Report / Asia 3 minutes

马来西亚即将举行大选:超越种族至上主义?

执行摘要

马来西亚总理纳吉布•拉扎克必须在2013年4月召集马来西亚第十三次大选,此次大选可能成为影响社群关系的分水岭。这一次大选比以往任何一次都更有可能给反对党提供一次机会,即便只是微乎其微的机会。倡导公开透明、经济平等和社会公正的反对党将会有机会击败世界上连任最久的政治联盟——国民阵线(National Front/Barisan Nasional)。国民阵线的民众基础是建立在马来西亚的马来人、华人及印度人团体之间的社会契约上的。这项契约给予马来人优先地位,以换取安全和经济增长。随着日益壮大的中产阶级开始对领导层提出更多要求,这项契约愈显过时。执政党和反对党两方都在引用“阿拉伯之春”发出警告——前者警告如果不能再次获选连任的话将会出现混乱局面,后者则警告除非加紧进行政治变革否则将会引发动乱局势。

 社会的变化和人口结构的变化,加之反对党的领导有方以及一场有广泛民众基础的选举改革运动的兴起,很有可能使此次大选成为一次至少是势均力敌的竞争。执政党联盟由占主导地位的马来民族统一机构(United Malays Nationalist Organisation,UMNO)、马来西亚华人公会(Malaysian Chinese Association,MCA)、马来西亚印度人国大党(Malaysian Indian Congress,MIC)以及其他几个小政党组成,与执政党联盟抗衡的是人民联盟(People’s Alliance /Pakatan Rakyat),成员党包括由前副总理安瓦尔夫人旺·阿兹莎领导的人民公正党(People's Justice Party/Party Keadilan Rakyat,PKR)、民主行动党(The Democratic
Action Party,DAP)和泛马伊斯兰教党(Parti Islam Malaysia/Partai Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS)。与以往相比,此次最摇摆不定的选民可能会是中间立场的马来人:城市里的上班族、学生和“网民”——即网络用户。这些人一直以来都从受宪法保护的马来人的优先地位中获益,但同时他们又厌倦了任人唯亲和腐败,对于公民自由受严格控制深感不满。

局势对反对党不利有多种原因,其中重要的一点是目前的选举体制。这个体制是建立在受到质疑的投票卷以及可以为了政党利益而改划的、实行单一代表制的选区的基础上的,每个选区的竞选者只需相对多数(即得票最多)即可当选。2007年,对于一个更公平的竞选环境的要求使得人们开始了一场广泛的公民社会运动,自由与公平选举联盟(the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections)(简称净选盟,Bersih)举行的四次大规模街头集会都吸引了数万参与者,分别是在2007年11月,2011年7月,2012年4月和8月。前三次集会都遭警方驱散,上百人被捕。在第3次集会时,一些参与者的暴力行为遭到警方的激烈反击,还出现了对暴行的指控。前总理马哈蒂尔·穆罕默德虽然已经退休,但目前任UMNO中极端保守派的领袖,他警告马来西亚人民如果反对党在大选中失利,将引发更多的街头暴力行为。

重大的问题包括有经济、腐败和政治改革。与民众生活息息相关的民生话题对选民而言是最重要的,国民阵线所拥有的大量资源使之能够在选举之前的这段时间向具有战略意义的选区提供经济利益。反对党则从UMNO高层官员卷入的腐败丑闻的事件中获得了先机,尽管UMNO通过法律挑战和诽谤诉讼对腐败指控进行回击。双方都把政治改革视作好办法。总理纳吉布放宽或是修订了一些严苛的法规——其中最引人注目的是殖民地时期的国内安全法案(Internal Security Act,ISA)——前总理马哈蒂尔在其执政的22年中曾使用这些法规来约束异见。但是反对党仍谴责纳吉布此举力度太轻、实施的太晚。

有两大问题并未出现在这两个联盟的官方议程之上,但却在很多方面主导着议程。一大问题是马来人在公共生活几乎所有的领域中享有优先地位,放开政治空间和促进社会公平是否会使这种优先权消失。UMNO中的极端保守派决心不惜一切代价保护马来人的这种特权。另一大问题是伊斯兰法和宗教宽容。在马哈蒂尔时代,马来西亚实施了一项把政府和官僚机构伊斯兰化的计划,这项计划以他在2001年时宣布成立一个伊斯兰国家而告终。以前的PAS以推行强硬的伊斯兰议程著称,而现在的PAS由一群实用主义者所领导,为了击败国民阵线,他们愿意搁置——至少是暂时搁置有争议的问题,例如伊斯兰刑事司法问题等。但是,执政党和反对党都预测如果对方当选将降低对非马来人群体的容忍度——双方都尝试通过这种预测来恐吓非马来人团体,尤其是华人团体。在反对党联盟内部,PAS和华人为主的DAP之间的关系仍然很脆弱。

执政党和反对党双方都紧张地计算着能够赢得席位的策略,针对相关的群体调整他们传递的选举信息。东部的两个州沙巴州和沙捞越州可能会左右选举结果,因为这两个州控制着25%的候选席位。

最终,马来西亚人民在选举当天必须要回答的问题是:这两个党派哪一个能够更好地适应政治变革,与此同时能在强硬力量面前保护少数民族,从而带来更多的政治开放。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2012年10月1日

Executive Summary

Malaysia’s thirteenth general election, which Prime Minister Najib Razak will have to call by April 2013, could be a watershed in communal relations. More than ever before, there is a chance, albeit a very small one, that opposition parties running on issues of transparency, economic equity and social justice could defeat the world’s longest continually-elected political coalition, the National Front (Barisan Nasional), that has based its support on a social compact among the country’s Malay, Chinese and Indian communities. That compact, granting Malays preferential status in exchange for security and economic growth, has grown increasingly stale as the growing middle class demands more of its leaders. Both ruling party and opposition are using images of the Arab Spring – the former to warn of chaos if it is not returned to power, the latter to warn of popular unrest unless political change comes faster.

Social and demographic change, coupled with effective opposition leadership and the rise of a broad-based movement for electoral reform, are likely to make this election at the very least a close contest. The ruling coalition, composed of the dominant United Malays Nationalist Organisation (UMNO); the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA); and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), as well as several smaller parties, faces the Peoples Alliance (Pakatan Rakyat), composed of the Peoples Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Rakyat, PKR), led by former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim; the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Partai Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS). More than ever before, the swing vote may be the Malay middle ground: urban professionals, students and “netizens” – internet users – who have benefited from constitutionally-protected preferential status for Malays but who are tired of cronyism and corruption and are chafing under the tight controls on civil liberties.

The deck is stacked against the opposition for many reasons, not least because of an electoral system based on questionable voting rolls and carefully gerrymandered, single-representative constituencies where victory requires only a plurality (first past the post). Demands for a more level playing field gave rise in 2007 to a broad-based civil society movement, the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections, known as Bersih (Clean), that has held four mass street rallies drawing tens of thousands of participants: in November 2007; July 2011; April 2012 and August 2012. The first three were broken up by police with hundreds of arrests. In the third, violence on the part of a few participants led to harsh police counter-actions and allegations of brutality. Former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, now retired but leading UMNO’s ultra-conservatives from the sidelines, has been warning Malaysians to expect more violence in the streets if the opposition loses.

The big issues are the economy, corruption and political reform. Bread-and-butter topics matter most to the electorate, and Barisan’s vast resources enable it to dole out economic favours to strategic constituencies in the lead-up to the election. The opposition is getting plenty of mileage out of corruption scandals involving top UMNO officials, although UMNO is fighting back with legal challenges and defamation suits. Political reform is seen by both sides as a political winner. Prime Minister Najib has rolled back or reworked some of the draconian legislation – most notably the colonial-era Internal Security Act (ISA) – that Mahathir used to curb dissent during his 22 years in power, but the opposition denounces it as too little, too late.

Two huge issues are largely off the official agendas of both coalitions but dominate them in many ways. One is the preferred treatment for Malays in virtually all spheres of public life and whether opening political space and promoting social justice would diminish that status. The ultra-conservatives within UMNO are determined to protect Malay rights at all costs. The other is the question of Islamic law and religious tolerance. Under Mahathir, Malaysia embarked on a program of Islamisation of the government and bureaucracy, culminating in his declaration of an Islamic state in 2001. PAS, once known for a hardline Islamist agenda, is now led by pragmatists who are willing to put contentious issues like Islamic criminal justice on hold, at least temporarily, in the interests of trying to defeat Barisan. But neither side is above trying to scare non-Malay communities, particularly the Chinese, by predicting greater intolerance if the other wins. Within the opposition coalition, relations between PAS and the Chinese-dominated DAP remain fragile.

Both sides are furiously making calculations about tactics to win seats, tailoring their message to the communities concerned. The two eastern states of Sabah and Sarawak could be kingmakers, because they control 25 per cent of the available seats.

Ultimately the question Malaysians will have to answer on election day is which of the two choices will be better able to accommodate political change, while protecting minorities against the hardline forces that more openness can produce.

Jakarta/Brussels, 1 October 2012

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