Fighting While Female, How Gender Dynamics Are Shaping the War in Ukraine
Fighting While Female, How Gender Dynamics Are Shaping the War in Ukraine
Report 235 / Europe & Central Asia

东乌克兰:危险的冬天

执行摘要及建议

乌克兰的冬天给一场本已动荡的冲突带来了更多的不确定性。愈发引人担忧的是,在乌克兰东南部由分裂分子控制的顿涅斯克和卢甘思科地区很有可能发生人道危机。分裂分子政权只有简单初级的行政架构,有能力的行政人员寥寥无几,民兵缺乏训练,长期战略几乎没有。除非俄罗斯在经济、人道和军事上大力提供援助,否则他们很难捱过这个冬天。与此同时,乌克兰在实施改革以解决多重经济问题上行动缓慢。基辅和分裂分子都受到来自战争说客的压力。爆发更多冲突的短期风险很高。目前急需要做的是停止冲突,隔离双方的军队,在战区和俄乌边境各处大幅度增派国际观察员,以及立即采取措施援助双方的平民。

显然,分裂分子知道自身的弱点,在安全方面,他们的民兵是缺乏配合、领导无方的混乱的杂牌军,在政治方面,由于不能给民众提供基本服务,他们政权的根基可能遭严重动摇。他们也承认,俄罗斯的态度是模棱两可的:莫斯科会为了防止严重的军事或人道主义灾难而出手干预,但并不打算承认分裂主义政府或大规模提供发展或重建的援助。分裂分子们还说,为了控制乌克兰,俄罗斯在下一盘长棋,但他们自身正努力熬过未来的六个月。

冲突可能会以多种形式重新爆发。一旦乌克兰发起进攻,俄罗斯几乎肯定会采取军事反击。2014年8月事态的发展就是先例,此前乌军本来所向披靡,却在顿涅斯克市附近的伊拉瓦易斯科遭到俄军重挫,攻势嘎然而止。从那时起,各方占领的地盘一直保持到现在。9月份达成的停火协议基本上无人遵守。分裂分子领导层内的一个强大集团认为,生存的必要条件是占领更多土地。他们想要重新发动进攻的意图昭然若揭,并相信会由此卷入俄罗斯。分裂分子们把在莫斯科的鼓励和煽动下发生在东南部其它自治省的夺权事件称为“俄罗斯之春”,并希望“俄罗斯之春”再次上演。此外,如果今冬的天气条件切断克里米亚的海上补给线,莫斯科也许会出手开辟一条从俄罗斯边境穿过乌克兰领土的陆地线路。毫无疑问,俄方任意形式的主动出击都会被欧盟、美国和其他支持乌克兰的国家视为严重升级,并引发进一步制裁。

在伊拉瓦易斯科之战后,欧盟和美国的制裁也许真的对俄罗斯起到了威慑作用,使其没有沿黑海沿岸继续深入,而且从当时来看,制裁似乎也使分裂分子不敢突破既有前线大幅挺进。制裁还加重了俄罗斯经济下滑的痛苦。莫斯科本以为欧盟各国在布鲁塞尔达成的共识会很快瓦解,因此对欧盟在制裁问题上的强硬立场大感意外。不过,几乎没有迹象表明美国或欧盟设想过,当最终需要使冲突逐步降级时,到底应该怎么做。俄罗斯也做着类似的走一步看一步的打算。俄方低估了吞并克里米亚和干预东乌克兰事务带来的后果。莫斯科保护东乌分裂主义组织不受乌克兰袭击,但似乎除此之外,不愿有更多举动。

各方需要以交流来取代这种走一步看一步的做法。这将帮助化解紧张关系,也许能为主要交战方进行磋商奠定基础,还能使各方在即将到来的冬天着力于人道主义救援。在交流中,俄罗斯可以明确表示无意承认分裂主义政权,也可以否认在基辅盛传的俄罗斯将在春天发动大规模攻势的说法。同样的,基辅也可以承诺在春天不发动军事进攻。它还可以公开地、明确地向乌克兰东部的人民说明战后在东乌克兰的政治构想,并明确保证,在西方的援助下,基辅将帮助重建该地区。这种各方都参与的方法不但可以帮助乌克兰捱过一个危险的冬天,还能让对未来的希望在春天出现。

本报告主要讨论乌克兰危机中一个不太为人所知的方面——分裂分子领导层的想法、能力、他们同莫斯科的关系以及他们对未来的看法。本报告并不对美国、欧盟和其他成员国对危机的政策进行总体分析。

Executive Summary

Winter in Ukraine is injecting further uncertainty into an already volatile conflict. Concerns are increasing about the strong risk of a humanitarian crisis in the south-eastern separatist-held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. The separatists have a rudimentary administrative structure, few competent administrators, ill-trained militias and little in the way of a long-term strategy. They will be hard pressed to survive the winter without major Russian aid – financial, humanitarian or military. Ukraine, meanwhile, is dragging its feet on implementing reforms to address its manifold economic problems. Both Kyiv and the separatists are under pressure from their war lobbies. The near-term risk of further hostilities is high. There is an urgent need to halt the conflict, separate the troops, deploy substantially larger numbers of international monitors across the warzone and the Russian-Ukrainian border, as well as take immediate steps to assist civilians on both sides.

The separatists are clearly aware of their vulnerability, both in terms of security – their militias are a bewildering array of uncoordinated and poorly led military units – and in political terms – their inability to provide basic services for the population could seriously undermine their support base. They also admit an ambiguous relationship with Russia. They say that Moscow will intervene to avert major military or humanitarian catastrophes, but has no plans to recognise the separatist entities or provide major development or reconstruction aid. And they say that while Russia is playing a long game for the control of Ukraine, they are trying to stay alive for the next six months.

Renewed hostilities could take a number of forms. A Ukrainian offensive would almost certainly trigger a Russian military response, as Russian forces showed when in August 2014 they inflicted a devastating defeat on Ukrainian troops in Ilovaisk, near Donetsk city, stopping their hitherto successful offensive. The geographical status quo has prevailed since then. A ceasefire brokered in September has been largely ignored. A powerful group within the separatist leadership feels that they will not survive without more land, and clearly wants to resume offensive operations, in the belief that this would also bring in the Russians. Separatists are hoping for another “Russian Spring” – their term for Moscow-encouraged and fomented seizures of power in other south-eastern oblasts. And, should weather conditions impede resupply of Crimea by sea this winter, Moscow may intervene to open up a land route from the Russian border through Ukrainian territory. Either move would undoubtedly be viewed by the EU, U.S. and other supporters of Ukraine as a major escalation and lead to further sanctions.

EU and U.S. sanctions may well have deterred a further Russian advance along the Black Sea coast after Ilovaisk, and seem at the moment to be deterring any substantial separatist advance beyond the current frontline. They have also added to the pain of Russia’s economic downturn. The EU’s tough line on sanctions surprised Moscow, which assumed that consensus in Brussels would quickly disintegrate. But there is little sign that either the U.S. or the EU have thought about ways to de-escalate when the need finally arises. Russia is following a similar improvisatory path. It underestimated the implications of annexing Crimea or intervening in eastern Ukraine. It protects the entities from Ukrainian attack, but seems reluctant to do much more than that.

Improvisation needs to be replaced by communication between all sides. This would help defuse tensions, perhaps prepare the ground for consultations between the main warring parties, and allow all sides to concentrate on humanitarian assistance in the coming winter. Russia could confirm that it has no plans to recognise the separatists. It could reject the idea, often floated in Kyiv, of a major Russian offensive in the spring. Kyiv could similarly promise to refrain from offensive military operations during this period. It could spell out publicly and clearly to the people of the east what political solution it has in mind for their areas after the war, and offer a clear assurance that it will, with Western assistance, help rebuild the east. Such an approach by all sides would not only help Ukraine weather a dangerous winter, but also allow it to emerge in the spring with hope for the future.

This report concentrates largely on one of the lesser known aspects of the crisis – the thinking and capacity of the separatist leadership, their relationship with Moscow and their views of the future. It does not present an overall analysis of the U.S., European Union and member states’ policies on the crisis.

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