How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue
How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue
Report 120 / Europe & Central Asia

Izbori Prekretnice Na Kosovu

Sedamnaestog novembra 2001, stanovnici Kosova okrenuli su novu stranicu sopstvene istorije time öto su uzeli učeöća u viöestranačkim izborima za institucije nove samouprave.

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REZIME

Sedamnaestog novembra 2001, stanovnici Kosova okrenuli su novu stranicu sopstvene istorije time öto su uzeli učeöća u viöestranačkim izborima za institucije nove samouprave. Opöta je ocena da su izbori odrûani u atmosferi koja je bila bolja od one na opötinskim izborima oktobra 2000. Iako je bilo viöe glasača, bilo je znatno manje nasilja.

Kao i proöle godine, Albanci su uglavnom glasali za tri stranke. Za razliku od proöle godine Srbi su uzeli učeöća u izborima. Da su se masovno odazvali, mogli su da dobiju viöe od 25 mesta od ukupno 120 poslaničkih mesta u Skupötini. Umesto toga, zbunjujuće poruke koje su upućivali njihovi lideri - neke od njih su vröile kampanju protiv učeöća - uticale su na smanjenje broja srpskih glasača.

Uspostavljanje novih institucija samouprave na Kosovu posle izbora za novu Skupötinu 17. novembra 2001. predstavlja značajni istorijski momenat u posleratnom razvoju pokrajine. Nove institucije imaće ograničenu vlast i uprkos odbacivanju odgovornosti za svakodnevno rukovođenje u mnogim delovima vlade, prvobitna vlast Specijalnog predstavnika Generalnog sekretara (SRSG) je nesmanjena.

Pored toga, politički značaj izabrane Skupötine leûi u tome da je ona legitimna za većinsko albansko stanovniötvo, bez obzira na formalna ograničenja koja se odnose na njenu nadleûnost. Uspostavljanje izabrane Skupötine i vlade Kosova doveöće do nepovratne transformacije političkog krajolika pokrajine i odnosa između administracije UN i lokalnih političkih lidera.

Osnovno je da je SRSG ovlaöćen da savlada bilo koji pokuöaj iskoračenja van nadleûnosti institucija, kao öto je predviđeno Ustavnim okvirom, dokumentom kojim se određuju ovlaöćenja novih tela. Posebno öto institucije nemaju nikakvih ovlaöćenja za bilo kakve poteze za odlučivanje pitanju krajnjeg statusa Kosova. To je u skladu sa rezolucijom Saveta bezbednosti UN (UNSCR) br. 1244, kojom je uspostavljen sadaönji privremeni sistem na Kosovu.

Na taj način bi bio uzaludan bilo kakav pokuöaj od strane stranaka kosovskih Albanaca da iskoriste Skupötinu da učine korak ka svom cilju za nezavisnost. Ipak, bez obzira na ograničenja, Skupötina obezbeđuje nov i značajan forum iz koga će lokalni lideri, pod okriljem legitimiteta demokratskog mandata, moći da osporavaju UNMIK na način koji joö uvek nije jasan.

U predizbornoj kampanji, ključno pitanje je bilo da li će Srbi uzeti učeöća. SRSG se angaûovao u besomučnim pregovorima sa liderima u Beogradu koji su na kraju urodili plodom tek dve nedelje pre izbora. Dok je sporazum koji je postignut omogućio da u Beogradu tvrde da su oni izvojevali ustupke, ali da UNMIK ne ugrozi odredbe rezolucije Saveta bezbednosti UN br. 1244 ili Ustavnog okvira, on je podbunio albanske lidere baö kao i ključno angaûovanje Beograda tokom ovog procesa.

Za izbore, u nekim delovima Kosova Srbi nisu izaöli u velikom broju. Zastraöivanje srpskih glasača, koje je pokvarilo izbore u regionima pod kontrolom Srba severno od Ibra, samo je istaklo potrebu da UNMIK, uz podröku KFOR-a, izađe na kraj sa organizovanim razbojniötvom koje, uz podröku iz Beograda, sprečava administraciju UN da primeni slovo zakona u ovom regionu.

Zvaničnici sa Zapada uticali su na političke lidere sa Kosova da za sada ostave po strani pitanje nezavisnosti i da se usredsrede na rad novih institucija, i da na taj način pokaûu da su sposobni da upravljaju pokrajinom. I zaista, preuzimanje odgovornosti za upravljanje predstavljaće izazov za kosovske lidere, koji su svoje iskustvo stekli u suprotstavljanju a ne u uspostavljanju vlasti.

Ali nije realno očekivati da će lideri kosovskih Albanaca ili glasači zaboraviti ono najvaûnije pitanje, do koga im je najviöe stalo. Ako Skupötina pokuöa da proöiri svoju ulogu izvan onoga öto je predviđeno Ustavnim okvirom, ili ako usvoji suprotstavljajući pristup, moûe se očekivati da će je SRSG drûati na kratkoj uzici. U svakom slučaju, malo je verovatno da će novoizabrani zvaničnici duûe trpeti sputavanje koje im nameće neizabrana međunarodna administracija. Ljutnja Albanaca zbog sporazuma UNMIK-a sa Beogradom kako bi se obezbedilo učeöće Srba, povrh nestrpljenja zbog sporog napredovanja ka nezavisnosti, moûe da bude prethodnica zategnutijih odnosa između UNMIK-a i albanskih stranaka posle izbora.

Priötina/Brisel, 21. novembar 2001

On 17 November 2001, people from Kosovo turned a page in their history by voting in multiparty elections for new self-government institutions. The conduct of the election was generally judged to have been a clear improvement on the municipal elections of October 2000.  Levels of violence were much lower, even though more voters took part.

Like last year, Albanians voted mainly for three parties. Unlike last year, Serbs took part in the election. If they had voted massively, they could have won more than 25 seats in the 120-seat Assembly.  Instead, the confusing messages sent by their leaders – some of them campaigning against participation – depressed the Serb vote. 

The establishment of new self-government institutions in Kosovo following the election for a new Assembly on 17 November 2001 will represent a significant landmark in the post-conflict development of the province. The powers of the new institutions will be limited, and, despite the devolution of responsibility for the day-to-day running of affairs in many areas of government, the ultimate powers of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) are undiminished. 

Nevertheless, the political significance of an elected Assembly lies in its legitimacy for the majority Albanian population, whatever the formal limitations on its authority.  The establishment of an elected Assembly and a Kosovo government will irrevocably transform the political landscape of the province and the relationship between the UN administration and local political leaders.

Crucially, the SRSG is empowered to strike down any attempt to step outside the institutions' competencies, as laid down in the Constitutional Framework document that defines the powers of the new bodies.  In particular, the institutions have no authority to make any moves towards deciding the issue of Kosovo's final status.  This is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which established Kosovo's present interim system. 

Thus any attempt by Kosovo Albanian parties to use the Assembly to move towards their goal of independence would appear futile.  Yet, whatever its limitations, the Assembly will provide a new and significant forum from which local leaders, with the legitimacy of a democratic mandate, will be able to challenge UNMIK in ways which are as yet unclear.

In the run-up to the election, a key issue was whether or not Serbs would participate.  The SRSG engaged in a round of frenetic negotiations with Belgrade leaders that eventually bore fruit just a fortnight before the vote.  While an agreement was reached which enabled Belgrade to claim that they had won concessions, but without UNMIK compromising the principles contained in UNSCR 1244 or the Constitutional Framework, Albanian leaders were incensed by the agreement and by the key involvement of Belgrade in the process. 

In the event, Serbs in some parts of Kosovo stayed away in large numbers.  The intimidation of would-be Serb voters that marred the election in the Serb-controlled region north of the Ibar river underlined the need for UNMIK, with the support of KFOR, to deal with the organised thuggery that, supported by Belgrade, keeps the UN administration from extending its writ to that area.

Western officials have urged Kosovo’s political leaders to put aside for now the issue of independence and concentrate on making the new institutions work, and thus prove themselves capable of governing the province.  Indeed, taking on the responsibilities of government will be a challenge for Kosovo leaders whose experience has lain in opposing the established authorities rather than constituting them. 

But it is unrealistic to expect Kosovo Albanian leaders or voters to shelve the one overriding issue that really matters to them.  If the Assembly attempts to expand its role beyond that which is envisaged in the Constitutional Framework, or adopts a confrontational approach, the SRSG can be expected to keep it on a short leash.  In any event, the newly elected officials will be unlikely to accept for long the straightjacket imposed by the unelected international administration. Albanian anger over UNMIK’s agreement with Belgrade to obtain support for Serb participation, added to impatience with the slow progress towards independence, may be a precursor to more strained relations between UNMIK and the Albanian parties after the election.

Pristina/Brussels, 21 November 2001

How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue

Online Event to discuss Crisis Group's report "Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue", in which we discussed what currently stands in the way of a new status quo and what it will take to relaunch the process with the Pristina elections in view.

Thirteen years after Kosovo broke away from Serbia, the two countries remain mired in mutual non-recognition, with deleterious effects on both. The parties need to move past technicalities to tackle the main issues at stake: Pristina’s independence and Belgrade’s influence over Kosovo’s Serbian minority.

In this conversation, we discussed what currently stands in the way of a new status quo and what it will take to relaunch the process with the Pristina elections in view.

How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue (Online Event, 28th January 2021)

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