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Briefing 138 / Asia

印度尼西亚:藐视中央政权

I. 概述

印度尼西亚在分权制度下成立的地方机构,正在违背国家最高法院的判决却不受到惩罚、破坏司法权威和纵容地方冲突恶化。区议会、市长和地方选举委员会已经意识到,忽视法院对于选举纠纷或者宗教纠纷的裁决并不会有什么损失,因此他们反倒会去迎合地方选区和压力集团。总统果断的领导力可能会使事态有所改变;相反,雅加达方面缓慢且无效的回应会助长更多的不服从行为。如果地方对于他们获得的新权力过分自信,并且中央政府继续作出薄弱回应的话,那么这种对法治缺乏承诺的行为可能会在2014年总统选举之前,国家政治紧张局势加剧的这段时期内导致更多的冲突事件。

地方官员藐视法庭的问题是印尼1998年之后实施民主化进程所采取的两个步骤的直接后果。一个步骤是1999年“大爆炸”式的分权,将政治和财政权力下放至省级以下部门:区(kabupaten)和市/直辖市(kota)。第二个步骤是2005年开始实行地方行政长官直选,包括区长(bupat))和市长(walikota)。这两个步骤对巩固印尼的民主都至关重要,但两个因素加在一起,就造就了权力非常强大的地方政权,他们既不对中央政府心存感激,也不总是不会觉得有必要去服从国家两个最高级别法院的裁定。

最高法院(Mahkamah Agung)是对大多数民事和刑事案件实行终审的法院,同时它也会受理对由国家行政法院(Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara)裁定的案件提出的上诉,对国家官员或国家机构的决定进行的投诉由国家行政法院来裁决。2008年成立的宪法法院(Mahkamah Konstitusi)已经成为对地方上有争议的选举结果的唯一仲裁者。最高法院和宪法法院的地位是平等的;两个法院的裁定都是具有约束力的最终决定。但是,应当如何执行这些裁定或者说对不执行裁定的行为如何进行有效的惩罚,却都没有一个明晰的政策。

有三件事例证明了这一点。在中加里曼丹省的西哥打瓦林勒区,2010年7月宪法法院依据贿买选票的指控取消了该县地方选举获胜者的资格,并裁定在竞选中落败的现任地方长官获选连任。这个裁定可能是有争议的,但为了维护司法权威,也应当予以执行。但是,当地的县议会却把裁定视为雅加达对当地选举的一种干涉,而拒绝接受。两年多之后,由于受到当地的抵制,被宪法法院裁定获选的区长仍无法上任。在西爪哇省的茂物市和勿加泗区,当地官员拒绝允许建造教堂,尽管最高法院裁定当地政府封锁有争议的建造地点的行为是毫无根据的。

在所有这三个事例中,当出现判决得不到执行而引发的紧张局势有演变成暴力行为——这种情况时有发生——的威胁时,中央政府所采取的最积极的行动也仅是派遣一名官员前去尝试在出现纷争的党派之间协商出一种折衷的办法。即便是如此,雅加达也仅仅会在这类地方冲突已经成为全国关注的焦点时才会采取行动。

但是如果两个法院有任何的权威的话,作为国家最高行政长官的总统需要采取比鼓励折衷行为更积极的举措。他手上有其它一些可以利用的工具:颁布总统令;扣留给地方政权的基金;直接进行个人游说以及有策略地利用媒体进行宣传。纵容地方官员藐视最高法院不仅仅会破坏解决地方争端的前景,还会传递出一种信息,那就是大多数人的权力可以凌驾于司法机构之上,这样会鼓励暴徒行为,让少数群体感到无法依靠国家来保护他们从而心存恐惧,最终会破坏印尼的民主。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2012年8月30日

Briefing 139 / Asia

印度尼西亚:亚齐旗帜引发紧张局势

A dispute over a flag in Aceh is testing the limits of autonomy, irritating Indonesia’s central government, heightening ethnic tensions, reviving a campaign for the division of the province and raising fears of violence as the 2014 national elections approach.
 

I. Overview

The decision of the Aceh provincial government to adopt the banner of the former rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) as its official provincial flag is testing the limits of autonomy, irritating Jakarta, heightening ethnic and political tensions, reviving a campaign for the division of Aceh and raising fears of violence as a national election approaches in 2014.

On 25 March 2013, the provincial legislature adopted a regulation (qanun) making the GAM’s old banner the provincial flag. It was immediately signed by Governor Zaini Abdullah. The governor and deputy governor are members of Partai Aceh, the political party set up by former rebel leaders in 2008 that also controls the legislature.

The central government, seeing the flag as a separatist symbol and thus in violation of national law, immediately raised objections and asked for changes. Partai Aceh leaders, seeing the flag as a potent tool for mass mobilisation in 2014, have refused, arguing that it cannot be a separatist symbol if GAM explicitly recognised Indonesian sovereignty as part of the Helsinki peace agreement in 2005 that ended a nearly 30-year insurgency. Partai Aceh believes that if it remains firm, Jakarta will eventually concede, as it did in 2012 over an election dispute.

Indonesian President Yudhoyono’s government is torn. On the one hand, it does not want a fight with the GAM leaders; the 2005 peace agreement is the most important achievement of a president who, in his final term, is very much concerned about his legacy. It also is unwilling to provoke GAM too far, fearful that it will return to conflict, a fear many in Aceh discount as unwarranted but one that Partai Aceh has exploited with relish. On the other hand, it does not want to be branded as anti-nationalist as the 2014 election looms, especially as some in the security forces remain convinced that GAM has not given up the goal of independence and is using democratic means to pursue it. The president and his advisers also know that if they allow the GAM flag to fly, it will have repercussions in Papua, where dozens of pro-independence activists remain jailed for flying the “Morning Star” flag of the independence movement.

GAM leaders see little to lose by standing their ground. The flag is a hugely emotive symbol, and defying Jakarta is generally a winning stance locally. Some individual members of parliament see it as a way of regaining waning popularity for failing to deliver anything substantive to their constituencies. Also, Partai Aceh took a controversial decision to partner with Gerindra, the party of former army General Prabowo Subianto, for the 2014 election. Leaders like Muzakir Manaf, deputy governor and former commander of GAM’s armed wing, may want to use the flag issue to show they have not compromised their principles by allying with a man whose human rights record is often questioned.

Within Aceh, adoption of the GAM flag has sparked protests from non-Acehnese ethnic groups in the central highlands and south west. The GAM heartland has always been along the east coast; to highlanders like the Gayo, the flag thus represents the domination of the coastal Acehnese at their expense. The issue has revived a dormant campaign for the division of Aceh into three by the creation of two new provinces, Aceh Leuser Antara (ALA) for the central highlands and Aceh Barat Selatan (ABAS) for the south west. If GAM does not back down on the flag, support for that campaign by the intelligence services is likely to rise, and with it, the probability of increased ethnic tensions.

The options for breaking the stalemate seem to be as follows: the government concedes; GAM concedes, making slight changes to the flag by adding or removing an element; GAM agrees to limits on how or where the flag can be displayed; or the dispute is taken to the Supreme Court, thereby delaying any resolution.

In the meantime, the power of the GAM machinery in Aceh continues to grow.

Jakarta /Brussels, 7 May 2013