肯尼亚: 国际刑事法院诉讼程序的影响
肯尼亚: 国际刑事法院诉讼程序的影响
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
What Next After Ruto is Declared Winner of Kenya’s Nail-biter Election?
What Next After Ruto is Declared Winner of Kenya’s Nail-biter Election?
Briefing 84 / Africa

肯尼亚: 国际刑事法院诉讼程序的影响

I. 概况

虽然2007年12月备受争议的选举之后的混乱看似是一个例外,但是暴力已经成为了自1991年引入多党制以来肯尼亚政治的普遍特点。不过,备受争议的投票之后的死亡和流离失所的人数是前所未有的。为带给受害者正义,打击普遍的政治免责,并阻止未来暴力,国际刑事法院(ICC)针对六名据信对选举后暴力负有最大责任的嫌疑人提起了两起诉讼。这两起诉讼对于肯尼亚2012年的选举和国家稳定会带来巨大的政治影响。在这一年中,裁决和诉讼程序将不可避免地减轻或加剧社会紧张局势。如果国际刑事法院诉讼程序是要制止肯尼亚未来的政治暴力,那么法院和其伙伴必须向公众更好地解释其工作和受到的局限。而且,肯尼亚政府必须制定一个旨在打击有罪不罚和惩罚种族仇恨言论及暴力的国家进程,来配合国际刑事法院的诉讼程序。

过去,精英们策划暴力事件以阻止政治集会,阻挠对手的支持者进行投票,并且如在2007至2008年事件中那样恐吓对手。在危机之后,肯尼亚成立了一个由法院上诉法官菲利浦·瓦基担任主席的选举后暴力调查委员会(CIPEV),调查选举暴力的事实和情况。其主要建议是建立一个肯尼亚特别法庭来审判被指控的组织者。念及历来政治上都存在有罪不罚,委员会建议如果政府未能建立法庭,由科菲·安南领导的对政治危机进行斡旋的非洲杰出人士小组应该向该委员会出具一个密封信封,内含那些据信对暴力负有最大责任的人员名单,以对它们进行调查和起诉。总统姆瓦伊·齐贝吉和总理奥廷加签署协议,在2008年12月16日实施了选举后暴力调查委员会的建议,议会也在2009年1月27日采纳了该委员会的报告。

一份建立特别法庭的法案两次被提交议会批准,但都未能通过,即使总统和总理在最后时刻进行游说也未能说服议会成员。因此,安南将密封信封和瓦基收集到的证据在2009年7月9日递交给暴力调查委员会总检察官路易斯·莫雷诺-奥坎波。四个月后,2009年11月5日,检察官宣布他打算要求当局进行调查,以确定谁对选举后暴力罪行应承担最大责任。

当莫雷诺-奥坎波在2010年12月15日宣布六名嫌疑人的姓名时,许多曾反对建立特别法庭法案的立法委员指责法庭实施的是选择性正义。看起来,许多人曾经投票反对肯尼亚特别法庭是由于他们以为海牙诉讼程序将会更漫长和更持久,使得那些志在参选总统的嫌疑人能够参加2012年的选举。然而,对于许多肯尼亚人来说,国际刑事法院的介入发出了一个信号,即长期以来对富裕和有权势的政客的有罪不罚将不会再继续下去。如果国家法院不能或不愿意起诉总统选举暴力事件的肇事者,国际法庭可以。对于过去常常被免罚的政治阶层来说,国际法庭的加入可能改变了在肯尼亚从政的游戏规则。

国际刑事法院将发挥肯尼亚政治家无法发挥的重大作用,而2012年的总统选举和立法选举将在这一背景下举行。其他因素也将发挥作用。现任总统齐贝吉将不会参选。2010年8月27日颁布的宪法建立了一些有强大权力的新职位,包括一个独立的首席法官,并提高了总统候选人门槛。得胜的候选人必须获得选票的绝对多数并至少要在47个县中的24个获得多于四分之一的选票。政治角逐和联盟已经真正开始,算是部分回应了国际刑事法院的诉讼程序。

两个最主要的嫌疑人,乌呼鲁·肯雅塔(副总理、财政部长和肯尼亚第一任总统的儿子)和威廉·卢托(前农业和高等教育部长),以及副总统和许多其他想法一致的政治家正在探寻团结在一名候选人身后的可能性。国际刑事法院预计将于2012年1月底宣布是否确认对六名嫌疑人的指控以及是否将继续进行审判。法院裁决将把一个额外的——可能是至关重要的——因素引入已经非常关键的选举。

如果法院在同一天确认了对于两起案件的指控,那么将是帮助缓解上升的种族紧张局势的关键一步。现在人们切实担心的是,如果撤销对某一种族嫌疑人的指控但却确认对另一种族嫌疑人的指控,那么不管其在法律上有没有意义,种族紧张局势都可能急剧增加。国际刑事法院的裁决将在肯尼亚的政治进程中继续发挥举足轻重的作用,特别是在关键的2012年选举中。法院似乎认识到这些裁决将不会被许多肯尼亚人视为法律裁决,诉讼和裁决程序的时机和如何对其进行宣传将不可避免地升级或者平和紧张局势。因此:

  • 国际刑事法院应该认识到警告嫌疑人和其他政客不要将司法程序政治化的公开声明可以抑制和阻止激进的种族和政治言论,比如法官叶卡捷琳娜·特伦达菲罗瓦在2011年10月5日指出继续发表仇恨言论将会在审判前的审议中被仔细斟酌。
     
  • 虽然国际刑事法院仍旧受欢迎,但肯尼亚公众对其支持已经下降,这是由于嫌疑人巧妙地利用媒体干预所致。为了化解对法院裁决的误解,法院和其支持者,包括公民社会和其他伙伴,应该增加在信息公开和推广上的努力,以解释自己的使命、工作和程序。
     
  • 肯尼亚政府必须认识到打击政治暴力和有罪不罚现象的是其责任。它需要通过建立一个与国际刑事法院进程平行的国家进程与其进行互补,从而消除有罪不罚的现象。它应该从指导总检察长调查涉嫌2007年选举后暴力事件的其他人开始,目的在于在国内法院提起诉讼。
     
  • 政府也应该支持新的首席大法官威廉·穆通加在改革司法部门和恢复公众对肯尼亚政治体系的信心方面的努力。

 内罗毕/布鲁塞尔,2012年1月9日

Although the mayhem following the disputed December 2007 elections seemed an exception, violence has been a com­mon feature of Kenya’s politics since the introduction of a multiparty system in 1991. Yet, the number of people killed and displaced following that disputed vote was unprecedented. To provide justice to the victims, combat pervasive political impunity and deter future violence, the International Criminal Court (ICC) brought two cases against six suspects who allegedly bore the greatest responsibility for the post-election violence. These cases have enormous political consequences for both the 2012 elections and the country’s stability. During the course of the year, rulings and procedures will inevitably either lower or increase com­munal tensions. If the ICC process is to contribute to the deterrence of future political violence in Kenya, the court and its friends must explain its work and limitations better to the public. Furthermore, Kenya’s government must complement that ICC process with a national process aimed at countering impunity and punishing ethnic hate speech and violence.

In the past, elites have orchestrated violence to stop political rallies, prevent opponent’s supporters from voting, and – as in the 2007-2008 events – intimidate rivals. In the aftermath of the crisis, a Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), chaired by Kenya Court of Appeal Judge Philip Waki, was established to investigate the facts and circumstances of the election violence. Among its major recommendations was creation of a Ken­yan special tribunal to try the accused organisers. Mindful of the history of political impunity, it recommended that if the government failed to establish the tribunal, the Panel of Eminent African Personalities that under Kofi Annan’s chairmanship mediated the political crisis should hand over a sealed envelope containing the names of those who allegedly bore the greatest responsibility for the violence to the ICC for investigation and prosecution. President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga signed an agree­ment for implementation of CIPEV’s recommendations on 16 December 2008, and parliament adopted its report on 27 January 2009.

A bill to establish a special tribunal was introduced twice in parliament but on both occasions failed to pass. Not even last-minute lobbying by the president and prime minister convinced parliamentarians. Annan consequently transmitted the sealed envelope and the evidence gathered by Waki to the ICC chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, on 9 July 2009. Four months later, on 5 November 2009, the pro­secutor announced he intended to request authorisation to proceed with an investigation to determine who bore greatest responsibility for crimes committed during the post-election violence.

When Moreno-Ocampo announced, on 15 December 2010, the names of the six suspects, many of the legislators who had opposed the tribunal bill accused the court of selective justice. It appears many had voted against a Kenyan tribunal on the assumption the process in The Hague would be longer and more drawn out, enabling the suspects with presidential ambitions to participate in the 2012 election. To many Kenyans, however, the ICC’s involvement sends a signal that entrenched impunity for wealthy and powerful politicians will not be permitted to endure. If national courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute perpetrators of gross electoral violence, the international court can. For a political class used to impunity, this is a likely game changer for how politics are conducted in the country.

The 2012 presidential and legislative elections will play out against the backdrop of a significant ICC role that Kenyan politicians will be unable to influence. Other factors also will come into play. The incumbent president, Mwai Kibaki, will not run. The constitution promulgated on 27 August 2010 has created powerful new positions, including that of an independent chief justice, and raised the bar for presidential aspirants. A successful candidate must obtain an absolute majority of votes as well as more than a quarter of the votes in at least 24 of the 47 counties. Political jockeying and alliance formation have already begun in earnest, in part as a response to the ICC proceedings.

The two most prominent suspects, Uhuru Kenyatta (the deputy prime minister, finance minister and son of Kenya’s first president) and William Ruto (the former agriculture and higher education minister), as well as the vice president and many other like-minded politicians, are exploring the possibility of uniting behind one candidate. The ICC is expected to announce in late January 2012 wheth­er it has confirmed charges against each of the six suspects and will proceed to trials. The court’s rulings will introduce an additional – possibly crucial – factor into an already pivotal election.

If the court confirms charges for both cases on the same day, this could be a crucial step to help defuse a rise in ethnic tensions. There are real fears that if charges are dropped for suspects of one ethnicity and confirmed for those of another, ethnic tensions could increase sharply, regardless of the legal merits. The ICC’s decisions will con­tinue to play a pivotal role in Kenya’s political process, especially in the crucial 2012 election. The court appears cognisant that these will not be viewed by many Kenyans simply as legal decisions and that the timing and framing of proceedings and rulings will inevitably have an impact in heightening or tamping down tensions. Accordingly:

  • The International Criminal Court should recognise that public statements warning suspects and other politicians not to politicise the judicial proceedings, such as Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova’s on 5 October 2011 noting that continued hate speech would be considered in the pre-trial deliberations, can dampen and deter aggressive ethnic and political rhetoric.
     
  • While the ICC is still popular, the Kenyan public’s approval of its role has been declining, due to deft media engagement by the suspects. In order to counter misconceptions of the court’s decisions, the court and its supporters, including civil society and other friends, should intensify public information and outreach efforts to explain its mandate, workings and process.
     
  • The Kenyan government must recognise that the fight against political violence and impunity is its responsibility. It needs to close the impunity gap by complementing the ICC process with a parallel national process. It should begin by directing the attorney general to investigate other individuals suspected of involvement in the violence that followed the 2007 elections with a view to carrying out prosecutions in the domestic courts.

The government should also support Willy Mutunga, the new chief justice, in his efforts to reform the judiciary and restore public faith in Kenya’s system.

Nairobi/Brussels, 9 January 2012

Podcast / Africa

What Next After Ruto is Declared Winner of Kenya’s Nail-biter Election?

This week on The Horn, Alan is joined by Murithi Mutiga, Crisis Group’s Africa program director, to discuss the outcome of Kenya’s closely fought, high-stakes election.  

Kenyans went to the polls last week in what turned out to be a closely fought but so far strikingly peaceful election. After six tense days of vote counting, Deputy President William Ruto was declared Kenya’s next President with a wafer-thin majority. While the election has been broadly regarded as free and fair, his challenger, Raila Odinga, a political heavyweight backed by outgoing President and former rival Uhuru Kenyatta, has launched a legal challenge to the results. 

This week on The Horn, Alan speaks to Murithi Mutiga, Crisis Group’s Program Director for Africa, to discuss how Kenya’s nail-biting election has shaped up and the possible fallout of Odinga’s challenge. They outline both candidates' backgrounds and assess their respective campaigns in the build-up to election day. They talk about the significance of Odinga’s challenge to the vote, the role of Kenya’s electoral commission and the resilience of the country's democratic institutions in the wake of the election. They also assess how far ethnic divisions have played a role in the outcome of the election and where Kenya’s democracy might be headed if Ruto’s presidency is confirmed by the Supreme Court. 

Click here to listen on Apple Podcasts or Spotify

For more analyses, check out Crisis Group’s Kenya country page.

We want to hear from you as we start preparing Season Four of The Horn! If you have any feedback or suggestions for topics you’d like us to cover next season, you can write to podcasts@crisisgroup.org or get in touch with Alan directly on Twitter, @AlanBoswell.

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