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Tayikistán: un Estado cada vez más frágil en una región quebradiza
Tayikistán: un Estado cada vez más frágil en una región quebradiza
Op-Ed / Europe & Central Asia

Tayikistán: un Estado cada vez más frágil en una región quebradiza

Originally published in Esglobal

Rusia, Estados Unidos y la UE deben ser conscientes del nexo entre represión e inseguridad en el país centroasiático. ¿Qué pueden hacer para ayudar a Tayikistán a prevenir el conflicto?

El presidente tayiko, Emomali Rahmon, habla mucho de democracia, pero su presidencia se ha caracterizado por un estancamiento económico y social, agudizado por la corrupción y la mala gestión. El único partido de oposición con verdadero peso, el Partido del Renacimiento Islámico de Tayikistán (PRIT), ha sido prohibido y tachado de terrorista. Las elecciones fraudulentas y docenas de detenciones en 2015 han callado a los adversarios políticos, y en marzo asesinaron en Turquía a un líder de la oposición en el exilio. Los activistas temen el acoso de las autoridades, y las ONG “actúan en un entorno incierto y de alto riesgo”.

Todo ello no ha hecho más fuerte al Presidente. Su aparato político y de seguridad es frágil. Las divisiones de la guerra civil siguen existiendo desde el acuerdo de paz de 1997; algunas áreas controladas durante el conflicto por la Oposición Tayika Unida (OTU) no han aceptado jamás la autoridad del Gobierno central. Un diplomático ruso calcula que Dusambé no controla verdaderamente más que alrededor del 30% del país. El hecho de que el general Gulmurod Khalimov, responsable de la Unidad Policial de Misiones Especiales (OMON), desertara y se uniera al Estado Islámico en mayo de 2015 y la decisión del viceministro de Defensa Abduhalim Nazarzona de organizar un ataque para salir de la capital, dejan claro que las lealtades están desmoronándose. Las medidas draconianas tomadas por Rahmon contra la oposición política, la disidencia civil y el islam están provocando una respuesta negativa.

La prohibición de los islamistas legales

El acuerdo de paz de 1997 puso fin a cinco años de combates entre las fuerzas de la oposición y las del Gobierno que habían dejado entre 60.000 y 100.000 muertos y una economía destrozada. El pacto preveía un sistema de múltiples partidos que canalizaran hacia la política legítima las aspiraciones de los islamistas y otros segmentos de la sociedad. En 2000, el PRIT obtuvo dos de los 63 escaños de la cámara baja del Parlamento, mientras que, como parte del acuerdo de reparto de poder, se asignaron puestos en la administración y los servicios de seguridad a antiguos miembros de la OTU. La participación política limitada del PRIT garantizaba la base del acuerdo de paz. Sin embargo, Rahmon seguía desconfiando de las asociaciones de algunos antiguos jefes de la OTU y estaba indignado con la resistencia de ciertas zonas a aceptar el control del Gobierno.

Tras la muerte del líder del PRIT Said Abdullah Nuri en 2006 y el nombramiento como sucesor de un islamista más moderno, preparado y elocuente, Mokhiddin Kabiri, Rahmon empezó a pensar que el partido representaba una amenaza directa contra su liderazgo.

En vísperas de las elecciones parlamentarias del 1 de marzo de 2015, el Ejecutivo ordenó a los imanes de las mezquitas inscritas en el registro oficial que predicaran contra el voto al PRIT, por considerarlo “el partido de la guerra”. El PRIT no obtuvo más que el 1,5% de los votos y perdió sus dos escaños en unos comicios calificados de “descaradamente manipulados”. Kabiri temía que lo detuvieran y huyó a Turquía. El Gobierno prohibió el partido en agosto y se apresuró a declararlo organización terrorista.

El hecho de haber privado a las antiguas bases de la OTU de representación política formal en el Parlamento y la aplicación de una versión del islam restrictiva y aprobada por el Gobierno pueden hacer que otras alternativas radicales sean más atractivas para los islamistas, en particular los jóvenes.

El caso Khalimov y Daesh

La deserción del jefe de la Policía Especial para unirse a Daesh debilitó gravemente la sensación de seguridad de Rahmon. El desertor, el coronel Khalimov, se formó en Estados Unidos y Rusia, había participado en operaciones del Gobierno y no tenía relación con la OTU. En mayo apareció en YouTube un vídeo de él en el que amenazaba: “Prestad atención, perros, el Presidente y los ministros. Si supierais cuántos chicos, hermanos nuestros, están aquí, esperando y anhelando volver para restablecer la ley [islámica] de la sharia [en Tayikistán]… Iremos a buscaros, Dios mediante, iremos a buscaros para mataros… Escuchad, cerdos americanos, he estado en América tres veces, y vi cómo entrenabais a los soldados para matar musulmanes. Dios mediante, iré con esta arma a vuestras ciudades, vuestros hogares, y os mataremos”. En el vídeo mencionaba políticas religiosas represivas y llamaba a quienes trabajan para el gobierno y a los trabajadores inmigrantes y marginados a derrocar a Rahmon.

La obsesión de Khalimov por las restricciones contra las prácticas islámicas es significativa. Aunque no existen indicios de que el extremismo religioso violento tenga un apoyo masivo, la política de mano dura del Ejecutivo ha tenido efectos negativos entre los devotos, ha alimentado el resentimiento y radicalizado a los creyentes moderados. Aunque el porcentaje de extremistas islámicos confirmados entre los 8,2 millones de habitantes de Tayikistán es pequeño, el peligro que pueden constituir es considerable. Cientos de tayikos se han unido a Daesh, pero un funcionario de la OSCE dice que esos cálculos son “muy conservadores; seguramente se pueden duplicar, por lo menos”. Se han visto las banderas negras del grupo yihadista en varios distritos, sobre todo cerca de la frontera con Afganistán. Un funcionario de la ONU dice que “la posible radicalización de los jóvenes tayikos es un motivo de preocupación… Daesh tiene un sistema de reclutamiento muy astuto, y el sentimiento de unión y estabilidad que anuncian los rusos chechenos ha sido eficaz… La vida [en Tayikistán] se ha vuelto más difícil e inalcanzable económicamente, y es comprensible el atractivo del Estado Islámico”.

La frontera entre Tayikistán y Afganistán es un eslabón débil en la seguridad de Asia central, con presiones crecientes de los talibanes que controlan el norte de Afganistán y el peligro de que los militantes islámicos afganos, avezados en el combate, se alíen con pequeños grupos de posibles aliados en el país vecino. La fortaleza del Ejército tayiko, que constituye una segunda línea de defensa detrás de los 16.000 guardias de fronteras, es dudosa. Si los combatientes talibanes avanzaran hacia el norte con el objetivo de llegar a Uzbekistán, los tayikos seguramente tendrían que solicitar la intervención de la Organización del Tratado de Seguridad Colectiva (OTSC), dirigida por Moscú. Con su situación, entre Afganistán y Uzbekistán, y su frágil estado actual, Tayikistán representa un peligro de guerra y desestabilización.

La frontera afgana

Aunque es posible que los gobiernos de Asia Central exageren la amenaza del extremismo islámico para conservar su influencia, obtener ventajas económicas y justificar la represión interna, es cierto que existe un peligro. Un riesgo agravado por el anuncio de Estados Unidos de que iba a retirar sus tropas de Afganistán -después desmentido en parte- y la decisión de Pakistán de atacar a los yihadistas en Warizistán del norte, cerca de la frontera con Afganistán. Estos dos factores han llevado a combatientes extranjeros, entre ellos tayikos, uzbekos, kirguizos, chechenos y uigures, a la provincia afgana de Badakhshan, desde donde han lanzado ataques contra el Ejército afgano en las provincias de Kunduz, Badakhshan, Baghlan, Faryab y Takhar.

Un antiguo alto funcionario de defensa kirguizo dice que es posible que los combatientes del norte de Afganistán intenten adentrarse en Asia Central “en los próximos dos o tres años”. Hoy, en el Movimiento Islámico de Uzbekistán (MIU), algunas facciones están alineadas con Daesh y otras con los talibanes en las zonas cercanas a Tayikistán. Su interés fundamental sigue estando en el propio Uzbekistán, pero quizá trate de aprovechar la debilidad tayika para ganar posiciones.

El presidente ruso, Vladímir Putin, considera que la situación en la frontera entre Afganistán y Tayikistán es crítica, y ha prometido ayuda militar. La base militar de Rusia en Tayikistán, la mayor que tiene en el extranjero, va a reforzarse y a pasar de 5.900 hombres a 9.000 de aquí a 2020, y se han desplegado “aviones de guerra avanzados, helicópteros de ataque y drones” dentro de una “defensa en tres niveles”.

Moscú también ha aumentado su presencia militar en las proximidades de Dusambé, lo cual indica que es consciente de las múltiples amenazas que se ciernen sobre el país centroasiático. Dice un diplomático ruso: “Tayikistán puede contar con la ayuda legal de Rusia si la amenaza viene de fuera. El problema es si el enemigo viene de dentro, y no estamos autorizados [a intervenir]… Ese es un problema interno [de Rahmon]… No podemos rescatarlo si da pasos equivocados en política interior”.

Irónicamente, un acuerdo de paz en Afganistán podría ser peligroso para Tayikistán, porque seguramente quedarían excluidos de él grupos como el MIU y otros con combatientes extranjeros, y algunos de éstos pasarían a Asia Central, donde los Estados no están bien preparados para recibir a losyihadistas que regresen. Por tanto, cualquier acuerdo de paz debería incluir a los combatientes extranjeros.

Drogas

El narcotráfico tiene repercusión directa en la seguridad fronteriza y la estabilidad interna de Tayikistán. Proporciona unos ingresos que pueden redistribuirse o blanquearse a través de la economía, y entre el 20% y el 30% del PIB. La falta de un desarrollo económico legítimo tiene consecuencias políticas y de seguridad, y el control de las lucrativas rutas de la droga es un motivo de rivalidad entre las élites regionales y dentro de los corruptos servicios de seguridad.

La ayuda de Rusia y Occidente para reforzar la seguridad de las fronteras y luchar contra el narcotráfico ha tenido efectos limitados. Se calcula que el programa de la UE de Administración de Fronteras para Asia central (BOMCA por sus siglas en inglés), la Escuela de la OSCE para el personal de gestión fronteriza, los proyectos fronterizos de la Organización Internacional de la ONU para las Migraciones (OIM) y la ayuda bilateral económica y de formación, sobre todo de Estados Unidos, en materia de seguridad, costaron 83 millones de dólares (unos 76 millones de euros) para el periodo 2005-2013, pero dichos proyectos carecen de la puesta en marcha por parte de los tayikos.

Durante más de 10 años, los intereses de política exterior de EEUU en Asia central han quedado relegados por los grandes objetivos estratégicos y militares en Afganistán. Estados Unidos y varios países de la UE han recurrido a una estrecha cooperación con gobiernos regionales represivos con el fin de obtener apoyo logístico para las operaciones en Afganistán, a menudo sin prestar atención a los derechos humanos. Pero la relativa ineficacia de la ayuda contra las drogas y el aumento de la represión en Tayikistán deben obligar a reexaminar la cuestión.

Washington ha dedicado millones de dólares a programas de lucha contra las drogas en Tayikistán desde 2007. Ahora bien, los beneficiarios son personas que violan constantemente los derechos humanos, entre ellos algunos acusados de torturas y ejecuciones extrajudiciales. Un detractor de estas ayudas dice que “Estados Unidos no debería aceptar tan fácilmente las acciones del Gobierno tayiko. Las fuerzas tayikas, entrenadas en EE UU, apoyan al Presidente, protegen el narcotráfico y extorsionan y torturan al pueblo”.

Relaciones externas

Tayikistán tiene una situación tan frágil que, si bien la UE, EE UU y China tienen menos peso que Rusia, deberían planear una seria campaña de prevención de conflictos, en colaboración con Moscú, a corto y medio plazo. El Ejecutivo autoritario de Rahmon es una amenaza tan terrible para el Estado como una posible incursión desde Afganistán.

No es probable que el Kremlin exija a Rahmon unas reformas que transformarían su Estado o su sistema de Gobierno, pero la estrategia de mantener el statu quo, en parte para fomentar la estabilidad pero sobre todo para conservar influencia, puede acabar siendo contraproducente.

Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea tienen mucha menos influencia y no se han mostrado enérgicos a la hora de imponer condiciones para la cooperación y la ayuda técnica que proporcionan. El Acuerdo de Partenariado y Cooperación firmado en 2010 por la UE incluye “facilitar la transición económica en Tayikistán y promover un desarrollo humano y económico inclusivo y sostenible”. Sin embargo, esta estrategia no ha logrado arraigar en Estados de Asia Central como Tayikistán, que tienen poco que ofrecer a cambio y ningún deseo de auténticas reformas.

La cooperación estadounidense se ha centrado sobre todo en los sectores de la defensa y el orden público, el gobierno local y la transparencia, pero es frecuente que las reformas queden supeditadas a su interés prioritario, que es Afganistán. El hecho de que EE UU no aborde públicamente las violaciones de los derechos humanos en Uzbekistán, un socio más estratégico, mientras que sí habla acerca de  Tayikistán, despierta dudas sobre lo equitativo de su política en Asia central.

Occidente debe prestar atención a la responsabilidad y la rendición de cuentas, las violaciones de los derechos humanos, la corrupción y la reducción del espacio democrático en Tayikistán. Rusia debería reforzar la seguridad, exigir a Rahmon que recuerde las ambiciones plasmadas en el acuerdo de paz de 1997 para llevar a cabo reformas económicas dirigidas a la creación de empleo y disminuir las presiones sobre los musulmanes devotos. Moscú tiene que comprender que la represión política y religiosa, el aumento de la radicalización, las grietas en los servicios de seguridad y la creciente fragilidad del Estado están relacionados.

A Rusia, Occidente y los vecinos inmediatos de Tayikistán les interesa que se modere el autoritarismo de Rahmon. Todos deben trabajar para lograr una transición pacífica para que, después de él, venga una época menos autoritaria, y ser conscientes del nexo entre represión e inseguridad. Es fundamental que haya un consenso para asegurar la frontera afgana, que incluya el acuerdo sobre el papel primordial de la OTSC. Además, Moscú debe volver a sumarse a las campañas internacionales para cortar el tráfico de drogas. Son comprensibles los recelos sobre las ambiciones regionales rusas en otras zonas, pero prevenir un conflicto en Tayikistán es algo que interesa a todos.

DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN - SEPTEMBER 08: Tajikistan's President Emomali Rahmon greets people during a military parade marking the 25th anniversary of the Tajikistan Independence Day at Dusti (Friendship) Square in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on 8 September 2016. ANADOLU AGENCY/Tajikistan Presidency.
Briefing 86 / Europe & Central Asia

The Rising Risks of Misrule in Tajikistan

With his seven-year term set to end in 2020, uncertainty is growing over whether Tajikistan’s long-time ruler President Rahmon will handpick a successor or continue his reign. Growing troubles at home and abroad ensure both scenarios are fraught with risk and must be managed prudently, lest the country become another source of regional disorder.


 

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I. Overview

Tajikistan’s 25 years as an independent state have been marred by poverty, endemic state corruption and the steady narrowing of political power to a single family. Its patriarch is President Emomali Rahmon, 64, who has ruled the country since 1992 through a carefully calibrated system of patronage and brutality. With Rahmon’s current seven-year term set to end in 2020, many observers believe he is now planning to hand over power to a close family member, probably his eldest son, Rustam, 29. This transition plan is fraught with risk, however, and will play out in a country riven by internal frailties and external vulnerabilities. The outside world has few levers in this Central Asian state of 8.7 million people. But its pivotal position in Central Asia, where it borders on both Afghanistan and China, should prompt external actors, especially Russia, to engage as far as possible to avoid a new source of regional disorder.

Over the past two years, President Rahmon has cleared the political space, removing any group or individual, ally or adversary he considered a potential threat. This provides him with a powerful argument against any international or domestic political actor tempted to call for change. Other than the president and his family, there are no organised, functional political forces left. It is his regime or nothing, with even parts of his own traditional powerbase increasingly marginalised. The resentment this produces could lead to a destabilising and potentially violent internal backlash. The fallout likely would be felt throughout Central Asia.

The international community has few options. Central Asian neighbours, including Russia and China, should focus on securing the vulnerable Tajik-Afghan border and China in particular should take steps to help revive Dushanbe’s failing economy. The European Union (EU), an important donor to Tajikistan, should push for an orderly transition even if devoid of democratic credibility. In taking these steps, all parties need to bear in mind the one overriding factor that constrains their influence: for now, Rahmon’s own personal interests dominate the country’s agenda.

II. Internal Uncertainties

A. Family Feuds

A key question for Tajikistan today is whether President Rahmon will forego power in 2020 and, if he does, whom he will choose as a successor. Rahmon, still relatively young at 64, is putting a transition plan in motion, if not for 2020 then later. Constitutional amendments passed in 2016, particularly one that lowers the president’s minimum age, suggest Rahmon’s son Rustam is the favourite.[fn]Crisis Group Europe and Central Asia Briefing N°78, Tajikistan Early Warning: Internal Pressures, External Threats, 11 January 2016.Hide Footnote Rahmon has been pushing Rustam into high-profile, powerful posts, such as that of mayor in the capital city of Dushanbe.[fn]“Рустами Эмомали назначен мэром Душанбе” [“Rustam Emomali appointed as mayor of Dushanbe”], Radio Ozodi, 12 January 2017.Hide Footnote If Rustam joins the senate as its chairman after he turns 30 in December 2017, as analysts and media have speculated, he could become president should his father die or became incapacitated.[fn]Kamila Ibragimova, “Tajikistan: Purge of ex-mayor’s allies picks up steam”, EurasiaNet, 15 February 2017. Crisis Group correspondence, Central Asia expert, September 2017.Hide Footnote

This scenario is far from certain, however. Rustam faces internal competition and is hampered by his own lack of skill as a government administrator and manager of patronage networks.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, local researcher and Western observer, Dushanbe and Khatlon, September 2016. Similar concerns are voiced by Western diplomats in the region. Crisis Group interviews, European diplomat, Bishkek, January 2017; U.S. diplomat, Astana, June 2016.Hide Footnote But he has consolidated informal power over the security services, which ultimately will be the decision-makers in the event of a contested succession.[fn]Crisis Group interview, local researcher, Dushanbe, September 2016. Foreign officials familiar with American-Tajik security cooperation also noted that Rustam has considerable influence over the security forces, often acting as if he were their boss when attending training and other exercises. Crisis Group interviews, Dushanbe, September 2016.Hide Footnote Moreover, although Western observers and members of the urban intelligentsia often describe Rustam as reckless, aggressive and lacking leadership qualities, the pool of potential successors is small.

[A]lthough Western observers and members of the urban intelligentsia often describe Rustam as reckless, aggressive and lacking leadership qualities, the pool of potential successors is small.

That pool consists of family members. Media speculation focuses on internal rivalries, mentioning Rustam’s sister Ozoda, 39, who runs the presidential administration and is reputed to be competent. She and her banker-businessman husband Jamollidin Nuraliyev at times are mentioned as a possible power couple, though Tajikistan’s patriarchal society works against her. Conflicts involving members of the extended family and could also trigger instability in the context of a succession.[fn]Ilkhom Nazarov, “Борьба за власть в Таджикистане. У Рустама Эмомали появилсяконкурент?” [“The struggle for power in Tajikistan. Does Rustam Emomali have a new competitor?”], Alternativnaya Politika, 28 October 2016. See also “Tajikistan’s anti-corruption drive sign of internal feud?”, EurasiaNet, 22 May 2017.Hide Footnote Rustam has struggled with his uncle (the president’s brother-in-law) Hasan Asadullozoda for control of revenues from the Tajik Aluminium Company (Talco), which provides up to 70 per cent of the Tajikistan’s foreign currency earnings.[fn]“Last year’s blackout reportedly costs TALCO at more than 8 million USD”, Asia-Plus, 1 May 2017.Hide Footnote Other family members feature in local conflicts over state resources. Without careful management, these internal family feuds could be destabilising, especially at a time of uncertainty over the presidency’s future.

B. Local Rivalries

The president’s regional power base is showing signs of disaffection. President Rahmon’s winning faction during the civil war (1992-1997) was based in Kulob, part of the cotton-growing area of Khatlon, on the country’s southern border with Afghanistan. Kulobis consequently dominate the most lucrative businesses and hold the most important positions in security structures, at the expense of those from other regions who feel they occupy subservient positions. That circle of power has narrowed, however, as money and resources have dwindled.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Tajik analyst, Dushanbe, September 2016.Hide Footnote The effect has been to sharpen fault lines among Kulobis, undermining the political unity that had allowed them to prevail. For example, Kulobis from other parts of Khatlon are losing out to Kulobis from Rahmon’s hometown, Danghara. This is feeding anger among many previously loyal supporters, who may not need much persuasion to take a stronger stance against the Rahmon clan.

The trouble brewing in Rahmon’s loyalist heartland is a bellwether for ten-sions in Tajikistan’s politically peripheral regions.

The trouble brewing in Rahmon’s loyalist heartland is a bellwether for tensions in Tajikistan’s politically peripheral regions. Any perception that President Rahmon’s power is about to weaken could tempt areas suspicious of Dushanbe’s central power – such as the eastern area of Rasht and the mountainous Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) – to take further steps toward autonomy. Rasht has long been known for its distrust of Dushanbe’s authority. Former United Tajik Opposition (UTO) members there have used force to retaliate against efforts by Dushanbe to enforce its writ, leading to killings of Tajik security and military forces.[fn]Crisis Group Europe and Central Asia Report N°162, Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure, 12 February 2009; Crisis Group Europe and Central Asia Report N°205, Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats, 24 May 2011. The UTO fought against the government during the civil war that began in 1992, but signed a peace agreement in 1997.Hide Footnote In GBAO, too, infringements on local autonomy resulted in bloody flare-ups in 2012 and 2014.[fn]Kirgizbek Kanunov, “Riots in Tajikistan’s Gbao raises fears of broader destabilization”, The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 June 2014.Hide Footnote

Clashes in both Rasht and GBAO have embarrassed Rahmon, demonstrating the limits of his power. His response to the unrest in both regions was to cut deals and co-opt leaders by granting access to resources and other forms of patronage.[fn]Crisis Group Report, Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats, op. cit., p. 10.Hide Footnote Given Tajikistan’s weak finances, this is far from sustainable. Moreover, Rahmon’s successor may not have the skills required to navigate a fraught political environment.

C. Economic Troubles

Tajikistan’s systemic economic problems are part of the reason government resources are shrinking. Many sectors are suffering: confidence is low in Tajikistan’s currency; remittances from Russia decreased in 2016;[fn]Remittances from Russia fell to $1.9 billion in 2016 compared to $2.2 billion in 2015. “Central Asia’s remittances: Take two”, EurasiaNet, 22 March 2017.Hide Footnote the real-estate market is crashing; and half of all bank loans are non-performing. The Tajik government this year issued high-yield bonds to raise revenue,[fn]Natasha Doff and Lyubov Pronina, “Junk bond fever hits a new high in Tajikistan”, Bloomberg, 11 September 2017.Hide Footnote which has allowed them to avoid working with international financial institution or donors who ask for reforms.

The government points to the Russian economic crisis as the primary cause of its woes, but fiscal mismanagement and predatory economic policies have also played a significant role over the past decade. Diplomats say the lack of accountability remains a major hurdle for international financial support.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Bishkek, January 2017. The banking sector in particular remains fragile. “Papa’s purse: Faced with signs of fraud, some donors look the other way”, The Economist, 18 June 2015.Hide Footnote In 2016, the Tajik government declined an offer of up to $200 million in the form of grants and loans from the World Bank, because of the pre-conditions attached, which involved reform of the banking sector, currently largely controlled by Rahmon family members and associates.[fn]The conditions included wholesale reforms of the banking sector, including changing top management at Tajikodirotbank and Agroinvestbank.Hide Footnote Nor did the EU or International Monetary Fund (IMF) provide financial support to the Tajik budget in 2016.[fn]“Tajikistan: Strong Growth with a Challenging Outlook”, Country Economic Update, World Bank Group, spring 2017. Hide Footnote Tajikistan’s successful foray into the bond market arguably has weakened the leverage of donors seeking to impose political conditionality on aid and loans.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Brussels, September 2017.Hide Footnote

The public bears the brunt of these persistent economic difficulties. A third of Tajikistan’s population is undernourished and malnutrition is the underlying cause of about one third of child deaths,[fn]“The Republic of Tajikistan”, World Food Programme, 2016; Tajikistan, “Annual Report 2015”, UNICEF.Hide Footnote a higher proportion than in any of the other former Soviet republics. But the economic crisis also affects the corruption and patronage networks behind Rahmon’s rule. Citizens and private businesses increasingly are unable to pay bribes to law enforcement officers and government officials. These officials, in turn, have become increasingly aggressive as they struggle to pay debts incurred to finance the bribes they had to pay to obtain their jobs.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Tajik analyst, Dushanbe, September 2016.Hide Footnote In short, economic realities are placing an increasingly fragile power structure under strain, raising questions about its long-term viability.

D. Migration

Migration is the main outlet for Tajiks suffering from social, political and economic tensions. More than a million Tajiks live and work in Russia, which helps defuse a potential source of instability by absorbing working age men who might otherwise be under- or unemployed at home. But there is a flip-side as Moscow could force the migrants to return, which gives it important leverage over the Tajik president and serves as a considerable constraint on his dealings with Russia.

Moscow’s priority is to have a compliant partner and an ongoing military presence in Tajikistan.

Moscow’s priority is to have a compliant partner and an ongoing military presence in Tajikistan. A senior member of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), an opposition party banned in October 2015, said, “Russia tolerates, not supports, Rahmon, because there are no other options really … whether Russia will support his eldest son, Rustam, [in his succession bid] will depend on how Rustam behaves”.[fn]Crisis group phone interview, Bishkek, August 2017.Hide Footnote Although it seems unlikely at this stage, Moscow could threaten to expel Tajik migrants should bilateral relations deteriorate, presenting the current or incoming president with an enormous crisis.

Emigration from Tajikistan also concerns the EU as the number of Tajik asylum seekers is rising. In 2016, 3,230 Tajiks applied for asylum in EU countries, up from 1,160 in 2015 and 605 in 2014.[fn]“Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex annual aggregated data (rounded)”, Eurostat, consulted by Crisis Group August 2017.Hide Footnote An IRPT member living in Europe said, “if something happens in Tajikistan, Tajik refugees will come to Europe. It is cheaper and easier for Tajiks to get to Europe than for Syrians”.[fn]Crisis Group phone interview, IRPT member in exile, July 2017.Hide Footnote European officials express fears that Russia could use an influx of Central Asian migrants to heighten tensions over migration in Europe.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, EU diplomats, Delhi, India, June 2016; Brussels, May 2017. See also: Jozef Lang, “Central Asia: the crisis of the migration model and its potential impact on the EU”, Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich (OSW), 25 April 2017.Hide Footnote

III. A Jihadist Threat?

A. Afghanistan

For years Tajikistan has confronted the risk of jihadist spillover from across its 1,400km border with Afghanistan. The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province or the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), an affiliate of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has led both Russian and U.S. officials to express concern that the movement may reset its priorities northward and attempt to make inroads into Central Asia.[fn]Vladimir Dobrovolskiy, “Россия обеспокоена афганским крылом ИГ” [“Russia is worried about the Afghan wing of ISIS”], RIA-Novosti, 5 October 2016. In February 2017, the U.S. warned that IS-K had assembled a network that included former Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) members. “These groups benefit from complementary capabilities and networks and require continuous pressure to prevent the emergence of a new, more virulent organization in which the new whole is more dangerous than the sum of the previous parts”. “Statement for the Record by General John W. Nicholson, Commander U.S. Forces – Afghanistan Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Situation in Afghanistan”, 9 February 2017.Hide Footnote The presence of Central Asian militants within IS-K ranks, albeit as a minority, aggravates such fears.[fn]Crisis Group correspondence, security official, March 2017.Hide Footnote So too does increasing instability in Afghanistan’s north east, close to the Tajik border.

The immediacy of the threat remains open to debate, however. Although the situation in northern Afghanistan is deteriorating, most incidents along the Tajik-Afghan border appear to be related to smuggling rather than incursions into Tajik territory or attempts to attack the Tajik state.[fn]Crisis Group interview, local analyst, Dushanbe, September 2016.Hide Footnote Though its emergence is worrisome, the IS-K is still dwarfed by the Taliban, which remains by far the largest armed opposition group and whose leaders express no territorial interest beyond Afghanistan’s borders. The Taliban arguably has been the main check on ISIS’s growth in Afghanistan, often moving quickly to crush IS-K factions.[fn]“Afghan Taliban issues statement for the Central Asian countries”, Khaama Press, 18 July 2016. There recently have been reports of collaboration between Taliban and IS-K militants, including during one offensive near Sar-e Pul, but overall the two movements compete. Even during the Sar-e Pul incident, UN investigators found no evidence of operational ties between the local IS-K faction and the core of the movement in eastern Afghanistan. See, for example, Josh Smith, “Joint Taliban Islamic State raid killed unarmed Afghan militia, civilians: UN”, Reuters, 20 August 2017.Hide Footnote Moreover, the core of the IS-K remains in eastern provinces closer to Pakistan than Central Asia. Whether the small militias in the north that claim to be part of IS-K have direct operational ties to forces in the east is unclear. Nor is it clear, for now, that the Central Asian militants fighting alongside the Taliban, including in the north east, have Tajikistan in their sights.[fn]See, for example, Obaid Ali’s series “The Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North”, Afghan Analysts Network, January-September 2017.Hide Footnote

Tajikistan’s inherent weakness and porous borders make it vulnerable, however. Traffickers have been moving large volumes of drugs across the Afghan border for over two decades, providing revenue to security officers who, in turn, support Rahmon and his inner circle.[fn]Filippo De Danieli, “Counter-narcotics Policies in Tajikistan and Their Impact on State Building”, Central Asian Survey, vol. 30, no. 1 (2011), pp. 129-145; David Lewis, “High Times on the Silk Road: The Central Asian Paradox”, World Policy Journal, vol. 27, no. 1 (2010), pp. 39-49.Hide Footnote The governing elite’s role in cross-border narcotics smuggling may help it manage the border informally for now, but in the longer-run such activities undermine efforts to secure it. So long as corrupt officials have an interest in keeping the border porous, there is a danger that militants – not just drugs – will spill over from Afghanistan into Tajikistan.

B. Radicalisation

Under the guise of combating jihadists, authorities in Dushanbe have quashed internal dissent and repressed Islamic practices.[fn]Crisis Group Briefing, Tajikistan Early Warning, op. cit.Hide Footnote The government restricts its citizens’ ability to display piety and publicly adhere to Islamic norms. Police have forcibly shaved men’s beards, and registered or even arrested women who wear hijabs.[fn]Anora Sarkorova, “Tajikistan’s battle against beards to ‘fight radicalisation’”, BBC News, 21 January 2016. Ishaan Tharoor, “A city in Tajikistan is drawing up lists of women who wear hijabs”, The Washington Post, 22 August 2016; “Isfara resident jailed for shooting cell phone video of detention of women wearing hijab”, Asia-Plus, 31 May 2016. See also: “Минкультуры разрабатывает образцы исконно таджикской одежды” [“Ministry of culture is developing the samples of the original Tajik clothing”], Radio Ozodi, 21 July 2017.Hide Footnote The government also forbids anyone under the age of eighteen from attending a mosque and prohibits anyone under 35 from making the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Tajiks resent these policies, which apply only to certain citizens. The economic or political elite faces few such restrictions. Young members of criminal gangs and the sons of government officials are seen wearing beards and the wives of government officials wear hijabs, sometimes because their husbands order them to.[fn]Sarvinozi Ruhulloh and Shahloi Abdulloh, “Баъзе мақомдорони тоҷик зани худро ба ҳиҷобпӯшӣ маҷбур мекунанд” [“Some Tajik officials force their own wives to wear a hijab”], Radio Ozodi, 5 November 2016.Hide Footnote While the security services claim the bulk of militants travelling to Syria and Iraq to join the ranks of ISIS come from the opposition IRPT – thereby linking Islamism in Tajikistan to jihadism abroad – a prominent Tajik expert on radicalisation disputes that:

We have this stereotype that people who leave for Syria are usually from areas that were pro-opposition during the civil war, but it is not true. It is actually the opposite. People from the areas known for being pro-communist [pro-Rahmon] during the war leave more. A lot of Uzbeks leave, a lot of Ku-lobis leave. Even Gulmurod Khalimov who left, is Kulobi, always fought on the government’s side and was never in the opposition.[fn]Crisis Group phone interview, Tajik analyst, Bishkek, July 2017. Gulmurod Khalimov is a former high-ranking security official who defected to ISIS in Syria in May 2015 becoming ISIS’s “minister for war”. He was reportedly killed in Syria in April 2017, but in July 2017 two militants said in videos that he was still alive. Russia subsequently said it had killed him during an airstrike on Deir el-Zour, eastern Syria, on 5 September 2017. Tom Parfitt, “Russia ‘kills Isis commander in Syrian airstrike’”, The Times (UK), 8 September 2017. See also: “Islamic State Threatens Central Asia”, Crisis Group blog, 8 June 2015.Hide Footnote

The government’s refusal to distinguish violent jihadists from non-violent individuals who are visibly devout or hold anti-government views risks making all of them enemies. This contributes to popular frustration, which with the right trigger could bubble over into street protests, other types of resistance – or even violence.[fn]Crisis Group phone interview, Tajik analyst, June 2017.Hide Footnote

IV. Conclusion

Tajikistan’s current trajectory is cause for concern. In less than three years, the country’s president is – in theory – obliged to transfer power. Whether President Rahmon will do so is uncertain, but either continuation or succession could result in turmoil. Feuds inside the ruling family and rivalries among Tajikistan’s various regions, including those that have previously supported the president, form a turbulent political backdrop. The regime’s margin for manoeuvre is narrowing in the context of a troubled economy, institutional dysfunction and growing instability in Afghanistan. The next president will inherit a fragmented state with low levels of trust in government if not deep hostility toward the state. Many constituencies possess a capacity for violence.

Foreign powers have little leverage over Rahmon’s government, which is hostile to any external criticism. Western powers appear reluctant to expend limited political capital pushing for reforms that might over time strengthen Tajikistan’s institutions but whose prospects for now appear remote.

Russia and China hold more cards, but have decided so far not to play them. As the main outside power engaged in Tajikistan, Russia has a major interest in securing the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border and ensuring Tajikistan does not become a victim of jihadist violence. Yet despite occasional signs of impatience, Moscow tolerates Rahmon if only for lack of a viable alternative.[fn]Crisis Group Briefing, Tajikistan Early Warning, op. cit.Hide Footnote China, which holds over half of the country’s debt and wants to protect its growing economic assets, is also concerned about Afghanistan and has therefore stepped up security cooperation with Tajikistan.[fn]On 31 August 2017, Rahmon and Chinese President Xi Jinping, meeting in Beijing, signed a “comprehensive strategic partnership”, including an agreement to share intelligence information. Christian Shepherd and Tom Hogue, “Tajikistan agrees to more intelligence exchanges with China”, Reuters, 1 September 2017. See also, Crisis Group Europe and Central Asia Report N°245, Central Asia’s Silk Road Rivalries, 27 July 2017.Hide Footnote Most of all, China seeks to counter Islamic extremism, separatism or terrorism in its restive Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which borders Tajikistan and is home to a small minority of ethnic Tajiks. Yet despite these interests, Russia and China are even less likely than Western powers to press for meaningful political or institutional reform.

Foreign powers have few good options, but they share an interest in a smooth transition whenever it occurs. Central Asian countries, Russia and China, with help from the EU and U.S., should focus in the interim on bolstering vulnerable borders to prevent violence from spilling throughout the region. With the limited leverage they have, EU and U.S. political engagement should stress the risks of political exclusion urging Dushanbe to refrain from repressive measures that could undermine the transition, triggering instead instability and violent conflict.

Bishkek/Brussels, 9 October 2017