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Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Briefing 138 / Asia

印度尼西亚:藐视中央政权

I. 概述

印度尼西亚在分权制度下成立的地方机构,正在违背国家最高法院的判决却不受到惩罚、破坏司法权威和纵容地方冲突恶化。区议会、市长和地方选举委员会已经意识到,忽视法院对于选举纠纷或者宗教纠纷的裁决并不会有什么损失,因此他们反倒会去迎合地方选区和压力集团。总统果断的领导力可能会使事态有所改变;相反,雅加达方面缓慢且无效的回应会助长更多的不服从行为。如果地方对于他们获得的新权力过分自信,并且中央政府继续作出薄弱回应的话,那么这种对法治缺乏承诺的行为可能会在2014年总统选举之前,国家政治紧张局势加剧的这段时期内导致更多的冲突事件。

地方官员藐视法庭的问题是印尼1998年之后实施民主化进程所采取的两个步骤的直接后果。一个步骤是1999年“大爆炸”式的分权,将政治和财政权力下放至省级以下部门:区(kabupaten)和市/直辖市(kota)。第二个步骤是2005年开始实行地方行政长官直选,包括区长(bupat))和市长(walikota)。这两个步骤对巩固印尼的民主都至关重要,但两个因素加在一起,就造就了权力非常强大的地方政权,他们既不对中央政府心存感激,也不总是不会觉得有必要去服从国家两个最高级别法院的裁定。

最高法院(Mahkamah Agung)是对大多数民事和刑事案件实行终审的法院,同时它也会受理对由国家行政法院(Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara)裁定的案件提出的上诉,对国家官员或国家机构的决定进行的投诉由国家行政法院来裁决。2008年成立的宪法法院(Mahkamah Konstitusi)已经成为对地方上有争议的选举结果的唯一仲裁者。最高法院和宪法法院的地位是平等的;两个法院的裁定都是具有约束力的最终决定。但是,应当如何执行这些裁定或者说对不执行裁定的行为如何进行有效的惩罚,却都没有一个明晰的政策。

有三件事例证明了这一点。在中加里曼丹省的西哥打瓦林勒区,2010年7月宪法法院依据贿买选票的指控取消了该县地方选举获胜者的资格,并裁定在竞选中落败的现任地方长官获选连任。这个裁定可能是有争议的,但为了维护司法权威,也应当予以执行。但是,当地的县议会却把裁定视为雅加达对当地选举的一种干涉,而拒绝接受。两年多之后,由于受到当地的抵制,被宪法法院裁定获选的区长仍无法上任。在西爪哇省的茂物市和勿加泗区,当地官员拒绝允许建造教堂,尽管最高法院裁定当地政府封锁有争议的建造地点的行为是毫无根据的。

在所有这三个事例中,当出现判决得不到执行而引发的紧张局势有演变成暴力行为——这种情况时有发生——的威胁时,中央政府所采取的最积极的行动也仅是派遣一名官员前去尝试在出现纷争的党派之间协商出一种折衷的办法。即便是如此,雅加达也仅仅会在这类地方冲突已经成为全国关注的焦点时才会采取行动。

但是如果两个法院有任何的权威的话,作为国家最高行政长官的总统需要采取比鼓励折衷行为更积极的举措。他手上有其它一些可以利用的工具:颁布总统令;扣留给地方政权的基金;直接进行个人游说以及有策略地利用媒体进行宣传。纵容地方官员藐视最高法院不仅仅会破坏解决地方争端的前景,还会传递出一种信息,那就是大多数人的权力可以凌驾于司法机构之上,这样会鼓励暴徒行为,让少数群体感到无法依靠国家来保护他们从而心存恐惧,最终会破坏印尼的民主。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2012年8月30日

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

Originally published in The Interpreter

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.