苏丹:大刀阔斧的改革还是更多的战争
苏丹:大刀阔斧的改革还是更多的战争
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
A Critical Window to Bolster Sudan’s Next Government
A Critical Window to Bolster Sudan’s Next Government
Report 194 / Africa

苏丹:大刀阔斧的改革还是更多的战争

执行摘要

“苏丹问题”并没有因为南方分离出去而消失。权力和资源集中于政治中心从而导致的积年累月的冲突仍然困扰着苏丹。作为该问题的解决方案,一个更具包容性的政府得以建立。这个政府至少解决了一些边缘地区的不满情绪,但是对政府治理进行改革的承诺仍然没有得到兑现。一个主要的——尽管并不是唯一的——障碍是巴希尔总统,他将权力进一步地集中到了一个受其信任的官员的小圈子中,也不愿意从总统的职位上退下来。许多人希望通过政变来实现政权更迭,但是却没有考虑过其中的危险性。解决苏丹问题的目标应该是实现管理有序的政府转型,转型之后总统巴希尔领导的全国大会党(National Congress Party, NCP)可以继续参政但不占主导地位。如果巴希尔断定很有可能出现更混乱无序的局面甚至是政变的话,他可能会愿意进行这种转型,但前提是要有适当的激励因素。国际社会应该促成这些激励因素,但是首要的条件是建立一个可信的、具包容性的过渡政府,开展一个有意义的关于新宪法的全国性对话,以及制定一个对苏丹治理方式进行永久性改革的路线图。

喀土穆政权处于危机之中,面临着多重挑战,这些挑战合在一起严重威胁到喀土穆政权的存在和苏丹的稳定。经济正在急速下滑,任何与南苏丹的石油交易仅能减缓但无法阻止经济的衰落。全国大会党的成员对该党的领导人、党的政策以及普遍的腐败现象深感不满。执政党内部的长期敌对派系和“伊斯兰运动”(the Islamic movement)都在不择手段地提出一个能被大众接受的新政府,来替代全国大会党领导的政府。与此同时,政治反对派们变得愈加自信,政府与苏丹革命阵线(Sudan Revolutionary Front, SRF)的战争也在慢慢扩大,造成军队人员的大量伤亡,同时也在耗空国库。

许多人希望一场政变或者规模广泛的起义会迫使巴希尔和全国大会党交出权力,但这存在一个很大的风险:不管是政变还是起义都可能引发更多的暴力。巴希尔是在1989年的军事政变中上台的,所以他有意瓦解了安全力量,并频繁地让指挥官们轮换岗位,以使发动一场军事政变变得更加困难。除非指挥官们联合起来,否则军队很容易就会分裂成敌对的派别。另外也存在有一些其它的安全力量和忠于全国大会党不同领导人的武装民兵。给这种紧张的混乱局面火上浇油的是还存在有众多的武装部落,这些武装部落扎根于喀土穆以外的其他地区,寻求利用首都的动荡来造就一些事实——一些对于一个新政权而言很难逆转的事实。

巴希尔和全国大会党可能认识到现阶段的危险比起以前他们挺过去的那些社会和经济危难更棘手。他们的本能是与分裂的反对派达成协议(将一些权力和资源割让给一两个政党和/或一个主要的武装组织),并利用与南苏丹的部分和解来恢复石油供应。但是这些行动只会争取到一些时间而已,并不能解决造成长期冲突的根源或者阻止内战的蔓延。

国际社会应该从过去失败的协议倡议中汲取教训:苏丹需要一个真正意义上的全面和平协议,而不是一个局部的协议,这个局部协议仅仅为政府的分而治之策略所服务,且使得让人无法接受的这种现状延续下去。同时,任何的转型过程都需要全国大会党参与其中,将其置之事外会付出巨大代价。该党的政治精英过于强大,以致于不可忽视;反对党则过于分裂,且没有单独治理国家的经验。有全国大会党参与其中,执行一个全面的解决方案和一个包括民族和解在内的为全民所接受的、真正的政治改革,才是摆脱无尽冲突的困境的唯一出路。

总统及其同事必须要自己来得出以下结论,那就是比起之前他们为挺过危机所作出的调整而言,为应对当前危机所需要的政策调整会更加激进。但是,如果他们得出这种结论,那么国际社会可以通过提供激励因素,来帮助他们就该结论采取相应的和负责的行动。国际社会的激励因素应该精心地与以下条件联系起来:巴希尔和全国大会党要达到具体的、不可逆转的基准(例如危机组织早在2009年提出的基准),而且他们还需要被证实是在继续进行转型。这种合作可能对一些人来说难以接受,这些人认为巴希尔是暴行的罪魁祸首,但是,防止进一步的冲突以及在苏丹和南苏丹持续发生的人道主义危机是很有必要的。对于一个管理有序的转型,一个把全国大会党和反对派双方的领导人都纳入其中的转型——无论这些反对派领导人是文职还是武装领导人,一个可以把苏丹带上一条更具包容性的、可持续发展的道路的转型,巴沙尔都是至关重要的因素。不进行转型的另一种局面则会是维持现状,全国大会党将不考虑任何人道主义成本而拼命抱住权力不放,反对派则会寻求使用一种更可能出现国家分裂风险的军事战略。

大多数苏丹人知道,要结束数十年的冲突,哪些因素是必要的。即使在1956年独立之前,人们也很清楚权力和资源应该更公平地与被边缘化的地区进行分享。历史上,人们的注意力往往集中在南苏丹,但其它的地区也深受其害。在不同的时期,多数的外围地区都发生了武装叛乱,要求得到更大的代表性和更多的发展。这种动态不会发生改变,除非展开以下行动:对国家的治理方式进行根本性的结构改革,以及所有的政治势力——全国大会党、传统政党、苏丹革命阵线和青年团体——一同建立一个更具包容性和代表性的政府,这个政府要接受和尊重苏丹人民具有巨大的多样性的特点。

内罗毕⁄布鲁塞尔,2012年11月29日

Executive Summary

The “Sudan Problem” has not gone away with the South’s secession. Chronic conflict, driven by concentration of power and resources in the centre, continues to plague the country. The solution is a more inclusive government that addresses at least some of the peripheries’ grievances, but pledges to transform governance remain unfulfilled. A key hurdle – though not the only one – is President Bashir, who has further concentrated authority in a small circle of trusted officials and is unwilling to step aside. Many hope for regime change via coup but have not considered the dangers. The goal should be managed transition to a government that includes, but is not dominated by his National Congress Party (NCP). He might be willing to go along if he concludes greater disorder or even a coup is growing more likely, but only if the right incentives are in place. The international community should contribute to these provided a credible and inclusive transitional government, a meaningful national dialogue on a new constitution and a roadmap for permanent change in how Sudan is governed are first put firmly in train.

The regime in Khartoum is in crisis, faced with multiple challenges that, combined, profoundly threaten its existence and Sudan’s stability. The economy is in a freefall that any oil deal with South Sudan will only slow, not arrest. NCP members are deeply unhappy with the leadership, its policies and massive corruption. Feuding factions within the ruling party and the Islamic movement are jockeying to present an acceptable alternative to the NCP government. At the same time, political opposition forces are growing more assertive, and the war with the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) is slowly expanding, bleeding the military dry and draining the treasury.

Many hope a coup, or popular uprising, could force Bashir and the NCP regime out, but there is a great risk that either event could trigger more violence. Since he came to power in a military coup in 1989, he has deliberately fragmented the security services and frequently rotated commanders to make an army takeover more difficult. Unless commanders are united, the army could easily split into competing factions. There are also a host of other security services and armed militias loyal to different NCP leaders. Added to this combustible mix are numerous armed tribes outside of Khartoum that would seek to take advantage of turmoil in the capital to create facts on the ground difficult for a new regime to reverse.

Bashir and the NCP likely recognise that the dangers of the present phase are greater than the social and economic troubles they have survived in the past. Their instincts are to cut a deal with the fractured opposition (ceding some power and resources to one or two of the political parties and/or a major armed group) and take advantage of the partial settlement with South Sudan to get the oil flowing again. But that can only buy more time, not resolve the causes of chronic conflict or stop the spreading civil war.

The international community should learn the lessons of past failed settlement initiatives: Sudan needs a truly comprehensive peace agreement, not a partial settlement that serves the government’s divide-and-rule tactics and perpetuates the unacceptable status quo. At the same time, the NCP needs to be part of any transition. Leaving it out in the cold would be costly. Its elites are too powerful to ignore, and the opposition is too divided and inexperienced to rule alone. A comprehensive solution and genuine political reform including national reconciliation acceptable to all, with the NCP on board, is the only way out of the trap of endless conflict.

The president and his colleagues will have to reach their own conclusion that the present crisis requires more radical adjustments than those they used for survival previously. If they do, however, the international community, by providing incentives, can help them to act on that conclusion consequentially and responsibly. These should be carefully tied to Bashir and the NCP meeting specific, irreversible benchmarks, such as those Crisis Group set out as early as 2009, and verifiably continuing the transition process. Such cooperation might be unpalatable to many who hold Bashir responsible for atrocity crimes, but it would be necessary to prevent further conflict and continued humanitarian crises in Sudan as well as South Sudan. He is crucial to a managed transition that incorporates both the NCP and opposition leaders – civil and armed – and that could put Sudan on a more inclusive, sustainable path. The alternative would be continuation of the status quo, with the NCP desperately clinging to power at whatever humanitarian cost, and the opposition pursuing a military strategy that risks more national fragmentation.

Most Sudanese know what is necessary to end decades of conflict. Even before independence in 1956, it was clear that power and resources should be shared more equitably with marginalised regions. The historical focus was often on South Sudan, but other areas have suffered as well. At different times, most peripheral regions have risen in armed revolt to demand greater representation and more development. This dynamic will not change unless there is fundamental structural reform of how the country is governed, and all its political forces – the NCP, the traditional parties, the SRF and youth groups – work together to create a more inclusive and representative government that accepts and respects the tremendous diversity of the Sudanese peoples.

Nairobi/Brussels, 29 November 2012

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