support a mixed electoral system that maintains proportionality and the influence of smaller, regionally-dispersed parties through use of double-ballots.

To address the complex demands of transitional justice processes

To the government of Sri Lanka: 

  1. Reaffirm publicly the government’s commitment to full implementation of the 1 October 2015 UN Human Rights Council resolution and take initial steps to build capacity and public support for effective transitional justice, by:
     
    1. launching a coordinated public outreach campaign – involving the offices of the president and prime minister, the Reconciliation Secretariat (SCRM), National Unity Office (ONUR) and national dialogue ministry – to promote the value of transitional justice mechanisms and highlight links to broader rule-of-law measures, beginning with immediate distribution of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL) report in all three languages once Tamil and Sinhala translations are available;
       
    2. giving the public consultation process adequate resources and endorsement and presenting draft legislative proposals to it for popular input, with a transparent timeframe for final submission to the parliament; 
       
    3. publishing draft legislation for the Missing Persons Office and inviting active input from families of the missing and disappeared and other stakeholders;
       
    4. establishing a timeline for training judges, lawyers and investigators for participation in the special war crimes court and for passing legislation establishing command responsibility as a mode of criminal liability and incorporating war crimes and crimes against humanity into national law; and
       
    5. requesting the OHCHR to recommend international prosecutors and judges for participation in the special court as committed to in the resolution. 

Colombo/Brussels, 18 May 2016

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