琼莱的部族冲突:化解苏丹南部的不安全因素
琼莱的部族冲突:化解苏丹南部的不安全因素
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Report 154 / Africa

琼莱的部族冲突:化解苏丹南部的不安全因素

执行摘要

2009年,苏丹南部的部族冲突导致数千人丧生,而在土地辽阔但几乎道路不通的琼莱省境内及周边,暴力事件尤为肆虐。袭击一般多发生在畜牧区,但在琼莱,新的危险的政治因素开始涌动。在过去的一年中,该地区的死亡人数超过了达尔富尔,约35万人流离失所。南苏丹政府应该认识到冲突的本质是当地矛盾,应行使政府职能,证明政府有保护地区安全的能力,否则这些问题将成为实现自治的主要路障。同时,国际伙伴应提供大力支持,否则在苏丹即将进行全国大选和就自治问题举行全民公决之即,其南部将进一步陷入动乱。

琼莱土地面积为12万平方公里,人口为130万,是苏丹南部十省中最大的省,也是世界最落后的地区之一。该省境内许多民族以放牧为生,过着随季节迁徙,逐水草而居的游牧生活,因此,冲突的导火索常常是因抢夺水源和牧草或者偷牛行径引发的争执。同时,该地区居民具有强烈的部落主义思想,常认为政府对本部落待遇不公。另外,道路和基础设施几乎不存在,食品供应普遍得不到保障,土地纠纷不断以及司法资源稀缺,种种因素加剧了各部族间的矛盾。2009年琼莱境内和周边冲突不断升级,各部落间已经埋下了猜忌的种子,而2010年初旱季的迁徙活动可能重新点燃新一轮的大规模斗争。

许多人认为首都喀土穆的苏丹政府是南部暴力事件的幕后主使,因此这些冲突染上了政治色彩,并产生了新的力量变化。鉴于执政的全国大会党有挑起动乱的前科,因此对当局的猜疑并非完全毫无根据。但是,尽管2009年发生的部落斗争伤亡日趋惨重,目前还没有证据证明苏丹政府在暗中煽风点火。由于暴力冲突覆盖面广,该地区边界防守松懈,而且南苏丹政府能力有限,因此不能完全排除外部干涉的可能性,但南苏丹政府应避免将北方政府作为替罪羊,而应该专注于提高自身执政能力,加强安全,促进和解。

虽然南方各部落都希望南苏丹获得独立,但他们的地域和部落认同感远大于国家意识。部落认同感是南方政治的核心,琼莱也不例外。暴力的升级深化了各部落及其首领间的分歧,而且有的头领正利用冲突来谋求私利。在琼莱的政治较量和背后的主使人物可能也与对南苏丹政权和广大南部地区控制权的争夺纠结不清。由于2010年4月的全国选举及2011年1月的自治公决日益临近,政治斗争可能将更加激化,但部落首领应该掂量部落分化的后果和南部团结的益处。想要成功地建立一个新的国家,部落间必须加强合作。

和南部其它大部分地区一样,琼莱境内武器泛滥,而且居民对战争中的累累罪行仍然记忆犹新。为了停止民族间的暴力争斗,南苏丹政府视解除平民武装为头等大事。虽然之前在这方面作出的努力收效甚微,甚至引发了更多的冲突,但政府即将开始新一轮行动。尽管收缴平民武器的必要性不容置疑,但政府很可能动用武力,后果令人担忧。除非各族同时解除武装,而且政府在收缴完毕后立即提供充分的安全保障,否则各部落将违抗命令。由于各部落不相信政府,也不相信邻近部落,因此都认为安全保障必须靠自己。政府安全部队很可能会遭遇小区域顽强抵抗。许多官员承认武器收缴会造成人员伤亡,但却声称这是为长远利益所付出的必要代价。

南苏丹政府是一个新生的政权,尽管仍不稳固而且能力有限,却仍在竭尽全力地处理大量亟待解决的问题。虽然安全部门改革在政务日程中应享受优先地位,但政府一直过度依赖军队。据宪法规定,南苏丹警察署应该是负责国内安全的主要部门,但却极端无能,因此军队自然而然担负起了处理部族纷争的责任。然而,军队的插手也有副作用——行动缺乏统一协调的指导政策,利用军事行动来处理执法问题过于粗暴,因此带来了混乱,引发了民怨,军队的积极作用也打了折扣。提高警察和军队的素质需要长期的投资,但要在短期内填补安全漏洞,南苏丹政府、捐助国和联合国都必须马上行动,否则南苏丹将发生更多的流血冲突,陷入更深的动荡。

朱巴的南苏丹政府正全力同全国大会党就一系列问题——尤其是大选和自治公决的细则——进行谈判。提防《全面和平协议》的签约伙伴破坏或操纵自决权投票已经是一项艰巨的任务,但同时还要注意南苏丹内部可能发生的问题。如果南苏丹政府的安全机构能发挥更明显的作用,南南和解能取得进展,那么就能阻止部族间分歧继续扩大,提高南苏丹政府对内对外的自信,并且有助于驳斥全国大会党所宣称的“南部没有能力自治”的说辞。

 

朱巴/内罗毕/布鲁塞尔,20091223

Executive Summary

Conflicts among tribes have claimed several thousand lives in South Sudan in 2009, with the worst violence in and around the vast, often impassable state of Jonglei. Violence often afflicts pastoral communities, but in this area it has taken on a new and dangerously politicised character. With the death toll over the past year exceeding that in Darfur and displacement affecting more than 350,000 people, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) should recognise the primarily local nature of the conflicts, extend state authority and prove itself a credible provider of security lest the problems become major obstacles on the road to self-determination and beyond. International partners must simultaneously step up their support or risk seeing the South become increasing unstable ahead of national elections and the self-deter­mina­tion referendum.

Jonglei is the largest of South Sudan’s ten states, comprising some 120,000 square kilometres. Home to 1.3 million inhabitants, it is also among the most underdeveloped regions in the world. Multiple ethnic communities migrate seasonally to sustain cattle and preserve their pastoralist way of life. Access to water and grazing areas, as well as cattle rustling, are thus primary triggers of conflict. Tensions between communities are aggravated by pervasive tribalism and perceptions of state bias, the virtual absence of roads and infrastructure, widespread food insecurity, land disputes and limited access to justice. The escalating conflict cycles witnessed in and around Jonglei in 2009 have sown deep mistrust, and movement during the dry season could reignite large-scale conflict early in 2010.

Perceptions that Khartoum is instigating violence have politicised conflict in the South and created new conflict dynamics. While such perceptions are plausible given the National Congress Party’s (NCP) historical policies of destabilisation, there is little evidence to substantiate claims of involvement in the year’s increasingly deadly tribal confrontations. The size of the territory involved, porous borders and limited GoSS capacity make it impossible to rule out external interference, but the government must avoid using Khartoum as a scapegoat and instead focus on improving its capacity to provide security and promote reconciliation.

Despite a shared goal of independence, local and tribal identities remain stronger than any sense of national consciousness in South Sudan. Tribal identities are central to politics, and Jonglei is no exception. The escalation of violence has deepened divisions among its communities and its leaders, some of whom may be manipulating conflict to their own ends. Politics and the personalities driving them in Jonglei may also be related to a broader competition for control in Juba and across the South. Political jockeying is likely to intensify as elections scheduled for April 2010 and the referendum that must be held by early January 2011 approach, but leaders should work to unite, not just until 2011 but beyond. They need to weigh the consequences of tribal posturing against the benefits of a united South, since greater cooperation is necessary if they are to forge a new and viable state.

Like much of the South, Jonglei is awash with weapons, and the memory of crimes committed during the war is still fresh. Under pressure to halt ethnic violence, civilian disarmament is a top GoSS priority. Although previous operations to disarm the population yielded limited results or stimulated further conflict, another campaign is imminent. While the need to remove arms from the hands of civilians is paramount, a campaign in which force is likely to be used is cause for serious concern. Unless ethnic groups are disarmed simultaneously and adequate security is provided in the wake of the campaign, communities will be reluctant to comply. Lack of trust in government and neighbour alike means communities feel the need to guarantee their own security. Thus, security forces are likely to encounter pockets of serious resistance. Many authorities acknowledge that lives will be lost but say this is a price that must be paid for the long-term benefits of disarmament.

A young and fragile GoSS is doing its best to address a large number of priorities with limited capacity. Security sector reform is one that belongs high on the agenda, but attention has focused disproportionately on the army. The South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) – constitutionally and properly the principal institution for addressing domestic security concerns – is of abysmal quality, so the army has by default been obliged to respond to tribal clashes. But its intervention has not been without drawbacks. An inconsistent policy on engagement and a sometimes too blunt military approach to law enforcement have sometimes created confusion and resentment, limiting what might otherwise be a productive presence. Long-term investments are essential to improve both the army and the police, but near-term security gaps require immediate action from the GoSS, donors and the UN alike if the South is to avoid further bloodshed and resulting instability.

Juba has its hands full negotiating a variety of issues with the NCP, not least the details of the elections and referendum. Keeping its partner in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) from undermining the self-determination vote or otherwise manipulating these processes is a Herculean order in itself. But it must also focus internally. A more visible state security presence and some gains on South-South reconciliation could prevent further division along tribal lines, bolster both internal and external confidence in the GoSS and help refute Khartoum’s claim that “the South cannot govern itself”.

Juba/Nairobi/Brussels, 23 December 2009

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