Crisis Group has worked in Türkiye for well over a decade, engaging the government and a range of other stakeholders in order to develop analysis of the country's domestic and regional concerns and to advocate for ways of ending, mitigating or preventing conflict. At home, these concerns include the threat of escalated fighting with Kurdistan Workers’ Party militants and the uncertainty presented by jihadists returning from foreign battlefields, as well as the political, economic and social strains of hosting over four million refugees. In its immediate neighbourhood and beyond, Ankara has become a crucial player whose alliances and geopolitical ambitions are shaping various conflicts and prospects for their resolution. As Türkiye finds its place in a changing world order, Crisis Group provides insights into how its policies, and those of its partners, may better contribute to peace and stability.
Low-cost and high-performing, Turkish-made armed drones are capturing an increasing share of the global market. This success comes with risks, including escalation of conflict and reputational damage, but there are several ways for Ankara to manage them.
Military targeted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Syria and Iraq, opposition won local elections for first time in two decades, and Turkish-Greek diplomacy continued despite evidence of tensions.
Ahead of potential summer offensive, limited operations against PKK continued. In northern Syria, Turkish defence ministry 14 April announced killing of three militants. In northern Iraq, clashes with PKK 9 April killed Turkish soldier; military 15 April launched airstrikes in mountains Asos and Hakurk areas of north. President Erdoğan late March reiterated plans for summer offensive against PKK in Iraq, stating determination to prevent “terror corridor” and permanently eradicate group. Erdoğan 22 April made first visit to Iraq in over decade, signing over 25 cooperation agreements with Baghdad (see Iraq).
Authorities targeted alleged Islamic State (ISIS) members. Security forces during April detained at least 410 individuals with alleged links to Islamic State (ISIS). Following deadly ISIS terror attack in Russian capital Moscow in March, perpetrated by Tajikistan nationals, govt 5 April revoked visa-free travel for Tajikistani nationals.
Opposition edged out ruling party in local elections. In first election defeat for ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) since rising to power in 2002, opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) won 31 March local elections with 37.7% of vote to AKP’s 35.5% on 78% voter turnout; CHP secured victories in seven out of eight largest and most economically significant cities, including Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.
Diplomacy with Greece inched ahead. Türkiye and Greece continued preparations for Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis’s visit to capital Ankara scheduled for 13 May. In step to boost confidence, Greece 1 April launched seven-day visa-free travel scheme for Turkish tourists visiting ten eastern Aegean islands. Underscoring lingering maritime tensions, Ankara 3 April condemned Greece’s declaration of two marine park zones in Ionian and Aegean Seas, claiming Athens sought to disguise its territorial claims with environmental concerns; Greece responded by accusing govt of politicising environmental issues. Defence Ministry 13 April released footage of Greek Coast Guard vessel releasing two migrants into waters of Aegean near Samos/Sisam island. Turkish and Greek delegations 22 April met to discuss progress on confidence-building measures.
Especially after the elections in Turkey, the EU is looking for new ways of having a more constructive and less acrimonious relationship with Turkey.
The success of Ankara's mediation [over Gaza] will depend on how much influence the political wing of Hamas has on the armed wing.
Ankara remains intent on further pushing back against the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] and its affiliates in the region.
If the UN fails to extend its operation [in Syria] via these [Turkish border] crossings, donor states should bypass the UN and do bilateral assistance themselves.
Less escalation in the conflict with the PKK may give authorities [in Türkiye] struggling with how to respond to this unprecedented crisis one less thing to worry about.
Attacks [from the PKK] this year show that they still have the capacity to carry out sensational attacks in Türkiye’s cities.
Relations between Ankara and Brussels have been warming despite democratic backsliding in Türkiye. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2023 – Autumn Update, Crisis Group explains how the EU and its member states can deepen this trend, cooperating with Türkiye in areas of mutual interest.
UN diplomacy aimed at reunifying Cyprus has been drifting since talks broke down in 2017. The Secretary-General should appoint an envoy to draft a roadmap with sufficient incentives to bring both Greek and Turkish Cypriots back to the table.
Since the Syrian uprising began in 2011, Ankara has been drawn ever deeper into the crisis. Its approach will likely hold steady for now. But the choices it makes next matter for the fate of millions of Syrians.
In this online event, Crisis Group’s experts and external speakers discussed the extent to which hydrocarbons have shaped conflict dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and the prospects for effective gas diplomacy, in particular.
This week on War & Peace, Olga Oliker speaks with Crisis Group’s Türkiye Director Nigar Göksel about the Turkish elections and how President Erdoğan’s new term might shape the country’s domestic and foreign policy.
Major gas finds in the eastern Mediterranean seabed over the last ten years have fuelled ambitions to link the region’s energy markets and, in turn, bring its countries in conflict to the negotiating table. These great expectations have proven outsized, but smaller-scale objectives are achievable.
Greek and Turkish Cypriots have moved farther apart since a failed summit in 2017, hampering cooperation in several important matters and increasing tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. Hopes for reunifying Cyprus are faint at present, but the parties can still work toward more modest goals.
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