Briefing / Asia 2 minutes

印度尼西亚:藐视中央政权

I. 概述

印度尼西亚在分权制度下成立的地方机构,正在违背国家最高法院的判决却不受到惩罚、破坏司法权威和纵容地方冲突恶化。区议会、市长和地方选举委员会已经意识到,忽视法院对于选举纠纷或者宗教纠纷的裁决并不会有什么损失,因此他们反倒会去迎合地方选区和压力集团。总统果断的领导力可能会使事态有所改变;相反,雅加达方面缓慢且无效的回应会助长更多的不服从行为。如果地方对于他们获得的新权力过分自信,并且中央政府继续作出薄弱回应的话,那么这种对法治缺乏承诺的行为可能会在2014年总统选举之前,国家政治紧张局势加剧的这段时期内导致更多的冲突事件。

地方官员藐视法庭的问题是印尼1998年之后实施民主化进程所采取的两个步骤的直接后果。一个步骤是1999年“大爆炸”式的分权,将政治和财政权力下放至省级以下部门:区(kabupaten)和市/直辖市(kota)。第二个步骤是2005年开始实行地方行政长官直选,包括区长(bupat))和市长(walikota)。这两个步骤对巩固印尼的民主都至关重要,但两个因素加在一起,就造就了权力非常强大的地方政权,他们既不对中央政府心存感激,也不总是不会觉得有必要去服从国家两个最高级别法院的裁定。

最高法院(Mahkamah Agung)是对大多数民事和刑事案件实行终审的法院,同时它也会受理对由国家行政法院(Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara)裁定的案件提出的上诉,对国家官员或国家机构的决定进行的投诉由国家行政法院来裁决。2008年成立的宪法法院(Mahkamah Konstitusi)已经成为对地方上有争议的选举结果的唯一仲裁者。最高法院和宪法法院的地位是平等的;两个法院的裁定都是具有约束力的最终决定。但是,应当如何执行这些裁定或者说对不执行裁定的行为如何进行有效的惩罚,却都没有一个明晰的政策。

有三件事例证明了这一点。在中加里曼丹省的西哥打瓦林勒区,2010年7月宪法法院依据贿买选票的指控取消了该县地方选举获胜者的资格,并裁定在竞选中落败的现任地方长官获选连任。这个裁定可能是有争议的,但为了维护司法权威,也应当予以执行。但是,当地的县议会却把裁定视为雅加达对当地选举的一种干涉,而拒绝接受。两年多之后,由于受到当地的抵制,被宪法法院裁定获选的区长仍无法上任。在西爪哇省的茂物市和勿加泗区,当地官员拒绝允许建造教堂,尽管最高法院裁定当地政府封锁有争议的建造地点的行为是毫无根据的。

在所有这三个事例中,当出现判决得不到执行而引发的紧张局势有演变成暴力行为——这种情况时有发生——的威胁时,中央政府所采取的最积极的行动也仅是派遣一名官员前去尝试在出现纷争的党派之间协商出一种折衷的办法。即便是如此,雅加达也仅仅会在这类地方冲突已经成为全国关注的焦点时才会采取行动。

但是如果两个法院有任何的权威的话,作为国家最高行政长官的总统需要采取比鼓励折衷行为更积极的举措。他手上有其它一些可以利用的工具:颁布总统令;扣留给地方政权的基金;直接进行个人游说以及有策略地利用媒体进行宣传。纵容地方官员藐视最高法院不仅仅会破坏解决地方争端的前景,还会传递出一种信息,那就是大多数人的权力可以凌驾于司法机构之上,这样会鼓励暴徒行为,让少数群体感到无法依靠国家来保护他们从而心存恐惧,最终会破坏印尼的民主。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2012年8月30日

I. Overview

Local institutions in Indonesia, empowered by decentralisation, are defying the country’s highest courts with impunity, undermining judicial authority and allowing local conflicts to fester. District councils, mayors and regional election commissions have learned that there is little cost to ignoring court rulings on electoral or religious disputes, pandering instead to local constituencies and pressure groups. Decisive leadership from the president could make a difference; instead, slow and ineffective responses from Jakarta brew more insubordination. If the regions become overconfident in their new powers and the central state continues to respond weakly, this lack of commitment to rule of law could encourage more conflict as the national political temperature rises ahead of the 2014 presidential election.

The problem of local officials defying the courts is a direct result of two steps taken by Indonesia in its post-1998 drive toward democratisation. One was its “big bang” decentralisation in 1999 that devolved political and fiscal power down to sub-provincial units: districts (kabupaten) and cities/municipalities (kota). The second was the introduction in 2005 of direct elections for local executives, including district heads (bupati) and mayors (walikota). Both were essential for the consolidation of Indonesian democracy, but the combination has made for a very powerful stratum of local authorities which feel neither beholden to the central government nor always compelled to comply with rulings from the nation’s top two courts.

The Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) is the court of final appeal for most civil and criminal cases; it also hears appeals on cases decided by the state administrative courts (Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara), which rule on complaints against decisions taken by state officials or institutions. The Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) since 2008 has become the sole arbiter of election results that are disputed at the local level. The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court are equals; decisions of both are final and binding. But a clear policy is missing on how those rulings should be enforced or an obvious penalty for failing to comply.

Three cases illustrate the point. In West Kotawaringin district, Central Kalimantan province, the Constitutional Court in July 2010 disqualified the winner of the district’s local election on vote-buying allegations and ruled that the defeated incumbent should get a second term. It may have been a questionable decision, but for the sake of reinforcing judicial authority, it should have been enforced. The local district council, however, saw the ruling as an intrusion by Jakarta in a local race and refused to accept it. More than two years later, the bupati who was awarded the victory by the court still cannot govern because of local resistance. In Bogor city and Bekasi district in West Java province, local officials have refused to allow the construction of churches despite court rulings that there were no grounds for sealing off the disputed building sites.

In all three cases, as tensions left unresolved by the rulings threatened to – and occasionally did – erupt into violence, the best the central government could do was to send an official to try and negotiate a compromise between contending parties and even then, Jakarta only reacted when the dispute made national headlines.

But if courts are to have any authority at all, the president, as chief executive, needs to do more than urge compromise. He has other tools at his disposal: issuing presidential decrees; withholding funds from local authorities; direct personal lobbying and making strategic use of the media. Allowing local officials to defy the courts is not just hurting the prospects of local conflict resolution. It sends the message that the power of the majority can take precedence over institutions of justice in a way that emboldens mobs, threatens minorities that feel they cannot depend on the state for protection, and ultimately undermines Indonesia’s democracy.

Jakarta/Brussels, 30 August 2012

Subscribe to Crisis Group’s Email Updates

Receive the best source of conflict analysis right in your inbox.