建立还是打破:伊拉克逊尼派和国家
建立还是打破:伊拉克逊尼派和国家
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  1. Executive Summary

建立还是打破:伊拉克逊尼派和国家

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伊拉克自转型进程开始以来就始终被一个问题所困扰,这就是逊尼派阿拉伯人参与伊拉克政治秩序的问题,同以往一样,这个问题敏感且极具争议性。在这个由什叶派和库尔德人占主导地位的体系当中,政治权力的是按种族派别来分配的,只获得少数权力的逊尼派因此迅速被边缘化,对于新的权力分配方式,大部分逊尼派成员起初是采取有意回避的态度,后来便开始进行反抗。他们从起义逐渐转向尝试性的政治参与,但这样的赌注却只换来了有名无实的代表性,并且让他们更强烈地感受到了不公平和歧视性的差别待遇。如今,逊尼派的失望情绪升至顶点,逊尼派和什叶派在该地区的两极分化达到前所未有的严重程度,自7月斋月开始以来致命的汽车爆炸事件在全国各地频繁上演,随着上述种种情况的出现,种族内战极有可能重新爆发。为了避免战火重燃,伊拉克政府应该同逊尼派官员就如何在当地实现停火进行协商,找到把逊尼派阿拉伯人更公平地纳入政治进程的方法,并同当地的参与者们进行合作,在伊拉克-叙利亚边境建立起一个有效的治安体系。

这场危机有着很深的根源。在7年的任期时间里,努里·马利基总理采取了“各个击破”的策略瓦解了所有可靠的逊尼派阿拉伯领导层。政府还采取了加强种族议程观念的举措。依据《司法和问责法》(Justice and Accountability Law),一些重要的官员(多数来自逊尼派)被罢免,理由是他们被控参与了前复兴社会党并担任要职。联邦安全部队在巴格达的逊尼派聚居地以及逊尼派聚居的省份(安巴尔、萨拉赫丁、尼尼微、基尔库克和迪亚拉)都部署了更大比例的兵力。最容易与逊尼派阿拉伯人扯上关系的政治运动组织是伊拉克全国运动党(Al-Iraqiya),即便是在马利基同时采取合法和法外手段来巩固其权力时,该组织也因为内部斗争而慢慢解体了。

事实证明,过去一年中发生的事件极具毁灭性。叙利亚事件点燃了逊尼派阿拉伯人在政治上卷土重来的希望,伊拉克全国运动党的一位著名成员拉法赫·阿尔-伊萨维(Rafea al-Issawi)的保镖遭到逮捕,作为回应,逊尼派阿拉伯人在2012年底发起了一项前所未有的和平抗议运动。这场运动同样也没有解决逊尼派的积怨情绪。相反,示威活动以及由此招致的镇压行动进一步加深了逊尼派人受排挤和受迫害的感觉。

最初政府作出的回应不仅缺乏活力而且很公式化,它成立了多个委员会,单方面处理示威者的诉求,避免直接谈判,并在逊尼派聚居区加强了安保措施。半心半意且姗姗来迟的妥协措施加深了逊尼派对政府的不信任感,纵容了更激进的派系斗争。在历经4个月的对峙之后,危机进一步升级。4月23日,政府军攻占了基尔库克省哈维贾市一个示威者的营地,造成50余人死亡,110人受伤。这个事件引发了5年以来最为严重的暴力事件浪潮。安全部队受到攻击,更糟糕的是平民也遭到袭击,人们开始担心伊拉克可能会回到全面内战的时代。基地组织在当地提出的“伊拉克伊斯兰国”的说法再次兴起。什叶派民兵已经针对逊尼派作出了回应。让逊尼派阿拉伯人参与巴格达的事务,这主要是个政治问题,表面上看,政府想通过更强硬的安保手段来解决这个问题,但极有可能进一步恶化当前的形势。

这场人民运动不仅受到轻视、被妖魔化,还越发受到中央政府的镇压,慢慢开始转变成武装斗争。就这方面而言,缺乏统一的逊尼派领导人已经被证明是一个严重的不利因素,而巴格达的政策造成了这个结果,并且马利基很有可能把这个结果当成是一种资本。在这样一个越来越有种族分裂迹象的关键时刻,这场人民运动的支持者们把目光转向了西方的叙利亚,把叙利亚当成是一个可以进行反对伊拉克政府及其什叶派同盟的舞台,而东方的伊朗则被视为所有不幸的根源所在。

来自政府军的压力日益增加,找到政治解决途径的希望越发渺茫,很多逊尼派阿拉伯人由此断定他们唯一现实的选择是暴力冲突,这场冲突越来越被打上忏悔式的标签。接下来,政府便顺水推舟地宣布所有反对派都是种族分裂的叛军,顺理成章地实施更为严厉的安保措施。如果不彻底转变处理的方式,伊拉克脆弱的政体将会面临瓦解的风险,成为易燃局势的受害者,而这种局势是其长久以来的缺陷加之日益恶化的地区紧张所造成的。

巴格达/布鲁塞尔,2013年8月14日

Executive Summary

The question of Sunni Arab participation in Iraq’s political order that has plagued the transition since its inception is as acute and explosive as ever. Quickly marginalised by an ethno-sectarian apportionment that confined them to minority status in a system dominated by Shiites and Kurds, most community members first shunned the new dispensation then fought it. Having gradually turned from insurgency to tentative political involvement, their wager produced only nominal representation, while reinforcing feelings of injustice and discrimination. Today, with frustration at a boil, unprecedented Sunni-Shiite polarisation in the region and deadly car bombings surging across the country since the start of Ramadan in July, a revived sectarian civil war is a serious risk. To avoid it, the government should negotiate local ceasefires with Sunni officials, find ways to more fairly integrate Sunni Arabs in the political process and cooperate with local actors to build an effective security regime along the Syrian border.

The origins of the crisis run deep. Throughout his seven-year tenure, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has implemented a divide-and-conquer strategy that has neutered any credible Sunni Arab leadership. The authorities also have taken steps that reinforce perceptions of a sectarian agenda. Prominent officials – predominantly Sunni – have been cast aside pursuant to the Justice and Accountability Law on the basis of alleged senior-level affiliation to the former Baath party. Federal security forces have disproportionately deployed in Baghdad’s Sunni neighbourhoods as well as Sunni-populated governorates (Anbar, Salah al-Din, Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala). Al-Iraqiya, the political movement to which Sunni Arabs most readily related, slowly came apart due to internal rivalries even as Maliki resorted to both legal and extrajudicial means to consolidate power.

This past year has proved particularly damaging. As events in Syria nurtured their hopes for a political comeback, Sunni Arabs launched an unprecedented, peaceful protest movement in late 2012 in response to the arrest of bodyguards of Rafea al-Issawi, a prominent Iraqiya member. It too failed to provide answers to accumulated grievances. Instead, the demonstrations and the repression to which they gave rise further exacerbated the sense of exclusion and persecution among Sunnis.

The government initially chose a lacklustre, technical response, forming committees to unilaterally address protesters’ demands, shunning direct negotiations and tightening security measures in Sunni-populated areas. Half-hearted, belated concessions exacerbated distrust and empowered more radical factions. After a four-month stalemate, the crisis escalated. On 23 April, government forces raided a protest camp in the city of Hawija, in Kirkuk province, killing over 50 and injuring 110. This sparked a wave of violence exceeding anything witnessed for five years. Attacks against security forces and, more ominously, civilians have revived fears of a return to all-out civil strife. The Islamic State of Iraq, al-Qaeda’s local expression, is resurgent. Shiite militias have responded against Sunnis. The government’s seeming intent to address a chiefly political issue – Sunni Arab representation in Baghdad – through tougher security measures has every chance of worsening the situation.

Belittled, demonised and increasingly subject to a central government crackdown, the popular movement is slowly mutating into an armed struggle. In this respect, the absence of a unified Sunni leadership – to which Baghdad’s policies contributed and which Maliki might have perceived as an asset – has turned out to be a serious liability. In a showdown that is acquiring increasing sectarian undertones, the movement’s proponents look westward to Syria as the arena in which the fight against the Iraqi government and its Shiite allies will play out and eastward toward Iran as the source of all their ills.

Under intensifying pressure from government forces and with dwindling faith in a political solution, many Sunni Arabs have concluded their only realistic option is a violent conflict increasingly framed in confessional terms. In turn, the government conveniently dismisses all opposition as a sectarian insurgency that warrants ever more stringent security measures. In the absence of a dramatic shift in approach, Iraq’s fragile polity risks breaking down, a victim of the combustible mix of its long­standing flaws and growing regional tensions.

Baghdad/Brussels, 14 August 2013

Members of Iraqi security forces are deployed in Sinjar, Iraq December 1, 2020. REUTERS/Khalid al-Mousily

Iraq: Stabilising the Contested District of Sinjar

Sinjar has yet to recover from the ravages of 2014, when ISIS subjected the population to unrelenting terror. Thousands remain displaced. To persuade them to return, the Iraqi federal and Kurdish regional governments will need help from the current residents in improving governance and security.

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