Has Timor-Leste left behind its violent past?
Has Timor-Leste left behind its violent past?
Briefing 116 / Asia

东帝汶:联合国撤离时机已到

概述

联合国应大幅度缩减东帝汶综合特派团(UNMIT)的治安队伍规模,因为自2006年危机以来,东帝汶的安全问题已得到改善,并且未来局势也趋向稳定。自2008年以来,东帝汶已表明有决心自行处理内部威胁,而不依赖联合国第三大治安特派团。当地警力比联合国警察更能响应本地需要。政府多年来都无视联合国关于在安全部门进行艰难改革或对已犯罪行进行裁决的建议。2007年选举产生的较为稳定的联盟政府似乎可以承受这一压力。影响东帝汶国家稳定的真正危险依然存在——政府未能对2006年事件进行法律裁决。但这些问题最好由本国政府来解决,而不是由国际警察继续干涉。当联合国将在2011年2月更新对东帝汶综合特派团的指令时,应该承认对安全部门de改革在漠不关心的政府面前是枉费心机的。

虽然联合国警察对于维护危机后的直接稳定功不可没,但是它未能就警察改革这一高难度政治任务做足准备。维和任务开展四年,联合国仍没有在如何支持东帝汶警察改革方面提出任何能达成共识的计划。东帝汶政府虽然能力有限,但已经开始自行着手解决该问题。2010年政府针对等级结构进行了全面彻底的改革,这的确是迈向警察专业化和独立性的切实步伐。政府完全漠视联合国对于惩治涉嫌2006年动乱的警察的建议,并已接管了联合审批程序,因此该过程将很可能无果而终。最近的违纪事件也强化了当地警方不愿或无力惩处队伍内部不法行为的形象。虽然从联合国维和部队向东帝汶警察部队逐区移交职责的过程正稳步推进,但要在2011年3月前完成全面移交仍有一些压力。

国际机构在危机后对东帝汶司法和安全部门改革所提出的一些主要建议已经被系统性地忽略了。联合国独立调查委员会的工作已经遭到破坏,因其所提出的主要起诉都已被搁置,而其他的起诉或是由于缺少证据而被弃之不理并最终得到总统赦免,或是在四年后的今天仍处在调查阶段。这致使司法遭到否认、法治受到腐蚀,国家政治暴力为所欲为。但危急的局势并不是增多国际警察就可以解决的。

联合国特派团未能很好地履行其协助更广范围安全部门改革的职责,其努力也一直遭到政府的断然拒绝。四年过去,联合国没有发表任何对于安全部门试图指导政策发展的评论,时至如今,联合国即使发表此类评论也已无关紧要。联合国所提出的关于划定警察和军队不同角色的目标已经被东帝汶领导人拒绝,因为东帝汶主张将两股力量紧密地联合起来以避免互相对抗,而安全部门中支持特派团的部门应当被关闭。

如果在谈论派遣“合适规模”的维和特派团时能考虑到它将于2012年撤离,人们就可以清楚地认识到如此大规模的特派团并不适合东帝汶目前的需求。如果特派团维持治安的任务能被完整移交,其使命将在2011年初中止,届时,警察分队的规模应该至少被缩减一半。但目前的计划只是有限缩减,这将会留下一个过份庞大的警察分队,掩盖了东帝汶警察在营运和物流方面一直存在的缺陷。在目前的情况下,联合国特派团全面撤离确实会造成很多问题,但是政府和警方应当与留驻的联合国警察合作解决这些问题。

除此之外,东帝汶政府正与联合国特派团就东帝汶综合特派团(UNMIT)的未来进行商讨,其当务之急应包括:

  • 与政府签订有约束力的协议,由驻留的联合国警察向东帝汶警察就核心职能——包括调查和惩戒机制——提供培训和支持。
  • 对任何有关联合国特派团在资产移交方面的可能条款做出澄清。
  • 支持对东帝汶警察的需求和能力做出东帝汶政府所要求的独立评估,评估将服务于未来国内和双边的训练计划。
  • 与澳大利亚/新西兰国际稳定部队商讨驻东帝汶的国际安全警力(国际维和部队和联合国警察)的撤离时间。
  • 商讨联合国在2012年选举中的职能、以及在东帝汶综合特派团完全撤离之后对东帝汶进行政治和人权方面的监督。

联合国将在建设东帝汶警察能力方面遗留许多未完成的工作,但2006暴力危机更主要的起因是由于政治争端,而不是国家安全服务存在技术弱点。东帝汶领导人对和平政治竞争的坚定承诺将是通过2012年选举来维持稳定的最好方式。

帝力/布鲁塞尔, 2010年12月15日

Overview

The policing contingent of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) should be sharply reduced in size to reflect improvements in security since the 2006 crisis and to support future stability. Since 2008 the Timorese have shown themselves determined to handle internal threats without the support of the UN’s third-largest policing mission. The local force has answered to its own command rather than UN police. The government has for years ignored UN advice on undertaking difficult reforms in the security sector or pursuing formal justice for crimes committed. A mostly stable coalition government elected in 2007 seems to be able to survive its own weaknesses. Real risks to the country’s stability do remain – many the result of the government’s failure to tackle impunity for the events of 2006. These will be best addressed by the country’s political leaders rather than a continued international police presence. When UNMIT’s mandate is renewed in February 2011, the UN should acknowledge the futility of its security sector reform efforts in the face of government disinterest.

While they made an important contribution to the immediate post-crisis stabilisation, UN police were never equipped to conduct the highly political task of police reform. More than four years into the mission, there is still no agreed plan for how to support reform of Timor-Leste’s police. The government has embarked on its own efforts with limited capacity. A comprehensive overhaul of the rank structure undertaken in 2010 was a real step towards the professionalisation and independence of the police. The government has shown little interest in UN recommendations to punish police linked to turmoil in 2006 and has taken over a joint vetting process that will likely end with very limited results. More recent disciplinary cases have reinforced the image of a force unwilling or unable to punish wrongdoing from within its own ranks. The district-by-district process of handing back responsibility from the UN to the Timorese police has nevertheless progressed steadily, with some pressure for a full handover by March 2011.

Key recommendations on justice and security sector reforms made by international bodies after the crisis have been systematically ignored. The work of the UN Independent Commission of Inquiry has been undermined as the most prominent prosecutions it proposed have been shelved; others have either been thrown out for lack of evidence, have ended in presidential pardons or are still under investigation four years later. The effect has been to deny justice and corrode the rule of law, leaving the country without a strong disincentive for political violence. This is dangerous, but more international police will not solve it.

The UN mission has poorly handled its mandate to assist in broader security sector reform and its efforts have been consistently rebuffed by the government. The review of the security sector intended to guide policy development remains unpublished four years later and at this stage its release would be irrelevant. The UN’s stated goal of delineating the roles of the police and the army has been rejected by Timorese leaders in favour of bringing the two forces closer together to avoid rivalry. The security sector support unit of the mission should be closed.

As talk of “right-sizing” the peacekeeping mission begins with an eye towards its withdrawal by December 2012, it is clear that such a large mission is currently not tailored to the country’s needs. As its executive policing role looks likely to end in early 2011 with the completion of the handover, the police contingent should be reduced by at least half. Current plans for only a limited reduction will leave an oversized police contingent that will mask the continued operational and logistical deficiencies in Timor-Leste’s police. The government and the Timorese police command should engage those UN police who do remain on how best to address these deficiencies between now and the mission’s full withdrawal.

In addition, immediate priorities for discussions underway between the government and the UN mission on the future of UNMIT should include:

  • A binding agreement with the government on a limited set of priorities for training and support to core functions of the Timorese police by those UN police that remain, including investigations and disciplinary mechanisms.
  • Clarification of the likely terms of any handover of assets of the UN mission.
  • Support for an independent assessment of the needs and capacity of Timor-Leste’s police, as requested by the government, which could serve as a tool for planning future domestic and bilateral training.
  • Discussion with the Australia/New Zealand International Stability Force regarding the timing of the departure of the international security presence in Timor-Leste (ISF and UNPOL).
  • Discussion of an ongoing political role for the UN in supporting the 2012 elections as well as in political and human rights monitoring after the full withdrawal of UNMIT.

The UN will leave behind much unfinished work in building the capacity of Timor-Leste’s police, but the violence of 2006 was caused more by a failure to address political issues than it was by technical weakness in the country’s security services. The best way to maintain stability through the 2012 elections would be a strong commitment to peaceful political competition by Timor-Leste’s leaders.

Dili/Brussels, 15 December 2010

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