عرسال في مرمى النار مأزق بلدة حدودية لبنانية صغيرة
عرسال في مرمى النار مأزق بلدة حدودية لبنانية صغيرة
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
Time to Resolve the Lebanon-Israel Maritime Border Dispute
Time to Resolve the Lebanon-Israel Maritime Border Dispute
People gather amid damage and the remains of tents for Syrian refugees that were burnt in the fighting between Lebanese army soldiers and Islamist militants in the Sunni Muslim border town of Arsal, in eastern Bekaa, 9 August 2014. REUTERS/Ahmad Shalha
People gather amid damage and the remains of tents for Syrian refugees that were burnt in the fighting between Lebanese army soldiers and Islamist militants in the Sunni Muslim border town of Arsal, in eastern Bekaa, 9 August 2014. REUTERS/Ahmad Shalha

عرسال في مرمى النار مأزق بلدة حدودية لبنانية صغيرة

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لمحة عامة

الدولة اللبنانية، التي أضعفتها الخلافات داخل الطوائف وفي ما بينها، تخلّت تدريجياً عن دورها الرئيسي في الحكم وفي إدارة الحياة السياسية التمثيلية وهي تعتمد بشكل متزايد على الإجراءات الأمنية للمحافظة على الاستقرار والوضع السياسي الراهن. وتشكل بلدة عرسال الحدودية البعيدة في الشمال الشرقي مثالاً بارزاً على هذا النهج في معالجة الاضطرابات. يتّسم هذا النهج، الذي تصاعد بعد بداية الحرب السورية في الجوار، بالخطورة وقصر النظر، إذ إنه يعالج الأعراض بينما يعزز في الوقت نفسه ومن غير قصد العوامل الكامنة المسببة لعدم الاستقرار. لو عالجت الحكومة محنة عرسال بطريقة أكثر توازناً تأخذ تلك العوامل في الاعتبار من خلال إدماج المكوّن الأمني في استراتيجية سياسية شاملة، لكان في وسعها تحويل حلقة مفرغة شريرة إلى حالة إيجابية، ومنع تردّي الوضع في البلدة وتقديم نموذج لمعالجة تلك المشاكل في البلاد بأسرها.

تجمع عرسال العديد من المصاعب التي يعانيها لبنان، والمتمثلة في تراجع الوضع الاقتصادي وسوء الإدارة في مناطقه البعيدة، وصياغة خطوط التصدّع الطائفية لمصير جيب سنّي محاط بمحافظة ذات أغلبية شيعية (بعلبك – الهرمل) في البقاع، وقيادة سنّية ضعيفة تزداد ضعفاً، وتنامي قوة حزب الله، الحزب الشيعي اللبناني الذي يشارك ذراعه العسكري بشكل مباشر في القتال الدائر في سورية؛ بالإضافة إلى تداعيات الصراع السوري. لقد حوّل هذا العامل الأخير عرسال إلى قاعدة خلفية للمقاتلين المعادين للنظام، ونقطة عبور للعبوات المتفجرة. ولهذين السببين، تحولت البلدة إلى تهديد لحزب الله وللأجهزة الأمنية اللبنانية. كما أن ذلك جعل البلدة ملاذاً آمناً أوّلياً للاجئين السوريين، ما يضيف إلى الضغوط الحادة الواقعة على الدولة اللبنانية بشكل عام وعلى المناطق المحلية في سائر أنحاء لبنان.

أدت معركة دامت خمسة أيام بين الجهاديين السنّة والجيش اللبناني في آب/أغسطس 2014 إلى وضع عرسال على الخارطة بوصفها تهديداً وطنياً في أذهان العديد من اللبنانين. حاصر الجيش البلدة، ففرضت نقاط التفتيش التي أقامها صعوبات كبيرة على سفر العرساليين العاديين وعلى غير العرساليين الراغبين بزيارتها، وعلى وصول المساعدات إلى آلاف اللاجئين المتجمعين في المنطقة وحتى على وصول الفلاحين المحليين إلى أراضيهم. وفي حين انهار اقتصاد البلدة، ظلت المجموعات السنّية المسلحة موجودة، وتمتعت في ما يبدو بنوع من التسوية المؤقتة مع الجيش شريطة عدم القيام بتحركات ملفتة للنظر. في مثل هذا المأزق المتصاعد الذي يجمع الاضطرابات الاجتماعية والاستياء الشعبي، فإن المجموعات السورية المتطرفة، مثل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية (المعروف بداعش) وجبهة النصرة، هي المستفيدة الأكبر، إذ يمكنها تعبئة الغضب المحلي وتطويعه ليتلاءم مع رؤيتها.

لقد تراجعت حدة العنف في عرسال وما حولها نتيجة حصار الجيش لكن هذا العنف لم ينته. قد يكون الرد العسكري اللبناني مفهوماً؛ إذ إن الاستقرار الهش في البلاد لا يتيح مجالاً للتراخي أو لاتخاذ مخاطر سياسية، خصوصاً في البيئة الإقليمية الحالية التي تتسم بخطورة عالية. إن تعطل أجهزة الدولة يعطي للقوات المسلحة اللبنانية مطلق الصلاحية بحكم الأمر الواقع، لأنها تمثل إحدى المؤسسات النادرة التي لا تزال قادرة على العمل. علاوة على ذلك، فإن تدفق الأعداد الهائلة من اللاجئين، الذي بلغ أكثر من ربع سكان لبنان، فاقم المشاكل التي كانت موجودة من قبل ووضع ضغوطاً كبيرة على الموارد الشحيحة أصلاً، ما يجعل من الصعوبة البالغة حتى بالنسبة إلى حكومة فعالة أن تتمكن من تلبية الاحتياجات الاجتماعية والاقتصادية.

رغم ذلك، فإن الاعتماد الكبير للدولة على الأمن لحل جميع أشكال المعضلات السياسية والاجتماعية لا يشكل حلاً مستداماً. إذا كان لأي شيء أن يفسر بشكل أكثر تحديداً كيف خرج الوضع في عرسال عن نطاق السيطرة، فإن ذلك يتمثل في سجل طويل من إهمال السلطة المركزية؛ وإذا كان ثمة شيء يريده سكانها فعلاً، فهو درجة أكبر من وجود الأجهزة غير الأمنية للدولة، أي خدمات أساسية أفضل، وفرص اقتصادية، وتمثيل سياسي أفضل، وإيجاد حل لأزمة اللاجئين، أو على الأقل تخفيف حدّتها، وتوفير خدمات شرطية فعالة بدلاً من العقاب الجماعي.

بالاضافة إلى حالة عرسال، المثيرة للقلق بحد ذاتها، هناك القضية الأكبر المتمثلة بتخلّي الدولة تدريجياً عن واجباتها. نظراً إلى أن أداء الدولة في الإدارة والسياسة التمثيلية يزداد رداءة بشكل يومي، فإنها باتت تعتمد بشكل متزايد على التدابير الأمنية التي تخلو من أي مكوّن سياسي، أو إنساني أو تنموي جدي. لقد أثبتت هذه المقاربة أنها مغرية بشكل خطير، فهي تحافظ على استقرار ظاهري بينما تتسبب في المزيد من تهالك الدولة في حلقة تعزز وتديم نفسها، إذ إن الإجراءات التي تتخذها الحكومة للتعويض عن نواقصها تجعل الأمور أسوأ. على مدى سنوات، أصبح هذا السلوك نمطاً متكرراً في لبنان. وخارج حدود لبنان، تطوّر المنطق نفسه، كما في العراق، الذي ينبغي أن يكون التفكك التدريجي لدولته درساً تحذيرياً. بدلاً من قمع الأعراض عندما تتنامى ظواهر عدم الاستقرار، على السلطات اللبنانية أن تعالج الأسباب.

يمكن أن تشكل عرسال نقطة بداية جيدة. من أجل وقف المزيد من التردي، على السلطات الحد من الإجراءات الأمنية التي يتخذها الجيش في البلدة وحولها لكن بطريقة تحافظ على فعاليتها الأمنية. على سبيل المثال، لا شيء يمنعها من إلغاء التصريح المطلوب لزيارتها من قبل غير أهلها، أو منحه للجميع، باستثناء الحالات التي يوجد فيها دليل واضح على سوء النيات. كما ينبغي أن تخضع مزاعم انتهاكات حقوق الإنسان من قبل عناصر الأمن للتحقيق الفوري والصارم ومعاقبة الانتهاكات المثبتة. ثمة حاجة لإجراءات تمكّن المزارعين المحليين من زراعة أراضيهم. وعلى السلطات تيسير وصول المساعدات الإنسانية الكافية للاجئين السوريين وتخفيف الضغط على عرسال بنقل بعضهم إلى مناطق أخرى في لبنان، وهي فكرة ناقشتها الحكومة لكنها لم تعمل بموجبها. إذا نجحت هذه المقاربة الشاملة في عرسال، يمكن للحكومة والجهات المانحة من ثم أن تطبّق الدروس المستقاة منها على نقاط الاضطراب التي يزداد عددها في البلاد. في تلك الحالة، سيترتب على الدول المانحة زيادة دعمها للبنان بشكل كبير لمساعدته على معالجة أزمة اللاجئين وآثارها على المجتمعات االمضيفة. وسيترتب على الحكومة اللبنانية بدورها تخصيص الأموال الكافية لمناطق أخرى مثل عرسال تستضيف أعداداً كبيرة من اللاجئين، بهدف إقامة مشاريع اقتصادية ومشاريع بنية تحتية مستدامة وقابلة للحياة.

بيروت/بروكسل، 23 شباط/فبراير 2016

I. Overview

Weakened by deepening inter- and intra-communal rifts, the Lebanese state has gradually abandoned its primary role in governance and as manager of representative politics and relies increasingly on security measures to maintain stability and the political status quo. The remote border town of Arsal in the north east is emblematic of this security-centric method of tackling unrest. The approach, which escalated after the Syrian war began next door, is short-sighted and dangerous, as it fights symptoms while inadvertently reinforcing underlying factors that drive instability. If the government were to address Arsal’s plight in a more balanced manner that takes those factors into account by folding its security component into an overall political strategy, it could yet turn a vicious circle into a virtuous one, preventing the town’s downward spiral and providing a model for tackling such problems in the country overall.

Arsal combines many of Lebanon’s woes: economic erosion and poor governance at its fringes; sectarian fault lines shaping the fate of a Sunni enclave within a majority-Shiite governorate (Baalbek-Hermel) in the Beqaa Valley; the weakening of Sunni national leadership and growing assertiveness of Hizbollah, the Lebanese Shiite movement whose militia is actively fighting in Syria; and the spillover of the Syrian conflict. The latter has turned the town into a rear base for anti-regime fighters, a trans-shipment point for explosive devices, and – for both these reasons – a threat for Hizbollah and Lebanon’s security apparatus. It has also turned the town into an initial haven for waves of refugees, adding to severe pressures on both the Lebanese state and individual localities throughout Lebanon.

A five-day battle between Syrian jihadis and the Lebanese army in August 2014 put Arsal on the map as a national threat in the minds of many Lebanese. The army then cordoned off the town, its checkpoints making it extremely difficult for ordinary Arsalis to travel, outsiders to visit, aid to reach tens of thousands of refugees hunkered down in the area and even local peasants to access their lands. The economy collapsed, while Syrian armed groups stayed put, seemingly enjoying a modus vivendi with the army provided they kept a low profile. In this festering stalemate of social disruption and popular resentment, radical Syrian groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and Jabhat al-Nusra benefit the most, as they can mobilise local anger and harness it to their worldview.

Violence in and around Arsal has decreased as a result of the army’s cordon but not ended. Lebanon’s military response might be understandable. The country’s brittle stability does not leave room for much leniency or political risk taking, especially in today’s highly dangerous regional environment. The state’s dysfunction gives carte blanche to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by default, because it is one of the country’s rare functioning institutions. Moreover, the massive refugee influx, amounting to more than one quarter of Lebanon’s population, has aggravated pre-existing problems and strained already scarce resources, making it very difficult for even an effective government to cope with socio-economic needs.

Nevertheless, the state’s heavy reliance on security to solve all manner of political and social ills offers no durable solution. If anything can explain more specifically how the situation in Arsal spun out of control, it is a long track record of central authority neglect; and if there is anything its inhabitants truly want, it is a greater presence of the state’s non-security parts: improved basic services, economic opportunities, better political representation, a solution to, or at least mitigation of, the refugee crisis and effective policing instead of collective punishment.

Beyond the Arsal case, which is troubling in its own right, lies the bigger story of the state’s gradual abdication of its duties. As its performance on governance and representative politics grows more dismal by the day, it increasingly falls back on security measures devoid of any serious political, humanitarian or developmental component. This approach has proven dangerously seductive, by maintaining an appearance of stability while catalysing the state’s further decay in a self-reinforcing loop in which the measures the government takes to compensate for its shortcomings make matters worse. Over the years, such behaviour has become a pattern in Lebanon; beyond its borders, the same logic has been taken even further in Iraq, the progressive disintegration of whose state should be a cautionary lesson. Rather than suppressing the symptoms wherever instability metastasises, Lebanese authorities should be treating the causes.

Arsal would be a good place to start. To arrest the downward spiral, the authorities should reduce army security measures in and around it in ways that would still be security-effective. For instance, nothing prevents them from either abolishing the permit required for outsiders to visit, or granting it by default, except when there is clear evidence of ill-intent. Allegations of human rights abuse by security officers should be promptly and vigorously investigated and proven offences punished. Procedures are needed that would enable local farmers to cultivate their land. Authorities should facilitate adequate humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees and relieve Arsal by relocating some of them to other areas in Lebanon, an idea discussed by the government but not acted upon.

If this comprehensive approach can succeed in Arsal, perhaps the government and donors could then apply the lessons to the country’s other multiplying trouble spots. In that case, donor countries would have to significantly increase their support to Lebanon to help it address the refugee crisis and its impact on host communities. The Lebanese government would then need in turn to allocate adequate funds to other areas like Arsal that are hosting high numbers of refugees, with the aim to set up viable and sustainable economic and infrastructure projects.

Beirut/Brussels, 23 February 2016

Demonstrators carry a banner and flags during a protest against Israeli gas extraction that Lebanon says falls in disputed waters near the Lebanese-Israeli border, southern Lebanon, June 11, 2022. The banner reads " The Line 29 is a red line". REUTERS/Aziz Taher

Time to Resolve the Lebanon-Israel Maritime Border Dispute

Domestic politics in Israel and Lebanon could scuttle talks about their claims in the Mediterranean – and to the gas riches underneath. With the U.S. mediator’s help, the two countries should refocus on achieving an accord that serves their mutual interest and spares them a confrontation.

U.S.-mediated maritime border talks between Lebanon and Israel have entered a perilous new phase. The parties have been engaged for over a decade in indirect negotiations over the ownership of natural gas fields discovered, or presumed to exist, in disputed offshore territory. Israel is reportedly on schedule to start extracting gas from the area as early as September. These plans have prompted Hizbollah – the powerful Lebanese Shiite militia and party – to threaten attacks if Israel proceeds without first resolving the territorial dispute. While the two neighbours are reportedly closer than ever to an accord, political crises in both may delay the agreement or make reaching it impossible. Washington has invested significant political capital in fostering a compromise, and it should intensify its efforts to help the two negotiating teams clear the remaining hurdles. Israeli and Lebanese leaders, for their part, should keep their sights trained on concluding an agreement that carries clear mutual benefit, while avoiding a conflict with dangerous consequences for both countries.

Lebanon and Israel have conducted indirect negotiations over demarcating their maritime border since the two sides became aware more than a decade ago that lucrative gas deposits may lie off their shores. Originally in dispute were 860 sq km of waters between the southern boundary of the Lebanese claim (known as “line 23”), which it formally asserted under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the boundary Israel sought to draw to the north (known as “line 1”). In 2012, U.S. mediator Frederic Hof proposed a compromise that would have split up the area at a ratio of 55 per cent for Lebanon and 45 per cent for Israel. But – without offering clear reasons – the Lebanese government failed to approve the proposal and the negotiations lapsed. When indirect talks resumed in late 2020, the Lebanese delegation presented new legal and hydrographical studies to support an expanded claim (bounded by what is known as “line 29”) encompassing an additional 1,430 sq km south of line 23; it did not, however, formalise the expanded claim by amending its prior UNCLOS filing, which remains pegged to line 23.

Lebanon’s subsequent insistence on staking its claim based on line 29 has brought previously undisputed gas reserves into play, setting the stage for the recent escalation of tensions. Under Lebanon’s original line 23 claim, the Karish field – the one from which Israel is preparing to extract gas as soon as September – lay far to the south in Israeli waters. By contrast, the new Lebanese claim would put the northern half of Karish in Lebanese maritime territory, turning the field into a source of contention. Predictably, Israel has rejected the new Lebanese position, and the parties have struggled unsuccessfully to narrow the gap between them – engaging first through five rounds of indirect talks at the UN base in Naqoura, a small city in southern Lebanon, and then via shuttle diplomacy conducted by U.S. mediator Amos Hochstein. Meanwhile, on the Israeli side, preparations have continued for Karish’s development, which is expected to add around 1.41 trillion cubic feet of gas to Israel’s proven reserves. The expected quantity of gas available at Karish falls well below the estimated size of the Leviathan and Tamar fields, which Israel is already exploiting, suggesting that Karish is not integral to Israeli energy security at present.

In June, Israel signalled that it could begin extraction at Karish in a matter of months. On 5 June, the London-listed company Energean – which Israel has enlisted to develop Karish on its behalf – deployed a floating production, storage and offloading facility to the field. Israeli officials point out that the company began its work at a spot clearly south of line 29, and also note that Lebanon has never amended its UNCLOS filing to bring its claim to that line. Thus, Israel argues, Lebanon has not formally claimed the area where Energean is working.

Hizbollah ... has vowed to defend the country’s maritime claims.

These arguments have triggered a harsh response in Lebanon – particularly on the part of Hizbollah, which has vowed to defend the country’s maritime claims. In several speeches, the party’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, maintained that the Karish field is disputed. He threatened to attack the offshore gas infrastructure if Israel began extracting gas before the two countries agreed on a border. On 2 July, Hizbollah’s military wing, the Islamic Resistance, deployed unarmed reconnaissance drones toward Karish, which the Israeli air force intercepted. Two days later, Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati publicly denounced interference in the negotiations by non-state actors, saying it exposed Lebanon to “unnecessary risks”. Undeterred, Nasrallah spoke of military action if the dispute was not settled by September. On 31 July, Hizbollah released a video displaying its capacity to attack gas infrastructure. The same day, the group published footage of black-clad fighters patrolling unarmed near the Israeli-Lebanese border.

With Hizbollah putting its credibility on the line, and Israel doubtless reluctant to back down in the face of threats from a group that it characterises as a terrorist organisation, the risk of some form of escalation is significant. While Nasrallah expressed hope that the dispute can be resolved without a fight, Hizbollah’s brinkmanship – in marked contrast to the more cautious approach to Israel the group has taken in recent years – suggests that the organisation is prepared to take greater risks this time. Even a limited military confrontation could spin out of control, due either to miscalculation about the other side’s red lines or to operational error – such as a missile or drone attack aiming to inflict only material damage but causing casualties instead.

That said, there are grounds for hope that a confrontation can be averted. Despite the threat of conflict, or perhaps because of it, the two sides now appear closer to a deal than ever. During U.S. mediator Hochstein’s last visit to Beirut on 31 July, Lebanon reportedly proposed a compromise that moves its claim back from line 29 to line 23, on the condition that Israel cedes an additional 80 sq km south of line 23. This extra pocket of maritime territory would put the Qana prospect – a gas deposit of unproven potential to the north east of Karish – entirely within Lebanese waters. In practical terms, the suggested compromise treats Lebanon’s claim to line 29 as a bargaining gambit to secure its claim up to line 23, along with the entire Qana prospect.

Israel is reportedly ready to accommodate this proposal, which would entail giving up on the nearly 400 sq km north of line 23 it was supposed to receive under the 2012 Hof proposal, as well as Qana. It is possible that Israel may ask for a share of future proceeds from Qana should gas exploitation prove viable, or for territorial compensation north of line 23, which would mean an S-shaped rather than a straight demarcation line. While Israel’s official response to the Lebanese proposal remains unknown at this stage, a territorial swap would appear to be a more straightforward solution than a profit-sharing arrangement, given the antagonism between the two countries.

Israeli officials also told Crisis Group that they would welcome ... resolving disputes through negotiation, rather than violence.

Israel has good reason to make such substantial concessions. The energy crisis in Europe, triggered by the war in Ukraine, provides a window of opportunity to expand gas exports. But if that is the goal, securing stable access to the offshore reserves is imperative – and that will require an accommodation with Hizbollah and Beirut. While Israel may be confident that it can defeat Hizbollah in a military confrontation, private corporations are unlikely to undertake investments and expose staff and multi-million-dollar equipment if they risk being caught in the crossfire. Israeli officials also told Crisis Group that they would welcome the precedent a deal would set for the two countries resolving disputes through negotiation, rather than violence.

For Lebanon, wrapping up the negotiations swiftly would also be a win, not least because it would receive a far larger share of the disputed maritime area than appeared possible even a few months ago. A comprehensive solution to the demarcation issue would also clear the way for exploration in Lebanon’s promising southern waters. Until now, the international consortium commissioned to explore the area, led by French energy giant Total, has made clear that operations cannot proceed before the parties resolve their dispute. As for Hizbollah, despite its bellicose posture, it has never committed to defending any specific line, and has repeatedly stressed that the Lebanese government alone is responsible for reaching a settlement; that said, Hizbollah would likely take credit for helping Lebanon achieve a favourable outcome if a deal is struck.

Yet despite an accord being within reach and to clear mutual benefit, the process may still falter in the final stages because of dysfunctional domestic politics on both sides. Lebanon’s politicians have been unable to form a new government since the country’s elections on 15 May. Leaders are increasingly preoccupied with the debate over the succession of President Michel Aoun, whose term expires on 31 October, and the spectre of an open-ended constitutional crisis if no compromise on his replacement can be found. This matter has reduced Beirut’s bandwidth for the border negotiations, and indeed for major political decisions of any kind. There is also a risk of last-minute sabotage by leading Lebanese politicians, who have long competed with one another to claim personal credit for a successful outcome in the maritime talks. In Israel, the ruling coalition’s collapse has left a caretaker cabinet in charge that likewise finds it difficult to make big decisions. With elections approaching in November, hardliners may exploit any border compromise for political attacks.

It would be a missed opportunity for both sides, and a blow to regional stability, if an otherwise achievable agreement were to fall through for any of these reasons. After more than a decade and many false starts, the maritime border negotiations are tantalisingly close to a viable solution. As the parties move toward a deal, outside actors that have influence with key players in each system should urge them forward over the finish line. The U.S., whose shuttle diplomacy has contributed significantly to the process, should in particular redouble its efforts to get the deal done. It may need to hold more regular meetings with, and lean on, the two countries’ negotiators to get them to recognise the matter’s urgency. Washington should also encourage Lebanese interlocutors to dissuade Hizbollah from hardening its confrontational stance and Israel to hold off on gas extraction while the deal is hammered out – even as it works to maintain the talks’ momentum and keep them from being held hostage to political developments in either country.

Ultimately, it will fall to Israeli and Lebanese political leaders to make the deal happen. Their task may be difficult amid jockeying for electoral and partisan advantage. The prize, however, is well worth the trouble. The parties have the chance to make an agreement that is good for both countries, sets an important precedent for greater bilateral comity and averts the prospect of dangerous escalation. They should seize it.

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