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خطوات نحو تحقيق الاستقرار على حدود سورية الشمالية
خطوات نحو تحقيق الاستقرار على حدود سورية الشمالية
Investing Diplomatically in Syria's Idlib
Investing Diplomatically in Syria's Idlib
A YPG fighter walks near residents who had fled Tel Abyad, as they re-enter Syria from Turkey after the YPG took control of the area, at Tel Abyad town, Raqqa governorate, Syria, 23 June 2015. REUTERS/Rodi Said

خطوات نحو تحقيق الاستقرار على حدود سورية الشمالية

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لمحة عامة

على جانبي الحدود السورية التركية، ثمة استراتيجيات متصلبة تدفع نحو المزيد من التصعيد والاتساع في صراع خطير. تواجه تركيا في الوقت نفسه تمرداً مسلحاً عنيداً لحزب العمال الكردستاني وتقدماً في سورية تحققه مجموعات مرتبطة بحزب العمال الكردستاني مثل وحدات حماية الشعب. إذا استمر الحال على هذا المنوال، فإن النتائج المرجَّحة تشمل المزيد من سفك الدماء في جنوب شرق تركيا، وضربة كبيرة للاقتصاد التركي وتوسّع عدم الاستقرار العنيف إلى المناطق الهادئة حتى الآن في غرب تركيا وشمال شرق سورية. تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية، الحريص دائماً على اغتنام فرص الفوضى، لديه الحافز والقدرة اللذان يمكنانه من ترتيب ذلك. المثير للقلق على نحو خاص ليس فقط احتمال نشوء اضطرابات أكبر في منطقة تعاني أصلاً، بل المدى الذي تدفع به الحسابات الآنية لكل من الأطراف المعنية (أنقرة، وحزب العمال الكردستاني والجهات المرتبطة به وتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية) وعن طيب خاطر إلى تلك الهاوية. إن تجنب التداعيات الخطيرة التي سيحدثها ذلك يتطلب تعديلات فورية تقوم بها الولايات المتحدة، اللاعب الوحيد الذي يتمتع بنفوذ كبير لدى أنقرة، من جهة، ومعسكر حزب العمال الكردستاني/وحدات حماية الشعب، من جهة أخرى.

كي تزيد واشنطن من نفوذها لدى تلك الأطراف وتحفزها للإحجام عن التصعيد وتدفعها نحو طاولة المفاوضات، ينبغي عليها تغيير أولويتها من "إضعاف وتدمير" تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية واستبدالها بالهدف الأوسع المرتبط بذلك والمتمثل في منع المزيد من عدم الاستقرار (وفي الوقت نفسه الاستمرار بحربها ضد تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية)؛ وأن توضح بجلاء أن أفعال حزب العمال الكردستاني في تركيا ستؤثر في الكيفية التي ترى بها الولايات المتحدة علاقتها مع وحدات حماية الشعب الكردية في سورية؛ وأن تبعث بإشارة إلى أنقرة مفادها أن العودة إلى برنامج إصلاحي قائم على الحقوق وتمهيد الطريق نحو مباحثات جديدة مع حزب العمال الكردستاني ستمكّن الولايات المتحدة من تعزيز جهودها لمعالجة المخاوف الأمنية التركية ما وراء حدودها.

يبدو أن الأطراف الرئيسية في الحرب تتفق على شيء واحد وحسب يتمثل في أن تحقيق مصالحها يتم من خلال زيادة حدة القتال بدلاً من تخفيفها. وهذا ينطبق على جميع ساحات الصراع، كما يتضح من مقاربات أنقرة وحزب العمال الكردستاني في تركيا؛ وأنقرة ووحدات حماية الشعب الكردية في سورية، وتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في سورية وتركيا على حد سواء.

 اسطنبول/القامشلي/بروكسل، 8 نيسان/أبريل 2016

Investing Diplomatically in Syria's Idlib

The Sochi agreement between Russia and Turkey succeeded in averting a Syrian regime offensive in Idlib. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2018 annual early-warning update for European policy makers, Crisis Group urges the EU and its member states to continue to provide diplomatic support for Turkey and engage directly with Russia to prevent an attack that would likely have catastrophic humanitarian consequences.

This commentary is part of our Watch List 2018 – Third Update.

The 17 September Sochi agreement between Russia and Turkey forestalled the Syrian regime’s imminent attack on rebel-held Idlib governorate and surrounding areas in Syria’s north west. The agreement established a 20km buffer zone between rebels and the regime along Idlib’s borders, which was to be emptied of heavy weapons by 10 October. By late October, the agreement’s implementation appeared to be in progress: heavy arms were no longer visible, though it remained unclear if they had been removed. In any event, Russia expressed satisfaction with Turkey’s efforts to demilitarise the zone.

The agreement succeeded in averting – for now – a battle that the UN warned could trigger the worst humanitarian catastrophe of the 21st century. But while Idlib’s fate remains uncertain, European partners must work to support Turkish efforts to implement the deal’s conditions and sustain a political process while bolstering preparations for managing the humanitarian fallout in the event of an attack, the threat of which remains real.

The EU and its member states should consider the following steps:

  • Keep backing the agreement, both publicly and in direct contacts with Russia. Europeans should emphasise that an all-out assault on Idlib and a humanitarian disaster there would substantially impair their future cooperation with Russia on Syria, and thus prevent Russia from achieving its political objective – not just the regime’s survival but a settlement that leads to a degree of regime rehabilitation.
     
  • Engage prudently with Russia. The EU should be open to discussing avenues of cooperation with Moscow on Syria, both independently and in support of Turkish initiatives such as its 27 October quartet summit alongside France, Germany and Russia. At the same time it should resist Moscow’s efforts to accelerate the provision of European reconstruction assistance in the absence of any political progress.
     
  • Press Russia to continue to show flexibility with Turkey as it proceeds with implementing the commitment it made in Sochi in September. Europeans should continue to vocally support Turkey and, if necessary, condition future cooperation with Russia on such Russian flexibility.
     
  • Encourage Turkey to continue its own humanitarian preparations in the event of an attack on Idlib, including planning, building aid infrastructure, and pre-positioning assistance; and materially support Turkey in these efforts.
     
  • Urge Turkey to coordinate its humanitarian response with international allies. Europeans should ask Turkey to share more information, specifically about its security operations in Idlib that restrict humanitarian access. If the Syrian regime attacks Idlib, Turkey’s allies will be more effective partners if they have jointly planned and prepared.
     
  • Urge Turkey to allow humanitarian action in Turkish-controlled Aleppo independent of Turkish state and para-state bodies. Turkey may be uncomfortable with allowing autonomous relief actors into an area it is keen to keep under control, but otherwise Europeans and others cannot support its aid efforts.
Europeans should continue to vocally support Turkey as it implements Sochi’s provisions.

Sochi’s Origins and Stakes

Several factors enabled the Sochi agreement, notably Turkey’s strong indications it would resist an Idlib offensive – including its decision to send considerable addi-tional weapons to Syrian rebels in Idlib – and U.S. pressure. Arguably most im-portant was Ankara signalling to Moscow that an offensive would end Turkish-Russian cooperation on a political settlement. As one of the guarantors (together with Russia and Iran) of the Astana process, Turkey remains central to Russia’s ef-forts to find a political resolution to Syria’s war. Russia needs Turkish buy-in if it hopes to crown its military success with some international re-legitimisation of the Syrian regime and secure outside funds for the country’s reconstruction. 

Along with the U.S., EU member states provided important diplomatic backing to Turkey in support of an Idlib deal. Emphatic public European opposition to an assault and energetic, direct diplomacy with Russia by EU member states con-vinced Moscow that an all-out attack would seriously damage cooperation on Syria. Europeans should continue to vocally support Turkey as it implements Sochi’s pro-visions and, through direct channels with Russia, stress that a humanitarian disas-ter that displaces more refugees (and some militants) into Turkey and Europe di-rectly prejudices European interests. EU member states should make clear that an attack on Idlib would poison further cooperation and cripple Syria’s political pro-cess, on which major reconstruction funds depend. 

The Potential Humanitarian Catastrophe 

The priority for Europeans and others must be preventing an attack on Idlib, as the humanitarian impact would outstrip even the best-planned and well-resourced re-sponse. But the EU should also anticipate the worst case scenario, namely the So-chi deal’s collapse and an ensuing regime offensive. The EU needs to ensure it is prepared to the extent possible, helping humanitarian partners plan and pre-position supplies and funding the humanitarian response. 

Turkey has been undertaking emergency preparations, though it has not always publicised them for fear of undermining good faith efforts at de-escalation. Yet its limited communication prevents donors and their international NGO partners from effectively coordinating and planning their contribution to a relief effort. Turkey has also restricted independent access for international organisations to the parts of Aleppo governorate it controls. Humanitarian capacity is already stretched in these areas, which are the likeliest destination for Idlib’s residents if they have to flee.

Europeans must continue to appeal to Turkey to share information on their ef-forts in Idlib in order for other donors and humanitarians to appropriately plan. And the EU needs to push Turkey to allow independent humanitarian action inside Turkish-controlled Aleppo, where, if Idlib is attacked, Turkey will be unable to sin-glehandedly meet vulnerable Syrians’ urgent needs.