制止尼日利亚的暴力(一):乔斯危机
制止尼日利亚的暴力(一):乔斯危机
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Report 196 / Africa

制止尼日利亚的暴力(一):乔斯危机

执行摘要

自2001年以来,地处尼日利亚中间地带的高原州首府乔斯市爆发了暴力冲突。从表面上看,冲突的焦点是原住民比罗姆人/阿纳古塔人/阿非兹人(Berom/Anaguta/Afizere,BAA)与豪萨-富拉尼(Hausa-Fulani)定居者之间关于土地、权力和资源的“权利”之争。原住民与定居者之间的冲突在尼日利亚不是一个新问题,但是该国目前正在发生广泛的种族冲突,这对中间地带有着重要的影响。尼日利亚原本想要通过修宪,让基础广泛的公民身份优先于独有的原住民身份,并保证公民权利由居住地而非原住民身份决定。但是修宪的努力失败了,结果导致了乔斯危机。原住民与定居者之间的冲突继续破坏着安全形势,修改宪法是化解冲突的重要一步。修宪的同时必须立即采取措施,查明并起诉在乔斯或者其它地方的施暴者。要想结束族群冲突,本地、州和联邦的精英分子也必须始终如一地采取措施,旨在减少民族归属感和获取资源、权力和安全这二者之间的危险联结。

原住民原则意味着一些群体控制了其所在州的权力和资源或者是当地政府所在区(local government areas,LGAs)的权力和资源,而其他人——因各种原因迁徙至此的外地人——则被排除在外。这不但引发了民众的不满,还带来了激烈的政治竞争,而这些竞争又往往会导致暴力事件的发生。原住民原则在1960年国家独立时获得了宪法效力,以保护少数族裔不被人口更多的豪萨-富拉尼族、伊博族(Igbo)和约鲁巴族(Yoruba)所支配,并保存他们的文化和政治身份以及传统的治理制度。宗教是一个相关的但却是次要的因素,会加深潜在的紧张局势,多年来也具有愈加重要的意义,尤其是自1999年5月恢复民主以来更是如此。以民族动员和暴力为特征的激烈而不受管制的政治竞争,再加上不善的治理、政府对经济控制的放宽以及猖獗的腐败,已经严重加剧了种族之间、宗教之间和地区之间的分裂。国家公民的观念似乎已经被种族和血统所取代。

高原州的定居者和原住民之间的冲突从未间断过,反映出BAA(其中包括一小部分穆斯林)仍然对豪萨-富拉尼族心怀不满,认为他们被豪萨-富拉尼族当成了二等公民来对待,这种不满情绪由来已久。以穆斯林主的远北地区曾企图征服以基督徒为主的中间地带,遭到了后者的顽强抵抗,这段历史让中间地带极富盛名,中间地带的人们对没有正常公民权的体会比其它任何地区都要深刻。BAA的政治企图是拧转所谓的历史压迫者对他们的歧视,而夺回他们作为高原州原住民的权利是贯穿此政治企图的主基调。相反,豪萨-富拉尼族声称他们才是乔斯真正的原住民,而不是BAA;在最大的LGA区乔斯北部,他们虽然是人口最多的族群,但却无法获得权力和资源,对此他们也心存不满。

由于定居者几乎全是穆斯林,而原住民则主要是基督徒,关于土地所有权、经济资源和政治控制权的斗争往往不仅限于种族方面,还体现在宗教方面。在所有的定居者中,只有豪萨-富拉尼族要求得到对乔斯的所有权,这使得冲突加剧。随着暴力的一再发生,空间上的两极分化和隔离加剧了社会和政治分歧;人们更加意识到地方的团结和忠诚,也更加愿意表达这种情绪。

自2010年年底以来,针对教堂和安全目标发生了恐怖袭击和自杀式炸弹袭击,乔斯的安全局势进一步恶化。这些袭击的犯罪嫌疑人是伊斯兰组织博科圣地的激进分子,该组织曾在北部掀起了一场前所未有的恐怖袭击浪潮。在2010年年底以来的袭击中,已有数千人被杀害,成千上万的民众在国内流离失所,数十亿美元的财产被毁坏。

到目前为止,地方和国家当局的大多数应对措施已被证明是无效的。这些应对措施分为三种。第一,任命一些司法调查委员会调查“危机的根源”并提出“持久的解决方案”的建议。但是当局却迟迟未能发布相关的调查报告,也没有及时根据委员会的建议行事。口气强硬的公开演讲并没有被转化为切实的针对煽动者和肇事者的政治行动:委员会提出的嫌疑人没有一个被起诉,有罪不罚的现象则继续成为暴力活动的温床。

第二种应对措施是出动警察和采取军事行动,这并没有取得什么成功。安全部队不仅无法在其内部之间共享情报,而且还涉嫌偏袒冲突的某一方,一些士兵还被指控贩卖枪支来获利。第三种措施是彩虹行动(Operation Rainbow,OR),这是自2010年6月以来联邦政府和高原州政府联合发起的一项行动,并得到了联合国发展计划署(UNDP)的支持。它被认为是一项全面应对危机的措施。彩虹行动仍然处于起步阶段,它看起来似乎会发挥作用,但前提条件是该行动至少能赢得冲突双方的信心。当局应当在基层对该行动进行宣传,以此来获得人民的认可。

高原州的危机既需要国家也需要地方采取措施来解决。宪法条款中关于获得公民权利的内容在“原住民”(宪法并未对该词给出一个令人满意的定义)和“居留”这两个词上含糊不清,这对澄清当前局势几乎没有起到什么作用。目前尼日利亚关于其公民权(或者国民)问题的构想和执行存在不足和缺陷。解决这个问题的出路在于国民议会,首先要就这个问题举行全国性的公众听证会,然后通过召集一次全民公决或者是通过议会本身,用更具包容性的居留条款取代现有的原住民原则,以解决定居者和原住民之间的歧视和不平等问题,同时,有意识地立即采取步骤来缓和少数民族的担忧。

在州一级的层面,现任高原州政府应改变其执政方式。如果只是使用权力为原住民群体服务的话,这届州政府不可能再继续执政下去。高原州政府应当效法索科托州政府,在国家宪法改革出台之前就废除教育和就业领域中存在于原住民和定居者之间的歧视性政策。否则,政治分歧将变得更为严重,不幸的民众将遭受更多痛苦,州的发展——以及不可避免地,国家的发展——将会受到损害。

达喀尔⁄布鲁塞尔,2012年12月17日

Executive Summary

Since 2001, violence has erupted in Jos city, capital of Plateau state, in Nigeria’s Middle Belt region. The ostensible dispute is over the “rights” of the indigene Berom/
Anaguta/Afizere (BAA) group and the rival claims of the Hausa-Fulani settlers to land, power and resources. Indigene-settler conflicts are not new to Nigeria, but the country is currently experiencing widespread intercommunal strife, which particularly affects the Middle Belt. The Jos crisis is the result of failure to amend the constitution to privilege broad-based citizenship over exclusive indigene status and ensure that residency rather than indigeneity determines citizens’ rights. Constitutional change is an important step to defuse indigene-settler rivalries that continue to undermine security. It must be accompanied by immediate steps to identify and prosecute perpetrators of violence, in Jos and other parts of the country. Elites at local, state and federal level must also consistently implement policies aimed at reducing the dangerous link between ethnic belonging and access to resources, power and security if intercommunal violence is to end.

The indigene principle, or indigeneity (that is, local origin), means that some groups control power and resources in states or local government areas (LGAs) while others – who have migrated for different reasons – are excluded. This gives rise both to grievances and fierce political competition, which too often lead to violence. Indigeneity was given constitutional force at independence in 1960 to protect the ethnic minorities from being submerged by the larger Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba groups and preserve their cultural and political identity and traditional institutions of governance. Religion is a pertinent, albeit secondary factor, which reinforces underlying tension and, over the years, has assumed greater importance, especially since the return of democracy in May 1999. Fierce and unregulated political competition characterised by ethnic mobilisation and violence, coupled with poor governance, economic deregulation and rampant corruption, have severely exacerbated ethnic, religious and regional fault lines. The notion of national citizenship appears to have been abrogated by both ethnicity and ancestry.

The persistent settler-indigene conflict in Plateau state reflects the longstanding sense of grievance the BAA, including a small Muslim community among them, continue to nurse against their perceived treatment as second-class citizens by the Hausa-Fulani. The predominantly Christian Middle Belt, famous for its history of bitter struggle against attempts by the Muslim-dominated Far North to subjugate it, understands the citizenship malaise better than any other region. Reclaiming their rights, as the indigenous peoples of Plateau state, is the dominant narrative that runs through the BAA’s attempted politics of reverse discrimination against their perceived ancient oppressors. Conversely, the Hausa-Fulani claim that they, not the BAA, are the authentic indigenes of Jos and have been aggrieved about their lack of access to power and resources despite being the majority in the biggest of the LGAs, Jos North.

Because the settlers are almost entirely Muslim and the indigenous people predominantly Christian, struggle over land ownership, economic resources and political control tends to be expressed not just in ethnic but also religious terms. The dispute is compounded by the fact that, of the settler groups, only the Hausa-Fulani lay proprietary claim to Jos. As violence recurs, spatial polarisation and segregation accentuate social and political divisions; people become more conscious of their sub-national solidarity and allegiances and are more forthcoming about expressing them.

Since the end of 2010, security has further deteriorated in Jos because of terror attacks and suicide bombings against churches and security targets by suspected militants of Boko Haram, the Islamist group responsible for an unprecedented wave of terrorist attacks in the north. Thousands have been killed, hundreds of thousands have been displaced internally and billions of dollars of property have been destroyed.

Thus far, responses from local and national authorities have proven mostly ineffective. They have come in three ways. First, several judicial commissions of inquiry have been appointed to “get to the root of the crises” and recommend “lasting solutions”. But authorities have been slow in publishing reports and acting on their recommendations. Tough public speeches have not been translated into tangible political action against instigators and perpetrators: none of the suspects named by the various commissions have been prosecuted, and impunity continues to feed violence.

The second response is police and military action, which has had little success. Security forces not only fail to share intelligence among themselves, they are also suspected of taking sides in the conflict and soldiers are accused of trading guns for money. Finally, Operation Rainbow (OR), a joint initiative since June 2010 between the federal government and the Plateau state government with support from the UN Development Programme (UNDP), is considered a holistic response to the crisis. Still in its infancy, OR appears useful but will only be effective if it can, at the minimum, win the confidence of both sides. It should be publicised at the grassroots so that the population can own it.

The crisis in Plateau requires both national and local solutions. Constitutional provisions, by virtue of their ambiguity over the terms “indigene” (which the constitution fails to define satisfactorily) and “residency” for accessing citizenship rights, have done little to clarify the situation. Nigeria’s current conception and implementation of its citizenship (or national) question are inadequate and flawed. The way forward is for the National Assembly, via a referendum or by itself, following its nationwide public hearings on the matter, to replace the indigene principle with a more inclusive residency provision to fight discrimination and inequalities between settler and indigenous communities while consciously taking immediate steps to assuage the fears of ethnic minorities.

At the state level, the current Plateau government should change its approach. It can no longer carry on as if it is in power to serve only indigenous communities. It should not wait for national constitutional reform before abolishing discriminatory policies on education and employment between indigenes and settlers, as did the Sokoto state government. Otherwise, political differences will harden further, more pain will be inflicted on the hapless population, and the state’s – and, invariably, the country’s – development will be impaired.

Dakar/Brussels, 17 December 2012

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