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几内亚湾:新的危险区

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在过去的十年内,几内亚湾已成为世界上最危险的海域之一。海事不安全是一个重要的区域性问题,会影响这一战略经济区的发展,短期内会威胁海上贸易,长期来说将威胁沿海国家的稳定。这个问题最初让该地区各国政府措手不及,现在各国政府已经意识到了这个问题,联合国也正在就此组织一次首脑峰会。在东部非洲海岸,暴力跨国犯罪造成了海洋经济和沿海国家的不稳定。要避免类似问题,几内亚湾国家必须填补其领海的安全真空,并携手应对危险。几内亚湾国家必须敦促中部非洲国家经济共同体(中非经共体,ECCAS)和西非国家经济共同体(西非经共体,ECOWAS)进行动态合作,带头促进安全并采纳一种既提高安全又改善经济治理的新方式。

最近在几内亚湾发现的海上油气储量提升了该地区的地缘战略重要性。在长期忽视其领海事务之后,几内亚湾国家现在意识到了这一弱点。国际方面,除了西方国家对该地区重新产生兴趣外,新兴国家也产生了类似兴趣。在这种情况下,海上犯罪活动的加剧使得各国对该地区的集体关注度上升,而在过去几十年中,该地区有关主权和领土控制的问题仅限于在陆面上。

尼日利亚的尼日尔河三角洲地区是最初的海上犯罪中心。几十年来,尽管该地区出产石油,却反而很贫困。随着社会紧张和环境污染的加剧,石油收入在很大程度上仅仅只让中央政府、石油公司和地方精英获利。被排除在体制外的民众开始诉诸暴力进行反抗。为了获得哪怕是一小部分的石油财富,他们被迫绕过国家,组织非法活动,包括抽取原油,秘密提炼燃料并进行非法交易。石油产业的价值不断上升,使得这类非法活动频发,经济犯罪蔓延。

几内亚湾国家的海洋政策很薄弱且总体而言不完善,加之他们彼此之间缺乏合作,使得犯罪网络从事的犯罪活动更加多样化,并逐渐从尼日利亚沿海扩展到了公海。犯罪活动不仅影响着石油行业,而且形式也越来越多样化,包括了海盗活动以及越来越大胆的、精心策划的海上袭击。犯罪集团学习得很快,他们趁着该地区的社会政治形势充满问题,将犯罪踪迹扩大到喀麦隆、赤道几内亚、圣多美和普林西比、贝宁和多哥等国家的沿海。

几内亚湾国家和西方国家已经摆脱了最初的措手不及的状态,正在探索处理这个问题的最佳方式,以防止造成更大范围的不稳定。各国和区域性组织纷纷采取了特别行动,并制定策略来提高安全。那些受影响最严重的国家打算成立海军和增加沿海警务资源,希望以此来震慑犯罪分子。

在区域层面上,中非经共体在其和平与安全政策的框架内建立了一个区域海事安全中心,还组织了联合训练演习。然而,各国却发现要组织联合出资或者协调行动不是一件简单的事。海事政策才刚刚起步,还只具有象征性,各国也无法在海上保持持续的存在。就西非经共体而言,海事合作仍处于起步阶段,政治紧张局势和邻国对尼日利亚的不信任都对合作造成了阻碍。

在跨区域层面上,中非经共体和西非经共体之间的合作将允许地区巡逻队跨越海上边界实施追捕权。然而,区域间关于合作的讨论才刚刚启动,政治紧张局势对促进务实合作的努力又造成了障碍。与此同时,在该地区有经济利益的西方势力(美国,法国,英国)和新兴国家(巴西,中国,印度,南非)为协助区域行动而提供了财政支持和安全方面的专业知识。

区域合作的制度化和国际社会的倡议增多并不能掩盖一个事实,那就是几内亚湾犯罪活动增多主要是由于治理不善。该地区的大多数国家已经无法控制在其海域以及国际水域的经济活动,也无法保证其沿海的发展。这种集体性的失败为犯罪网络创造了一个重要机会,当地群众的需求和怨恨成为了滋养它们的温床。扭转这一趋势需要采取一系列紧急措施:要实施改革以提高经济和安全部门的治理,实行全面有效的海洋公共政策,以及进行实际的、不仅仅只是意向声明的地区合作。长期的应对措施是必要的,因为尽管海盗活动是最近才在该地区出现,但是其根源却非常深。

达喀尔/内罗毕⁄布鲁塞尔,2012年12月12日

Executive Summary

Within a decade, the Gulf of Guinea has become one of the most dangerous maritime areas in the world. Maritime insecurity is a major regional problem that is compromising the development of this strategic economic area and threatening maritime trade in the short term and the stability of coastal states in the long term. Initially taken by surprise, the region’s governments are now aware of the problem and the UN is organising a summit meeting on the issue. In order to avoid violent transnational crime destabilising the maritime economy and coastal states, as it has done on the East African coast, these states must fill the security vacuum in their territorial waters and provide a collective response to this danger. Gulf of Guinea countries must press for dynamic cooperation between the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), take the initiative in promoting security and adopt a new approach based on improving not only security but also economic governance.

The recent discovery of offshore hydrocarbon deposits has increased the geostrategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea. After long neglecting their maritime zones, Gulf of Guinea states are now aware of their weakness. On the international front, renewed Western interest in the region is accompanied by similar interest from emerging nations. In this context, the rise in maritime crime has increased collective concern in a region where, for decades, the problems of sovereignty and territorial control have only been posed on dry land.

The Niger delta region in Nigeria was the initial epicentre of maritime crime. For decades, oil production has paradoxically created poverty. As social tensions and environmental pollution increased, oil income has, in large part, only benefited central government, oil companies and local elites. Those excluded from the system turned to violent opposition. Forced to bypass the state to gain access to even a fraction of this wealth, they have organised illegal activities, including siphoning off crude oil, clandestine refining and illegal trade in fuel. The constant increase in the value of the industry has allowed these activities to prosper and economic crime to spread.

The weakness and general inadequacy of the maritime policies of Gulf of Guinea states and the lack of cooperation between them have allowed criminal networks to diversify their activities and gradually extend them away from the Nigerian coast and out on to the high seas. Crime does not affect only the oil industry; it has diversified to include piracy and increasingly audacious and well-planned sea-borne raids. Criminal groups have learned quickly and appeared along the coasts of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipé, Benin and Togo, taking advantage of troubled socio-political situations.

Having recovered from the initial surprise, Gulf of Guinea states and Western countries are exploring how best to deal with the problem before it causes wider instability. States and regional organisations have launched specific operations and are formulating strategies to improve security. Those states most affected aim to build navies and increase resources for coastal policing in the hope of deterring criminals.

At the regional level, within the framework of its peace and security polices, ECCAS has created a regional maritime security centre and organised joint training exercises. However, states do not find it straightforward to organise joint funding or coordinate their efforts. Maritime policies are embryonic and symbolic and states are unable to maintain a continuous presence at sea. In the case of ECOWAS, maritime cooperation is still in its infancy and is hampered by political tensions and distrust of neighbouring states toward Nigeria.

At the inter-regional level, cooperation between ECCAS and ECOWAS would allow regional patrols to exercise the right of pursuit beyond maritime borders. However, inter-regional discussions have only just begun and political tensions hamper efforts to promote practical cooperation. Meanwhile, Western powers (U.S., France, U.K.) and emerging nations (Brazil, China, India, South Africa) with economic interests in the region are providing financial support and security expertise to assist local initiatives. 

The institutionalisation of regional cooperation and the increase in the number of international initiatives must not obscure the fact that rising crime in the Gulf of Guinea is mainly due to poor governance. Most states in the region have been unable to control economic activities in their maritime zones and in international waters and ensure the development of their coasts. This collective failure has created a major opportunity for criminal networks that feed on the needs and resentments of local communities. A range of urgent measures is needed to reverse this trend: reforms to improve governance of the economy and security sector, comprehensive and effective maritime public policies and practical regional cooperation beyond declarations of intent. A long-term response is needed because, although piracy is a recent phenomenon in the region, its root causes are much deeper.

Dakar/Nairobi/Brussels, 12 December 2012

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