欧亚经济联盟:权力、政治和贸易
欧亚经济联盟:权力、政治和贸易
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
War & Peace: Deconstructing Islamic State’s Appeal in Central Asia
War & Peace: Deconstructing Islamic State’s Appeal in Central Asia
Kyrgyzstan's President Almazbek Atambayev (R), Russia's President Vladimir Putin (2nd R), Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev (C), Belarus' President Alexander Lukashenko (2nd L) and Armenian's President Serzh Sargsyan (L) stand for a photograph b
Kyrgyzstan's President Atambayev, Russia's President Putin, Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev, Belarus' President Lukashenko and Armenian's President Sargsyan stand for a photograph before a meeting of the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana, 29 May 2014. REUTERS/Mikhail Klimentyev/RIA Novosti/Kremlin
Report 240 / Europe & Central Asia

欧亚经济联盟:权力、政治和贸易

欧亚经济联盟EEU2015年创建以来,它所兑现的承诺屈指可数。在经济上取得的有限成功掩盖不了俄罗斯与邻国之间的众多紧张因素。欧亚经济联盟在未来的成功程度将取决于成员国有无诚意抛弃区域政治,致力于提高国际合作、国家治理、社会福利与管理人口流动。

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欧亚经济联盟(EEU)成立于2015年、由俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、白俄罗斯和亚美尼亚创建,并称其为首个成功的后苏联倡议,其旨在克服贸易壁垒,并促进结构分散、欠发展地区的整合。支持者认为欧亚经济联盟可以成为该地区与欧盟(EU)和其他国际合作伙伴对话的机制。而批评者则认为欧亚经济联盟会制造不稳定因素,其加强了俄罗斯在该地区的主导地位、限制了其他成员国与西方的关系。欧盟认为该项目抑制了其东部邻国对于主权的选择。自从阿美尼亚在2013年退出了与欧盟签订的——包括深入全面的自由贸易区在内——联合协议后,及在俄罗斯吞并克里米亚后,欧洲对于该组织便愈发持疑。

从理论上讲,欧亚经济联盟作为一个经济技术项目,旨在为成员国提供具体利益,尤其是增加跨境贸易并促进劳动力迁移;然而,由于它增加外部关税、引导经济偏离国际市场,这也给经济带来风险。目前为止,欧亚经济联盟虽尚未取得显著的经济成就;但进入俄罗斯劳动市场仍是加入联盟的一个重要动力,且总体而言,这对于苦苦挣扎的后苏联经济体是个正面成果。因受贸易争端、政权被制裁和区域经济危机的困扰,欧亚经济联盟的内部贸易在2015年下降了26%。但乐观者则认为,随着该组织内的外来务工人员的法律地位得到改善、海关和贸易规则的协调,联盟将产生长期的收益。

然而,围绕着欧亚经济联盟的主要政治紧张则源于其在地缘政治中扮演的角色。俄罗斯不仅把它看作是经济上的组合,且还想借此对其邻国进行系统化影响、并建立新国际秩序的板块。这加剧了俄罗斯与成员国之间的紧张关系,与欧盟和俄罗斯的邻国之间的其它整合措施产生了冲突,尤其是欧盟的联合协议,其中包括深入全面的自由贸易区(AA/DCFTA)。莫斯科认为这些欧盟举措是对其影响力的挑战。这些区域项目之间的冲突助长了2014年乌克兰的紧张局面和矛盾;此外,莫斯科还认为联合协议和深入全面的自由贸易区不利于俄罗斯经济,但欧盟官员却认为这种疑虑是出于政治目的,他们强调在向俄罗斯出口商品或与俄罗斯公司合作时,欧盟标准对欧盟公司而言甚至都不是负担。尽管两方互视为对手,但除俄罗斯外,其它欧亚经济联盟成员国则已力求与欧盟深化关系。

欧亚经济联盟范围内更紧密的经济整合应该会减少成员国——如,俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦——之间的冲突。跨境贸易和活动能减少中亚地区的紧张因素。然而,若俄罗斯利用欧亚经济联盟在政治上主导该地区、并将其作为抗衡西方的平台,那其他成员国则或会把该组织视为对其主权独立的威胁。由此,其它的竞争经济伙伴关系——无论是与欧盟还是中国——将具有更大的吸引力,这或会导致欧亚经济联盟成员国与莫斯科的关系紧张。

欧亚经济联盟角色和未来的不明朗,加之其与俄罗斯就克里米亚和乌克兰东部的对峙,欧盟因此难以对其制定连贯的政策。一些欧盟官员和成员国反对任何形式的对话,担心这样即是认可了俄罗斯对其邻国的政策,并切断欧盟和亚美尼亚、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦和白俄罗斯之间的双边关系。而这些双边关系在过去的一年半则都有了新势头。其他人则认为欧盟和欧亚经济联盟的接触或成为改进与俄罗斯关系的渠道,至少其能帮助构建桥梁,或至少能减轻东欧邻国和中亚国家的压力,它们中部分国家还就其身陷于莫斯科与布鲁塞尔的争执中而抱怨过。

目前,尤其是在——就乌克兰冲突达成的——明斯克协定实施的条件得以满足之前,这两个组织之间的政治接触并不现实。尽管莫斯科一再表示其有兴趣正式化关系,但很多欧盟国家则认为如此一步只是外强中干,表面上双方正常往来,但实际却少有收获。

若欧盟在充分意识到上述风险的前提下接触欧亚经济联盟,那双方官员之间的低级别技术谈话则可能会为未来战略提供信息、产生一些实质性的短期利益,这至少有助于为未来谈判建立实质内容。

但是,高层的参与只能会在俄罗斯政策——对乌克兰的政策和与其他地区国家的关系——发生明显转变后才会发生,但这在中短期难以实现。欧盟还需要考虑的是,承认欧亚经济联盟究竟是会提高还是削弱其小成员国与布鲁塞尔建立双边关系的能力。

莫斯科/阿斯塔纳/比什凯克/杜尚别/布鲁塞尔,2016年7月20日

Executive Summary

The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), created in 2015 by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz­stan, Belarus and Armenia, claims to be the first successful post-Soviet initiative to overcome trade barriers and promote integration in a fragmented, under-developed region. Supporters argue that it could be a mechanism for dialogue with the European Union (EU) and other international partners. Critics portray a destabilising project that increases Russia’s domination of the region and limits its other members’ relations with the West. The EU views the project as a challenge to sovereign choices in its Eastern neighbourhood. Positions hardened after Armenia’s 2013 departure from the Association Agreement with the EU, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade area, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

On paper, the EEU is an economic, technocratic project that offers some benefits to members, particularly in easing cross-border trade and facilitating labour migration, but also poses economic risks by raising external tariffs and potentially orienting economies away from global markets. So far it has had little economic success, though access to Russia’s labour market has been an important motivator and, on balance, a positive outcome for struggling post-Soviet economies. Beset by trade disputes, sanctions regimes and a regional economic crisis, trade inside the EEU fell by 26 per cent in 2015. But optimists argue that the legal status of labour migrants within the bloc has improved, and there will be long-term gains from harmonising customs and trade rules.

The main political tensions around the EEU, however, stem from its role in regional politics. Russia views it not only as an economic grouping, but also as a mechanism to institutionalise influence over its neighbours and as a building block in a new international order. This raises tensions with members and has led to a clash with other integration drivers in the EU’s and Russia’s shared neighbourhood, specifically the EU’s Association Agreements, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade area (AA/DCFTA). Moscow views these EU initiatives as encroachment into its sphere of influence. This clash between different regional projects contributed to the tensions and conflict in Ukraine in 2014, and while Moscow argued the AA/DCFTA was harmful for its economy, EU officials saw the concern as political, stressing that EU standards are not a burden even for EU companies when exporting to Russia or cooperating with Russian companies. Both sides view the other as a rival, but EEU member states other than Russia have sought to deepen their relationships with the EU where they can.

Closer economic integration within the EEU should make conflicts between members (for instance, between Russia and Kazakhstan) less likely. Easier cross-border trade and movement could reduce tensions in Central Asia. Yet, if Russia uses the EEU to dominate the region politically and as a platform for confrontation with the West, other members are likely to view the organisation as a threat to their independence. Rival economic partnerships – whether with the EU or China – would then look more attractive, potentially creating tensions in relations between EEU members and Moscow.

The EEU’s uncertain role and future and the standoff with Russia over Crimea and eastern Ukraine, make it difficult for the EU to develop a coherent policy toward it. Some Brussels officials and member states are opposed to any talks, fearing they would legitimise Russia’s policies toward its neighbours and cut across bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus – all of which have experienced new momentum in the past year and a half. Others argue that EU engagement with the EEU is a possible channel for a breakthrough in relations with Russia, or at least that it could help build bridges, or even take pressure off countries in the Eastern neighbourhood and Central Asia, some of whom have complained about being trapped between Moscow and Brussels.

Political engagement between the two blocs is hardly realistic at present, in particular until conditions such as implementation of the Minsk Agreement on the Ukraine conflict are met. While Moscow has repeatedly expressed an interest in formalising relations, many in the EU have concerns that such a step would produce a substantively empty process with an appearance of normal relations but minimal substantive gains.

If approached with full awareness of the above risks, low-level technical talks between EU and EEU officials could, however, help inform future strategies and offer some pragmatic short-term gains, at least in terms of defining substance for future discussions.

Higher-level engagement, however, should only follow serious shifts in Russian policy, both in Ukraine and in relation to other regional states, and this is highly unlikely in the short-to-medium term. The EU would also have to consider whether recognition of the EEU would enhance or undermine the ability of smaller EEU member states to define their bilateral relationship with Brussels.

Moscow/Astana/Bishkek/Dushanbe/Brussels, 20 July 2016

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