Report / Africa 3 minutes

南苏丹:不叫“内战”的内战

执行摘要

2013年12月15日,世界上最年轻的国家陷入内战。持续的交战造成1万多人丧生、超过1百万人流离失所,还有更多人面临人道主义危机的威胁。南苏丹人民和国际社会对防止或中止这场冲突束手无策:南苏丹的盟国对调解苏丹人民解放运动内部领导层的分歧几乎未作任何努力。苏丹人民解放运动及其军队苏丹人民解放军自独立战争以来就存在分歧,而且未得以解决,两方很快因此决裂,导致苏丹人民解放军反对派的成立。如果没有乌干达、叛军盟军和民兵组织的干预,苏丹人民解放军就无法控制朱巴或夺回被占领土。这场战争有可能让这个国家分裂加剧,并将周边国家卷入其中。解决冲突需要的并不是速效之计,而是国内外持之以恒的努力。国家的治理,包括苏丹人民解放运动和苏丹人民解放军的改革以其与民众关系等问题,必须受到关注。在这一过程中,宗教领袖、族群领袖、公民社会和妇女的作用至关重要,因此他们的参与不可或缺。

虽然引发冲突的苏丹人民解放运动内部的分歧主要是政治性质的,但针对种族的攻击、族群的动员和螺旋上升的暴力行为很快就导致针对平民的骇人暴行,包括教堂和医院内的故意杀人事件。总统卫队和其他安全部门的丁卡成员参与了内战初期在朱巴发生的针对努维尔人的有组织的暴力活动。作为回应,包括努维尔白军在内的武装分子在十几个地点展开了针对丁卡和其他平民的袭击。冲突正在卷入其他族群,外国势力加大干涉力度的可能性日渐上升。

区域性组织——东非政府间发展组织(伊加特)很快做出了回应。塞尤姆·梅斯芬大使(埃塞俄比亚)、拉扎罗·苏姆贝伊沃将军(肯尼亚)和默罕穆德·艾哈迈德·穆斯塔法·艾达比将军(苏丹)等三位特使穿梭于朱巴、和谈举行地亚的斯亚贝巴和反对派控制地区之间,并经过数周的施压和谈判,取得了停火。然而,停火几乎立刻遭到违反。由于监管与核查代表团在冲突地区难以立足,战火持续燃烧。

同为伊加特成员的南苏丹邻国乌干达,以及与苏丹的武装反对派有关联的一些武装力量(最突出的是公义平等运动)在冲突伊始就出手干预以支持南苏丹政府。这可能导致苏丹政府对反南苏丹政府的苏丹人民解放军提供支持。已公布的组建由伊加特领导的武装力量的计划将加大南苏丹内战进一步卷入地区势力的可能性,而且这些计划在授权范围、人员组成和资金来源等方面存在重大问题。

联合国南苏丹共和国特派团(联合国特派团)目前接纳了大约7万名由于种族报复行动而出逃的平民,但是其维和部队完全无法与数以千计全副武装的部队和民兵组织相匹敌,并且已经遭受了攻击,在琼格莱州一名维和士兵为保护平民而丧生。在至少5个地点,寻求保护的南苏丹平民在联合国特派团基地或基地附近遭武装分子袭击杀害。政府官员和一些反对派指挥官对联合国特派团日益激烈的言辞攻击,以及对其活动范围的限制加大了特派团工作的挑战。面对重重困境的联合国特派团重新界定了获权任务的轻重先后,实际上是把这个国家分成了两部分:在其中一部分保持公正,却在另一部分支持政府。这一决定无法让南苏丹人明确理解特派团的角色,因此需要在更新授权之前对其再做斟酌。

由于和谈陷入僵局,内战继续肆虐。为了防止发生更大的灾难,南苏丹领导人及其国际伙伴需要考虑对政府进行彻底重组。仅仅是通过几次政治对话和一点权力共享来抛光朱巴政府合法性使其勉力支撑,并不会结束冲突。必须邀请新的群体参与全国性对话并尊重他们的观点,这不仅仅局限于苏丹人民解放运动/军内部争权夺利的各派力量,还应包括其他武装组织和对政府不满的族群,以及整体上扩大妇女和公民社会的参与。这些群体对于重建苏丹人民解放运动,在党内外扩大民主空间,起草国家宪法和筹备令人信服的国家选举等进程都至关重要。内战前为这些任务设定的日程表已经不具可行性。政治承诺必须适应与新的现实。南苏丹的上层精英和族群之间以及他们各自内部需要从根本上重新界定国家治理协议,才能通过协商达成解决方案以保证持久的和平。

亚的斯亚贝巴/朱巴/内罗毕/布鲁塞尔,2014年4月10日

Executive Summary

On 15 December 2013 the world’s newest state descended into civil war. Continuing fighting has displaced more than 1,000,000 and killed over 10,000 while a humanitarian crisis threatens many more. Both South Sudanese and the international community were ill-prepared to prevent or halt the conflict: the nation’s closest allies did little to mediate leadership divisions within the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM). The SPLM and its army (SPLA) quickly split along divisions largely unaddressed from the independence war, resulting in the formation of the SPLA in Opposition. Were it not for the intervention of Uganda and allied rebel and militia groups, the SPLA would likely not have been able to hold Juba or recapture lost territory. The war risks tearing the country further apart and is pulling in regional states. Resolving the conflict requires not a quick fix but sustained domestic and international commitment. Governance, including SPLM and SPLA reform and communal relations, must be on the table. Religious and community leaders, civil society and women are critical to this process and must not be excluded.

Although the dispute within the SPLM that led to the conflict was primarily political, ethnic targeting, communal mobilisation and spiralling violence quickly led to appalling levels of brutality against civilians, including deliberate killings inside churches and hospitals. Dinka elements of the Presidential Guard and other security organs engaged in systematic violence against Nuer in Juba in the early days. Armed actors, including the Nuer White Army, responded by targeting Dinka and other civilians in more than a dozen locations. Other communities are being drawn into the conflict and there is an increasing possibility of more significant foreign intervention.

The regional organisation, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), responded quickly. Three envoys, Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin (Ethiopia), General Lazarus Sumbeiywo (Kenya) and General Mohammed Ahmed Mustafa al-Dhabi (Sudan) shuttled between Juba, Addis Ababa, where peace talks have been held, and opposition-controlled territory and, after weeks of pressure and negotiation, obtained a cessation of hostilities. However, this was violated almost immediately, and fighting continues, as a monitoring and verification mission struggles to establish itself on the ground.

Neighbouring Uganda (also an IGAD member), as well as forces associated with Sudanese armed opposition groups, notably the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), intervened early in support of the South Sudanese government. That in turn may yet trigger Sudan government support to the SPLA in Opposition. Announced plans for an IGAD-led force, about which there are critical mandate, composition and funding questions, raises the prospect of even greater regional involvement in the civil war.

The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is hosting almost 70,000 civilians fleeing ethnic reprisals, but its badly outgunned peacekeepers are no match for the thousands of heavily armed forces and militias. It has already come under attack, including a fatal one in Jonglei, while protecting civilians. In at least five locations, South Sudanese seeking protection have been targeted and killed by armed actors in or around UNMISS bases. Increasingly hostile rhetoric from government officials and some opposition commanders and limitations on its freedom of movement are additional challenges. The reprioritisation of its mandated tasks has essentially divided the country in two for the beleaguered UNMISS: it remains impartial in one part, while supporting the government in another. This decision will do little to clarify its role for South Sudanese and should be reviewed before the mandate is renewed.

As peace talks stall, the civil war rages on. To prevent further catastrophe, the country’s leaders and its international partners need to consider a radical restructuring of the state. Propping up the government in Juba and polishing its legitimacy with a dose of political dialogue and a dash of power sharing will not end the conflict. New constituencies have to be admitted to a national dialogue and their perspectives respected, including armed groups and disaffected communities that go beyond the contending forces within the SPLM/A, as well as women and civil society more generally. These constituencies are critical to rebuilding the SPLM, increasing democratic space within and beyond the party, drafting a national constitution and preparing for credible national elections. If these processes are to be viable, they will not be able to proceed according to the pre-war timeline. Political commitments must match the new realities. The country needs fundamental reworking of the governance agreement between and within elites and communities if a negotiated settlement is to lead to a sustainable peace.

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